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Abstract 
Rebellion under the Palm Trees: Memory, Agrarian Reform and Labor in the 
Aguán, Honduras 
by 
Andrés León 
Advisor: Marc Edelman 
On December 9, 2009, the Unified Peasant Movement of the Aguán (Movimiento Unificado 
Campesino del Aguán; MUCA) occupied over 20,000 hectares of oil palm covered lands in the 
Aguán region in the Honduran northern coast. This was the latest, and probably most dramatic, 
chapter in the region´s tumultuous recent history. This dissertation explores this history and the 
process of creation of the Aguán region from the perspective of a set of impoverished peasant 
families that migrated from different parts of Honduras towards the Aguán from the 1970s 
onwards, in search of a better present and future.  
It asks about the processes by which the region went from supposed “empty” space in the 
1960s, to centerpiece of the Honduran agrarian reform in the 1970s and 1980s and the principal 
location of the country’s palm oil industry in the 2000s and site of one of the most intense 
agrarian conflicts in Latin America at the same time. I argue that by analyzing at the particular 
history of the palm oil industry in the region, we are able to look at the ways in which agrarian 
structure and political power come together.  
Four are the main threads that hold together this argument: 1. The perspective of passive 
revolution to approach the process of state formation in postcolonial Central America; 2. The 
tension between labor capture and flight as a way of approaching the topic of agrarian reform, in 
the midst of different processes of dispossession and struggle; 3. The consolidation on the 
ground of the global palm oil assemblage and the move to the center of the region´s life of oil 
palm monoculture and; 4. The process of creation of historical narratives in the Aguán, as the 
tension between individual and collective memories. 
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For each one of these threads, I combine my own ethnographic observations based on 
eleven months of fieldwork, with different secondary sources and the broader set of theoretical 
and scholarly work that deals with the topics of primitive accumulation and dispossession, state 
formation, political ecology and oral history. 
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Introduction: the coup from above, the coup from below and the agrarian conflict 
in the Bajo Aguán  
The parliamentary regime lives by discussion, how shall it forbid discussion? Every 
interest, every social institution, is here transformed into general ideas, debated as ideas; 
how shall any interest, any institution, sustain itself above thought and impose itself as 
an article of faith? The struggle of the orators on the platform evokes the struggle of the 
scribblers of the press; the debating club in parliament is necessarily supplemented by 
debating clubs in the salons and the bistros; the representatives, who constantly appeal 
to public opinion, give public opinion the right to speak its real mind in petitions. The 
parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of majorities; how shall the great 
majorities outside parliament not want to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of 
the state, what else is to be expected but that those down below dance? 
Karl Marx (2008:66), The18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon 
The coup from above 
On June 28, 2009, between five and six a.m., Lieutenant Colonel René Antonio Hepburn Bueso, 
accompanied by a special detachment of the Honduran Army, proceeded to make effective the 
search warrant on the house of the President of the Republic, Manuel Zelaya. Once at the 
property, they encountered a group of “armed personnel in uniform,” that were identified as 
members of the president´s security team, who did not allow him to carry out the warrant and 
dismissed the validity of the order and thus had to be disarmed and subdued by the soldiers. 
With “the opposition defeated,” they entered the house and proceeded to capture Zelaya. 
Soon the news would spread all over the world: “In the first military coup in Central 
America since the end of the cold war, soldiers stormed the presidential palace in the capital, 
Tegucigalpa, early in the morning, disarming the presidential guard, waking Mr. Zelaya and 
putting him on a plane to Costa Rica” (Malkin 2009). 
This situation created mixed reactions both internationally and domestically. 
Internationally, the coup was received with outrage and condemned by everyone, ranging from 
President Obama – who called it a “terrible precedent” (Cooper and Lacey 2009) – to Hugo 
Chávez, who decried that “[b]ehind these soldiers are the Honduran bourgeoisie, the rich who 
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converted Honduras into a Banana Republic, into a political and military base for North 
American imperialism” (Kozloff 2009). 
Domestically, the coup defied such unified positions and rather came to split the country 
into three neat groups: those against the coup – the Resistance,1 as they would eventually come 
to be known –; those in favor2 of the “good coup” or “constitutional succession,” as it was 
euphemistically called (see for example Di Iorio 2010; Martínez 2010); and finally, those that 
did not have a clear position in relation to the crisis, but were stuck in the middle nevertheless. 
The only consensus was that what happened on June 28 was the result of a set of historical 
tensions and conflicts; and that these conflicts had become magnified in its aftermath. 
An in-depth study of the coup is still waiting to be written, and this is not the space for 
one. However, it is important to point out how little the “agrarian question” featured in the 
discussions and analysis of the coup. In a country where little less than half the population, 
around 80 percent of the poor and more than half of the economically active population lives in 
rural areas, this is nothing less than perplexing. In general terms, both national (for example 
Mejía and Fernández 2010; Salomón 2009) and foreign (for example Ruhl 2010; Meyer 2010) 
analysts of the coup heavily emphasize the institutional aspects: how the democratic institutions 
were too weak, the state too corrupt and the elites too reactionary; how Zelaya’s populism had 
broken the delicate political balance in the country, exacerbated class and social hostilities and 
thus led to the crisis; how either U.S. imperialism or the expansion of Venezuelan communism 
were at the root of this situation. 
                                                        
1 These included the Executive Power, a minority party (Democratic Unification; UD), popular 
organizations, most unions and peasant organizations, a few Catholic pastors and Dioceses and some local 
media, particularly the not so small sector of community radios. 
2 Mainly : the National Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Court, the domestic large capital, the 
leadership of the traditional parties (National Party [PN] and Liberal Party [PL]), the mainstream media 
and broad sectors of the middle class. 
3 
 
Probably the best two examples of this lack of analysis of the relation between the coup 
and the agrarian question are the reports presented by the state sanctioned Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee (C.V.R. 2011); and by the more left-oriented Truth Committee (C.V. 
2012). Only in the second — and offhandedly — is the topic of struggles over land mentioned. 
Also, little to no mention is made of the peasant movement in either study. Further, the Aguán 
region in the country’s north coast – the focus of this study and by far the most conflictive 
regions in the country in the months leading to the coup – is only mentioned indirectly a couple 
of times: first, in relation to the assassination of a person elsewhere whose sibling was part of 
the peasant movement in the Aguán; and second, in relation to the closing down of a local TV 
station by the military. 
This is nothing new. It would seem that with the declaration of the 1984 Constitution –
which officially began the “transition towards democracy”– discussion of the Honduran agrarian 
question was abandoned in favor of topics such as the plight of the different indigenous groups 
that inhabit the country (for example, Tucker 2008; Graham 2009; Brondo 2013), the violence 
of the urban gangs (for example, Pine 2008; Arana 2005; Ribando 2007), or the supposed 
“failure” of the state.3  This of course contrasts with the previous period – particularly between 
the 1970s and 1980s – when the Honduran peasantry was central to  vibrant debates about 
agrarian reform and its relation to the third world country’s development (see for example, 
Boyer 1982; Kay 1998; Edelman 1998).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, with the consolidation of the so called neoliberal wave, 
discussion about agrarian reforms and peasant movements was as outdated as reading Lenin, 
Marx or Chayanov. However, as often happens, the rhythms and fashions of academia are not 
the same as those of the rest of society. While scholars “forgot” to question the relation between 
                                                        
3 I have cited here only works by U.S.-based scholars. The situation of national academia is not 
significantly different.  
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political power and agrarian structure (Moore 1966), the Honduran peasantry remembered well 
that their history was necessarily one of tension with the state.   
The coup from below 
On December 9, 2009, less than six months after the ousting of Zelaya, around 600 peasant 
families organized in the Unified Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MUCA), occupied 26 palm 
oil plantations in the region. Covering a total of around 20,000 hectares, the 28 peasant 
cooperatives that comprised the movement claimed that those lands had been forcefully and 
illegally taken away from them in the 1990s by the terratenientes [large land owners] Miguel 
Facussé, René Morales and Reinaldo Canales during what came to be known as the “agrarian 
counter reform.”4 
Marielos, a 40-ish mother of five, whose features hint at her mixed Salvadoran and 
Lenca family background, remembers that day well. In an autobiographical note she writes: “I 
remember well!!! That Wednesday 9 of December, 2009. We left our aldeas [villages] and 
moved towards the lands currently occupied by the three landowning monsters [Facussé, 
Morales and Canales]. We arrived at the location at 11:00 p.m., evading all the private guard 
posts.”  
Early in the morning of December 10, they took the guards by surprise and disarmed 
them, taking control of the 26 estates in different parts of the region. Due to the poverty of the 
families involved, for the first three days of the occupation they did not eat, as they had been 
unable to bring any food with them. They were constantly surrounded and harassed by the 
military and the police and sometimes a group would be evicted from one of the estates, only to 
re-enter the lands once the security forces had left. Eventually, in February 2010, the peasant 
                                                        
4 I will deal in some depth on this topic at the end of Chapter 1 – with a quick overview of the Honduran 
reform – and in chapter 3, when I analyze the agrarian counter-reform.  At the moment, it suffices to say 
that between 1992 and 1994, more than half of the land distributed during the agrarian reform (1972-
1992) was sold to private investors (COCOCH 2010). 
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families would leave the estates, after the newly elected and highly disputed government of 
Porfirio Lobo began to negotiate a deal between MUCA and the landowners. I will expand on the 
history of MUCA in chapter 5. 
In contrast to the academic analysts mentioned in the previous section, for peasant 
activists such as Marielos, there was a crystal clear connection between the coup and the 
agrarian history of the country. She writes further in her notes: 
The coup d´état, if I’m not mistaken, was ordered by the terrateniente Miguel 
Facussé,5 after the peasant organization MUCA had made a massive occupation 
and road block in front of his Exportadora del Atlántico [palm oil] extracting 
mill. This occupation began on June 6, 2009 at 1:00 a.m.… [and] took place after 
we researched how it was that he came into legal possession of agrarian reform 
lands… We discovered that he had acquired some of his lands illegally and that he 
has acquired the lands through trickery from former cooperative members who 
used to own the land … We remained resisting in the occupation of the extracting 
mill for another 10 days. On the Tuesday 16 of June, Mel Zelaya came to Tocoa 
and met with the peasants of MUCA; and in that meeting, Manuel Zelaya Rosales 
promised that the agrarian reform lands in the Bajo Aguán would be returned to 
the peasants. This was the vile sin that Mel committed; wanting to help the 
impoverished people of his country [and why he was toppled in the coup]. 
During my stay in the Aguán I often heard similar interpretations of the coup. These 
accounts combined what had happened on June 28 with other elements of regional and national 
history, including the passing of the Agrarian Modernization Law in 1992 – which opened the 
legal floodgates that led to the counter reform – and the creation of the Bajo Aguán Colonization 
project (BAP) that began in the early 1970s. This presence of the past in people’s understanding 
of the present revealed a deeper vein that came to connect the current conflicts with a much 
broader political processes that included the dynamics of agrarian conflict. Also, the fact that the 
state, or more specifically the government, had such a salient presence in these narratives spoke 
of the close, but not necessarily evident relation that people felt linked agrarian structure (or 
conflict) and political power to the production of their current reality. 
 
                                                        
5 I will expand on Facussé ´s ignominy in chapter 3. 
6 
 
Outlining this project: enter the Bajo Aguán  
 
 
Figure 1: Research location 
 
This work is a case study of the Bajo Aguán (or Lower Aguán) region in the Honduran north 
coast. The Bajo Aguán, the lower section of the Aguán River basin, is a valley of fertile alluvial 
lands that extends for over 200,000 hectares (Jones 1985:140).6 Traditionally seen as an 
“empty” space, it would not be until the 1920s and 30s that the Honduran government paid any 
attention to the region, as extensive sections of land were given to the Truxillo Railroad 
                                                        
6 When the full watershed is taken into account, its dimensions extend to over a million hectares (Jones 
1985). 
7 
 
Company – a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) – for the creation of banana 
plantations. By the late 1940s, as a result of  the spread of Panama disease, a banana blight, the 
company had completely pulled out of the region (Soluri 2009), leaving behind scattered 
settlements of former railroad and plantation workers, as well as Salvadoran immigrants and 
Garifuna communities (Casolo 2009). During  the  1960s-70s  the  region  became  the home of 
the Bajo Aguán Project (BAP); a colonization scheme and the central  piece of  the  Honduran 
agrarian reform (Posas 1981), which included the creation of over 150 peasant cooperatives that 
became the nucleus of the strongest peasant movement in Central America (Kay 1998; Edelman 
1998). Later, in the 1990s, the Bajo Aguán became the country’s “capital of the agrarian counter 
reform” (Macías 2001), as more than 70 percent of the land distributed within the BAP was sold 
to a handful of large landowners (including Facussé, Canales and Morales). Later, it became the 
home of a set of massive land occupations in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 (Kerssen 
2013; Falla 2000); and has turned in the last few years into the site of an escalating agrarian 
conflicts pitting peasant communities against state and private security forces (Boyer 2010; 
Kerssen 2013; Ríos 2014). 
My aim is to interrogate the intersection between agrarian conflict and political power in 
Honduras, through an in-depth ethnographic and historical account of the Aguán. To do so, I 
explore how the state “…comes into being as a structuration within political practice…” (Abrams 
1988:82) and how the traces left by these processes in the memories of the people of the Aguán, 
inform their understanding of the region today. I use three distinct but interconnected entry 
points into the subject. First, I briefly sketch the country’s political history, paying close 
attention to the “problematic of hegemony” (Crehan 1997). Second, I focus on the introduction 
and consolidation of the palm oil industry in the Aguán region, with the aim of shedding light on 
the concrete forms in which these intersections between political power and agrarian conflict 
took place and articulated on the ground and which, following Michael Watts (2012), I call the 
palm oil assemblage. Finally, I examine the different ways in which memories are transmitted, 
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circulate and gain traction within the region, to try and understand how the past inhabits the 
present and informs or gives particular understandings of the actions and realities – the ways of 
being in the world – of the peasant organizations and communities in the region. 
In what is left of this introduction, I will briefly discuss each of these nodes or entry 
points (the hegemony problematic; the palm oil assemblage; and memory) to frame the general 
approach and questions that guide this project, as well as outlining the contents of the different 
chapters. 
The hegemonic problematic: labor capture and passive revolution 
In any society different groups and individuals must be located among and relate to each other 
in particular ways. These locations are both material – in the sense of actual metabolic relations 
with their environment – as well as subjective – in the sense of the forms in which reality is 
understood and interpreted. In societies were capitalism is dominant, these relations are mainly 
organized around the production of commodities for the market. For this to happen, labor 
power must be accumulated and deployed in particular forms. However, labor is not simply 
lying around for the would-be capitalist to simply take it; it must be manufactured. For this to 
happen, would-be workers must be stripped of at least some proportion of their ability to engage 
in self-provisioning and thus, be forced to work for others. Nonetheless, this is not enough, as 
the “freed” individuals, must also be willing and able to work for others; they must be made into 
workers. These two elements combined is what we usually understand as primitive 
accumulation (Marx 1993; Federici 2004; De Angelis 2004). However, provisions must also be 
made to “bridle” or anchor this labor (Moulier-Boutang 2006) – both socially and 
geographically –, in the sense of making sure that it stays put and available to work and avoid its 
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flight.  These two elements combined – primitive accumulation and labor bridling – are what I 
understand as labor capture.7 
The particular forms and mechanisms by which labor is captured in different places are 
highly contingent. They depend on the particular history and geography of the setting, including 
the forms of organization and political practice and domination already in place, the relations of 
production, gender and kinship dynamics and ideologies (Stoler 1995; Gidwani 2008a; Burawoy 
1979; Mintz 1985), among others. Further, labor capture is never done, it must constantly be 
reenacted: potential labor might decide to flee and move outside the purview of state and capital 
(Clastres 1989; Scott 2009); it might organize politically and try to protect or pry away further 
control over its subsistence (Striffler 1997); or quite simply, the amounts of “freed” potential 
labor may be far greater than the work needed and thus, left to care for itself (Li 2010), starting 
the process anew somewhere else. Also, as we will see in the next two chapters, the process of 
capture is deeply gendered, as men and women experience the penetration of capitalist relations 
and monetization in different ways (Mackintosh 1989a; Crehan 1997; Mies 1986). 
This high contingency and the constant tensions produced by these processes of capture 
and flight create a situation in which political domination and economic exploitation are 
constantly negotiated and disrupted. Following Kate Crehan (1997:25), I understand this 
dynamic and space of political contestation as a “problematic of hegemony.” As Crehan argues, 
there has been a tendency by much of the literature that deals with the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony to limit or water it down to how the world is described and consensus is produced; 
what she terms “Hegemony Lite” (Crehan 2002:172). For her rather,  
                                                        
7 There are evident similarities between my understanding of “labor capture” and Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s (2003) notion of the “Apparatus of Capture,” as presented in 1,000 Plateaus. However, as it 
should soon become evident, the broader theoretical framework in which I deploy it differs significantly 
from the one presented by the Frenchmen.  
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Hegemony  is also  very  much  about  real material forces, embodied in 
institutions like schools, churches, and the media, which both bring into being 
specific landscapes of power and mold the individual subjectivities that feel at 
home in those landscapes. Hegemony, as it were, focuses attention on the 
complex, and two-way, passage between the economic and the political. (Crehan 
1997:25) 
Within this approach, and in general in modern capitalist societies, these struggles over 
hegemony necessarily hark back to the notion of the state. This is not the place to develop an 
extended discussion of what the state is or is not, as there are various works that deal with this 
issue from an anthropological perspective (see for example Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and 
Gupta 2009; Trouillot 2001). I will settle with some basic cues from which to enter the relation 
between the problematic of hegemony and the state. 
In his hugely influential article on the difficulties of studying the state, Philip Abrams 
(1988) argues that we should stop thinking about the state as a “thing” or an object of study. 
Rather, for him, our focus should be on the concrete set of institutions that are created to enact 
the dynamics of domination, as well as the ways in which the idea of the state, as a 
homogeneous, ever-present and all mighty subject, is created and reproduced.  Also, towards the 
end of the article, he presents the argument that “[t]he state comes into being as a structuration 
within political practice: it starts its life as an implicit construct: it is then reified … and acquires 
an overt  symbolic identity progressively divorced  from practice” (1988:82).  
 In his own work on the formation of the Italian state during the Risorgimento, Gramsci 
(1971) comes to the conclusion that unlike France where the Jacobins had managed to bring 
together the city and the countryside and sweep away the old regime and create a new society, in 
Italy the bourgeoisie never managed to lead all of the country and its consolidation of power was 
more the result of the international context and a set of compromises with the old elites. Thus, 
…restoration  becomes  the  first policy  whereby  social  struggles  find  
sufficiently  elastic  frameworks to  allow  the  bourgeoisie to  gain power  without 
dramatic upheavals, without the French machinery of  terror.  The  old  feudal  
classes  are demoted  from  their  dominant  position  to  a  "governing"  one,  but 
are not eliminated, nor is there any  attempt to liquidate them  as  an organic  
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whole;  instead  of  a  class  they  become  a  "caste"  with specific  cultural  and  
psychological  characteristics,  but  no  longer with  predominant  economic  
functions. (1975: 115) 
The result is an uneven patchwork of different overlapping and coexisting social 
formations, dominant elite groups and forms of articulation with the international market. For 
Gramsci(1978), the differentiation between the Italian industrial north and the agrarian south 
characterized by him in the Southern Question was the most dramatic expression of this 
unevenness.  
Generically understood as a “passive revolution,” this approach has been fruitfully used 
to explore the process of capitalist state formation in both the European periphery (Davidson 
2010) and the postcolonial global south (Morton 2003; Morton 2013a; Chaudhuri 1988; 
Chatterjee 1988). As Adam David Morton (2013b:53) reminds us, “[t]he process is not literally 
‘passive’ but refers to the attempt at ‘revolution’ through state intervention, or the inclusion of 
new social groups within the hegemony of a political order, without an expansion of mass 
producer control over politics.”   
In the next chapter, I combine the passive revolution approach, applying certain 
elements of Kalyan Sanyal’s (2013) critique of its use for the Indian case, with the discussion of 
labor capture, to explore and characterize the process of transformation of the Honduran state –
of the problematic of hegemony more broadly – in the postcolonial period; from its 
independence in 1821 to the coup of 1972 that inaugurated the period of “military reformism” 
(Sieder 1995). 
The palm oil assemblage 
One of the overarching elements that I have found in the political economic history of Honduras 
is the ever-so-present gap between the imagined natural riches that the country harbors and the 
persistent inability of Hondurans to exploit and enjoy this wealth. As in most of Latin America, 
this wealth has traditionally been linked to either mineral or agricultural primary exports and  a 
series of boom and bust cycles affecting different industries controlled mainly by foreign capital 
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and on which the dreams of the nation’s progress centered (Coronil 1997; Bulmer-Thomas 
2003). Seen in broader terms, this progress, and after 1945 development, speaks to the ever-
present attempts by Latin American elites – and nations more generally– to make the big jump 
and “catch up” with the Global North. However, as dependency theorists demonstrated decades 
ago, development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin (Frank 1966; Cardoso 
and Faletto 1979); or as Aníbal Quijano (2000) would have it, what develops are not countries 
but a global pattern of domination and distribution of power. 
One of the characteristics of this type of peripheral capitalist accumulation, is the 
reliance on rent capture as the main mechanism of profit (Amin 2010; Coronil 1997). As I have 
been arguing, the problematic of hegemony is not only about political or ideological domination, 
but also of the articulations between the political and economic in particular settings. These two 
elements together – the centrality of rent capture and hegemony at the crux of the political and 
the economic – point to how the history of these crops and their articulation to the global 
market, cannot be understood simply as a result of ecological conditions or economic reasoning 
(Soluri 2009; Rogers 2010; Galt 2014; Grossman 1998). Politics and the art of hegemony are 
always also at the center. For example, James Scott (1998:2) in the introduction to Seeing Like a 
State asks “[h]ow did the state gradually get a handle on its subjects and their environment?” 
And he in part responds by asserting that “[w]hatever their other purposes, the designs of 
scientific forestry and agriculture and the layouts of plantations, collective farms… all seemed 
calculated to make the terrain, its products, and its workforce more legible – and hence 
manipulable – from above and from the center.”  
Here we can see clearly how agriculture is at the crux of political power and economy and 
of how in the history of its industrialization, we can envision the threads that link the state with 
sedentary agriculture and those that link labor capture with the centralization of power and its 
institutionalization (Clastres 1989). It would seem that Vandana Shiva (1993) is right when she 
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argues that monocultures have more to do with social control and political domination than 
with agriculture. 
I argue in this dissertation that one can see the history of the problematic of hegemony in 
the Aguán by looking at the history of the introduction and development of the palm oil 
industry. Even when little of the production and profit of the industry remains in the region, the 
Aguán is saturated by palm oil. While money is pumped out of the region in the form of rent, 
palm oil clogs its everyday life, with its landscape of infinite rows of symmetrically placed palm 
trees and the smell of the black fumes discharged from the various extracting mills. The crop is 
also intertwined with how the region understands and identifies itself. The city of Tocoa – the 
largest in the region – is known as the “city of palms;” its football team’s emblem has two oil 
palms as its center and every year the city hosts a festival to celebrate “palm culture.”  
Although it places different social groups in different positions, the centrality of the oil 
palm knows no class boundaries. Just as the same large corporations install large plantations, 
poor peasant families plant a few palm trees in their backyards. A significant part of the current 
expansion of the crop in the Aguán – close to 80,000 hectares in 2013 – has not necessarily 
been done by large entrepreneurs, but by peasant individuals and peasant collective enterprises.  
To understand how palm oil acquired such a central position in the region, I would argue 
that we need to look at processes happening in different scales and under different 
temporalities. On the one hand, it has to do with the ways in which the past inhabits the present. 
For many of these poor peasant families and organizations, oil palms are emblematic of the 
wellbeing and prestige that came with the creation of a set of palm oil producing cash cropping 
peasant cooperatives in the 1970s as part of the BAP, as we will see in chapters 2 and 3. 
However, at the same time, we have to understand the introduction of the industry in the 
country parallels the efforts made since the 1940s by the U.S. banana companies (particularly 
United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company) to diversify their production and find a 
viable alternative to their Panama disease-riddled plantations. Also, as Gilberto Ríos (2014:166) 
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points out, “the increase in the cultivation of African palm is due to the rise in the prices in the 
domestic market, by an estimated average of $174 /ton; a significant increment in relation to the 
1990s, where there were years when the prices barely reached $26.50 /ton for the producer.”  
On the other hand, it has to do with the dreams and projects for the future that are 
harbored in the present. For example, the newly elected president Juan Orlando Hernández 
proposed during his campaign to increase the country´s oil palm area by 150,000 hectares to, to 
reach a staggering extension of over 400,000 hectares, thus catching up with Colombia, the 
largest producer in Latin America.8 To do so, the government is committing around $50 million 
of the 2014 national budget  to the expansion of the crop (La Tribuna 2014).  It is clear that the 
elites view the palm oil industry as key to the development of the country. 
In both cases – the past and future in the present – the national tale of the palm oil 
industry must be read against the background of the rise of this crop as a global commodity and 
the quintessential “flex crop” (Borras et al. 2012). According to the website Oil World 
(oilworld.biz), for 2012, palm oil represented 55.5 percent of the world consumption of 
vegetable oils and fats, with a consumption 52.1 million tons, followed by soybeans with 41.7 
million tons. However, palm oil has many other uses besides the food industry; ranging from the 
cosmetic industry to the expansion of the so-called “bio” or agro fuels. This flexibility makes 
palm oil a very attractive industry, as it is hard to imagine a significant drop in prices when the 
tendency is towards an increasing demand and producers and refiners can potentially sell to 
several different kinds of end-users. 
To try to come to grips and articulate these different levels of analysis, I draw upon 
Michael Watts’ (2012) understanding of the “oil assemblage.” Watts proposes that we approach 
                                                        
8 The difference of scales within the industry becomes quite evident when we compare this numbers with 
those of Malaysia and Indonesia, which dedicate an estimated 4.6 million and 9.4 million of hectares 
respectively to the crop. To put this in context, Honduras’ total territory is only a little over 11 million 
hectares.  
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the petroleum industry as a global network that links, through a set of shared principles and 
forms or organization, the different sites of production, distribution and consumption of oil. In 
Chapter 3 I draw upon this notion to characterize the palm oil assemblage. However, unlike 
Watts, who is more interested in looking at the articulation of these different sites from a global 
perspective, I focus more on how the palm oil industry took concrete form and has been lived by 
the different groups involved in the Aguán region.  
In theoretical and methodological terms, I focus on the history of the palm oil industry in 
the region – and its tensions with other scales such as the national and the global – as a way of 
exploring the ways in which struggles over hegemony took place on the ground. I am interested 
in the processes by which a group of landless or land-poor peasant families migrated from 
different parts of the country to eventually become either palm oil producers in the peasant 
cooperatives that were created during the BAP in the 1970s; day laborers in the large palm oil 
plantations that were installed in the lands sold by many of those cooperatives; or members of 
various impoverished peasant collective enterprises, which currently struggle for survival and 
peg their dreams of a better future on entering the industry as palm oil producers. Crucial for 
my interests is questioning and shedding some light in the ways in which these peasant men and 
women experienced, remember and were positioned in regard to these processes. 
Memory as entry point 
The historical  unity  of the  ruling  classes  is  realised  in  the  State,  and their  history  is 
essentially  the  history  of  States  and  of  groups  of States… 
The history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic.  There  
undoubtedly  does exist a  tendency  to  (at  least provisional  stages of) unification  in  
the historical  activity  of  these groups,  but  this  tendency  is  continually interrupted by  
the  activity of  the ruling groups ;  it therefore can only  be demonstrated when  an 
historical  cycle  is  completed  and  this  cycle  culminates  in  a success…Every trace  of  
independent  initiative  on  the  part  of  subaltern  groups should  therefore  be  of  
incalculable  value  for  the  integral  historian. Consequently,  this  kind  of  history  can  
only  be  dealt  with  monographically,  and each monograph requires  an immense  
quantity of material which  is  often  hard to  collect. 
Antonio Gramsci (1971:52, 54–55), “History of the subaltern classes: 
Methodological criteria.” 
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It has been mainly from the threads of memories that the fabric of this dissertation has been 
weaved. The decision to build research upon these weaves had to do both with an empirical 
necessity and a methodological decision. Empirically, it grew out of the limited number of 
primary and secondary sources that could be found. In terms of secondary sources, although the 
Aguán is recognized as the centerpiece of what was probably the most extensive agrarian reform 
in Central America, very few in depth studies deal with it either directly (Salgado 1994; Macías 
2001; Castro 1994; Kerssen 2013) or indirectly (Soluri 2009). Also, most of these focus on the 
institutional and more overarching transformation and with a short historical  scope that begins 
in the 1970s with the creation of the BAP, leaving aside both the dwellers present before the 
arrival of the cooperatives and the subjective experiences of the more recent migrants. 
For primary sources, the situation is not much different. During the 1990s, for example, 
as the country’s agrarian policy moved towards more liberal positions, the National Agrarian 
Institute (INA) began to discard most of its archives and library under the idea that they would 
no longer be needed. In this process, most of the documents on the BAP and the agrarian reform 
were lost. Also, although in Honduras one finds strong regional identities and the country in the 
last decades has gone through a process of municipal political regionalization, most of the 
available statistical data is for the national level. 
Just as Jeffrey Gould and Aldo Lauria-Santiago (2009:xiv) argue for the Salvadoran 
case, I believe that “…when confronted by the paucity of documentary materials that would 
allow us to reconstruct ethnographically thick descriptions… testimonies can be employed to 
approximate sociological and ethnographic realities in the past.” Also, following their lead, I use 
“…a methodology based on mutual interrogation of oral and written sources and a continuous 
cross-referencing between the two, moving from the micro and regional level to the national 
level of analysis.”  
In practical terms, this means that in those cases in which no regionally specific 
information could be found, I relied on sources for other locations and scales, in an attempt to 
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create connections from which to pose questions and approach my own data. Also, when 
possible, I collected and used alternative sources, such as conference minutes, personal archives 
of peasant leaders and legal reports. However in general these sources were scant and hard to 
find. 
Methodologically, following Alessandro Portelli (1997:146), I understand that working 
with memories deals more with representations than with facts, understood in more traditional 
ways. However, “[r]epresentations and facts do not exist in separate spheres. Representations 
work on facts and claim to be facts.”9 This tension between representations and facts is at the 
crux of oral history.  According to Portelli, it is precisely the task of the oral historian to explore 
what happened (the facts) while also understanding at the same time how people remember and 
organize their understanding and decide to act in relation to those memories (representations): 
“[o]ral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed 
they were doing, and what they now think they did” (Portelli 2010:50). Thus oral sources, 
memories in this case, are a privileged window into the subjectivity of the people involved, 
allowing us to shed some light on the forms in which historical and structural processes are 
lived, understood and acted upon. 
According to David Berliner (2005: 198), the last decade or so has seen a proliferation – 
a “boom” as he calls it – in the anthropological study of memory. However, according to him, 
with this proliferation also comes a “…process of conceptual extension leading to the 
entanglement of memory and culture…” where, “…memory gradually becomes everything which 
is transmitted across generations… ‘almost indistinguishable’ then from the concept of culture 
itself.”  
                                                        
9 “The first thing that makes oral history different, therefore, is that it tells us less about events than about 
their meaning. This does not imply that oral history has no factual validity. Interviews often reveal 
unknown events or unknown aspects of known events; they always cast new light on unexplored areas of 
the daily life of the non hegemonic classes” (Portelli 2010:50). 
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Understood in these terms, the forms of narration and temporality become crucial in the 
study of memories – particularly in terms of untangling individual from collective memories. 
Regarding the former, “[t]he organization of the narrative reveals a great deal of the speakers’ 
relationship to their history.” In this sense, Portelli (2010:70) proposes three main levels on 
which memories tend to be organized:  
Institutional: the sphere of politics, government, parties, unions, and elections; 
the national and international historical context; and ideology. Space referent: 
the nation and the world. 
Collective: the life of the community, the neighborhood, and the workplace; 
strikes, natural catastrophes, and rituals; and collective participation in 
"institutional" episodes. Space referent: the town, the neighborhood, and the 
workplace. 
Personal: private and family life; the life cycle of births, marriages, jobs, children, 
and deaths; and personal involvement in the two other levels. Space referent: the 
home. 
The idea is that the placing of different events in one of the levels may reveal more about 
the speaker’s perspective than about the event itself. It speaks of the narrator’s interests, but 
also shows the ever-present tension between individual and the eventual institutionalization of 
collective memories. This point is important. 
According to Portelli: 
Like all human activities, memory is social and may be shared… however … it 
only materializes in individual recollections and speech acts. It becomes 
collective memory only when it is abstracted and detached from the individual: in 
myth and folklore (one story for many people…), in delegation (one person for 
many stories…), in institutions (abstract subjects—school, church, State Party) 
that organize memories and rituals into a whole other than the sum of its 
separate parts. (1997:157) 
Thus, collective memory should not be understood as homogeneous or unproblematic, 
but rather as the result – unstable and constantly disputed – of a political struggle in which 
particular individual and sometimes shared memories and experiences coalesce – become 
institutionalized – in detriment of others. In this way, the study of collective memories should 
focus on the ways in which this institutionalization takes place and how these collective 
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memories circulate. Phrased differently, I place significant “…emphasis on the political 
mediation of memory [as] an essential complement to the usual focus on the narrative and 
social mediation of memory and history…” (Kligman and Verdery 2011:14) 
As I see it, exploring these political mediations of memory is at the crux of the 
contradiction between “dominant” and “subaltern” histories that Gramsci presents in the 
epigraph that opens this section. It is not only that dominant histories and memories are easier 
to access – as they tend to appear in history books and the media –, but also that they tend to 
show a manufactured homogeneity that papers over many of the political mediations that were 
part of the initial process of institutionalization. In the case of subaltern histories and memories 
this situation also holds, but with a twist. Their modes of presentation and sometimes even their 
content are – as Gramsci mentions – “necessarily fragmented and episodic.” This becomes both 
a challenge – as it is harder to reconstruct fully fledged historical narratives, – and an 
opportunity – as the challenging and conflicting forms of political mediation become that much 
more evident.  
As Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery (2011:14–15) claim in their study regarding the 
process of collectivization of agriculture in Communist-era Romania,  
Rather than seeing the new historiography [resulting from the use of new sources 
such as oral ones] as uncovering the “truth” about the past… we see it as part of a 
process of recovering and reconstructing usable pasts –plural because of the 
widely divergent interpretations… that are competing for the power both to 
reclaim and to rewrite history. 
Turning now to the temporal aspect of memories, it is important to remember that 
necessarily “…the past does not exist independently from the present” and “[i]n that sense, the 
past has not content.” (Trouillot 1995:15) Thus remembering is about the presence of the past in 
the present; in other words, that remembering is always a present act and people’s “… 
constitution as subjects goes hand in hand with the continuous creation of the past. As such, 
they do not succeed such a past: they are its contemporaries.” (p. 16). Or as Walter Benjamin 
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(1968:261) would have it in his XIV thesis on the philosophy of history: “[h]istory is the subject 
of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the 
now.” 
History is as much a process of narrative creation as it is a process of the production of 
silences (Trouillot 1995). This tension between what is narrated and what is silenced is 
necessarily an active political process in which the historical existence of certain subaltern 
groups – or certain individuals within those groups – is effaced from dominant historical 
narratives. From this perspective, the recuperation of memories of particular groups can also be 
seen as a process of recovering those denied and silenced histories.  
Just as the narratives of the coup have tended to efface and render invisible the 
experience of those dwelling in the Aguán, the narratives about the BAP have tended to deny the 
history of those people who already dwelled in the region beforehand, as well as the histories of 
migration that led those families from their homes in other parts of the country.  Similarly, 
many historical narratives about the sale of the agrarian reform cooperatives renders invisible, 
and thus denies, the experience of women in the process. By focusing on the memories of these 
men and women, I hope to present at least a part of this experience that has been denied and 
suppressed. Always remembering that 
The play of power in the production of alternative narratives begins with the joint 
creation of facts and sources for at least two reasons. First, facts are never 
meaningless: indeed, they become facts only because they matter in some sense, 
however minimal. Second, facts are not created equal: the production of traces is 
always also the creation of silences. (Trouillot 1995:29) 
Sources and facts are never neutral. They are always created within broader political and 
social contexts. This is particularly important when working with people´s testimonies, where 
the shift in the broader context can change the combination between what is said and what is 
silenced. I carried out my fieldwork (see the description below) in a period framed between the 
upcoming national elections of November 2014 and the still very raw and pervasive presence of 
21 
 
the 2009 coup. Just how much this context affected the testimonies collected is hard to 
determine. However, in my conversations, the topics of the elections and the coup were 
unavoidable. At times it felt that narrating people’s past was a way for them of looking for clues 
that would allow them to better understand their current situation.  Further, due to the high 
levels of violence and political repression present in the region at the moment, some people were 
reluctant to speak with me, fearing that I might be an agent of the military or even the CIA. 
Thus, there is much of this historical context, and the particular way I was positioned by the 
people I interviewed, in the facts and sources that I used. 
Also, as Kligman and Verdery (2011) are quick to point out, there are certain elements 
besides context – age, gender, class position, education level, among others – that also shape the 
encounter between interviewer and interviewee. For example, in my fieldwork, men were 
quicker to talk and more willing to have their interviews recorded than women. Also, it took me 
a longer time – and many failed attempts at learning to make tortillas – for many women to 
finally open up and tell me their stories.  In the end, some of the richer testimonies that I 
collected came from women and my focus on the relation between dispossession and gender 
came as much from my interest in the topic as from their implicit mandate that I tell their side 
of the story.  
Taking these elements into account, I treated each source and the data collected, as a set 
of fragments that needed to constantly be mended, reconnected and reconstructed in the face of 
any new element found. I constantly tried to triangulate my information, by contrasting the 
narratives collected with the meager written sources. In methodological terms this meant 
focusing more in the relations between sources and facts – and the particular social and political 
contexts in which they are inscribed – than on the sources themselves.    
Description of fieldwork 
I spent over ten months in the Aguán during 2013 and about a month more during 2012. During 
this time, I divided my time between the city of Tocoa and five peasant settlements in the region 
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that had formed during the wave of land occupations that had taken place since 2000 on both 
banks of the Aguán River. In addition to visiting these communities, I took part in the meetings 
and activities of the Permanent Observatory of Human Rights of the Aguán (OPDH), which was 
created in 2011 as a result of the escalating violence in the region in the aftermath of the coup. I 
also interviewed members of the local institutions, such as the Catholic Church and the military, 
as well as members of some of the older palm oil producing peasant cooperatives that were 
created during the BAP period.  
In terms of techniques, besides the more traditional activities, such as participant 
observation and in-depth interviews, I carried out around ten memory workshops in three of the 
five peasant settlements. The design of these workshops was inspired by  Pilar Riaño’s (2006; 
2000a) work with displaced communities in Colombia, but I made some changes to adapt her 
approach to Honduran realities. According to her, a memory workshop consists  
…of a group session in which participants engaged in a series of interactive 
activities. Each individual participated in telling stories and evoking memories, in 
the elaboration of maps, photo albums, or visual biographies, and in the 
discussion and reflection on their past memories and the ‘politics’ of 
remembering. (Riaño-Alcalá 2000b:40) 
 Through a set of participatory activities aimed at stimulating collective forms of 
remembering, these workshops had the objective of locating those traces from the past that 
linger in the present and inform much of the communities’ understanding of the present. The 
basic methodological idea behind these workshops is that they become spaces of collective 
knowledge production in which the interactions themselves are the starting point of the 
elaboration.10 Riaño (2000b:40) describes how in her fieldwork, 
                                                        
10 There has been much discussion regarding the differences and tensions that exist between individual 
and collective memories (Halbwachs 1992) and the tendency within social sciences to collapse them both 
into the same thing (Kansteiner 2002). As I mentioned before, I try to move away from this problems by 
focusing in the ways in which memories become institutionalized and circulate. In methodological terms, 
my approach was to build up to the workshops by interviewing individually most of the people that would 
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…an individual story became a trigger of many other stories and of an active 
sensorial and emotional exchange. Each story deepened individual and group 
reflections and brought back forgotten memories or other experiences lived by 
the participants and with this is a collective conversation emerged from the 
‘historical dust’ became the centre of a lively group exchange and of the ways each 
group re-created their individual and collective memories. 
Due in part to the significant amount of scholarly work written on the topics of 
displacement and violence in Colombia, Riaño decided to concentrate on what she calls the 
“anthropology of remembering.” This meant that her focus was not so much in recovering and 
reconstructing the histories of the people involved in the workshops, but rather, in the forms 
and politics of the process of remembering itself. However, similar methodological approaches – 
rooted in Orlando Fals-Borda´s (1984) branch of Participatory Action Research – have been 
used effectively in Colombia to recover and give evidence of the massacres and forced 
displacement that various groups in the country have suffered (see for example, Bello 2006; 
Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2010; Jimeno, Varela, and Castillo 2012).11 In these cases, memory 
workshops are used to register the ways in which these human rights violations were 
remembered by those whose experience was either openly denied by state officials, or quite 
simply ignored. The information collected in the workshops was then combined with other 
analytical registers – such as in-depth interviews, archival work, among others – to reconstruct 
particular events and historical conjunctures. The idea behind this is that remembering and 
narrating a conflict is the first step in a long process that can eventually lead to some sort of 
recognition and reparations by the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
participate in them. In this way I could contrast the individual testimonies with the collective elaborations 
in the workshops. 
11 It is important to add that Pilar Riaño has played an important role in the methodological development 
of some of these approaches. Also it is important to point out that here I only reference literature that 
focuses on the Colombian experience, as it is the one that I am more familiar with and has been more 
influential in my own work. However, similar types of work can be found in contexts such as the Mexican 
south or in the struggles for reparations in post-civil war Guatemala.  
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I would argue that this type of methodological approach – combining the collective 
memory elaboration in the workshops with the recollection of individual testimonies and other 
written sources – can be particularly useful in contexts such as the Aguán, where little secondary 
information can be found and where grievances from the past have such a vibrant (collective) 
presence in the present.  
In my own fieldwork, a typical workshop would be carried out with no more than ten 
members of one of the peasant movements that I worked with (see chapter 5). When possible, I 
would organize a session with only men, another with only women and a final mixed one with 
current and former leaders of the organization. My aim was to create differentiated spaces to see 
if there was a single homogeneous narrative of their plights, or rather if they were differentiated 
along lines of gender (Schraut and Paletschek 2008; Hirsch and Smith 2002), age  (Griffin 
2004) and organizational position, as much of the literature suggests.  
Giving a full account of the specific techniques and dynamics developed in the 
workshops goes beyond the scope of this introduction.12 I would just like to point out the 
centrality that creating collective timelines of the peasant movements had in these spaces. 
Regarding the collective timelines (see figures 2 and 3 for examples), the idea was to bring 
together the knowledge and perspective that different members of the movement had regarding 
their own history and systematize it in a graphical manner. This activity tended to create great 
discussions regarding particular dates and locations of events, names of people involved and the 
effects that these events had (or had not had) on the organization. This became a particularly 
fertile window into the internal tensions of the organizations, but also into the always conflictual 
process of making sense of historical processes and creating coherent narratives.  
 
                                                        
12 For a detailed account of the specific techniques used in these workshops, see Machado et al. (2009). 
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Figure 2. Memory workshop: collective timeline of the peasant movements 
of the Aguán 
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Figure 3. Memory workshop: Timeline of the Luzón Palmeras Peasant 
Movement 
 
 
Also, following Gastón Gordillo’s (2004) insight that memories are always spatialized, I 
did various walking tours with members of the community, in which they would show me what 
they considered to be important places in the history of their settlement. Every time that we 
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arrived at one such place, we would stop for a while and have a conversation regarding why it 
was an important place and which memories were attached to it.  
Figure 4. Memory workshop: community maps of the Luzón Palmeras 
Peasant Movement 
 
 
 
Both maps depict the  Unidos Lucharemos settlement, home of the Luzón Palmeras Peasant Movements. The one on the left was 
drawn by women, the one on the right by men. We can see significant differences in the ways both depict their community. 
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In combination with these walks, I was able to carry out three participatory mapping 
workshops in which members of a community would draw sketched maps of their settlements, 
locating their current conflicts and problems, as well as the different actors present. With the 
support of the San Alonso Rodríguez Foundation (FSAR) and the OPDH, I was also able to carry 
out a regional participatory mapping workshop with representatives of ten of the 22 peasant 
organizations that take part in the Observatory. During this workshop we again utilized the 
techniques of participatory mapping to locate the different dynamics currently taking place in 
the region.  
Outline of the chapters  
Summarizing, this dissertation explores the process of creation of the Aguán region from the 
perspective of a set of families that migrated towards the north coast from the 1970s onwards, in 
search of a better present and future. It asks about the processes by which the region went from 
“empty” space in the 1960s, to centerpiece of the Honduran palm oil industry in the 2000s and 
site of one of the most intense agrarian conflicts in Latin America at the same time (Edelman 
and León 2013). Also, by looking at the history of the palm oil industry in the Aguán, it sheds 
light on the ways in which the Honduran problematic of hegemony took place in a concrete 
place. Further, it shows how this region became one of the most conflictive places in the country 
in the run up to the 2009 coup. Finally, by focusing on various individual and collective 
memories and historical narratives in the region, it explores the ways in which these processes 
have been experienced and lived by a set of poor peasant families. 
 The analysis is organized into five chapters. In chapter 1, I briefly outline an agrarian 
history of the country from its independence in 1821 to the 1972 coup and the formal rise to 
power of the military. Chapter 2 focusses on the individual memories of migration of various 
peasant families that left their home towns back in the country´s west in search of a better life in 
the north coast. Here, I begin to differentiate between the experiences of those families that 
arrived to the Aguán as part of the BAP and settled in the valley (the lowlands), and those that 
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arrived outside of the colonization scheme and settled in the surrounding hills. Also, I briefly 
analyze the BAP and how the region was before the arrival of the first cooperatives in the 1970s. 
Chapter 3 explores the creation of the palm oil industry in the region. It focuses on the 
introduction of the crop and how it functioned during the BAP period. Also, it questions the 
more traditional interpretations of the process of agrarian counter reform of the 1990s, as these 
focus only on the organizational weaknesses of the cooperatives, without taking into account the 
processes of differentiation between and within the cooperatives, which were due mainly the 
forms of rent capture. Finally, it tries to recover women´s experience of the process of selling the 
agrarian reform lands, as this is one of the key dimensions that is usually effaced in the more 
conventional narratives. 
Chapter 4 centers on the role of the Catholic Church in the region, particularly in the 
years prior to and in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in late 1998. More than the work of the 
church itself, the chapter explores the ways in which it helped create and organize a historical 
narrative regarding the reality of the region. In the aftermath of Mitch, this narrative became 
especially important in understanding how Aguán residents came to view the reconstruction 
process and the necessity of re-launching an agrarian reform from below as response to the 
broader processes of dispossession in the region. 
Chapter 5 covers the period between 2000 and 2009 and the experience of three peasant 
movements that were born in the aftermath of Mitch: the Peasant Movement of Rigores (MCR), 
the Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MCA), and the Authentic Reclaiming Peasant Movement 
of the Aguán (MARCA). While the first two are movements created by peasants that before 
Mitch used to dwell in the surrounding hills, MARCA is the result of a set of former cooperative 
members who organized to recover what they deemed had been taken away illegally. I argue that 
this difference in composition had significant effects on their trajectories, but that in the end the 
palm oil industry overdetermines the region and thus, it is difficult to think about the current 
(and future) situation, without thinking about the monoculture.  
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In the conclusion, using the aftermath of the 2009 coup as setting, I propose that we 
think about the history of the Aguán as a braid composed of four differentiated, but 
interconnected, strands related to the main arguments of this study: 1. The perspective of 
passive revolution to approach the process of state formation in postcolonial Central America; 2. 
The tension between labor capture and flight as a way of approaching the topic of agrarian 
reform, in the midst of different processes of dispossession and struggle; 3. The consolidation on 
the ground of the global palm oil assemblage and the move to the center of the region´s life of oil 
palm monoculture and; 4. The process of creation of historical narratives in the Aguán, as the 
tension between individual and collective memories. 
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Chapter 1. Outlining an agrarian history of the Honduran state (1821-1972) 
So wonderful are the reports about this particular province, that even allowing largely for 
exaggeration, it will exceed Mexico in riches, and equal it in largeness of its towns and 
villages, the density of its population, and the policy of its inhabitants.  
Hernán Cortés (2009:118) to the Emperor Charles V, regarding the lands close to the 
town of Trujillo 
The desert has favored the idle and the mountain's guerrilla. The desert annoys and kills. 
Let us foment immigration that brings capital, work, and industry. Gobernar es poblar 
[to govern is to populate]; this is the administrative axiom that the Latin American 
nations recognized today. 
Ramón Rosas, 1872 (quoted by Del Cid 1988) 
I came to that conclusion because the hard knocks of life hurt, nobody likes poverty. And 
Honduras has the wealth to sustain itself, by itself, without aid from the North 
Americans, without aid of the Germans, without aid from any country of the world… In 
Honduras there is oil, in Honduras there is gold, there are emeralds and silver. 
Javier, peasant currently living in the Aguán   
 
Since it was first “discovered” in 1502 by Christopher Columbus himself, the territory that we 
now know as Honduras, already inhabited by indigenous peoples, has been greedily eyed as a 
place of great potential riches. For example, Robert Chamberlain (1966:9) describes how the 
Italian admiral, upon arriving at one of the Bay Islands just north of the Honduran coast, 
encountered a large Indian trading canoe, where  
[t]he natives were dressed in excellently woven cotton, and the canoe carried well 
wrought articles which figured in the highly developed trade in the region, 
including axes and other utensils of copper and pottery. The appearance of this 
canoe brightened Columbus’ hopes that the rich and populous lands which he 
sought were near. 
However, the chances of exploiting this potential, and converting Honduras’ natural 
resources into material riches, seem to forever remain out of reach. There has always been a 
“lack,” something missing, which has made it impossible for Honduras to live up to its potential. 
This gap between perceived and unrealized potential has changed throughout time – from 
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“progress” to “development” –, but always with the haunting persistence of pervasive poverty 
and lack of material development. This has led both politicians and analysts – whether 
Hondurans or foreigners– to constantly probe into the nature of this lack and more often than 
not come to the conclusion that it is a political problem that should be solved by and from the 
state– as the Rosas quotation at the beginning of this chapter so vividly suggests.  
This way of posing the problem — and it is important to remember that it is not unique 
to Honduras — points to the close, but not necessarily always evident relationship that exists 
between agrarian structure – understood very broadly as the forms of access to and control of 
land and natural resources – and political power (Moore 1966). The forms in which this lack has 
been understood and acted upon provide an excellent vantage point for exploring how the 
political tensions generated by the many attempts at placing particular groups in specific places 
to guarantee that this untapped nature would be utilized and that the eventual profits would 
flow in the right direction. 
In what follows, I will analyze this process of structuration within political practice in 
Honduras by looking at how the gap between natural potential and actual economic reality 
became, as it were, the state question in Honduras.  Further, following Antonio Gramsci’s (1971; 
Buci-Glucksmann 1980) notes on the state and hegemony, I will pay particular attention to the 
ways in which coercion and consent were articulated and sometimes equilibrated in different 
moments to shape the relations between dominant and subaltern groups in an effort — never 
entirely successful or complete — to create some sort of hegemony. 
My objective in this chapter is to outline what I am calling an agrarian history of the 
Honduran state. Outlining, because rather than focusing much on detail, I try to present certain 
historical threads that follow and are integral for my arguments in the next chapter. Agrarian 
history, because more than a fully fleshed historical narrative, I focus on the agrarian dynamics 
of the country and particularly, on the forms of conflict that have arisen from the interlinked 
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and constitutive processes of labor capture and flight— processes that will be developed and 
defined as we move along through the always messy history of Honduras. 
The myth of the rich but impoverished country and the colonial legacy 
The land and the people of a nation are its basic raw material.  Honduras is  fortunate in 
its  central location  in relation  to  the remainder  of  the American  republics  and in  its 
extensive  coast  lines  suitable  for  ports  on  both  the  Atlantic  and Pacific Oceans.  Its  
rough topography,  on  the  other  hand,  has  inhibited  its  social  and  economic  
development  in  the  past,  and  will continue  to  present  expensive  obstacles  in  the  
future.  
In  its  people,  Honduras  has  assets  as  yet  only  partially  developed;  Disease,  
malnutrition  and lack  of  education  have  to  be overcome  before  this  human  
resource  can  be fully  utilized  in  the country's struggle to  create  the  very environment  
which  can make health, an ample food supply,  education, -and the various  other 
material and cultural  aspects of more advanced  economies available to the people. 
Vincent Checchi (1959), Honduras: A Problem in Economic Development 
Since its discovery by Europeans, Honduras has been imagined as containing great 
potential for the accumulation of riches, as the epigraph from Cortés indicates. However, at the 
same time, no matter how much natural potential the country seemed to show, it was always all 
but impossible to actually enjoy or exploit those riches. Time and time again, let it be the 
conquistadors or the colonial authorities, the problem always had to do with a lack of enough 
labor to exploit the land’s “natural” potential. This lack was both absolute and relative. In 
absolute terms, it was due to the killing and enslavement of a significant proportion of the 
indigenous population during a period of conquest that proved to be complex and bloody 
(Chamberlain 1966; Newson 1986). Well informed of the deeds done by the Spanish 
conquistadors in Mexico, the Honduran indigenous groups mounted a furious resistance that 
included pitched battles, particularly in the western section of the country, and with hit and run 
skirmishes, where the country’s irregular and mountainous terrain became a great ally for flight, 
but a relentless enemy for colonial control. 
Regarding the relative lack of labor, it was not only that it was hard to find potential 
labor due to population depletion, but that the indigenous groups that could be found were hard 
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to pin down, due to a combination of the country’s physical geography, the indigenous groups’ 
particular ways of living and the colonial massacre. In geographical terms, Honduras has very 
uneven and mountainous terrain, where fertile valleys are separated by steep hills and 
mountains and more than two-thirds of the country present slopes of 25 percent or more and 
around 80 percent of the country’s surface ranges between 600 and 1,250 meters above sea 
level. Also, according to Newson (1986:96), the groups that populated the country at the time of 
conquest, were “…a large number of independent Indian groups, who at best formed weak 
confederacies,” which in practice meant that in contrast to the Mexican or Peruvian cases, “…the 
Spanish could not achieve effective control through political alliances with a few native leaders, 
but had to conquer each group separately.” Further, “[n]o sooner had one group been pacified 
than it revolted.” (p. 96).  
These elements – geographically fragmented territory, nomadic indigenous groups and 
bloody and complex conquest – combined to create a dynamic of intense spatial mobility by the 
subaltern groups – indigenous but also mestizo peasantry – that saw in the flight to the 
mountains a form of survival and social reproduction.13 
There were of course regional differences to this pattern, which were shaped by the 
different combinations of physical geography, types of indigenous groups present and the forms 
in which the conquest transpired and the dynamics of domination during the colonial period. 
For example, Linda Newson (1986) shows that there were clear differentiations between the 
western part of the country, with larger concentrations of indigenous population and where 
Spanish rule was more stable; and the eastern section, where smaller and more mobile 
                                                        
13 Cortés continually encountered a problem throughout his trip to this part of Central America: in most of 
the cases, each time that he arrived at an indigenous community, he would find it empty and burnt to the 
ground, as the local inhabitants had decided to run off to the hills rather than face the Spanish visitors 
that they related with death, due to the information that they had most probably received from the 
Mexican experience (Cortés 2009; Barahona 2002). 
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indigenous groups were able to mount some sort of effective resistance during most of the 
period. When taken together, the combined effect of the two forms of lack of labor – relative and 
absolute – created a highly fragmented social formation, with  very weak colonial institutions, 
which translated into a more lax system of domination system that could not fully resort to bear 
force to subdue and fix enough labor (Martínez Peláez 2011).  
From the point of view of the dominant groups, this scarcity of labor was not only 
quantitative but also qualitative. The existing population lacked “industriousness” and preferred 
to run off into the hills rather than to settle down and work for others (Barahona 2002; Martínez 
Peláez 2011). These two elements – geographic demographic dispersion and lack of 
“industriousness” – tended to combine in a sort of lack that shackled the country and made it 
seemingly impossible to accumulate capital. 
  Thus, one of the greatest problems the elites faced during the colonial period, and one 
which continues after independence, was the tendency of the population to move away from the 
centers of production – like the mines in center of the country – and towards remote places, 
where they could grow maize and other subsistence crops. In this way, 
[f]leeing to the mountains, so abundant in Honduras’s geography, became one of 
the particular forms of resistance that the indigenous communities used against 
Hispanic domination. For the Indians, this option meant the possibility of 
freedom due to transhumance, the return to nomadic culture, which 
disassociated them from the social body organized by the colonial power. 
(Barahona 2002:131) 
 This dynamic of fleeing from relations of labor exploitation did not disappear in 1821 
with the independence of Honduras from Spain. For example, according to the Baron of 
Franzenstein, an Austrian intellectual who lived in Honduras during the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, referring specifically to the topic of land use: 
… contrary to the Caucasian Europeans, who prefer large extensions of land for 
its exploitation, the Indians of Honduras look for a little piece of land where they 
establish a shanty [rancho] which can serve as a place of refuge for their 
laziness… The objective of the native farmers is not economic profit, but to have 
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enough maize and beans to satisfy their personal necessities. (quoted by 
Barahona 2002:52) 
If for the elites this tendency of the subaltern groups to run off into the hills was seen 
with exasperation, for the subaltern groups it became a strategy of both survival and the search 
for some sort of freedom. At the crux of this conflict seemed to be the idea of subsistence 
agriculture. According to Pierre Clastres (1989:193), “[a]s a matter of fact, two axioms seem to 
have guided the advance of Western civilization from the outset: the first maintains that true 
societies unfold in the protective shadow of the State; the second states the categorical 
imperative: man must work.”14 
Running off to the hills negated a surplus that otherwise could be captured by the elites; 
thus the problem seemed to be who would enjoy the fruits of whose labor.15 In this way, the 
social formation that was inherited by the postcolonial Honduran state was deeply dysfunctional 
in terms of profit making and domination. With a geographically fragmented population, weak 
institutional structure and a peasantry – both indigenous and mestizo – with a deeply ingrained 
sense of “freedom,” the gap between the perceived and imagined natural potential of the country 
and the cold and hard reality was quite glaring.  
Before exploring the forms in which this gap was framed and approached in the 
postcolonial period around the issue of labor accumulation and state formation, I will make a 
short digression to introduce the concept of labor capture, which is crucial for my later 
argument. 
 
 
                                                        
14 See William Roseberry (1991) for an interesting discussion on how this imperative to work articulated 
with different labor regimes in Latin America around the incipient coffee industry in early 20th Century.  
15 Another way of thinking about this problem is through the four “key questions” that Henry Bernstein 
(2010:22) proposes as central to a political economy approach: “Who owns what? Who does what? Who 
gets what? What do they do with it?” 
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Labor capture 
Capital must compel living labor to act for capital, as capital, in order to reproduce and 
expand; even as workers, as bearers (Trager) of social relations that posit them as labor, 
strive with varying degrees of success to resist the incarceration of their capacities. 
Vinay Gidwani (2008b:857), “Capitalism’s Anxious Whole” 
Capital, understood as a social relation, is never a given; it must always be assembled. 
Accumulation for accumulation’s sake is always a complex and deeply contingent process in 
which different elements must be placed in particular situations, in particular space-times, for it 
to be successful.  Human labor is necessarily at the center of this process. It is through labor that 
humans transform nature and in the process transform themselves.  In societies where the 
capitalist mode of production prevails, the fruits of this labor (commodities) must be oriented 
towards exchange in the market and surplus labor must be alienated from its immediate owners 
– the workers – and accumulated by the owners of the means of production –the capitalists– in 
the form of money. Why? Because the dominant source of value in capitalist societies is found in 
human labor. Or, to phrase it in a different manner, “…value can be thought of as the name for 
how productive, social activities get divided up within societies, activities – labor; in its very 
broadest sense – that yield the assemblages of humans and nonhumans that are necessary to 
sustain life, as well as spark new life” (Henderson 2013:xii).  
Seen from this vantage point, two questions become central. First, how are these 
“assemblages of humans and nonhumans” actually assembled in particular contexts and 
situations, so that surplus labor can be accumulated? Second, how is it that the diverse forms in 
which commodities are produced, are stitched together to give rise to capital in general – as 
global capitalist society as a whole? Both questions must be taken together, and particular 
attention must be placed on the movements between them. Commodities must be produced, 
distributed and consumed, only to begin the process anew in an expanded manner for capital to 
be accumulated; capital can be seen as value in motion. However, this is never a smooth trip, 
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…for value to expand, a phenomenon tantamount to the expansion of the realm 
of exchange values… it must pass, restlessly, through several phases. And, like 
any voyager, it faces the constant threat of an accident or breakdown (even death, 
absolute negation) that can bring the journey to an abrupt halt. (Gidwani 
2008b:861) 
The possibilities of these stoppages lurk everywhere in the process of capital 
accumulation. One of them – the one that we will be privileging here – resides exactly in the 
moment in which living labor has to be organized to produce commodities – with its double 
quality as use and exchange values. Through a Hegelian reading of Marx’s Grundrisse, Vinay 
Gidwani (2008b:869) presents us with this picture of the production process: 
Marx unpacks the process of production as a fraught space – time of non-
circulation that capital must traverse before re-entering the realm of circulation. 
And it is in this domain outside circulation, where capital directly encounters the 
other it must subsume as its own moment if it is to continue to exist, that we are 
offered Grundrisse’s new understanding of capitalism as a two-sided whole: 
value-for-itself (capital) pitted against use-value-for itself (labor).  
For capital accumulation to begin, living labor must be put to labor for other (the 
capitalist), but before it does, living labor is nothing but “…pure potentiality that has not yet 
become an instrument or raw material for capital; that has not as yet been captured and 
consumed for the production of value…” (p. 870); it is use-value-for-itself. This is a moment of 
friction in which nothing is given and everything is yet to be defined. Thus, the “…repeated and 
heterogeneous spatiotemporal encounters with labor… [are] a site of fear and anxiety,” where we 
find “… on the one side, capital’s desire to capture ‘living labor’ as use-value for itself and its 
permanent fear that labor could become otherwise; on the other side, he underscores labor’s 
desire to be otherwise and its fear that without capital it may not be able to remain active and 
reproduce.” (p. 874). 
 Willing labor is not already there for capital accumulation; it must be made willing, 
turned into a worker: it must be captured. In this sense, I understand the process of labor 
capture as the spatiotemporally concrete dynamics by which labor is made available and 
“consumed for the production of value.” I am particularly interested in two such dynamics: 
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permanent primitive accumulation and what Yann Moulier-Boutang (2006) has dubbed the 
“bridling of labor.”  
Towards the end of Capital Volume 1, Marx (1992) points us towards a paradox in the 
argument presented so far: capital is made of surplus-value, but for there to be surplus-value, 
there must already be capital. “The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a 
never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation… which 
precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode 
of production but its point of departure.” (p. 873). From there on we are introduced to the 
“anything but idyllic” process of primitive accumulation in which “conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.” (p. 874). Further, Marx argues that “the 
capital relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of 
the conditions for the realization of their labour” (p. 874). Thus, that “so-called primitive 
accumulation, therefore is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer 
from the means of production” (p. 874-75).  
Rivers of ink have flowed over the issue of primitive accumulation, particularly as to 
whether it should be seen as a definite historical moment – that of the birth of capitalism –, or 
rather as an ongoing process that is repeated constantly. In The Invention of Capitalism, 
Michael Perelman (2000) provides probably one of the more comprehensive arguments for 
primitive accumulation as an ongoing process. According to him, Marx uses the concept and the 
discussion of “so called primitive accumulation” to show the bloody birth of capitalist relations, 
as a way of debunking the Robinsonades’ myths of the “naturality” of this type of relations of 
production. Quoting Marx in Volume 1 of Capital, Perelman presents us with the following idea: 
…the pretensions of capital in its embryonic state, in its state of becoming, when 
it cannot yet use the sheer force of economic relations to secure its right to absorb 
a sufficient quantity of surplus labour, but must be aided by the power of the 
state. . . . Centuries are required before the ‘‘free’’ worker, owing to the greater 
development of the capitalist mode of production, makes a voluntary agreement, 
i.e. is compelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his active life. (p. 31) 
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Here we can see primitive accumulation as including both the creation of identity 
formation – the “free” worker who willingly sells his labor power – and institutional 
arrangements – as the state comes constantly into play to secure capital’s need for absorbing 
sufficient quantities of surplus labor. This process has to be constantly restarted, not only 
because new spaces not under the iron law of capital are still to be found – à la Rosa Luxemburg 
(2003) –, but also because the limits between self-provisioning and monetization (wage labor) 
are constantly shifting as the struggle between living labor and capital is perpetually enacted: a 
company decides lay off workers during low season, whole families move away from the grasp of 
wage relations by going off to the mountains, or the state is forced to create a social security 
system, just to name three examples (see, De Angelis 2004; Sanyal 2013). 
Thus, according to this particular reading, primitive accumulation is an ongoing process 
in which extra-economic practices are exercised to materially and symbolically place particular 
social groups – however conflictive this “placing” might be – in particular positions in regards to 
the market and the dynamics of capital accumulation. It is ongoing, because there is always an 
overarching tension between groups in flight, which try to remain beyond or outside the iron law 
of labor – however tenuous or fleeting this “beyond” and “outside” might be – and the different 
forms of labor capture.16 
Nevertheless, capture and ongoing primitive accumulation are not synonymous. Capture 
is at the same time the placing of people in particular positions, as it is a process of creating 
                                                        
16 Massimo De Angelis (2004) makes the persuasive argument that the fundamental distinction between 
“primitive accumulation” and “expanded reproduction of capital” is one of form. Both of them are based 
on the constant separation between means of production and workers. The difference is that while in 
primitive accumulation the separation is very visible and violent, expanded reproduction rests on the idea 
that this is the way in which the world works. For this second element to operate correctly, it is necessary 
to create systems of meaning making that naturalize exploitation, restricting the space within which 
alternatives can even be thought of.  In this case creating the idea that there is no “beyond” or “outside” 
the labor contract. 
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those positions; it appropriates, subdues and disciplines existing forms of being in the world, at 
the same time as it produces and shapes new ones in accord with both the forms of domination 
and capital accumulation. There are many forms of capture, of which primitive accumulation –
the constant process by which capital attempts to separate the control over the conditions of 
labor and provisioning from the producers– is one. The other one that I explore here is the 
“bridling of labor,” understood as the variable set of arrangements by which the worker’s body is 
immobilized, or tied to the labor relation, in an attempt to prevent its flight, the breach of the 
contract –be it de jure or de facto– and refusal to work (Moulier-Boutang 2006). This fixing 
refers to those practices – that go beyond the wage labor relation and can be both formal and 
informal– that obstruct the would-be workers’ (or workers’) mobility, whether geographical, 
professional, social or political.  
Ongoing primitive accumulation and labor bridling can and do tend to work together. 
For example, through primitive accumulation, potential labor is freed from the means of labor, 
and labor bridling makes sure it stays put and under the control of capital. In this sense, neither 
mechanism is understood in a single and particular way. Rather, the idea with both concepts is 
to try to apprehend the different ways in which living labor and communities are brought 
together under the political economic logic of other classes and the law of capital, at the same 
time as acknowledging that the whole process is fraught with frictions and moments in which, 
however fleetingly, living labor is able to attain some level of autonomy or distance from the law 
of capital (Henderson 1998). 
At the same time, it is important to heed Silvia Federici´s (2004) warning that primitive 
accumulation has been not only about the accumulation of wealth and “free” labor, but also of 
fixing a set of hierarchies within the working class. Phrased in somewhat different words, 
primitive accumulation – the violent introduction of people into capitalist relations – is 
necessarily gendered. In this sense, the study of the processes of labor capture must also be the 
study of the ways in which the penetration of capital has shifted the positions between men and 
42 
 
women, and between each and the overarching system. For example, according to Maureen 
Mackintosh (1989:35) “…not only do men´s and women´s experiences of class differ, but 
changes in the relations between men and women, including the sexual division of labour, is one 
of the ways in which new class structures become established.” 
For Mackintosh, as well as for Crehan (1997), one of the threads along which we can 
approach these micro-processes of class formation and gender reorganization, is that of 
monetization as a signal of shifts in the relations with production and subsistence. Starting from 
a conceptual continuum of monetization of the reproduction of the household that moves from 
total self-provisioning to full wage labor; and, in parallel, we may use as our starting point a 
domestic regulatory form of labor control and division that runs along a continuum between 
kinship relations and market transactions. We are left with a model in which shifts in terms of 
the monetization of the subsistence of the household are also reflected in terms of the forms of 
domestic control and division of labor.  
For example, in a household that is mostly self-provisioned, the division of labor is 
heavily gendered in terms of what is understood to be “women´s work” and “men´s work.” 
Women are subjugated, but this subjugation has to be understood in kinship terms and thus, the 
claims that each member of the household can make on the other members has to be 
understood in these terms. As the household´s subsistence is moved along the monetization 
thread by the process of labor capture, the forms of subjugation also begin to shift. Work that is 
monetized is separated from that which is not; and since the former becomes ever more 
important in procuring the household’s subsistence, it also becomes hierarchized and gendered. 
Production and reproduction (or the work of producing labor power) are thus separated and 
seen as discrete spheres of activity, with the market becoming the site of realization of the 
former and with men as its subject, and the household the site of the later, with women as its 
subject (Mies 1986).  
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This process should not be understood as complete, the actual historical situations tend 
to be located along the two continuums presented. Neither is it a peaceful or natural process; 
just as labor capture is constantly contested by subaltern subjects in general, so women´s “new” 
forms of subjugation are also renegotiated, reinterpreted and in need of constant mending. The 
question here is how the processes of labor capture and flight are gendered and disputed (or 
not) in particular settings. Where gender is understood as both “…a constitutive element of 
social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and …[as] a primary way 
of signifying relationships of power” (Scott 1999:42). 
Postcolonial capital and passive revolution 
In 1821 the former provinces of Spain — Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Guatemala — began a long and conflict ridden process – from Spanish colonies to part of the 
Mexican Empire (between 1821 and 1823), to the Central American Federation (roughly 
between 1823 and 1838), – which eventually led them to become formally independent 
republics. After a bloodless independence, these societies or, in many cases, agglomerations of 
communities, began the process of trying to carve out a place in the world as both nations and 
states. In this sense, this process has to be understood within the larger overarching dynamics of 
the expansion of capital accumulation and the rise of the British and later U.S. empires. For the 
brand new Central American republics, this meant turning a set of not very efficient and limited 
colonial economies, organized around various bust and boom extractive cycles (for example, 
precious woods and cochineal) into some sort of viable capital accumulation. The fact that this 
could not be done from scratch, but was built upon what was there, meant that the postcolonial 
Central American economy was also going to center around extractive practices and that the 
possibilities of amassing profit would come from rent capture. 
For the particular case of Italy during the Risorgimento Gramsci (1971) proposed the 
concept of “passive revolution” – or “revolution from above” or “revolution without a revolution” 
– to refer to the process by which the Italian bourgeoisie managed to rise to dominance without 
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being strong enough to become the moral and intellectual leader of the rest of the social classes. 
Rather, it had to enter into a set of concessions and pacts with the old dominant groups, to seal, 
however tenuously, its hegemonic position. In this way, the bourgeoisie managed to become 
dominant, but could not become a truly “progressive” force, in the sense of clearing the old 
regime up and creating the conditions for full-fledged capitalism.  
In what Terence Byres (1994) has dubbed the neo-Gramscian approach, a body of 
literature has used this concept to approach and problematize the state-development connection 
in postcolonial India. Kalyan Sanyal (2013:31) in his synthesis of this approach describes the 
process of passive revolution in these terms:  
…when the bourgeoisie is relatively weak in civil society, it resorts to a passive 
revolution in which it allies with the old dominant classes to get into macro 
power on the level of the state, and then engages in molecular transformation of 
civil society. The bourgeoisie, in this case, has to seek legitimation on the basis of 
a mixed agenda consisting of, along with its own goals, goals of other groups as 
well. In other words, the thesis (capital), for its own development, incorporates a 
part of the antithesis (pre-capital), producing a surrogate synthesis that blocks 
the true synthesis, (full-fledged capitalism). 
According also to Sanyal (p. 35), the neo-Gramscian approach is built upon four larger 
claims: 1. the post-colonial bourgeoisie has to form alliances with dominant pre-capitalist 
groups to attain state power; 2. it must legitimize capital accumulation as a national-popular 
goal; 3. this need for legitimation, rules out a full-fledged process of primitive accumulation in a 
time in which liberal principles of development and human rights are themselves gaining 
legitimacy, and; 4. the state therefore has to preserve and protect pre-capitalist modes of 
production. In this sense, the development question – understood as the superseding of the pre-
capitalist or traditional, by the capitalist or modern – is a false one. The traditional sector must 
be conserved as part of the unstable equilibrium of political forces needed to maintain 
hegemony under the framework of passive revolution. As Partha Chatterjee (quoted by Sanyal 
2013:33) argues, the bourgeoisie instead of destroying the pre-capitalist elites, seeks “to limit 
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their former power, neutralize them where necessary, attack them only selectively, and in 
general bring them round to a position of subsidiary allies within a reformed state structure.” 
Sanyal himself proposes the necessity of moving beyond this approach. For him, the 
whole neo-Gramscian approach, all Marxism really, sees the traditional sector as external to 
capital, and thus as something that could eventually be superseded. Rather, from his 
perspective, “…pre-capital constitutes and internal ‘other’…” (p. 39). Thus, he proposes that we 
replace pre- by non-capitalist. Further, for him it is crucial to recuperate the idea that primitive 
accumulation is not only present in the postcolonial Indian context, but it is a constituent 
element of capital accumulation. In his approach, primitive accumulation is a constant process 
by which significant amounts of labor are “freed” without all of it being absorbed by the 
economy; this labor surplus becomes the non-capitalist sector. In this model then, legitimation 
is achieved not by avoiding primitive accumulation, but by rehabilitating the non-capitalist 
sector through the discourse and practices of development, which he calls “reverse-primitive 
accumulation.” 
I would argue that this way of approaching the postcolonial rise to power of the 
bourgeoisie is also useful for understanding Central American reality, but with a few critical 
caveats. First, India’s independence arrived more than 100 years after Central America’s and 
thus, the level of development of global capitalism and of bourgeois sentiments and groups was 
different. Second, unlike England, Spain was hardly a booming economic empire and the 
articulation of the Latin American colonies was first and foremost as producers of raw materials 
and little to no technology transfer took place. Third, as Sanyal also points out, the legitimation 
and accumulation scale of the neo-Gramscian approach is fundamentally national. For the 
Central American case it is impossible to understand the region’s historical trajectory without 
taking into account the U.S. role. Finally, I agree with Sanyal in regards to the necessity of seeing 
the traditional sector as internal to the dynamics of capitalism and also regarding the centrality 
that primitive accumulation has for postcolonial capital. However, his argument regarding 
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reverse primitive accumulation has to be limited to the post-World War II period when 
development – as a particular set of discourses and practices – really took flight.17 Rather, I 
would argue that the tension between primitive accumulation and legitimation has to be 
understood within the hegemonic tension between consent and coercion. In other words, those 
periods in which primitive accumulation is exercised freely and extensively tend to be followed 
by periods in which concessions are given to subaltern groups in an attempt to maintain some 
equilibrium in the relations of force.  
Taking these elements into account, I “…begin by recognizing that it is economic 
heterogeneity that constitutes capitalism within which capital, as a specific relation of 
production, exists, and then ask whether that heterogeneity itself can be seen as an expression of 
capital´s hegemony” (Sanyal 2013:7). 
Rent capture as state formation 
Using the analytical scheme just presented, I would argue that the early – mainly 19th-century – 
Central American postcolonial political economy must be understood as a hegemonic scramble. 
In this scramble different social groups that came out of the postcolonial period struggled to 
gain control over the points of rent capture that would give them economic dominance and, 
through this process, to create a political framework that would allow them to enter and retain 
political power over society. This was not a simple task. First of all, as we can imagine, the lack 
of complexity of the Central American economies translated into a limited level of social 
differentiation between groups, particularly between dominant or elite ones. Thus, what 
eventually became the Liberal and Conservative parties found their differences in the grounds of 
affinity to either the pro-independence movement or the Spanish crown more than in some sort 
of class cleavage (Pérez-Brignoli 1989). Further, the fact that there had been no war of 
                                                        
17 However, it is important to remember Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud’s (2005:6) argument 
that “[b]oth the terms ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ were invented well before World War II 
(though their visibility waxed and waned and their precise meanings changed).”  
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independence meant that there would not be any liberators – in the mold of Bolívar or San 
Martín in South America – that could carry enough legitimation into the postcolonial period. 
This was also a period of flux in which new concepts were being adapted in practice. As 
the early nineteenth-century Honduran statesman José Cecilio del Valle described the period 
after independence in 1821: 
We were subjects of the Spanish government, in one of the less advanced 
provinces of America; and all of a sudden, without any previous learning, we 
ascended to the throne as legislators to organize Republics, form states and 
dictate fundamental laws (quoted by Barahona 2002:231) 
 It should then come as no surprise that the initial governmental steps were taken within 
the framework of the colonial period. A clear example of this was the struggle around the Central 
American Union that lasted from 1824 to 1838. The Union, was an attempt by a loose alliance of 
“Liberal” individuals and groups in the various countries, that promoted the idea that it was 
better to remain as a single Central American republic, than to become five small countries, 
which was in general terms the position defended by the “Conservatives.” Hindsight is, as they 
say, always 20/20, and it would seem that the unionist proposal would have worked better for 
everyone involved. However at the moment, there were simply more elements keeping apart the 
different countries, than the forces bringing them together – basically protecting themselves 
from foreign intervention, as Thomas Karnes (1976) persuasively shows. Further, it is important 
to add the direct involvement of the U.S. in discouraging the consolidation of the Union. 
Moreover, in the case of Honduras, it is worth mentioning the conflictive relationship with 
England over the territories of British Honduras –today independent Belize – which helped to 
create an embryonic and antagonistic national identity in opposition to the European power and 
the other former colonies (Barahona 2002). 
Taking these two elements together, what we find is a situation in which various social 
groups were trying to come to grips with a new set of political tasks and notions, at the same 
time as they tried to negotiate how they would enter and be articulated with the global capitalist 
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market. Here again the colonial legacy weighed heavily, as this articulation was necessarily 
thought through finding rent capture opportunities in the form of export-oriented cash crops or 
extractive activities, such as mining and precious woods. We have to speak almost of a three-
pronged process in which the groups scrambling for dominance were embarking on becoming a 
capitalist class, a nation – in the sense of creating a sense of national belonging among a group 
of isolated communities – and a state – in terms of creating the institutions and understandings 
that would mediate these political practices and bargain for their position at the global scale. 18 
The relations between these dynamics are more than evident. Rent capturing was necessary for 
there to be some sort of institutional centralization and expansion and penetration of political 
power to create something that would look like a modern state in the European mirror (Quijano 
2000) in which the Central American elites saw themselves. At the same time, some sort of 
centralized political power was needed to procure the conditions of production behind the rent 
capturing (infrastructure, labor laws, etc.); and a sense of national belonging was crucial to hide 
the class tracks of the whole process and present a much more unified image.19 
Following this line, I would argue that for the postcolonial Central American case, the 
process of state, nation and class formation came together and combined in particular forms, 
depending on the specific country, its resources and historical trajectory (Mahoney 2001). It is 
useful to think about this from the perspective of how labor, capital and land were (or were 
expected to be) articulated to promote the accumulation of capital. For the particular case of 
Honduras, at least until the early 1900s, this hegemonic scramble appeared mainly as a politico-
military conflict. According to Rachel Sieder (1995:103), in this period “…Republican politics 
                                                        
18 Kligman and Verdery (2011:3) make a somewhat similar argument for Communist Romania: “Contrary 
to popular belief, collectivization in Romania did not involve a powerful Communist Party imposing its 
will on the countryside, for Party rule itself was in a process of being created. To see the Party-state as a 
fully formed social actor at the time of collectivizing… would be an error.” 
19 For a different, albeit complementary study, see David Nugent´s (1997) study on Peru. 
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was distinguished  by intense regionalism, lack of  national integration and almost  constant 
foreign intervention.  Lack of domestic capital and recurring military conflict proved persistent 
obstacles to sustained economic development throughout the nineteenth century.”  
This conflict took the form of constant armed rebellions and internal fighting between 
different factions that would take on the label of either Liberal or Conservatives. What seems to 
be at stake was exactly the shape that political power would take. While there was an agreement 
– built upon the colonial legacy – that land equaled power, how exactly this relation would work 
was the center of the conflict. For the Conservative sectors, the idea was to maintain basically 
the colonial hegemonic equilibrium organized around a geographically fragmented system of 
cattle ranching – with the hacienda system as the nucleus of political power20 –, a boom and 
bust agro-export sector and a significant peasant sector, dedicated mainly to a self-provisioning 
economy that operated to a significant degree on community lands.   
For the Liberals, the task was rather to radically transform the economic structure to 
create the basic conditions to expand capital accumulation and thus, modernize the country.21 
For this, the grabbing of government was crucial, as it was seen “…as the vehicle par excellence 
to overcome the initial constraints” (Del Cid 1988:32). 
Neither group was able to fully defeat the other and in the end the process took a form 
close to the one described by Gramsci (1971:219) as “Caesarism”: “[w]hen the progressive force 
A struggles with the reactionary force B, not only may A defeat B or B defeat A, but it may 
                                                        
20 For a more elaborated version of this argument, see Sergio Tischler´s (2001) book on what he calls the 
“large farmer Guatemalan state form” [La forma finquera del Estado]. According to Tischler, the 
postcolonial Guatemalan state was organized along the same lines of social control present in the 
country’s large haciendas. 
21 For example, in reference to del Valle’s economic thought, Barahona (2002:353–53) mentions that: 
“…the economic project of del Valle for the construction of an independent and sovereign Central 
American nation, contemplated the creation the optimum conditions for the development of a capitalist 
agriculture that was mainly oriented towards the foreign market, as a way of acquiring social wealth.” 
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happen that neither A nor B defeats the other… and then a third force C intervenes from outside, 
subjugating what is left of both A and B.” 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Liberal governments came to power in all of Central 
America and began promoting laws intended to stimulate commercial agriculture. However, 
according to Sieder (1995:103–04), “While communal landholdings were under attack 
elsewhere in the region, the Honduran Ley de Fomento de la Agricultura, passed in 1887, had 
the effect of strengthening traditional agriculture, extending and protecting the ejidos ...” 
For example, 
[b]etween the Liberal ‘revolution’ of 1871 and 1883, close to 400,000 hectares of 
public lands in Guatemala were sold and another 74,250 hectares entered the 
market with the abolition of the censo enfitéutico, a type of ninety-nine year lease 
that granted access to ejido lands in return for an annual rent of 2 or 3 per cent of 
their value. This is a lot of land (4,742.5 km2), and it clearly ended up in the 
hands of a small number of owners. But the main importance of Liberal land 
privatization may, as some recent analyses argue, lie less in its territorial extent 
than in the social relations that it destroyed and created and in the multiple ways 
it exposed subaltern groups to the discipline of the state, elites and the market. 
Concretely, Liberal ‘reform’ in Guatemala and El Salvador (and to a lesser extent 
elsewhere) dispossessed indigenous populations, created a huge pool of landless 
‘free’ workers, and solidified central states that deployed formidable apparatuses 
of labour control and repression.  (Edelman and León 2013:1702–03) 
In contrast, the Honduran “liberal” land law did not directly attack the communal and 
municipal rights to control, hold and distribute land. On the contrary, it encouraged them to 
maintain the same tenure relationships as before. According to Robert Williams (1994), when 
we combine this situation with the lack of roads, we begin to understand the difficulties that the 
coffee industry taking hold in the country.22 I will return to this in a moment. 
                                                        
22 According to Williams, “[b]ecause of poor transportation networks, it was difficult for the Liberals who 
occupied high government offices to transform agriculture in the manner they may have wished. 
Decisions regarding land and who had access to it were left to the local municipalities, which tended to 
preserve traditional rights” (Williams 1994:94). 
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This situation speaks loudly of the type of relations that existed between the contending 
political groups, as the Liberals were unable to fully advance their agenda, and were forced to 
make concessions to remain in government to the former dominant groups, who relied on 
certain limited access to land by peasants as a form of political control. Further, it also speaks of 
the importance of keeping the peasantry somewhat happy, as levying forces for the armed 
conflicts clashed constantly with the tension between capture and flight that I mentioned before.  
This situation meant that in the Honduran case, rent capture, and thus, the processes of 
state and class formation could not take the same trajectory as in the rest of the region. Much 
has been written on the relation between the development of coffee and state formation in 
Central America during the Liberal period (see for example Williams 1994; Paige 1998); and the 
supposed lack of its development in Honduras until the 1940s is one of the arguments used to 
explain for the weaker state in Honduras (for example, Torres-Rivas 1981; Mahoney 2001). 
Without entering into much detail, the general argument is that coffee, due to its development 
by British and German capital, which controlled its commercialization, and local elites involved 
mainly in production, a situation arose in which governments were able to profit fiscally from 
the crop. Thus, a coffee oligarchy emerged in the same process in which growing income from 
exports allowed the government to strengthen, centralize and expand its grip over the national 
territory, particularly through the professionalization of the army. This was not the case of 
Honduras, where the process of primitive accumulation was not as extensive and where the 
development of the crop foundered in the face of limits imposed by territorial fragmentation and 
lack of the infrastructure. 
If we were to return to the schema of looking at how labor, capital and land were 
combined in this period, we could present this situation in this way. On the one hand, in the rest 
of Central America, particularly El Salvador and Guatemala, there was a labor surplus that had 
resulted from the process of labor capture and land grabbing. Then, these two resources could 
be combined with British and German merchant capital, organized around the production of 
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coffee, to create a set of financial surpluses that allowed for the creation of both a relatively 
strong army, a set of centralized public institutions and a dominant coffee oligarchy.  
On the other hand, in Honduras, since the Liberals had been unable to gain supremacy 
over the rest of the political forces in the country, the process of labor capture was much more 
limited, which had been anyway one of the largest problems in the province since the colonial 
period, and thus did not have either the land concentration or the labor surpluses to articulate 
with foreign merchant capital around coffee. I already showed how the problem of lack of labor 
was both absolute and relative, as it had to do as much with low population densities, as well as 
with the (supposedly) low levels of its quality. In the case of land, the situation was different. It 
was not so much that Honduran territory was limited, but rather that vast amounts of land were 
simply outside of the control of the elites and were thus understood as empty. Because of this 
situation, the task of the Liberals during the governments of Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-83) and 
Luis Bográn (1883-91) centered mainly on trying to connect and thus control the rest of the 
country, populate it with “better” human quality (Europeans and North Americans) and attract 
foreign capital.23 
The fact that agriculture had proven to be a sort of dead end made Soto turn his eyes 
towards the promotion of foreign capital investment in mining, which proved to be quite a 
lucrative venture for both the investors and a very limited sector of the domestic elite (Molina, 
Reina, and Palma 1983). However, mining had a limited effect in the strengthening of the 
government, as little to no fiscal revenues were collected by the Honduran state.  
                                                        
23 In Marvin Barahona’s (2002:250) words: “Most of the times they were [economic projects] singular 
ideas that were presented as the ‘great solution’ for the economic problems faced by the nation. In this 
way, that the dream to see the country populated by European and North American immigrants, of 
uniting the national territory from coast to coast with an interoceanic railroad, or resuscitating the mining 
industry, were in their time, projects in which the hopes of the nation were deposited.” 
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The other activity eyed by the Liberals was the construction of a trans-oceanic railroad, 
which would connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. This idea was connected with the U.S. 
expansionism towards Mexico and the discovery of gold deposits in California, which triggered a 
massive gold rush. In this context, the creation of the railroad would significantly shorten the 
distance between both U.S. coasts and benefit the country in the form of massive rents 
(Barahona 2002), much as occurred in Nicaragua, where thousands of miners traversed the 
isthmus via the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. However, in the end this Honduran 
railroad project was a failure. The Honduran government incurred in a massive debt with 
British banks to finance the construction and much of the funds were lost along the way through 
different forms of embezzlement.  It took the Honduran people a long time to finally pay off this 
debt.  
Creating a banana republic 
The tally of these two economic activities was not very flattering in terms of the grand attempts 
at nation-state (and class) formation by the Liberals. On the one hand, mining had proven 
effective in creating a certain amount of profits, but these had remained within a limited clique 
and had had little to no effect in increasing the government’s revenues or helping extend its 
influence over the territory. Further, the riches found in the Honduran mines had a short life 
and soon were exhausted. On the other hand, the rent capturing dreams of the trans-oceanic 
railroad had only translated into frustration and making of Honduras a state basically born in 
debt.  
In the early twentieth century, the promotion of immigration became even more central 
to the Liberals’ attempts to modernize the country. For example, in 1906, new legislation was 
approved that created an Immigration and Agriculture Council to propose and carry out 
immigration and colonization projects. However, the European and U.S. nationals that actually 
arrived in the country cared little about the government’s expectations (colonization and 
agricultural ventures) and instead settled in ports and worked in the commercial sector. At the 
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same time, the arrival of other immigrants – Arabs, Chinese, black West Indians – provoked 
xenophobic reactions, making clear that the Liberals’ view of the modernization was process was 
selective and racialized.24  
This embryonic form of nationalism, which tended to be fueled by the frequent 
interventions of the U.S. in Central America, constantly came into tension with the diagnosis 
and cure proposed for the national economy. Thus, at the same time as restrictions were placed 
on certain nationalities, an open door policy for foreign capital was being inaugurated. In an 
attempt to attract foreign investment, the Honduran government began to offer generous 
concessions of land, tax exemptions and almost free exploitation rights over land and natural 
resources (Williams 1994; Soluri 2009; Barahona 2005). In a short time, this policy brought 
most of the (limited) economic activities in the country under the control of foreign 
concessionaires.   
It is in this context that the entry and consolidation of the banana companies in the 
Honduran north coast must be understood. Banana production for export in Central America 
began as early as the 1870s (Posas 1993). Initially, these exports were carried out in a manner 
not that different from that of coffee. The local producers, most of them medium sized, would 
carry their production to the ports, where steamships would receive and buy the fruit, and later 
carry it to the United States. While most banana production was in Honduran hands at this 
time, some significant competition existed between shippers. 
Just as this commerce was intensifying, the government, under Liberal control with 
Soto, was embracing an export-oriented policy, which helped to consolidate the banana 
industry. However, it is worth mentioning that in the Ley de Fomento de la Agricultura, already 
                                                        
24 This was not of course something exclusive to Honduras, but rather a general trend present in most of 
the Caribbean Basin (see, for example, Putnam 2002; Gudmundson et al. 2010). 
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mentioned above, which gave tax and financial incentives for export-oriented farmers, bananas 
were not included (Soluri 2009).  
This was not the only element acting against the consolidation of the industry in the 
early period. Just as I have already mentioned, willing labor was hard to come by. For example, 
during the 1880s “…frequent armed conflicts disrupted labor supplies by causing men to flee 
towns and farms in order to avoid impressment.” This situation would carry on into the 20th 
century, as 
For example, in 1902 a U.S. citizen named Howard Reed complained about labor 
shortages due to the unwillingness of Hondurans living in the highlands to work 
on the coast. The Honduran government approved his request to introduce up to 
one thousand workers ‘suitable for agricultural work in the tropics excluding 
Chinese, Blacks and Coolies.’ (Soluri 2009:24 and 25)  
These two quotations are illustrative of some of the topics that I have been touching 
upon, particularly the difficulties of labor capture at that time. This idea of men fleeing towns 
and farms to avoid being drafted points to the tensions between capture and flight in a lively 
way. Further, Reed’s complaints not only present this situation again, but add the idea of the low 
quality of the labor that could be found in the country. In both cases – the capture-flight tension 
and the effective lack of labor – the state question was placed squarely in the middle. In terms of 
the lack of labor, the necessity of regulating the type of migrant workers that would enter the 
country was crucial, as well as expanding control over territory and thus limiting the space for 
labor flight. In terms of hegemony, some sort of socio-political stability was needed for these 
forms of labor capture to operate, and for this a group needed to somehow rise above the rest. I 
will return to this shortly. 
In terms of production, these barriers did not deter either national or foreign investors 
from expanding the crop along the Honduran north coast at the turn of the new century. For 
example, in 1905 Honduran banana exports totaled 4.4 million bunches and represented a 
significant amount of the wealth produced in the region. However, transportation continued to 
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be one of the main obstacles for the full development of the industry. According to Soluri 
(2009:26–27): 
The National Railroad [the limited section built with the funds for the Trans-
Oceanic Railroad], which ran some sixty miles inland from Puerto Cortés to the 
town of Potrerillos (south of San Pedro Sula), was the only significant railway in 
the region. Banana growers relied primarily upon fluvial transportation networks 
to carry their fruit to points of embarkation along the coast. Roads were poorly 
maintained and often impassable during the rainy season. Consequently, 
production zones were concentrated near ports, navigable inland waterways, and 
the National Railroad. These early banana zones emerged primarily on account of 
the efforts of small- and medium-scale growers with limited capital resources. 
The combination between bananas becoming a profitable venture, the lack of 
infrastructure, the policies for attracting foreign investment and the particular hegemonic needs 
of the local elites would create the conditions for the industry to become vertically integrated 
and under the control of U.S. capital. This was the birth of a quintessential banana republic. 
Banana politics and hegemony 
Following my discussion so far, it should come as no wonder that some of the first and most 
important concessions given to the would-be banana companies came by the way of railroad 
investments. Although the Inter-Oceanic Railroad venture had been a failure, railroads in 
general continued to fuel the Honduran elites’ dreams of an interconnected country in which – if 
the right type of labor were imported – great riches would be amassed and the country 
modernized.25 In 1902 the U.S. citizen William Streich received a concession to build and 
operate a railroad in the municipality of Omoa, department of Cortés, which also included the 
rights to lease property alongside the tracks to establish banana farms. Three years later the 
concession was passed to Samuel Zemurray, who with financial backing from the United Fruit 
Company (UFCO) bought Streich’s Cuyamel Company. In 1904, one year prior to Zemurray’s 
                                                        
25 For example, Soluri (2009:43) mentions that “[f]or many Honduran elites, railroads were the ties that 
would bind the nation-state both by linking the North Coast to the highlands and by generating revenue 
for other state-building projects.” 
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arrival, the New Orleans based Vaccaro Brothers and Company also received a concession to 
build a railroad in the brand new province of Atlántida (Posas 1993). In both cases, the U.S. 
investors built their lines with the sole purpose of hauling bananas, disregarding the 
commitments made in the concession agreements to helping the interconnection of the country. 
In this way, “[t]hese railroad projects initiated a trend that would eventually leave just two 
companies in control of the production, transportation, and distribution of export bananas” 
(Soluri 2009:33).  
According to Soluri, this move towards vertical integration was not only oriented by 
transport difficulties in the production sites, but also by the need for better control over both 
quantity and quality of the fruit reaching the U.S. and for lowering the financial risks of trading 
in highly perishable agricultural commodities. In any case, the rhythms of the now global 
banana industry became intertwined with the hegemonic scramble in Honduras. In December, 
1910, Manuel Bonilla launched an attack on Trujillo, with a small armed force of U.S. 
mercenaries financed by Zemurray. Just three years before, Nicaraguan forces had invaded 
Tegucigalpa, ousted Bonilla and put the Liberal Miguel Dávila in his place. Shortly after 
assuming the presidency, Dávila signed a treaty with the U.S. which granted the latter rights to 
oversee the country’s customs receipts. This was seen as a threat to the banana man, who feared 
that this might bring an end to the juicy duty exemptions held by the company. Further, unlike 
the period under Bonilla, Dávila granted important concessions – including the leasing of the 
National Railroad – to rival U.S. investors.  
Dávila asked the U.S. government to intervene in the armed conflict with Bonilla, which 
led to a mediated settlement – upon the U.S.S.Tacoma – which culminated with the naming of 
Francisco Bertrand as interim president. This meant defeat for Dávila and the Liberal party, as it 
opened up the door for Bonilla to be elected in the November 1911 elections. Gramsci’s 
definition of Caesarism, which I noted above, presents a situation in which forces A and B 
struggle against each other, with neither of them being able to of overcome their opponent “… 
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and then a third force C intervenes from outside, subjugating what is left of both A and B” 
(Gramsci 1971:219). If we understand this subjugating not as formal and total control, but as 
meddling and influencing to make sure that one of the forces is able to come into power and 
legislate in favor of C’s interests, then we can use this model of Caesarism to understand the rise 
in influence that Zemurray and UFCO eventually came to have over the country. 
With Bonilla as president, Zemurray and UFCO managed to secure various railroad and 
land concessions. This meant that for the first time in over ten years, banana companies 
managed to establish a secure foothold in the country. The railroad concessions were 
particularly important in this direction. According to Soluri (2009:43) 
The railroad concessions provided the legal means by which the U.S. fruit 
companies established control over vast quantities of resources. Although not 
identical, most of the concessions granted by early-twentieth century Honduran 
governments followed a similar formula: in return for constructing and operating 
piers, railroads, and telegraph lines, the concessionaires received rights to soil, 
timber, water, and mineral resources in addition to tax and duty exemptions. 
It was through this mechanism that the different banana companies – particularly 
UFCO, Zemurray’s Cuyamel and Vaccaro Brothers – came to control a massive amount of 
resources in Honduras. By 1929, around 29 million banana bunches were being exported from 
Honduras, more than Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Colombia put together. Also, more 
than 15 hundred kilometers of railroad linked banana farms stretching along the north coast. In 
terms of land, UFCO and its subsidiaries possessed over 160,000 hectares of land, including 
30,000 covered by bananas and another 6,000 by pastures. The Cuyamel Fruit Co. held 55,000 
hectares and Standard Fruit Company’s Honduran subsidiaries came to control over 23,000 
hectares (Soluri 2009:53).  
The banana companies’ production process had a very particular spatial dynamic. Due to 
diminishing soil fertility and the advent of the Panama disease in the 1920s, the profitability of 
the enterprise was predicated upon a kind of shifting agriculture. In this form of production, 
large extensions of land would be used to plant bananas and then later abandoned, with the 
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process starting anew in another place free of the disease. This meant two things at least. First, 
that the banana companies needed to keep large amounts of idle land in reserve for later use; as 
we will see, this would eventually become a conflictive situation. Second, the whole system 
depended on constantly securing land concessions from the government. Thus, the various 
banana companies were competing among themselves to control or win the favors of 
government officials. In this, no one was more aggressive than Zemurray, who in 1928 came to 
be in the middle of another political scandal. 
In May of that year, U.S. port officials in New Orleans intercepted $50,000 worth of 
arms being loaded aboard a Cuyamel Company steamboat bound for Honduras. Nineteen 
twenty-eight was an election year in Honduras and although it was never proven, U.S. 
government officials suspected that Zemurray was funneling arms and resources to Liberal party 
supporters in anticipation of a post-election rebellion. Party colors were of little importance to 
the banana man, who would as easily bet on a National party politician such as Bonilla, than 
support a Liberal uprising. In this case, the target of his animosity was the UFCO-backed 
National Party candidate Tiburcio Carías Andino. He was particularly concerned about his 
access to the production zone along the shared and disputed border between Guatemala and 
Honduras.26 
Since 1915 both Cuyamel and UFCO had been in an open struggle to gain control over 
these lands, trying to manipulate and influence both governments in their favor. By the late 
1920s the conflict between both countries continued to escalate and with troops assembling on 
the contested border, the U.S. government decided to intervene. At the same time, the 
Department of State pressured Zemurray to strike a truce with his company’s opponents and 
thus make the border dispute more manageable. In 1929, 
                                                        
26 For a detailed account of this border conflict and the role of the banana company, see Paul Dosal´s 
(1993 particularly chapters 5 and 8) political history of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. 
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United Fruit eventually agreed to purchase the assets of the Cuyamel Fruit 
Company from Zemurray for 300,000 shares of United Fruit stock. United Fruit 
acquired nearly 22,000 hectares of land planted in bananas, sugar cane, and 
coconuts; 23,000 hectares of forest and wetlands; steamships; and control over 
an additional 13 percent of the U.S. market. Zemurray, now holding United Fruit 
stock worth $32 million, retired to his family estate near New Orleans. (Soluri 
2009:74) 
With this move, one of the most important pieces in the Honduran hegemonic jigsaw 
puzzle came into place. The merger between Cuyamel and UFCO meant that their struggles over 
political power would no longer be reflected into the electoral arena and that with the rise of a 
single banana company, a single political faction would rise to power. However, it is important 
to remember that power is always exercised against resistance and that structural changes must 
always come with the creation of new social groups; we turn to this in the next section.  
Camperos vs. El Pulpo: the rise of organized labor 
By the 1930s, the forces unleashed by the development and transformation of the banana 
industry had had a deep impact in the social and political fabric of the country. The plantations 
and cities that grew up around the industry became socially and economically dynamic places, 
attracting incoming flows of labor – both foreign (West Indian and Salvadoran) and Honduran 
from the country’s west, center and south – and the creation of new social groups (Molina, 
Reina, and Palma 1983; Del Cid 1988). However, parallel to this dynamism the levels of social 
discontent against the foreign banana companies continued to increase. This discontent, which 
took the form of a nationalistic discourse, was aimed at what was seen as a sell-out government 
that did everything and anything that the companies and particularly el pulpo – the octopus, as 
the UFCO was popularly known – asked. Besides this nationalist posture, or rather within and 
through it, came also very concrete grievances presented by the nascent organized labor 
movement.  The emerging unions, created in the framework of the banana plantations, was 
increasingly fighting to improve workers’ living and working conditions, although mainly by 
following a corporatist agenda.  
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As Barahona (2005:87) points out, “The rise in labor organization, since 1929, coincided 
with the beginning of the world economic crisis and its consequences soon after.” Since at the 
time the north coast was the only region closely linked to the U.S. market, “the crisis took the 
form of the closing down of plantations, mass layoffs, reductions in salaries and the 
accentuation of xenophobia among the national workers.” 
The mass layoffs in particular, which were a combination of the effects of the contracting 
U.S. market as well as of the spread of  Panama disease (Soluri 2009), began to create a critical 
situation, in which the levels of violence increased as labor organizations became stronger. The 
creation of the Honduran Union Federation (FSH) in 1929, in particular, spurred campaigns for 
better wages and an eight-hour working day. The banana companies were quick to react and 
pressured the government to repress the labor movement. The government obliged and 
proclaimed martial law in the departments of Atlántida, Cortés, Colón and Yoro, where the 
plantations were located. Further, various paramilitary organizations – including a local branch 
of the Ku Klux Klan – were created to repress the new labor organizations. By 1932 the conflict 
between labor and capital – with the intervention of the state tilted in favor of the latter – had 
intensified, with a strike against a 15 percent decrease in wages implemented all the banana 
plantations on the north coast. The UFCO requested military intervention and the strike was 
drowned in blood.  
Nonetheless, the labor movement continued to grow, as became evident in the run-up to 
the 1932 national elections. The Communist Party, as well as other labor organizations, had 
done a good job of organizing the railroad workers and the camperos – as the banana plantation 
workers were colloquially known – and were presenting the Party’s general secretary, Manuel 
Calix Herrera, as a presidential candidate for the Worker-Peasant Bloc. As Marvin Barahona 
(2005) points out, this would have been the first presidential candidate born outside of the 
traditional elites. In the end, however, the state could not allow for such accommodation and the 
labor movement was brutally repressed, its leaders either killed or exiled. A set of progressive 
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labor policies presented by the Liberal government of Colindres were voted down by the 
National Party and the Bloc was unable to present candidates in the election. 
It is worth stopping for a second, and looking at this situation from the standpoint of 
hegemony and how the state-class link was operating. As we have seen, “[f]oreign investors 
cemented links with the local ruling class through a mixture of patronage networks and 
coercion, employing both methods in order to secure favourable concessions” (Sieder 1995:104). 
According to this same author, 
Under the influence of foreign capital, the politics of favours became a defining 
feature of the political system, aided and abetted by the weakness of central 
authority, deep-rooted traditions of caudillismo, and the chronic instability 
which plagued the country for the better part of the century following 
independence. 
In this context then, “[d]omestic political elites came to function as intermediaries for 
foreign concerns, rarely acting with any sense of unity or national interest” (p. 104). In terms of 
class formation, this observation is important. The material reproduction of the local elites 
rested upon rent capture, so there were no real incentives for the creation of a strong and 
dynamic national bourgeoisie. Further, since the main form of rent capture came from a single 
activity – bananas – under the control of a limited number of companies, this meant that to a 
significant extent their reproduction rested upon their links with these companies. Thus, the 
labor movement was as much a threat for them as it was for the banana companies.  
The increasing levels of organization and the fighting spirit of labor nonetheless had to 
be taken seriously. For this to happen, it was necessary to make changes in the political system 
to open some space for new social groups, while maintaining the same composition of the bloc 
in power. Political domination – Gramsci reminds us – is a complex set of relations between 
consent and coercion, between hegemony and dictatorship. The problematic of hegemony was 
shaped by the political practice between governing elites, incipient new social groups and the 
overwhelming weight of the banana companies. At the turn of the 1930s, the solution to the 
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problem posed by the labor movement would be dictatorship, and its most public face would be 
Tiburcio Carías Andino. 
Order and peace: The Carías dictatorship and the stabilization of domination 
The elections set for the end of 1932 pitted Tiburcio Carías Andino of the National Party against 
José Angel Zúñiga Huete of the Liberal Party. Both manifested similar characteristics and each 
had a perfect traditional caudillo résumé: lawyers, of liberal extraction, undisputed leaders of 
their respective parties and former government. As the elections neared, both candidates were 
sure of victory, which was usually a sign that the campaign would end in dissension by the losing 
party and some sort of armed revolt. However, at the same time, the economic crisis and the 
rising challenge of the labor movement meant that these elections were crucial for the survival of 
the two-party system and politics as usual (Barahona 2005) 
In the end, the results gave Carías a landslide victory over Zúñiga. As everyone expected, 
the Liberal Party and its followers, including many of the military commanders rebelled in an 
attempt to stop the elected president from taking office. However, the rebellion was quickly 
suppressed by the collective military action of the adherents of the two party system, which 
included members of the outgoing government (with a Liberal president), the National Party 
and national air forces (Argueta 2008), as well as the U.S. government and the banana 
companies, in their effort to transfer the costs of the crisis to the working classes (Bulmer-
Thomas 1993). Thus, Carías was able to assume the presidency in February 1933, which would 
eventually extend into a 16-year-long dictatorship, “legalized” through two constitutional 
reforms passed in 1936 and 1939.27 
                                                        
27 Each one of these reforms tended to concentrate more power around the figure of the president. For 
example, in the Constitution of 1936, the president was designated as Policía Mayor [literally, supreme 
policeman], which meant that he could take control over the national police. It also allowed the executive 
to expel people from the country and eliminated the age limit of 65 year of age to be president (Carías was 
to turn 60 that same year) (Argueta 2008). In 1939 a series of other constitutional reforms were passed, 
including the designation of the municipal authorities directly by the president and not by popular 
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The Carías dictatorship is important and constitutes a watershed in Honduran history on 
various levels. Regionally, it was part of a pattern that saw the ascent of conservative and highly 
repressive authoritarian regimes in the five Central American republics. In general terms, these 
regimes were the reaction to the emergence of new social groups in the region – mainly 
organized labor, peasant movements and the commercial petite bourgeoisie – that came to 
challenge the traditional dominant blocs, as well as the severe post-1929 economic and fiscal 
crisis in all the countries and the collapse of both coffee and banana prices. Victor Bulmer-
Thomas (1993:348) notes that, 
[i]n exchange for the preservation of their class interests, the elite in the four 
republics of the north [Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua], were 
prepared to renounce all of their accustomed privileges and benefits, which at 
least, since the 1920s, had given the superficially democratic appearance to the 
political process. 
Phrased differently, the elites gave up control over the governmental structures in 
exchange for remaining as the dominant classes. At the same time, the arrival of Carías allowed 
or signaled the supposed separation of politics from economics, with the latter hidden behind 
the mask of the former  in the appearance of an independent government (Abrams’ [1988] 
famous “mask of the state”). Also, the Carías regime to a certain extent delinked the dynamics of 
rent capture from class formation, and thus created the necessity of some sort of productive 
diversification by even the more conservative elites. 
This move towards autocratic regimes could never have happened had the position of the 
U.S. in relation to the region not changed. In 1923, the U.S. had forced all the Central American 
states to sign what came to be known as the General Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which 
stated the conditions under which a government would receive international recognition. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
election. According to Mario Argueta (2008:103), this reform “…only came to increase the concentration 
of power in the Executive. In this way, the last traces of popular expression by electoral means 
disappeared.”    
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objective was to control and contain the influence that other powers could have in the region. 
However, by the 1930s this fear had significantly diminished and  the U.S. focus shifted away 
from the region to more important issues (Bulmer-Thomas 1993). In any case, since Carías’s 
election was seen as constitutionally sound, it was non-issue, at least before the modifications of 
the constitution. 
In domestic political terms, the dictatorship also had a significant effect. Carías moved 
quickly to purge his own National Party from the elements that were against his continuation in 
power. This meant that slowly but surely, the different elements of opposition in the country 
began to gravitate towards the Liberal Party. Thus, if initially the difference between both 
groups was very limited, with the dictatorship the gap began to widen. This would be 
particularly the case for those sectors of the incipient commercial and industrial bourgeoisie 
who were born around the cities of the north coast and who had roots in the Middle East 
(Euraque 1996). The idea of opposition has to be tempered, however.  As a prominent National 
Party exile wrote to  U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “[t]he Honduran who did not agree 
with the dictatorship could choose between jail, exile and burial [el encierro, el destierro, o el 
entierro]” (Venancio Callejas quoted by Barahona 2005:101).  
The Carías regime’s social base consisted of the large landowners and local elites whose 
wealth was based on the possession of land, as well as the the UFCO and the U.S. government 
(Argueta 2008). The army had a clear role in the process too. Knowing how easily military 
leaders could turn into political contenders, Carías kept the officer corps on a short leash and 
eventually – from 1946 onwards – began a process of professionalization that saw many go 
abroad to study. More than the Army, Carías began to rely heavily on the Air Force, which he 
called the “support of the national peace” and which was much more securely under his grasp 
(Barahona 2005; Bulmer-Thomas 1993). 
His alliance with the banana companies has been the target of much criticism and is here 
that the idea of the “banana republic” really took off. Carías and UFCO were two sides of the 
66 
 
same coin and their fates were tightly knit into the Honduran political fabric. Although these 
companies did not leave much in terms of taxes, their weight within the local economy was so 
massive that it had to be taken into account. For example, in 1929, bananas accounted for 85 
percent of all Honduran exports, a figure that decreased somewhat over time, but in 1950 still 
accounted for 70 percent of total exports and 45 percent by 1960 (Del Cid 1988:139). 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that under Carías the only thing that flourished 
was the banana industry, or that his policies only focused on the north coast. Rather, it is during 
this period that the strategy of passive revolution is consolidated as capital accumulation by the 
banana plantations and political support by the conservative elites were meshed together into a 
state project. This separation between economics and politics had a very clear and distinct 
geographical pattern. While the north coast and its banana plantations became the nucleus of 
capital accumulation with San Pedro Sula as its capital (the “industrial capital of Honduras,” as 
it is commonly known), Tegucigalpa — in the interior, but historically oriented towards the 
south and the Pacific ocean, continued to be the seat of the state powers and most of the 
bureaucracy. The approach to subaltern groups in each region was significantly different. These 
differences are best understood by looking at the ways in which the Carías government’s motto 
“order and peace” was concretized in each space. According to the dictator himself,  
The government that I have had the honor of presiding maintains and will remain 
unyielding in its resolution of saving Honduras for good from anarchy. 
Internecine revolt or permanent social agitation will never be allowed again to 
occupy a prominent place in national life, sacrificing useful beings, impeding 
progress and distorting ideas. For the demagogues, nonconformists of the current 
order that reigns in Honduras, Freedom and Democracy are synonyms of 
licentiousness and disorder. (quoted by Barahona 2005:107) 
In the north coast and particularly in the case of the banana and railroad workers, order 
and peace meant bloody repression of any sort of revolt, strike or public demonstration against 
labor conditions, banana companies or the government (particular viciousness applied to 
sympathizers and members of the Communist Party or allied groups); this was the space of 
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capital, and order and peace would be understood in its terms. However, regarding of the rest of 
the country, Carías’s approach was paradoxically different. He treated Tegucigalpa’s artisans’ 
and government officials’ claims, for example, through negotiations and moderately progressive 
policies and distributed a certain amount of national lands to poor peasants (Barahona 2005; 
Argueta 2008) . 
Carías also succeeded in pacifying the country and bringing to a halt the constant revolts 
and armed clashes – 210 between 1892 and 1932 (Cáceres and Zelaya 2005:50) –  that had 
wracked the country since independence. This of course had a significant economic impact, as 
“[t]he wars required the mobilization either government or opposing troops, supplied by the 
population dedicated to productive activities, basically the peasant population. This subtraction 
interrupted the productive processes, mainly agriculture” (Cáceres and Zelaya 2005:58). 
With the concentration of power in Carías and the focus on order and peace, understood 
here above all as the lack of armed conflicts and the protection of private property, this situation 
began to change. In their study of the development of agriculture during Carías regime, Cáceres 
and Zelaya (2005) try to capture the impact that this situation had in economic terms. To do so, 
they divide in analytic terms the country into two spaces that they call the “Banana Republic” 
and the “Non-Banana Republic,” which basically refers to all of the country, outside of the 
banana producing departments of Colón, Atlántida, Yoro and Cortés. According to their data, 
the constant warring had had a significant effect in terms of de-capitalizing the Non-Banana 
Republic in terms of both production levels and demographic growth; at the same time that the 
Banana Republic capitalized around the banana plantations by attracting the impoverished 
population running away from conflicts and poverty in the rest of the country.28  
                                                        
28 These authors report that in the 1905-1926 period, while the Banana Republic showed a demographic 
growth of 3.73 percent, the Non Banana Republic recorded a much lower 1.26 percent (Cáceres and Zelaya 
2005:74) 
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Besides the effect that this pacification had, Carías also began to use a heavy hand to 
make sure that agriculture would be reactivated. In this way, mainly in the Non-Banana 
Republic, the army commanders, besides their traditional law and order functions, were 
supposed to assure that the peasants dedicated certain extensions of land to the cultivation of 
beans, maize, other staple crops and small-scale animal husbandry. Carías also started a 
program in which national and ejido lands were given to poor peasants in usufruct to produce 
staple crops (Cáceres and Zelaya 2005; Argueta 2008). According to these same authors, with 
Carías’s militarized approach to agriculture and his focus on security and order, economic 
conditions in the Non-Banana Republic began to improve. In fact, between 1932 and 1948 the 
economy in this space grows an annual 3.8 percent, going from $44.1 to $80.9 million in that 
period (p. 81). 
This coupling between discipline and order (property and personal security) was the 
basis of a certain economic growth in the Non-Banana Republic. According to Marvin Barahona, 
Fear became the axiom of the dictatorial ideology. The dictator offered security in 
exchange for submission. It was recognized that Honduras had entered a period 
of political order and stability, but at the same time there was fear that any 
critique of the official ideology would imply repression. This ambiguity was one of 
the pillars of the dictatorship as well as the factor that divided the collective 
memory into two sides: those who felt secure and those who felt scared…  (quoted 
by Cáceres and Zelaya 2005:86) 
Going back to the question of hegemony, it is clear that Carías managed to remain in 
power 16 years by this combination of authoritarian order and economic stabilization. To do so, 
Carías exacerbated and controlled certain contradictions and tensions in the country to his 
advantage. Carías did not create the national fragmentation that in kind led to the 
differentiation between the Banana and Non-Banana Republics; in fact, he moved forward in 
trying to integrate the country through the construction of a telegraph system and other 
infrastructure. However, he was able to capitalize on this by having a politically differentiated 
approach to each space. On the one hand, military support to the banana companies on the 
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north coast meant that the conditions of reproduction of the most important economic activity 
in the country – from the elites’ perspective at least – would remain stable in the Banana 
Republic. On the other hand, quelling social and armed unrest in the Non-Banana Republic and 
promoting agricultural production had a similar effect, but by a different process. For the 
traditional elites, the separation between class and state meant that they could dedicate 
themselves to other activities – such as cattle ranching or commerce – without having to worry 
about their intra-elite opponents grabbing the state (understood as a rent capturing apparatus).  
Importantly, Carías was able to use the large reserves of available ejido and national 
lands to securely fix an important sector of the peasantry on the land, without touching the 
lands of the elites.29 This fixing was important in three ways at least. First, it meant settling 
down population and made it difficult for opposing caudillos to conscript unhappy peasants for 
armed campaigns. Second, it meant increasing production of staple crops and thus lowered the 
price of labor on the national scale, as well as increasing commerce and economic activity. 
Third, and most importantly for my purposes, bridling their labor through access to land, and 
the active supervision of their work, meant restricting or limiting the tendencies towards flight 
that I have mentioned as one of the characteristics feature of the Honduran subaltern groups 
since the colonial period.30  
However here, we are also able to see the tensions intrinsic to domination by passive 
revolution. Consolidating the access to land of the peasantry meant that primitive accumulation 
                                                        
29 As an apologist of the Carías regime would mention in 1946, “The leader [Carías] gave them [the 
peasants] work, forced them to echar raíces [literally, put down roots], to be bound with the maternal 
land and the harvests have become profitable, and the businesses of the petite bourgeoisie have become 
enriched…” (Filánder Díaz Chávez, quoted by Argueta 2008:109). 
30 Although it is impossible to give a single explanation, this situation – access to national lands by 
peasants – goes a long way toward explaining why in Honduras, unlike El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, there were no significant armed rural movements in the 1970s and 1980s (see, Brockett 1990; 
Dunkerley 1988; Gould 1990; Grandin 2011; Schulz and Schulz Sundloff 1994).  
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– in terms of both living and past labor (Marx 1993) – would not be a possibility; thus, this 
policy stunted and delayed the development of a capitalist agricultural sector, as we will see 
later. In terms of capital accumulation and particularly in terms of rent capturing, all of the eggs 
would be placed in the banana industry’s basket, which of course, meant neglecting or leaving 
aside other important groups and dynamics that were also being developed in the country. 
The short-lived democratization of the passive revolution (I): “Honduras’s Paris 
Commune” (1954) 
Towards the mid-1940s, the opposition against Carías began to mount. The dictator really did 
not have much to fear from within, however, as none of the opposing social groups was really 
capable of disputing his reign either politically or militarily. The regional context, as well as 
U.S.’s approach to the regime, was shifting in a significant manner. After 1944 the Central 
American dictators’ club was down to Carías and the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, as both 
Martínez in El Salvador and Ubico had been forcefully removed from power.  
This situation had emboldened the Honduran opposition, which in that same year 
organized a set of marches in both Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, asking for Carías to step 
down. One of the most dramatic episodes in this period took place on San Pedro Sula on July 6, 
as thousands of students, housewives and members of the commercial and urban middle classes 
took to the streets to protest. The regime violently repressed the march by firing against the 
crowd with a final toll of around 22 people killed (Barahona 2005). Further, on October 14 of 
that same year, a group of around 200 exiles entered the country from El Salvador in an attempt 
to topple the government, but was repelled by the military. From 1945 onwards, the opposition 
– a combination of the urban middle class, the industrial and commercial petite bourgeoisie and 
the labor movement – began to organize in political parties to push for reform. Probably the 
most important was the Revolutionary and Democratic Honduran Party (PRDH), whose 
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members would eventually recreate the defunct Honduran Communist Party and organizing the 
more left-oriented faction of the Liberal Party from the 1950s onwards.31 
At the same time as domestic opposition was mounting, the U.S. approach to the region 
and particularly to dictatorial regimes was also changing. After World War II and in the context 
of the Cold War, the U.S. shifted its discourse towards the promotion of democracy. In the case 
of Honduras, from 1946 onwards, the U.S. began to make clear that it preferred a change of 
government in the country.  
In early 1948 Tiburcio Carías made clear that he would be stepping down and elections 
were planned for October. The initial optimism with which as the Liberal Party opposition 
received this news dwindled as time went by. In the end, José Angel Zúñiga Huete, the 
candidate of the Liberal Party, decided to pull out of the contest, in the midst of complaints 
regarding the electoral rolls. Thus, Juan Manuel Gálvez – Minister of War under Carías and 
UFCO’s former lawyer – was elected president.  
This political transition must also be understood against the backdrop of certain 
structural changes. In the aftermath of World War II, the international prices of bananas 
recovered somewhat, which meant an increase in both the extension of land cultivated and the 
size of the labor force. It also meant an improved fiscal situation for the government. At the 
same time, the U.S.’s war effort had also opened up a space for the introduction and 
development of new crops, such as beef, cotton in the south, oil palms, cocoa and Manila hemp 
in the north, and the spread and increase in the cultivation of coffee in most regions of the 
country.  These changes would have a particularly important effect towards the end of the 1940s, 
but particularly from the 1950s onwards, as they would come to diversify the economic 
                                                        
31 The Communist Party of Honduras was originally created in 1922 in the north coast in the city of San 
Pedro Sula. However, by the 1940s and due mainly to the repression unleashed by the Carías regime, the 
party had stopped operating. It would not be until April, 10 1954, that the “new” Communist Party would 
be formed in the city of San Pedro Sula. 
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structure. Three elements are important to mention. First, with economic diversification 
dependency on the bananas industry declined, which would eventually translate into a different 
sort of relationship between government and companies (Bucheli 2006). Second, the fact that a 
significant part of this diversification was agricultural meant that the traditional elite could 
modernize and shift into new kinds of production. Third, and closely related to the latter point, 
the protection of ejido and smallholder lands would become a barrier to the further expansion of 
the new agricultural export activities, which meant the “freeing” up of labor, which could either 
be absorbed as wage labor or would migrate and extend the agrarian frontier. 
Gálvez’s government was envisioned as one of transition towards democracy, but also 
towards economic and state modernization. From day one the former UFCO lawyer claimed that 
his government would focus on developing the agricultural sector and the internal market.  The 
idea was simple: improve transportation infrastructure, basically roads, to connect the foodstuff 
production in the interior with the larger north coast cities and markets. Also, under the tutelage 
of the IFIs (World Bank and IMF) – Honduras signed an agreement in 1945 – Gálvez’s 
government began a process of institutional modernization that included the development of a 
national banking system to stimulate the economy, a reform of the educational system, and 
various policies that eventually would crystallize in the 1959 labor code,  among others. 
Although Gálvez maintained a heavy-handed approach to dissent, this was a period in 
which the levels of labor organization – particularly on the north coast – continued to increase. 
Despite intense repression, from the early 1950s onwards, several strikes and strike attempts 
took place in the different banana plantations, but also in related branches such as the railroads. 
Tensions continued to build up in a context dominated by nationalist feelings and anti-
imperialist denunciations against the banana companies and particularly against the “octopus” 
(UFCO). In early May, 1954 the tensions peaked, as thousands of  UFCO workers launched a 
strike led by Communists, left-wing liberals of the PRDH and with the moral and financial 
support of the San Pedro Sula bourgeoisie (Euraque 1996). This strike should not be seen as a 
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spontaneous or surprising event. It was the result of a long arch of over 40 years of workers’ 
grievances, against the constant abuse and the companies’ refusal to permit any sort of 
economic or social rights in the plantations. As  the U.S. journalist and well known politician 
Henry Wallace observed, “…the odd thing about the 1954 strike was not that it took place in that 
year; the surprising thing is that it had not begun twenty years before” (Barahona 2005:168). 
The initial reaction of the government was a sort of carrot and the stick approach in 
which both military troops were deployed and a negotiating commission was named. However, 
the discipline and determination of the more than 25,000 striking workers, so vividly depicted 
by Ramón Amaya Amador (1988) in his novel Red Detachment [Destacamento Rojo], did not 
falter and they took over the banana towns and paralyzed the industry. Among the demands the 
workers presented were the right to organize unions, a significant wage increase and better 
working conditions. The company’s initial response was to try and delay the negotiating process 
and to break the strike. At the same time,  
…the banana towns had turned into a political stage governed by popular power. 
Marches and public manifestations, massive assemblies in the football fields, 
political discourses, collective kitchens [ollas populares], music and poetry by the 
people’s bards animated the workers protest. (Barahona 2005:169) 
In July, after two months of being on strike it was clear that the workers would not 
simply give in to the company’s pressure. Thus, Gálvez was forced to intercede and sit together 
with the representatives of both the UFCO and the workers to negotiate an agreement that 
would bring the strike to the end. For the labor movement, this was more a political than an 
economic victory, as only a bare minimum of the strikers’ demands were actually satisfied; but it 
opened the door for the legalization of labor organizing in the entire country. It also meant the 
entry into the political arena – in the sense of becoming an actor that had to be seriously taken 
into account in the hegemony conversation – of organized labor, as well as the incipient 
industrial bourgeoisie of San Pedro Sula. The strike also became a blueprint to follow for other 
actors, such as the peasant movement, in their forms of protest and negotiation with the 
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government. It comes as no wonder that Ramón Amaya Amador, one of the most important 
Communist Party intellectuals of this period, would later characterize the strike as Honduras’s 
“Paris Commune” (quoted by Euraque 1996:71). 
At the same time that this was happening in Honduras, in Guatemala president Jacobo 
Arbenz was being ousted by a CIA-orchestrated coup. Known as the Guatemalan Revolution, the 
Arbenz government promoted a set of reformist policies, including an agrarian reform and a 
labor code. The UFCO and the traditional land owning elite saw these policies as a threat and 
thus were quite supportive and active during the coup (Handy 1994; Grandin 2011; Gleijeses 
1992). This situation also had an important impact in Honduras. Not only had the more 
progressive sector in the country – read those against the regime – seen the Guatemalan 
Revolution with hope and sympathy, but also the traditional elites were afraid that it could 
spread into Honduras. When the 1954 strike broke out, the first suspicions were directed at 
Arbenz’s government. Thus, Gálvez’s government supported the Guatemalan coup by allowing 
its territory to be the launching pad for the Guatemalan counter-revolution. In exchange, the 
Honduran army received increasing U.S. support and, as Barahona (2005:173) mentions, it also 
“…inaugurated a tradition in which Honduras would take on the role of the territorial base of the 
Central American counter-revolution.”  
The short lived democratization of the passive revolution (II): Villeda Morales 
and the path towards political ascendency of the military 
After the 1954 strike, it became evident that the political dynamic was changing, that coercion by 
itself would no longer be enough to maintain dominance in the country and that some shift 
towards the creation of consensus would be needed. Several elements were important here. First 
of all, as I just mentioned, the strike had signaled the entry of new actors onto the political stage. 
Second, there had been a renewal of the Liberal Party’s leadership around Ramón Villeda 
Morales, which in part reflected the ascent of these new social groups as well as presenting a 
new political discourse favoring a more active role for the state in the national economy. Third, 
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the Honduran army was also in a process of change, as it modernized and as a new group of 
better trained leaders were coming up the rank and file. Fourth, during August and September 
of that same year, strong rains and flooding had destroyed a significant part of the banana 
production in the country. The banana companies responded by abandoning large amounts of 
land and introduced technological changes that led to the dismissal of around 13,000 workers 
(almost half of the total workforce). This combination of idle land and massive landlessness set 
the stage for combative peasant movements that not only sought to access land, but also 
protection for their tenure against the attempts of landowners to evict them (Posas 1981 see 
also; Carney 1985). Finally, the National Party, the dominant political force since Carías and a 
traditional ally of U.S. interests in the country, was in the decline.  
In October 1956, when Julio Lozano Díaz, who had taken over the presidency after 
Gálvez retired in 1954, rigged the elections to try to remain in power, the military decided to 
stage a coup. A constituent assembly was then organized in which the armed forces struck a deal 
with the Liberal Party: in exchange securing a Villeda Morales government – who had gotten 
most of the votes in the October election, although not a clear majority – the constitution would 
be amended to allow the military autonomy from civilian power. With this constitutional change 
and the coup, the army rose to be the new political arbitrator, as well as creating a situation of 
dual military and civilian government that would eventually be reconfigured with another coup 
in 1963. Moreover, the military, not the National Party, would become the new local partner of 
the U.S.  
During this period, and particularly after the Cuban revolution in 1959, the U.S.’s 
approach to Latin America shifted significantly. First of all, we have Eisenhower in August 1958 
making for the first time an emphatic statement in favor of representative governments in the 
region. Later that year he approved the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) – which, as we will see in the next chapter, played an important role in the creation of 
the Bajo Aguán Project –, and in early 1959 he extended his backing to the Central American 
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Common Market (CACM), albeit using the IADB as a financial lever to press for policies 
compatible with U.S. interests (Euraque 1996). After the Cuban revolution and the election of 
Kennedy as president, these policies crystallized further in the form of the Alliance for Progress 
in 1961. The Alliance promoted a set of development goals (economic growth, decreasing 
poverty, macroeconomic stability), as well as institutional transformations (democratic 
governments, agrarian reforms) that together would bring socio-political stability and thus 
undercut the communist threat that supposedly was hanging over all the countries.  
Villeda Morales took power in early 1957, and with this government came the formal rise 
to power of some of the groups that had been most active in opposition to Carías and the 
National Party, as well as a new generation of army officers, led by Oswaldo López Arellano, the 
newly appointed chief of the armed forces. From the beginning, these changes brought an 
increasing state role in the economy.  Some of the most important reforms were the passing of 
an industrial promotion law, the 1959 labor code and the creation in 1961 of the National 
Agrarian Institute (INA). Levels of repression diminished and the government brought moved 
closer to organized labor, promoting those unions close to the moderate ORIT and suppressing 
anything that smelled even slightly leftist. By late 1961, Villeda established a local counterpart to 
the Alliance for Progress, called “The March towards Progress.” With financial support from the 
IADB, this project was controlled by a group of technocrats drawn from the San Pedro Sula 
bourgeoisie and turned towards a deepening of the modernizing agenda. While these other 
aspects of Villeda’s agenda were important, here I will focus solely on the agrarian reform.  
In part due to the increasing pressure from peasants on the north coast after the 1954 
strike and the later technological fix by the UFCO, in 1962 the Honduran government passed an 
Agrarian Reform Law. Influenced by Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, the Law had two main 
objectives: modernization of agriculture and channeling peasant unrest in the countryside into 
market-oriented production. Further, the Law both opened up a legal space for peasant 
demands for land and production assistance (credit and technical support, among others) and 
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defined very clear structural limits to these demands. Far from redistributing land in the hands 
of big landowners, such as the banana companies, the law focused on the distribution of 
national and ejido (municipal) lands to peasant families. It was only in those cases where it 
would be proven that the land was not fulfilling its “social function” that the state in the form of 
the National Agrarian Institute (INA) would intercede, buying land from the original owners 
and redistributing it.  According to Posas (1981),  from this moment onwards peasant  
mobilization has aimed to “recuperate”32 national, ejido, or idle lands rather than privately held 
properties. Further, it is important to point out that the rhythms and levels of land distribution 
and redistribution have been determined by the changing intensity of peasant pressure “from 
below” and government action “from above.”  
No matter how limited the scope of the new agrarian reform, it was forcefully rejected 
and resisted by both the banana companies – the UFCO actually claimed that it put Honduras 
“on the path of Cuba and Communist China” (Edwin M. Martin, quoted by Euraque 1996:113) – 
and the traditional land owning elite based in and around Tegucigalpa. This opposition 
coalesced in three differentiated but related currents. First, it was part of broader resistance that 
these elites and UFCO directed from day one at Villeda’s government, his branch of liberalism 
and his supposed sympathy with the Cuban revolution. Second, clearly, even if the Agrarian 
Reform did not touch directly the lands of the large landowners and the banana companies, it 
created a framework in which the peasant organizations’ practice of “recuperating” land could 
be legitimized. I would add further, that with this law, the differentiation between the Banana 
                                                        
32 The notion of land recuperation has a deeply political content in Latin America. In the particular 
Honduran context, it is used by peasant organizations – and their sympathizers – to signal that the land 
that is being occupied was or should be national and thus patrimony of the Honduran poor peasantry 
(Posas 1981).  This is also part of a broader political and semantic battle, in which right-wing actors and 
mainstream media tend to refer to those same land occupations in terms of “invasions” or “land 
usurpation.” Oversimplifying, we could say that the tension between private property and common good 
(in terms of the nation) structures this semantic field and the politic struggles around it. 
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and Non-Banana republics that I mentioned before began to be erased in agrarian terms. Carías 
had always been very careful to craft his agrarian policies so that the north coast was excluded. 
However, in the 1960s, not only was the north coast the hotbed of national agrarian conflict, but 
the banana industry’s economic importance was decreasing, as new sectors expanded. Finally, 
Villeda’s government, and particularly the agrarian reform, called into question the pacts and 
understandings that held together the domination arrangement in the country. Phrased 
differently, the government’s policies were seen as going against the various equilibriums that 
held together the question of hegemony. It was good to include new groups into the political 
arena, but this inclusion had to be done within a set of limits and always mediated, at least 
according to those older powers that had derived their position of strength from the 
concentration of land. 
At the end, on October 3, 1963, a few days before the end of his term, Villeda Morales 
was ousted and, creating what would become a sort of tradition, was exiled to Costa Rica by the 
military and the chief of the armed forces, Oswaldo López Arellano, whom the Liberal Power 
had helped to consolidate in power. This was a bloody coup, in which the alliance between the 
military and the National Party went after the Liberal Party members and the social bases of the 
ousted government with unprecedented viciousness. With this coup, the question of dual power 
between civil and military government came to be temporarily resolved in favor in the latter. 
Just as in 1932, the concentration of power around a single actor who could operate as political 
arbitrator and upheld the powers that be became the “solution” to the national political crisis. 
Also, the coup came to show very clearly the limit of the hegemonic problematic in Honduras: 
any change would necessarily be done from above and popular participation would be kept to a 
minimum. 
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The rise to power of the military 
Darío Euraque (1996:114) observes that “…the nationalists’ participation in the 1963 coup 
reflected their efforts to arrest the liberals’ increasing influence over modern Honduran politics 
and the state, especially given the economic prominence of the industrializing North Coast.”    
Euraque further argues that López Arellano’s regime can be read as one of an increasing 
dispute between the San Pedro Sula-based industrial bourgeoisie and the traditional 
landowning elite organized around the political capital of Tegucigalpa. This reading shifts the 
axis of the conflict towards the differentiation between the interior and the north coast that I 
already mentioned. Also, it indicates that the institutional development experienced by the 
country in the postwar period was the key arena of this dispute. The role of the military as both 
arbitrator of the conflict and definer of the balance of scales between both forces (schematically, 
San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa) became central. At the same time, besides stunting the 
increasing influence of the industrial bourgeoisie within the Tegucigalpa-centric political arena, 
the coup was directed at making sure that the influence of subaltern groups such as an 
independent organized labor and peasant movements would remain outsiders.  In this way, the 
alliance between superordinate and subordinate groups was deactivated and thus the comfort 
zone of the passive revolution could be recreated.  
The response to the coup was immediate, as the different groups that had been affected 
tried to resist the repression. Noteworthy in this direction were the ephemeral alliances between 
Liberals and Communists, as they attempted to create a “unified front” against the coup. 
However, as Euraque points out, the Liberals’ leadership was slow and hesitant about calling for 
a popular revolt. Other groups opted for military resistance and guerrilla-type movements, but 
these attempts were forcefully stifled and repressed by the military in both the cities and the 
countryside. The culminating moment of these resistance efforts came in April 1965, when the 
military massacred seven members of the Popular Action Front (FAP) – including Lorenzo 
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Zelaya, former leader of the National Peasant Federation of Honduras (FENACH) – in the 
hamlet of El Jute in the department of Yoro.33  
Eventually López Arellano’s military regime managed to achieve a modicum of legal 
legitimacy in 1965, when a constituent assembly elected him president. The new regime did not 
close down any of the economic institutions created during Villeda’s government, but they did 
not manifest any interest in putting them to work or further strengthening the incipient and 
deeply dysfunctional developmentalist state. This is a clear example of how the coup was much 
more oriented towards changing those at the steering wheel than the actual vehicle.  
This forced those sectors whose interests were attached to the developmentalist project –
namely the industrial bourgeoisie and organized labor on the north coast – to create a common 
political platform to defend their interests. Initially, the 1968 municipal elections were seen as 
an important opportunity. However, according to the Liberal opposition, these were rigged, 
particularly in San Pedro Sula – the stronghold of the industrial bourgeoisie – where the 
Liberals were confident of victory but nonetheless lost. This event led to an even stronger 
articulation among opposition forces, which led in late 1968 to a general strike on the north 
coast.  
The reason for the strike was the signing by the government of the “San José Protocol,” 
an attempt to revamp and strengthen the Central American Common Market. However, this 
protocol negatively impacted Honduras’s incipient industries – some of the weakest in the 
isthmus –, as it lowered the level of commercial protection within the Central American region. 
This was particularly the case with El Salvador, who had become the most important regional 
trading partner of Honduras in the last few years and could benefit the most from the new 
Protocol. Further, it was easy to read the effects of this Protocol in relation to the tensions 
between the north coast and the country’s interior. At the same time that the lowering of tariffs 
                                                        
33 For a first-hand testimony of the massacre, see García (1991). 
81 
 
affected industrial production from the north coast, it was good news for the agrarian sector – 
sugar and beef producers for example –as they enjoyed a certain competitive advantage with the 
rest of the region. The López Arellano coup was specifically directed at the type of political 
alliances articulated around the developmentalist project, as the conservative land owning elites 
also benefited from policies aimed at the diversification of the economic structure. 
During the 1968 general strike, most of the stores in San Pedro Sula closed and workers 
also stopped their activities. The reaction by the regime was vicious, with the army being 
mobilized, the closing of the media close to the strikers and many protestors imprisoned. The 
strike prefigured what was to come, as it was the result of the concerted effort of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and the organized anticommunist labor movement, an alliance that would become 
important after 1972, as we will see towards the end of this chapter.  
The strike also indicated the effects of continuing to support the sole interests of the 
large landowning elites in the interior to the detriment of those of industrial capital, organized 
labor on the north coast, and the peasant movement.  Organized peasants were becoming more 
active and aggressive in both the north coast and the interior, where the cotton and beef 
industries – with significant technical and financial support from the new state agencies – were 
fueling new processes of land concentration and dispossession (Boyer 1982). In general, it was 
evident that towards the end of the 1960s Honduras was entering a situation similar to the one 
described by Gramsci (1971:275–76) as a “crisis of authority”: 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only 
‘dominant’, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great 
masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer 
believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in 
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum a 
great variety of morbid symptoms appear. 
Following this thread, I would argue further that actually the art of the passive revolution 
is to sustain that interregnum, but without it becoming evident that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born. In any case, in the Honduran case, it seemed that the crisis could and would 
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only be resolved by force. Just as peasant organizations were pushing the limits of the reformist 
policies and being very active on the ground, the large landowners struck back, leaving their 
usual isolation and organizing to lobby the government for changes to the agrarian legislation 
through the National Federation of Farmers and Cattlemen of Honduras (FENAGH), created in 
1966 (Sieder 1995). 
As early as 1967, it became evident that the dominant groups in the country were looking 
for an alternative resolution: the internationalization of internal tensions. Since the initial 
expansion of the plantation economy in the north coast, Honduras had become a magnet for a 
steady flow of poor Salvadorian peasants in search of the land or work that they could not find 
back home. By 1969 Honduras was host to between 250,000 and 300,000 Salvadorans in 
search of land. El Salvador is the smallest Central American country, but has historically shown 
some of the highest population densities in the Americas.34 This situation, combined with a 
landed oligarchy that, just like its Honduran counterpart, based its social reproduction in the 
high concentration of land, made the outmigration towards their eastern neighbors the only 
viable safety valve for its own agrarian pressures (Durham 1979).  
Just as Honduras was entering its own agrarian crisis in the late 1960s, El Salvador was 
facing increasing pressure from an impoverished peasantry – in the late 1960s, 60 percent of the 
country’s land was in the hands of 2 percent of the population (Anderson 1983) – and the 
political impossibility of entertaining the idea of a redistributive agrarian reform. Thus, 
Between early 1967 and the [Salvadoran] invasion of 1969, a number of 
contradictions associated with both countries’ transitions to peripheral 
capitalism adversely affected sectors of each country’s elites and their historic 
reluctance to deal with land problems. (Euraque 1996:140) 
                                                        
34 In 1970 the country had a population of over 3.5 million people, with a population density of 170 people 
per square kilometer (Anderson 1983). 
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In Honduras, by late 1967, organized landowners called for the expulsion of Salvadoran 
squatters as a way of dealing with the peasants’ increasing political activity. The evictions began 
towards mid-1969 and by July, Honduran authorities had deported around 20,000 Salvadorans. 
At least one sector of the Salvadoran oligarchy was calling for an invasion of Honduras as a way 
of dealing with the internal problems that would be exacerbated with the returnees (Euraque 
1996). The tensions between both countries continued to mount, including the persecution of 
Salvadorans living in Honduras by “white guards” and attacks on the Honduran national 
football team in June after a World Cup qualifying match that was won by the Salvadorans.  
On July 14, 1969, the Salvadoran army invaded Honduras, in what came to be known as 
the “Football War,” or the “100-Hour War.” Initially the invading army was able to push deep 
into Honduran territory. However, as the Honduran military, and particularly the air force, 
recovered from the initial surprise and the population moved en masse to protect the country’s 
sovereignty, the conflict was brought to a stalemate.  By July 18 the OAS had negotiated an end 
to the fighting, and by early August the Salvadoran troops had left Honduran territory. 
This conflict significantly impacted both countries, but for my purposes, I will focus on 
three aspects on the Honduran side. First, the armed conflict mobilized Honduran nationalist 
sentiment, papering over for a moment all of the internal antagonisms and conflicts. Second, 
and related to the previous point, the war brought the popular sectors – the Honduran Labor 
Central (CTH), for example – closer to the armed forces, which were seen as the guardians of the 
nation, as against the traditional parties – the “oligarchs” – whose policies had led the country 
to this debacle. Much as Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1990) suggests in the case of Haiti, it could be 
argued that “state” and “nation” came to be separated and pitted against each other, with the 
military taking on the role of protecting the latter from the short-sighted interests of the elites 
festering within the former. Third, the war was seen as a failure by the Honduran Armed Forces, 
particularly by the younger officers – most of whom had studied abroad – who placed the blame 
on the older leadership. Further, the conflict allowed this younger generation to enter in contact 
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with the population in general. These two elements together opened up a space for this younger 
generation to gain more relevance within the military as a whole and shifted its approach to 
national security. It is worth mentioning that members of this younger generation of officers had 
been deeply influenced by what they saw in Panama and Peru, where military governments had 
taken an active role in the modernizing of their countries in the name of social justice. This was 
the mindset and model that they wanted to bring to Honduras. 
Political space opened up somewhat in the aftermath of the “Soccer War,” as local 
tensions eased. In 1971, in the aftermath of the war and under a supposed banner of “national 
unity,” the military took on the commitment of holding democratic elections and ceding power 
to a civilian government. These elections took place in April, 1971, and Ramón Cruz was elected 
president. From the beginning, Cruz´s administration was tarnished by accusations of 
corruption and problems negotiating distribution of government appointments and the national 
budget between the two traditional parties (Liberal and National parties), in what came to be 
known as the pactito (“little pact”). At the same time, Cruz was accused of not moving forward 
with some of the reforms that the country needed, particularly agrarian reform, resolving the 
border conflict with El Salvador and the adoption of a more favorable trade policy in the Central 
American Common Market. Nevertheless, probably the straw that broke the camel´s back was 
the significant increase of peasant protest and unrest, demanding an immediate agrarian 
reform. According to Marvin Barahona (2005:221)  
Towards the end of 1972, the peasant organizations threatened to carry out 
‘hunger marches’ from the rural communities all the way to Tegucigalpa if their 
demands were not heeded. On December 4, 1972, before the peasant marches 
began, the military promoted a new coup d’état and ousted the tottering civilian 
regime. 
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Military reformism as passive revolution 
Unless we ourselves take a hand now, they'll foist a republic on us. If we want things to 
stay as they are, things will have to change. D'you understand?  
Fabrizio, prince of Salina to his nephew and heir Tancredi 
Giuseppe Tomasi Di Lampedusa (2007:19), The Leopard.  
 
Presenting my argument so far in a more schematic way, we could say that as the 1950s and 
1960s rolled in, the Honduran political field was organized around two main poles and four 
other key actors. In terms of the poles, we had the National Party – which came to represent the 
more traditional economic interests of the landowning elite, based mainly in the interior of the 
country and around the nation’s capital – and the Liberal Party, whose history was deeply 
intertwined with that of new social groups – particularly the industrial and commercial 
bourgeoisie – based around San Pedro Sula and the north coast. The other actors were the 
military, which after the 1956 had emerged as an important political actor; the organized labor 
and peasant movements, whose presence became much more active after the 1954 strike; the 
banana plantations, whose political influence was rather diminished, due mainly to their 
decreased weight in the national economy; and the U.S., whose support continued to be crucial 
for any sort of hegemonic alliance.  
From 1956 and until 1963, the military, in a bid to acquire greater political autonomy 
and power, backed the incipient alliance between the Liberal Party and organized labor to the 
detriment of the National Party and the banana companies. However, the new regime’s policy 
began to place severe stress on the set of balances and counterbalances that sustained the forms 
of domination, and threatened to rip apart what we could call the hegemonic fabric. In this 
context, the military made a new wager, one that could allow it to further increase and 
consolidate its power, at the same time as normalizing the political situation again and shifted 
its loyalty towards the National Party. This shift not only meant reorganizing the alliances and 
the balance of forces, but also excluding (organized labor) and diminishing the influence 
(banana companies) of the two odd-out actors.  
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The exclusion of these two actors – labor and the banana companies — merits further 
analysis. In the case of organized labor and the peasant movement, this exclusion was based 
both on a visceral anticommunist sentiment shared by the rest of the actors (from the two 
traditional parties to the U.S.’s post-Cuban revolution posture), as well as the always 
insurmountable distance that existed between social classes. In the case of the banana 
companies, their alliance with the government, particularly during the Carías period, was based 
upon their ability to provide a steady flow of income and some economic stability. However, 
once this was no longer the case, governments would opportunistically shift their alliances and 
mobilize popular nationalist sentiment against the companies (Bucheli 2006). Further, the fact 
that much of the protest in this period concentrated in rural areas and was organized around the 
struggle for land necessarily placed the banana companies and their massive extensions of 
reserve lands squarely in the middle of the disputes.  
The military government that took over after the 1972 coup had to operate with these 
constraints and pressures. The war against El Salvador had given great legitimacy to the armed 
forces as the defenders of the nation. This legitimacy was further consolidated by the open 
support given by the most important sectors of the labor and peasant movements and the 
industrial bourgeoisie, which saw in this rise to power the possibility of advancing its political 
agenda. The cycle of coercion and restitution that had dominated most of the last two decades 
was giving way to a period characterized by more consent. This would, however, be a controlled 
consent, in which the military would play the role of arbiter, defining the checks and balances 
and granting space for new interests and agendas to be included, but in a highly controlled 
manner. The path to modernization would be passive and revolutionary at the same time:  
 
 
 
87 
 
“Between 1972 and 1978, patron-client relationships were restructured, recreated and 
selectively extended in an attempt to incorporate emergent social actors on the terms of those 
controlling the balance of power within the reformist state, providing the latter with limited but 
nonetheless significant degree of legitimacy” (Sieder 1995:113). 
Much has been written on the topic of the military reformist regime that governed 
Honduras between 1972 and 1979 (see for example, Posas and Del Cid 1980; Sieder 1995). For 
my purposes I will limit myself to discussing its approach to agrarian conflict. First of all, since 
the trigger of the coup had been agrarian, the new government responded immediately by 
pushing forward and responding to the peasant movement’s demands. On December 26, barely 
three weeks after coming to power, the Armed Forces proclaimed Decree no. 8 as an emergency 
measure. This Decree ordered that all agricultural land owned by the state should be placed 
under the control of the National Agrarian Institute (INA) and given to landless peasant 
families. Further, the decree also proclaimed that those lands that were not being properly used 
– that is, idle – would be leased to peasant families that needed them. The relative success in 
applying this decree resulted mainly because of the peasant movement’s relentless activity, 
“recuperating” national lands and receiving the brunt of the landowners’ violent response, even 
though the peasants’ actions were almost always  limited to that land undeniably under state 
ownership (Ríos 2014). 
Two years later, in 1974, the military government passed a new agrarian reform law. In 
the bill, the country’s agrarian sector was characterized as having three different tiers: the 
traditional sector, basically small subsistence-oriented producers, who were considered to be 
obsolete; the modern sector, comprised of technologically developed productive units (basically 
the agroexport sector); and the contemporary sector, formed by the new and yet to be 
developed peasant enterprises (cooperatives, peasant leagues, and community peasant 
enterprises, among others).  
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The objective of the agrarian reform, then, was to eliminate the traditional sector and the 
tension between capitalist and non-capitalist production. In this way, the law claimed, 
productivity levels would increase, creating multiplier effects that would lead to more efficient 
use of natural resources, a better distribution of the benefits of these resources, cheaper and 
better access to food, increased income for the poor peasantry,  an expansion of the domestic 
market and commerce, better health conditions for the population, and  incentives to promote 
industrialization (Ríos 2014).  
In practical terms, these objectives were hardly reached, as the final result differed 
greatly from the initial, overly ambitious goals (see below). Moreover, the whole process became 
a bit tricky for the military government, as it had to maneuver between the peasant 
organizations’ relentless pressure on the ground and the right-wing National Federation of 
Farmers and Cattlemen (FENAGH), which made persistent efforts to limit and bring the reform 
to a halt. Following a pattern that was repeated all over Latin America, the solution was to 
emphasize distribution of national land – in part, the relative massiveness of the Honduran 
reform had to do with the large amounts of national lands that it still had – and the promotion 
of colonization projects.  
The agrarian reform in Honduras lasted from 1962 to 1992. Its “golden age” was in the 
1970s and particularly between 1973 and 1977, when over 120,000 hectares were distributed. In 
total, 409,000 hectares – 12.3 percent of the country’s farm land – were distributed among 
60,000 families; about 13 percent of the rural population. However, as massive as this reform 
was, it was unable to fully address the problems of inequality in access to land (Boyer 2010). 
 According to the 1993 agrarian census, over 126,000 rural families (27 percent of the 
rural population) did not have access either to land or a permanent job (FIAN 2000). I will 
return in different parts of this study to this topic, but before continuing, it is important to point 
out several things. There was nothing particularly new here, as the agrarian reform was part of a 
generalized framework of development through import substitution industrialization and the 
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role assigned to agriculture within it; employment generation was not a top priority of this 
approach (Thiesenhusen and others 1995). The Honduran agrarian is usually viewed as part of  
reforms promoted by  the Alliance for Progress, whose main political objective was to distribute  
land as a way of diffusing  agrarian conflicts that could lead to revolutionary outcomes, as in 
Cuba (Kay 1998). As much as I agree with these interpretations, however, I think that we should 
also think about the Honduran agrarian reform as process of labor capture. 
By labeling as “productive” – and thus desirable – only market-oriented production, the 
agrarian reform in effect called for the formal capitalist subsumption of the “traditional” sector. 
In other words, peasant households and communities would articulate with the national 
economy by producing commodities for sale on the market. This meant devaluing non-
commodified and non-monetized labor, as well as separating the realms of production and 
reproduction. As we will see in the next two chapters, this would have a significant impact in the 
relationships between men and women, as the work of the latter would become devalued and 
demoted to the domestic and reproductive spheres. 
Several mechanisms enforced this shift towards production for the market. The first and 
most important one was debt. In general, the agrarian reform did not just give land for free to 
the peasant families, but instead provided loans eventually had to be paid to the state.  From the 
beginning, reform beneficiaries needed some sort of monetary income to keep up with 
payments. Further, as we will see in the next chapter, this requirement in turn gave state 
institutions a powerful lever for determining what would be produced.  While this is not unlike 
Carías’s approach to the promotion of agriculture, the dictator used the overt compulsion of the 
armed forces, while the agrarian reform used the silent compulsion of the market.  
The other main way in which production for the market was enforced was by reshaping 
of the Honduran peasant subject. First, the agrarian reform decided that land would not be 
given individually, as this would only reinforce the “natural” tendency of the Honduran 
peasantry towards selfishness and individuality. Second, along with the distribution of land 
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came a process of training, carried out mainly by the Peasant Training Program for Land 
Reform (PROCCARA). Following the lead of Brazilian sociologist Clodomir Santos de Morais, 
PROCCARA carried out a set of Organization Workshops,35 in which the members of the new 
collective enterprises learned about the superiority of collective over individual labor and how 
best to learn to trust each other and work together. They learned about administrative 
principles, how to enforce discipline and how best to divide chores among themselves (Carmen 
and Sobrado 2000).  
Labor capture is not only about creating material conditions for capital accumulation; it 
is also about creating the right subjective characteristics in the would-be laboring subject. The 
process of agrarian reform took thousands of peasant families, many of them used to self-
provisioning, and turned them into members of market-oriented cooperatives. In the process, a 
new peasant subject emerged: one that was disciplined and able to work collectively, but also 
“fixed” to a particular geographical place, as the promise of betterment was linked to remaining 
in the cooperative.  The emerging peasant subject was also linked to a particular social space, as 
his role he was assigned in the development of the nation was to be an efficient producer of 
foodstuffs and raw materials. 
 Seen in abstract terms, no primitive accumulation took place, but rather the opposite, as 
land was given “back” to the peasantry. However, this land was given within a scheme that 
would curtail peasants’ traditional sense of autonomy. More importantly, from the perspective 
of uneven geographical development (Smith 2008), dispossession in the west and south – where 
elites encroached on peasants’ lands from the 1950s onwards – created agrarian conflicts 
elsewhere as the troublesome “freed” landless peasantry migrated, felling the forest and 
expanding the agrarian frontier. This internal migration, of course, resulted to a significant 
                                                        
35 By 1976 a total of 17,400 peasants participated in these workshops, representing around 39 percent of 
all beneficiaries up to that point. 
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degree from the centrality that colonization projects had within the Honduran agrarian reform. 
Of these, the Bajo Aguán Project was the largest and most ambitious. 
The next two chapters are dedicated to exploring the BAP and how this broad process of 
land capture by agrarian reform took place. One of the BAP’s main effects was to unleash 
economic and social forces – formal subsumption to the market, monetization of subsistence, 
disciplining and control of labor, palm oil production – that would forever change the lives of 
the families involved. The ways men and women experienced these processes were significantly 
different. Further, it is in the BAP that we must look for the conditions of possibility of both the 
wave of agrarian conflict that shook the region just before (and that continued after) the 2009 
coup and the development of the transnationalized palm oil empire that came to dominate the 
Aguán landscape and to exercise outsized influence in the country’s politics. 
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Chapter 2. The nature of agrarian conflict: kinship, internal migration and the 
creation of the Aguán (1972-1998) 
And well, my dad is from there [Copán], and they told my dad to come from there, right? 
Always searching, because the lands were barren [quemados], very little money to be 
made. I mean, very little where one can make some money, because there are no jobs. So, 
they came, searching for the Coast, that is how they call it here, “let’s go to the Coast.”  
Gonzalo 
But what happened is that there was a lot of timber: cedar, mahogany and that was 
exclusively from there… So he [the INA organizer] told us: look here, we cannot give you 
these lands, but we already have lots ready for you, prepared land in Colón. There – he 
said – we are going to give each family 10 hectares of land to work individually. We are 
going to give each associate 10 hectares for them to work… That really made us happy, 
because we did not have anywhere to work. So we decided to set up a legal commission. 
The problem began when we got here… 
Marcelo 
The organization began with [hurricane] Fifí, because we were left with our arms crossed 
[idle, unemployed], after the river flooded [la llena] and we lived close to the river. Aha, 
we were left then with almost nothing. And then, after a time I came to Colón, with the 
idea of coming here. 
Eugenia 
 
One thing is for sure, for Gonzalo, Marcelo and Eugenia, life had not panned out as they had 
expected or hoped. Born into poverty, their existence has so far been one of constant struggle: 
struggle in motion – as they migrated from their hometowns in the mountains in the western 
region of the country towards the fertile lands of Colón. The struggled with “nature” – as they 
brought down forests to grow maize and oil palms –; they struggled against capital – as they 
fought to “recover” land from the claws of a group of wealthy “foreign” landowners; they 
struggled against the state, which more often than not took the side of the few with plenty 
against the many with want. In brief, a constant struggle against poverty and dispossession not 
only marked their personal existence, but would also be central to the shared experience of the 
waves of peasant families that flocked to the Aguán from the 1960s onwards in search of a piece 
of land and a better life. 
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This chapter focusses on these struggles. By tracking the life trajectories of Gonzalo, 
Marcelo and Eugenia, and their shared experiences, I will analyze the ways in which the 
dynamics of the production of nature, labor capture and internal migration came together in the 
creation of the Aguán region. Phrased differently, by looking at the struggle in motion of these 
families, I hope to show the very particular and highly contingent ways in which the necessary – 
for capital accumulation, that is – flows of labor, capital and land were assembled and 
interrupted by the actions of the different groups involved, thus creating the particular 
landscape of the region. One of the main arguments I make is that far from representing an 
escape from dispossession and labor capture, the journey of these families towards Colón 
became a reenactment of a similar process in a different context. 
The chapter sets out to characterize two dominant, albeit different, flows of immigration 
into the Aguán region, which began in the 1970s. On the one hand, as the accounts of Eugenia 
and Marcelo exemplify, an induced and state-sponsored colonization project, which brought 
organized peasants from other regions in the country, created a set of cash crop-oriented 
(mainly palm oil and citrus trees) peasant coops in the lowlands of the valley, where the most 
fertile and accessible lands could be found. On the other, as in the case of Gonzalo, unorganized 
and informal migrations of impoverished peasant families that arrived in the region at the same 
time, mainly through long processes of phased migration, ended up settling in the hills 
surrounding the valley and growing staple crops (mainly maize, beans and cassava) for self-
provisioning. 
Countryside in flux: mobility and organization as responses to dispossession 
The 1960s was a decade of increasing agrarian conflict in the Honduran countryside. In the 
aftermath of the 1954 general strike, two main dynamics were evident: on the one hand, an ever 
increasing conflict between large landowners and peasants barely contained by the government. 
On the other, the military’s increasing participation in government, particularly after the 1964 
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coup and its rise to formal political power after the 1972 coup that saw Oswaldo López Arellano 
take the presidency.  
Here the development question took the form of trying to diversify the economic 
structure – to move away from dependency on bananas – and to exploit the hidden natural 
riches of the country. The myth of the rich but impoverished country continued to be mobilized, 
now in the form of modernization, or of “historical actualization,” as the 1972-75 National 
Development Program put it. The idea of attracting foreign capital continued to be crucial, but 
now it had to be combined with policies directed at improving the conditions of the rural and 
urban poor, and thus diffusing or deactivating popular unrest. The state was understood as both 
an enabler of capital accumulation – articulating the local with the global – and a buffer of class 
struggle. Nowhere was this more evident than in the countryside, as that same National 
Development Program saw the agrarian reform as the “fundamental task.” 
The generalized impoverishment, increasing agrarian conflict, dispossession and 
discontent in the Honduran countryside in the 1960s and 1970s resulted from the deeper 
penetration and further extension of capitalist relations of production and the articulation of the 
national economy into the international markets. In regional terms, the country was still 
fragmented. Towards the south a process of land alienation and proletarianization of peasants, 
and agrarian capitalist control of most of the land and labor, accompanied the rise of the cotton, 
cattle and sugarcane sectors (Williams 1986). The result was an increasing number of clashes 
between peasants and cattlemen, particularly towards the end of the 1960s (Boyer 1982).  
In the north, the banana enclave continued to serve as a migration attraction pole. But 
now – in the aftermath of the 1954 strike and various technological fixes – there were fewer 
jobs, a proliferation of peasant land occupations and a trickle of impoverished families moving 
towards lands in the northeast (Soluri 2009).  
 In the west, small farms persisted, producing staple crops and coffee, generally with low 
yields because of erosion and different forms of encroachment on communal and small owners’ 
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lands. The west also saw increased immigration of Guatemalan and Salvadoran poor peasant 
and indigenous families (Anderson 1983; Metz 2010). 
Finally, the state continued to view the eastern section of the country as “empty” but 
immensely rich lands. These “empty” lands, moreover, began to become the target of both the 
state, which saw them as a possible solution to the country’s agrarian conflicts and in need of 
“historical actualization,” and of an ever growing number of landless and land poor families who 
– informed as we will see by tales of the land’s extraordinary fertility and accessibility – 
envisioned the Department of Colón as an escape from their lives of poverty and suffering. 
Life before migration: kinship, land and labor 
Before describing the process of internal migration that led these families towards the Aguán, it 
is useful to characterize in very general terms the life conditions they encountered in their birth 
places. I focus mainly in the forms in which labor and land were procured and organized within 
households to secure subsistence. I privilege the perspective of kinship, because it is one of the 
places were the effects of the penetration of the capital relation is clearest. Nonetheless, this is a 
tricky approach, as kinship is one of the most neglected topics within the literature on Honduras 
(Central America really) of that period (1960s-70s). What I propose to do is to reconstruct 
certain general patterns, based on literature that does touch on the topic for the cases of the 
western  (Chapman 1985; Roquas 2002) and southern (Boyer 1982) regions, from where most of 
the settler of the Aguán came.  
 It is important to point out, however, that my use of the notion of kinship is much more 
empirically than theoretically informed. This means that instead of aiming at a clear definition 
of what the Honduran kinship system is,36 I focus on how it operated in defining particularly 
                                                        
36 If I was really pushed to provide a more formalized definition of the kinship network, I would say –
following David Robichaux´s (2005) characterization of what he calls the “Mesoamerican kinship system” 
– that it is patrilineal, virilocal and with the last son inheriting all. However, in a situation similar to that 
of the Guatemalan Q’echi’, as described by Liza Grandia (2012:79): “[d]ecisions about residence tend to be 
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thick networks of social relationships between people of different ages and forms of filiation 
(Bourdieu 2008). In general terms, these networks comprise relations based on blood and 
marriage, but also friendship, place of origin and social institutions and rituals such as 
compadrazgo.37 Not all of these relationships have the same importance. The nuclear family is 
at the center of this kinship network, where the relationships between siblings are particularly 
crucial. Other forms of relationship – such as compadrazgo and friendship – spread out from 
there and become particularly important in situations of migration, where – as we will soon see 
– people followed on the footsteps of those who had travelled the same paths before (Arizpe 
1980; Moctezuma Pérez 2006; Massey et al. 1999).  
As described in the previous chapter, the more generalized penetration of capital in the 
Non-Banana Republic really took off in the post-World War II period. Before this, 
commodification and relations of labor exploitation existed, but were much more limited and 
circumscribed to the villages and the regional scale. More than wage labor, different forms of 
peonage and land rental prevailed in these regions, with the idiom of kinship as the main form 
of control.  
In terms of production, most peasant households dedicated themselves mainly to self-
provisioning through the production of milpa, the slash and burn cultivation of maize, beans 
and squash in the same plot, and husbandry of cows, chicken and pigs. This household 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
practical – a choice between the two extended families based on the availability of land or the support 
they will offer… If neither family has land to offer the young couple, they may move somewhere else 
entirely. Even if they do live with one set of parents initially, a young couple will usually try to set up an 
independent household after the first child is born.” 
37 In very general terms, compadrazgo refers to system that generates extra-domestic kin relationships 
through rituals such as the election of baptismal and wedding sponsors. This institution has been 
described as both enabling the expansion of kinship networks, as well as crystallizing and reproducing 
condescending relation of domination, as in the case of the haciendas, where the owner tended to be the 
baptism godfather of most of the worker´s children (Mintz and Wolf 1950). 
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production would be combined with the production of certain goods, such as dairy products or 
handicrafts, for sale in the larger towns. The income received was spent immediately on 
clothing, cooking utensils, tools or foodstuffs, such as salt and sugar. Thus, although 
commodification was present, it did not necessarily translate into monetization, as the amounts 
of money present were limited and most work – be it domestic or in the fields – remained 
unpaid. 
Work was organized along gender lines. Agricultural labor, such as clearing and burning 
of the fields, weeding and harvesting, was mainly understood to being “men’s work.” However, 
in many cases, women would also take part in these activities during certain seasons, or in the 
cases of single mothers and widows. Domestic labor, such as hauling water, cooking and 
washing, milking cows and feeding livestock were – and are – seen as “women’s work.” This 
division of labor was also cross-generational, as children and young men and women were 
expected to work from a young age and to respect and obey their elders.  
Also, particularly in the western communities of Lenca indigenous descent, collective 
work was common. People linked by kin ties would work together in each other’s fields, where 
these forms of collective labor were highly ritualized and deeply ingrained in the communities’ 
understanding of themselves and their environment and were crucial for the reproduction of the 
communal bonds (Chapman 1985).   
Access to land was organized around both kinship and the ongoing expansion of the 
agricultural frontier, which was probably influenced by the idea that large amounts of free land 
were available. This connection becomes quite evident in the west, where land inheritance 
operated through what is known as the lazuro system. Here, according to Esther Roquas (2002), 
land would be passed undivided to the youngest son. In this way, the land was not fragmented 
and the idea was that elder brothers would have already left and created their own households 
by claiming free lands elsewhere, while the youngest one would remain home and take care of 
the parents. In the case of women, the idea was that they would be looked after by their husband 
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and they were thus excluded from inheritance. For women access to land has tended to always 
be indirect and through their husband. This inheritance system had more to do with what is 
usually known as “customary law” than actual written law, which did recognize women’s formal 
right to inheritance. Migration was thus deeply ingrained in the system of access to land and in 
the reproduction of peasant communities as a whole. I would argue that it is in part a legacy of 
the tension between labor and flight that existed since the colonial period (and which I 
described in the last chapter).  
This situation began to change with the penetration of capitalist relations, particularly 
from the 1960s onwards. First, the new, more intensive use of land by cattle, cotton, sugar and 
coffee farmers spurred more aggressive processes of land dispossession and concentration by 
the elites. For example, Boyer (1982:94) mentions that in the 1960s “…peasants were removed 
[from their lands] in two ways: (1) by raising land rentals above peasants’ ability to pay and (2) 
through land enclosures wherein peasants were forcibly, sometimes violently, evicted from 
lands whose legal status was often in question.”  
This situation began to place great stress on inheritance systems such as lazuro, as free 
land was no longer available for the older siblings to move out of their paternal homes. This 
eventually led to what Esther Roquas (2002) found in her fieldwork in Santa Bárbara 
Department in the mid-1990s, where the lazuro inheritance system was gradually transformed 
into a partible one in which land was fragmented and divided between sons and daughters, 
creating a whole new type of conflicts over property. 
The 1960s witnessed a dual pattern of land fragmentation by peasant communities, with 
both partible inheritance and land concentration by elites. More and more of the household´s 
subsistence had to be procured through the market. As plots became smaller and the land less 
fertile – due to diminishing fallow periods and the extended used of slash and burn techniques – 
households had to look for more wage labor. According to Chapman, in the mid-1960s every 
household in the western hills was forced to collect one full-time wage income besides its own 
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milpa production. This meant that women had to work more in the fields and also that parents 
tried to keep their sons in the household longer, either to work the fields or to gather income as 
wage laborers, and that there was less time for collective work. This meant not only an 
expansion of commodification – production for sale – but more importantly the monetization of 
subsistence. Monetization seems to have had a corrosive effect on the practices of collective 
labor, as by the time Roquas (2002) was doing fieldwork in Santa Bárbara in the mid-1990s, 
there was little evidence of its presence.38 Importantly, this penetration of money in the process 
of provisioning meant a shift in the position of women and men in relation to each other and to 
the household. As production (the fields or wage labor) and reproduction (domestic labor) 
became separated, with the latter remaining unpaid, the position and work of women became 
increasingly devalued.39 
According to both Chapman and Boyer, one of the main responses to this situation was 
organization. Boyer, for example, describes how peasants in the south began to flock towards 
the National Peasant Federation as a way of protecting themselves from dispossession and of 
organizing land recuperations under the new agrarian legislation. Chapman describes how the 
creation of cooperatives – also within the new agrarian legal framework – allowed communities 
to access technical assistance and credit and thus to improve their conditions of production and 
procure some independence from wage labor. However, this route led necessarily towards 
conflicts with local landowners. The development of colonization projects, such as the BAP, was 
in part a response to these rising tensions. 
                                                        
38 She does mention that the possibility of pooling extra labor was still present through the channels of 
kinship. However, no mention is made of the rituals that used to accompany it and the labor had to be 
paid either in kind or in money. I found a similar situation in my fieldwork among people originally from 
the west. 
39 See my discussion on the gendering of labor capture in the previous chapter. Also see Agarwal (1994), 
Mies (1986), Mackintosh (1989), and Crehan (1997) for similar discussions on the effects of monetization 
in other contexts. 
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The tendency towards migration remained, but with significant changes. First, because 
of growing tensions in the inheritance system, it became more common for the lazuro – younger 
son – to leave before his elder siblings, who might be engaged in wage labor or working in the 
family´s plot. As the local agrarian frontiers began to close, the patterns and routes of migration 
began to shift towards the north coast where, as tales had it, there were good wages to be earned 
in the banana plantations and plenty of free lands to be had.  
The march towards the West: agrarian conflict as trigger  
If we use the individual memories of the current dwellers of the Aguán Region as a window into 
the 1960s and 1970s and the dynamics that “triggered” their movement towards the east, what 
we find is a combination of elements deeply enmeshed in the political and economic conjuncture 
of the time, but that at the same time organized between the two options that I signaled at the 
end of the last section: organization and migration. These memories are of course informed by 
the current situation of those remembering, as well as by their particular life trajectories. 
However, when seen together, two main topics saturate migrants’ narratives about the “trigger” 
moment of their migration histories: dispossession and kinship. 
In most cases, the decision to move away from their places of birth in the west had to do 
with the lack of access to land. Gonzalo was born 1959 in the midst of his family’s phased 
migration from La Paz department, in the southwest region of the country, right next to the 
border with El Salvador.  
…my dad used to tell that they left there [La Paz in the late 1950s], right? Always 
looking, because those places were “burned” with very little money, I mean very 
few places to make money, there were no jobs. So they came searching to La 
Costa, that’s how they used to say over there, let’s go to La Costa. 
We find a similar situation in the case of Marcelo, who was born and raised in Copán 
department, close to the border with Guatemala. Remembering his life in his hometown in the 
period prior to his relocation to the Aguán in 1974, he mentions that “the life in Copán is a hard 
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one. There is only the one harvest: beans, rice and maize. Past that harvest there is nothing left. 
That is why we decided to come here when the INA brought us. I haven’t moved ever since.” 
Eugenia, and her husband Marino, both also from Copán, remember this period in a 
similar vein. When I asked them about what they used to do in their hometown before their 
period of phased migration and eventual arrival in the Aguán in the early 1970s, Eugenia 
responded: “Well in Copán the only work was as a day laborer.” “Over there only days that you 
work are eating days…” adds Marino. She continues, “And without lands, we didn’t have lands. 
He went renting land to work to make a little milpa. And I as a woman, only taking care of the 
kids, we had two kids… And then we migrated to [the department of] Atlántida…” 
This lack of access to land was crisscrossed by different situations. In Gonzalo’s case, his 
father told him that one of the reasons for leaving La Paz was that the only land he could find 
was as sharecropper. In the case of Eugenia and Marino, he had to work as a jornalero (day 
laborer) since they did not have any land, while she remained home taking care of their children. 
This idea that they could only eat those days that he could get some work is indicative of the 
process of monetization of subsistence that was already well under way.   
Alonso, who was born in 1973 in Atlántida, but whose parents came from Lempira, 
another department bordering El Salvador, presents the situation of dispossession vividly. 
When I asked him why his parents had decided to leave Lempira in the late 1960s, he 
responded: “Well, they tell me that they left because there were no possibilities in the 
department of Lempira and life was much harder. For example, they didn’t have a house, nor a 
piece of land, nothing. So they made the decision to leave their family in search of new horizons, 
because when two families come together it is to create new ideas, right?” 
 In a pattern similar to the one described by Grandia (2012) for the Guatemalan Q’echi’, 
more often than not, what I found is that the people migrating from the west during this period 
were young new families. Once they decided to make a home together – when a family is born, 
as Alonso phrased it – they found that the only option they had was to either stay with one of the 
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two families – usually the male’s – or to migrate in search of new lands. This was of course 
shaped by the kinship structure, in which the little land that the father had – for tenure has 
historically been a male entitlement in Honduras – was inherited by a single son or divided 
between all the sons and daughters, creating further fractioning. Also, as we will see, kinship ties 
structured the routes and dynamics of migration, as people tended to move where they had a 
family member or close friend. 
Taking these testimonies together, we get a clearer picture of what many peasant families 
in the West were facing in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, but also the traditional forms of tenure, reinforced and accelerated the processes 
of bridling labor and permanent primitive accumulation that I analyzed in the previous chapter. 
There was not a mechanical relation between these dynamics and the decision to 
migrate. The central effect of dispossession was to structure the field in which the social 
reproduction of these families occurred. By restructuring the tension between self-provisioning 
and market access (wage labor), it forced them to make decisions. These decisions, of course, 
were not entirely theirs to be made. However, there was always a choice. In this particular case, 
the options for the subaltern groups in the country’s west and south were threefold: to remain 
and endure labor capture; to remain but respond to dispossession through organization; or to 
migrate and respond to dispossession through flight.40 
 In the cases of those families I interviewed and that ended up in the Aguán, the choice 
between organizing and fleeing had very concrete effects. Two main patterns were evident. On 
the one hand, those families who decided to use flight as their main strategy of reproduction 
                                                        
40 Albert Hirschman (1978) argues in a similar vein regarding the alternative between “voice” and “exit” 
that the members of an organization have when confronting a conflict.  The voice option refers to 
remaining in the organization and raising the voice to try to change that which he or she considers wrong 
or unacceptable. The exit option refers rather to leaving the organization to avoid the conflict. However, 
as I will show in this chapter and the next ones, there was nothing apolitical about fleeing labor and state 
capture. 
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began a long process of phased migration that, more often than not, led them to the hills 
surrounding the valley. On the other hand, those who organized locally to fight for land in the 
form of land occupations, tended to take part in the state-sponsored colonization program of the 
lowlands that began in 1970. In the next section I will focus on this second pattern and delve 
into the history of the Bajo Aguán Project and the experiences of those involved. 
The Bajo Aguán Project: the creation of peasant cooperatives as capture 
The 1954 general strike came to impact many different aspects of the political and economic life 
of the country. At the same time that it signaled the birth of the rural peasantry as an active 
political protagonist, it came to serve as a warning to the local elites and the transnational 
banana companies of what could happen if measures were not taken to curb discontent. In the 
case of the banana companies – as I discussed in the previous chapter – the solution was largely 
a technological fix: firing a significant amount of its labor force, introducing new technology and 
abandoning large amounts of land. 
In the case of the state and the local elites, the solution could not be so simple. First of 
all, the 1954 strike and the 1964 coup against Ramón Villeda Morales, had exacerbated a conflict 
between an incipient industrial bourgeoisie, based mostly in San Pedro Sula, and the traditional 
seats of political and military power, located mainly around Tegucigalpa (Euraque 1996). While 
the first fraction was in favor of a redistribution of land and the creation of a settled peasantry 
that could bolster the domestic market, the second group, which related land tenure with 
political power, would have none of it and was willing to drown the Honduran countryside in 
blood before giving up its possessions and transforming the agrarian structure.  
A quite lively description of this situation is in the autobiography of James “Guadalupe” 
Carney (1985:206), a U.S. Jesuit priest who arrived in Honduras in 1961 and was deeply 
involved with the peasant movement in the North Coast, up to his disappearance by the 
Honduran army in 1983:  
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In May of 1966, the crisis of the campesinos in the sector of Guanchias was 
greatly intensified; this was when the contract of the Tela Railroad Company for 
renting these lands from the Bograns ran out. As mentioned earlier, these lands 
had been abandoned by the Tela years ago and now were occupied by about 
twelve thousand persons, campesino families who lived and planted their milpas 
on these lands. Without even taking into consideration these poor families, the 
Bograns sold about half to the rich Colombian, Arcesio Echeverry, who had a deal 
with the Standard Fruit Company to plant bananas there. He immediately tried 
to throw the campesino families off the land. The Bogran Fortin brothers, Luis 
and Fausto, and the Bogran Paredes family wanted to extend their existing cattle 
ranches over all the rest of the land.  
Extreme poverty and rampant dispossession, combined with an almost all out 
confrontation between organized peasantry, army and the private guards of the large 
landowners, created a very volatile situation. However, in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution 
and in the context of the Alliance for Progress, a less repressive solution to the conflict had to be 
found. Just as in the rest of Latin America, a timid, controlled and limited agrarian reform 
process was put in place (Kay 1998).41 
The agrarian reform was an opportunity to stitch together various political and economic 
raw wounds and thus stabilize domination. First of all, it was a form of neutralizing class 
struggle in those places where it had further escalated, by improving the living conditions of the 
rural poor, and thus broadening the internal market, but without significantly altering the 
agrarian structure — a sort of passive revolution in the countryside, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Second, Oswaldo López Arellano gave a speech on January 1, 1974, in which he 
mentioned that "the agrarian reform is oriented towards the incorporation of lands that 
currently remain unproductive and outside the national process of development, and substitute 
the system of large and small units by technically developed ones.” Third, by rationalizing land 
use and distributing “idle” land to cash crop producing organized peasants, it could expand 
agricultural production for both domestic and foreign markets, thus creating a surplus that 
                                                        
41 However, it is important to point out that, outside of Cuba and Mexico, this was probably the most far 
reaching agrarian reform in Latin America up to that point. 
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could be used for industrialization. Fourth, it meant that peasant organizations could be 
regulated through law, brought in line and reshaped to the needs of capital accumulation — 
labor capture in a larger and more stable form. Finally, if all of these elements could be brought 
together in a harmonious way, the agrarian reform could be the centerpiece of a process of 
“historical actualization” in which the gap between supposed natural riches and economic 
poverty would finally be brought together under the banner of development and progress. 
It is not surprising, then, that sponsored colonization, rather than land redistribution 
became the cornerstone of the Honduran agrarian reform. In general terms, colonization 
projects meant bringing land that the state deemed “empty” into the dynamics of capital 
accumulation without touching the agrarian structure, a requirement for the passive revolution 
approach to be viable.42 They were also a way of bringing important know-how and resources 
from abroad, as almost nobody – either from within or abroad – saw the country as having the 
minimal conditions for carrying out a meaningful agrarian reform program by itself (Castro 
1994). 
As early as 1960, before the famous Conference of Punta del Este in which the Alliance 
for Progress was officially launched, the Honduran government had requested support from the 
Organization of American States (OAS) for carrying out preliminary studies on designing an 
agrarian reform plan. The initial letter of intent sent by the Honduran government went beyond 
agrarian reform and proposed a set of broader reforms that together seemed to point towards a 
grand agrarian development program that included both agricultural and industrial 
development. Towards the end of 1960 the OAS sent a multidisciplinary group of specialists, 
which came to be known as Mission 105. Due to the lack of the necessary information, Mission 
                                                        
42 This sort of terra nullius argument is neither new, nor exclusive to the Honduran case. It has been used 
in many different contexts and times to legitimize dispossession (see for example, Locke 1980; Tully 1982; 
Gordillo 2004; Milun 2011; Gidwani 2008a). 
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105 limited itself to proposing two colonization projects: one in the South and the other in the 
Aguán River basin in the northeast. 
Regarding the Aguán, the initial objective of Mission 105 was to propose an integral 
development project that would include the whole river basin. However, because the 
government (and thus the Mission) lacked the necessary scientific information on the conditions 
(climatic, hydrological, morphological, among others) of the whole basin and because the 
country did not have the minimal necessary financial and human resources to develop the whole 
basin, it was decided that the project should focus only in one of its sections: the Bajo or Lower 
Aguán. The idea was that once this first part was completed it would be possible to include the 
middle and upper parts of the river basin. On March 4, 1964, the General Secretary of the OAS, 
Uruguayan José Mora, handed the Honduran government the document titled Proyecto Bajo 
Aguán (Lower Aguán Proyect; BAP). It included information related on the first two phases of a 
proposed general timetable. The report was presented by the Honduran Rigoberto Sandoval 
Corea, who was then working for the IDB, but who would later become the mastermind of the 
agrarian reform process.  
The original BAP proposed by Mission 105, was very ambitious. It suggested creating all 
the necessary infrastructure and the financial and technical conditions so that “following an 
ordered plan, the river basin … [could] be in full production in approximately 10 years” (OAS 
1964:2). This was envisioned as a project that would inscribe civilization and development into a 
region that was rich in natural resources, but very close to “empty” and “idle.” Early in the 
document, for example, is the claim that, 
The Bajo Aguán Colonization project consists of a series of measures for the 
development of one of the five zones in which the Aguán river’s Valley has been 
divided. These lands, most of which were very fertile, had been returned to the 
State by a banana company that exploited them for several years. However, due 
to the deterioration of the infrastructure, these lands are currently semi-
abandoned and populated in part by occupants whose activities do not contribute 
to fulfilling the economic potential of the region. (OAS 1964:4)  
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On the next page, the document asserts that the Aguán “…possesses the [country’s] most 
abundant and practically unexploited natural resources” and that the BAP is an epic endeavor in 
which “the project will be the first step in what could be called the ‘the march towards the East’” 
(OAS 1964:5). 
The main objectives of this march towards the East were to colonize around 70,000 
hectares and “…to incorporate to the money economy and improve the living conditions of 6,059 
peasant families…, reaching a level that will allow them to produce enough food to improve their 
diet, as well as producing surpluses for national and international markets” (OAS 1964:4–5). In 
terms of infrastructure, the region was portrayed as being almost “virgin” land, as the entire 
remaining banana company infrastructure was in very bad shape, but the report was optimistic 
that the situation could be improved in just three years.  
In terms of production, the BAP had a straightforward objective, to bring the peasant 
families into the logic of the market in two main ways: on the one hand, promoting the 
production of export-oriented cash crops, such as oil palm, cacao and citrus trees. On the other 
hand, to provide financial and technical support to improve the productivity of staple food 
production – mainly maize and beans – to supply both the domestic and Central American 
markets. This was supposed to help the country and peasants in different ways. First, by 
increasing their cash income, it would improve the living standards of the relocated families. 
Second, by creating surpluses that could be sold, it would create national income that could be 
funneled into industrialization. Third, it would diversify the productive structure and thus 
reduce dependency on bananas and the economic vulnerability that this implied. Finally, it 
would allow the creation of economies of scale and improve productivity through the use of 
better technology. 
Beneficiaries would be given individual farms. The size of these farms would depend on 
their location and would range from 10 to 16 hectares, depending on the fertility of the soils. 
Through the National Agrarian Institute (INA) and the state banking sector, they would receive 
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financial and technical support and the farms would be furnished with some basic 
improvements, such as irrigation ditches and water wells. Housing projects would also be 
developed to cover all of the beneficiaries. The construction formula was easy: the state would 
provide the needed materials and most of the construction labor would be provided by the 
beneficiaries themselves.  
The project’s report argued that one of the reasons for the low levels of productivity in 
the country were the low educational and health standards. Improvement in these areas was 
seen as crucial for the success of the project and, besides improving housing conditions, clinics 
and schools would be constructed using a similar construction formula as the one for the 
housing projects.  
The selection of the beneficiaries was not left to chance. Besides the selection criteria 
present in article 79 of the agrarian reform law – being Honduran, male or female head of 
household, at least 16 years old, owning no or very little land and having as an occupation 
agricultural labor –, the BAP presented a set of “specific characteristics, which define the 
individual and family group aptitude of the future beneficiaries” (p. 152). These characteristics 
included “working capacity” and “general conditions.” Regarding working capacity, “it will be 
measured through the point system proposed by the sociologist Arrigo Serpieri… In this system, 
points are accorded to the man-work unit, the consumption relation and the future consumption 
relation” (p. 153). It is worth noting that Serpiere was undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Agriculture under Mussolini in 1923. In the case of general conditions, four elements were to be 
taken into account: conduct, habits, health and education. 
As this quick overview suggests, the project proposed in the OAS report was not only 
quite ambitious, but also all very broad. It encompassed almost all the aspects of the future life 
of the beneficiaries, from what to produce to where they should live and what their homes 
should look like, to the type of attitudes they should have. All of these were to be under the 
control of the state in the form of the colonization authorities. The project drafted by the 
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Mission 105 imagined the BAP as an institutional hub that would supervise and through 
technical knowledge and power would create an island of development that could later be 
replicated in other parts of the country. Within this vision, peasant families would become 
efficient cash crop producers that would help the development of the country. Here, 
development was understood as both material and subjective, as what was assumed as peasant 
“nature” had to be transformed and cultivated for it to become compatible with development 
and progress. 
Parallel to this technocratic imagination, we are also introduced in spurts and hiccups to 
the anxieties that the Honduran reality created in the hearts and minds of those who prepared 
the report. Nothing could be left to chance, because everything that was “traditionally” 
Honduran represented a menace to development. It is important to stress that under this vision, 
development was understood as the transformation of subsistence-oriented and traditional 
households into modern capitalist, market-oriented ventures under the tutelage of the state. In 
this way, peasant households would metamorphosize from burdens into catalysts of the national 
economy.43 
The recipe for success was to fill an empty space that contained the natural potential of 
the nation, but that could be molded through inflows of foreign capital and technical knowhow 
into something different: a locus of capitalist development that could radiate outward to the rest 
of the country. An ever present obstacle, however, was the lack of the required human (labor) 
quality. For development to flourish out of the “virgin” lands of the Aguán, a new social subject 
had to be created, very Honduran in terms of nationalism and patriotic feeling, but utterly not-
Honduran in terms of her or his cultural and labor practices. If land capture needed the 
cultivation of a particular type of laboring subject, the intention of the BAP was to move in that 
                                                        
43 For a detailed ethnographic study of how development projects are deployed in the ground, see Tanya 
Murray Li’s (2007) study on Indonesia’s “development” history.  
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direction, absorbing unruly peasants from different parts of the country and converting them 
into productive citizens, tied to the land and to the national economy through the market.  
When paper encounters reality: from the Mission 105 to the actual BAP 
As it often happens with development projects (see for example Mosse 2005; Li 2007; Ferguson 
1990), significant differences existed between what Mission 105 presented, the goals with which 
it started and the results  on the ground. First, the final $7.7 million agreement between the OAS 
and the Honduran government was signed on October 2, 1969. The total cost of the Project was 
estimated at $13.1 million, leaving the government to provide the other 41 percent. However, the 
project suffered significant delays due in part to the 1969 war with El Salvador, but also to the 
fact that there were no clear legal procedures regarding land tenure. Thus in practice, the project 
only kicked off at the end of 1971, 24 months later than initially planned. Also, the BAP got off to 
a slow start, and it only began to gain momentum with the signing of Decree No. 8 (December 
26, 1972) and Law-Decree No. 170 (January 14, 1975), both mentioned above. Because of these 
delays, as well as the destruction caused by Hurricane Fifí (September, 1974), the budgetary 
disbursements were pushed back another twelve months until April 2, 1977. A final element that 
also influenced these delays was the decision in 1972 to change the original plan of individual 
farms towards a framework that favored peasant cooperatives.  
The Aguán at the moment of arrival of the cooperatives 
Before returning to the experience of the migrant families, it is important to describe how the 
region was before their arrival and to show just how “empty” it was. During the 1920s and 1930s 
the Aguán had been the home of the Truxillo Railroad Company, which cut down vast quantities 
of valuable hardwoods in order to plant thousands of hectares of bananas. The fact that in the 
early years it bought most of its bananas from local small producers speaks not only of the 
transformation of the landscape – from tropical forest to banana plantation – but also of some 
type of social organization, with groups of  small producers and railway and plantation workers. 
By the 1940s the company abandoned many of the banana farms  due to the spread of the 
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Panama disease – a plant fungus (Soluri 2009). In the postwar period, the companies had all 
but abandoned the Aguán, giving way to scattered settlements of ex-banana and railway 
workers,  Garifuna communities, landless Salvadoran immigrants and local landowners – either 
former banana producers or cattle ranchers –, remaining largely outside the influence of the 
state (Casolo 2009). In terms of tenure, the region’s land was divided into farms ranging from 1 
to 500 hectares, with a predominance of small farms (around 60 percent) (Castro 1994). 
However, according to the 1966 and 1974 censuses, 3.6 percent of the local population owned 87 
percent of the lands (Macías 2001).  
This description of the region contrasts with its characterization by Mission 105 as an 
almost empty space, with little and often abandoned infrastructure and poorly exploited land 
and other resources, supposedly largely outside of the market (both cattle and precious woods 
were reported as being extracted). In terms of the demography, according to the 1961 census, 
there were 30,020 people living in the zone, which represented a 50 percent increase in 10 
years. Further, the region was attracting flows of relatively young families (only 5 percent of the 
population was 65 or older).  
The migrants… proceed from various parts of the country, among others, from 
the banana producing zones, in which unemployment has increased due to the 
contraction of activities, particularly in the zones of Tela and Cortés; from the 
South coast and the West, which are zones of great demographic pressure. (OAS 
1964:71) 
Also, according to the 1952 census, 77 percent of the economically active population in 
the Aguán region was not under the wage relation, “…which indicates… the family character of 
the farms found currently in the Colonization zone…” (p. 75). Further, those family nuclei were 
relatively small (approximately 1.8 family members), which reinforced the idea of a young 
agrarian frontier region. The families lived under conditions of pervasive poverty that –
according to the Mission 105 report– could be literally seen in their housing conditions: 
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The immediate family members inhabit, in general, a house made of wattle and 
daub, or in a hut made of palm leaves. Commonly, this house has one or two 
rooms and is inhabited by the children, the adults, the pigs and the poultry. 
Commonly, furniture is scarce and very rustic, and most houses do not have 
wells, potable water, or sanitation systems that would help eliminate the hazards 
of intestinal parasites and other digestive illnesses. (Mission 105: 76) 
In broad terms, the approach of the state to the region can be divided into two moments. 
First, from 1971 to around 1975, the BAP got a weak start as the money from the IAB still had 
not rolled in and the military had not yet seized formal control of the state; this was a moment of 
slow advance. Second, from 1975 onwards, after the 1972 coup (see Chapter 1) and the passing of 
the agrarian law, the military state approached the colonization endeavor as if it were a war: 
with vertical control and a ruthless exercise of force that left little space for dissent. In 1977 the 
international funds for the BAP finally kicked in and then the actual plan of enrolling 
participants in different parts of the country began. 
In the first period (1971-1975), the original Mission 105 text of the BAP not only 
mentioned the local population of the region, but included them as potential members of the 
future cooperatives. However, once the project began to pick up steam, it became harder and 
harder for these families not only to be included within the cooperatives, but also to hold on to 
the land that they had called their own just a few years before. From the perspective of the state, 
all of the land that was to be included in the BAP was state-owned and thus the vast majority of 
local dwellers were illegal occupants. However, according to the agrarian reform law, the state 
had to pay for any improvements – crops planted, wells, buildings, and so on – that they had 
made on the land. 
Everyone I met who had been living in the Aguán prior to the arrival of the INA and the 
BAP remembered this period with bitterness, as they went from poor landowners to just poor. 
Three elements saturate their “memories of dispossession” (Hart 2006): first, that although they 
agreed with the idea of giving land to the poor, they were against how it had been done; second, 
that the state had lied to them, since they never actually received payment for the 
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improvements; third, the whole process was tilted in favor of the “outsiders,” as against the 
“locals.”  
Luis is a school teacher who was born and raised close to the town of Tocoa in the middle 
of the Aguán Valley. When I asked him about how the town was before the cooperatives arrived, 
he responded with a bitter tone:  
No, before the cooperatives, the town [of Tocoa] was hard working in agriculture 
and there was little education, very few schools. There was only one school here. 
So the people from all the aldeas [villages] came here and each independent 
peasant enjoyed having up to eight milk cows and there was no enclosed property 
in the hands of the poor. Only the rich had wire fences to keep their cattle, but for 
the poor, it was free space. And there was abundance of everything: maize, beans, 
rice, pork, cattle, milk, cream; everything in abundance. The daily wage was a 
Lempira [around $0.50 at that time]… It was, we could say, a more individual 
[independent] life style. 
Luis’s narrative presents a quite complex picture. For him, the arrival of the cooperatives 
meant a significant break with the past. Before the cooperatives, the Aguán was a place of labor 
and agriculture, a world of abundance filled with many different crops. It was also a place on the 
fringes of the state – as signaled by the lack of access to education. Although there was little 
social differentiation, it was not an idyllic classless society, as there was differentiation between 
the “rich” – with their cattle and barbwire44 – and the poor – with their staple crops and open 
spaces. Finally, it was a space of individual life and labor and in general, it would seem, of a 
certain peace and calm in poverty. 
“The process of intrigue began once the cooperatives came here,” Luis continued. As our 
conversation shifted to the period after the arrival of the cooperatives, he presented a 
description that seemed to mirror, but in opposition, all of the elements that he originally 
described: 
                                                        
44 See Blomley (2007)  for a very interesting analysis of the role played by hedges – “organic barbwire” – 
during the process of enclosures in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England. 
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The agrarian reform brought peasants from the South, from Intibucá; groups of 
many trucks would come in to the settlements with the military and evict the 
owners of the land. Then the peasant [that was living in the region before the 
BAP] began to emigrate, the sons of the peasants began to migrate to other 
places, looking for other life systems… So, we had a rivalry, because the 
cooperativista [cooperative member] could not see the independent peasant, 
because the latter resented that his patrimony had been taken away… It is then, 
after the agrarian reform with the settlements that the independent peasant 
began to look to the cerros [the hills].  Because they didn’t have any options, 
because they saw that everything was covered in palm and it was a labyrinth and 
major discords began, and there were a lot of deaths. After that, came the 
persecution by the large landowners, the cooperativistas and the large 
landowners. The individual peasant didn’t have any problems, he had settled in 
the cerros. But the large landowner did, because they were already there before 
the agrarian reform. And today, after the agrarian reform, large landowners still 
exist, and have bought the lands from the groups of peasants who have sold the 
land that the state gave them, and now they find themselves in a worse position 
than those peasants who were evicted at the beginning.  
With the cooperatives came the dispossession of the local poor.45 In a sense, this 
dispossession was parallel and enmeshed with the arrival of the state in the region, in the form 
of the military and the trucks that brought in the peasant families from other parts of the 
country. Further, as the migrants from the rest of the country rolled in, the “independent 
peasant” and in particular his sons, had to migrate to other places, mainly towards the hills, 
reenacting the tension between cycles of dispossession and cycles of flight as a form of survival, 
as a way of being in the world. For Luis, the independent peasant was opposed to the 
cooperatives, their collective labor and the support they had from the state. With the 
                                                        
45 This narrative resonates strongly with the one presented by what we could call the enclosures approach 
to dispossession (see for example, De Angelis 2004; Grandia 2012; Blomley 2007). According to this 
approach, capital and primitive accumulation come to destroy the “commons”: land and other natural 
resources that are openly available for all (where “all” can be defined in different terms), under a set of 
rules and customs that differ from the idea of private property. However, in much of this literature there 
is a strong tendency to present the (supposedly) precapitalist moment – that of the commons – in highly 
idyllic terms. Further, since the idea of the commons is squarely rooted in history of the British transition 
towards capitalism, there is a danger of collapsing very dissimilar processes under one single notion. It is 
mainly for this last reason that I prefer to think about how labor capture – the interconnections between 
primitive accumulation and labor bridling – takes place in particular settings.  
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cooperatives the intrigues began and the variety of crops gave way to the monoculture of palm 
oil and its labyrinthine, monotonous landscape. The only seemingly existing constant is that of 
the big landowner, of the valley’s rich.  
It should then come as no surprise that, during the first year of the Project, the message 
“INA fuera del Aguán” (INA leave the Aguán) could be found scribbled all over walls in Tocoa, 
or that trucks and other machinery were vandalized. This resistance to the agrarian reform and 
the INA was quite generalized in the region and was not limited to poor peasants such as Luis’s 
parents. In his book on the BAP, Angel Castro (1994:55) quotes the following testimony from 
one of the members of the earlier cooperatives regarding their arrival in the region. 
The agrarian reform was done through sheer pressure by peasants…The land was 
yet to be distributed and the peasants had to take it by force while rallied on by 
the INA [promoters]. The risk of dying was high as the army was on the side of 
the large landowners, they would come to evict us… I remember how my other 
compañeros and I watched with impotence how members of the Army made a 
functionary of the INA eat grass and bound him with barbwire in the aldea of 
Tosca. Days later the functionary’s dead body appeared. (p. 55) 
As we can see, before López Arellano came to power and placed the Agrarian Reform at 
the top of the government’s agenda, the situation in the Aguán was particularly hostile to the 
BAP. As much of the literature on agrarian reform points out, the speed and extension of the 
reform is defined by the particular combination between peasant pressure from below and a 
sympathetic government from above (see for example Kay 1998; Moyo 2002; Courville, Patel, 
and Rosset 2006; Chonchol 1967). Also, it would seem to confirm political scientist Michael 
Albertus’s (2010) claim that in Latin America autocratic governments have an easier time 
implementing significant redistributive reforms than democratic ones. According to Albertus, 
this has to do with the fact that autocratic regimes do not need to worry about pleasing or 
appeasing antagonistic social groups, as their legitimacy comes more from the deployment of 
force than the creation of electorally mediated consents. For the Honduran case, I would argue 
that it also had to do with the dynamics of passive revolution themselves. Marx (1992) mentions 
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in Volume 1 of Capital that the coercive law of competition creates a tension between the 
interests of the individual capitalist – maximize profit now – with the collective class interests of 
the bourgeoisie –reproduction of the conditions of accumulation for the future – and that it was 
the role of the state to step in and regulate the situation.46 It seems to me that something similar 
was operating here. For the landowning elite, the idea of promoting land redistribution was 
unthinkable, but for the political regime some sort of controlled access to land was the necessary 
condition for the forms of domination to remain intact. At the end, this contradiction came to be 
mediated and institutionalized through and in the form of the state. 
Returning to the Aguán, it is worth pointing out that certain last names, belonging to 
some of the most prominent local landowners present before the BAP, such as Nájera, Bascha 
and Alemán, continuously appeared, not only in the narratives of the people that I spoke to, but 
also in local landmarks, such as schools that were named after members of these families. They 
also appeared to get the better end of the process of land dispossession that the BAP entailed, as 
in every case they either managed to keep their lands or to be relocated to other places. Don 
José, for example, a member of La Norteña Cooperative, to whose history we will turn shortly, 
remembers how his dad had a 30 hectare farm on the hillsides close to Tocoa. He was 
threatened by the functionaries of INA that he either join a cooperative or lose his land. He 
opted for the former, but later learned that that his farm had been given to the Nájera family in 
return for a piece of land that they had lost in the valley´s lowlands. These sorts of negotiations 
between local elites and government point to the fact that capital accumulation – and hegemony 
for that matter – is never promoted or done in a vacuum. The BAP was to be installed in a place 
                                                        
46 In chapter 10, Marx shows how the pressure from the working classes to improve their conditions led to 
the promulgation of a set of policies oriented at regulating their working conditions. Marx points to the 
irony that at the same time that these policies improved somewhat their working conditions, they were 
also beneficial for the industrial bourgeoisie in the long run, as they curved the literal destruction of labor 
power in the workshop, and thus secured the conditions of capital accumulation in the future. 
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that — far from “empty” — was filled with political dynamics and tensions and particular 
relations of domination which – as Luis  so eloquently describes – articulated the local cattle 
ranching elite with the poor peasantry that also inhabited the region. Thus, more than simply 
imposing its will upon the region, the state had to negotiate with the dominant groups present 
locally, to lubricate the sociopolitical landscape and allow the agrarian reform to gain traction on 
the ground. 
 Father Carney (1985), whose autobiography we already referred to in this chapter, also 
mentions how the local landowners were given  a free hand to protect their lands by any means 
necessary and to encroach on those of poor peasants inhabiting the valley. There were also 
internal differentiations, as the levels of violence exercised by the landowners were greater on 
the left bank of the Aguán River than on the right bank, where the efforts of the BAP were 
mainly concentrated.  
This differentiation between the left and right banks has a long history. Already during 
the period of the banana plantations, there was a clear concentration of both infrastructure and 
production in the river’s right bank, which also affected population patterns once the companies 
left, as most people concentrated around the town of Tocoa. This situation also came to inform 
the design and implementation of the BAP, as the right bank was seen as having better 
conditions for the colonization project, due to its better infrastructure and year round 
accessibility. In this way, the first cooperatives created in the region – Salamá in 1971, quickly 
followed by La Confianza, Central Aguán, La Zamora and La San Isidro – were all located on the 
right bank and relatively close to Tocoa.   
Another point to take into account is the decision that the “locals” –those settled in the 
Aguán before the BAP– had to make about whether or not to join the cooperatives.  This was 
always a decision fraught with tensions. The testimonies of José and Luis present a notable 
counterpoint in this regard. In both cases, the arrival of the “foreign colonists” was experienced 
and remembered as a moment of dispossession in which the “local” poor had gotten the worst 
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end of the deal, while the “local” rich had managed to maintain their position. In the case of 
Luis’s family and many others, they had to leave their lands and migrate towards the hills, or 
move into Tocoa. There, they would have work in the incipient service sector –as in the case of 
Luis who became a teacher. The other available option, was to find work as day laborers in the 
cooperatives – which many times were located in the same place where they had formerly lived 
– or for the local rich (Castro 1994).   
In the case of José’s family, as well as other families, his father was given the choice of 
either joining the cooperative or leaving the region. His dad decided to stay, but this was done in 
a more communitarian context. He remembers the period before to the 1970s and the arrival of 
the cooperatives as a period in which the landscape was dominated by guamil (thick bush) and 
as a place where “there was no suffering” and, although there was a clear differentiation between 
the rich and poor, there were no conflicts between them. However, with the 1970s the INA and 
the state came to expropriate the lands due to their condition as “national” land. There was not 
much peasant organization to speak of in the region, but with the BAP came the arrival of 
different national organizations, such as National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH) 
or the state-sponsored Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (FECORAH). 
José and his family lived in the aldea of San Isidro, close to Tocoa, which eventually absorbed it 
and turned it into a neighborhood. Here, most families worked the land and grew mainly staple 
crops for self-provisioning; that, as we have seen, was the great enemy of the BAP and its 
development perspective. Around 1973, seeing the process of dispossession that was affecting 
most of the region, the people from San Isidro began organizing their own cooperative, because 
“it was not fair that the people of San Isidro should be left without access to land.” In this case 
we see the reenactment of the flight versus capture dilemma: leave the lands and venture into 
the hills (flight), or organize, become a cooperative and become absorbed by the BAP (capture). 
By 1976, José’s father had become a beneficiary of the agrarian reform program, as 
member of La Norteña cooperative. These were not the only cooperatives that had a strong 
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component of “local” members. Others were the Salamá, la Confianza, Bajo Aguán and Zamora 
cooperatives. All of them had been based in aldeas with a deeper history, closer kinship links 
and were more accessible, as they were all located on the right bank. We will return to their 
history briefly, but before that, I will turn to the experience of those who were brought in from 
outside the region and also examine some additional elements related to the creation of the 
cooperatives. 
Arriving in the Aguán 
If at the level of the state, the BAP had started with the negotiations with the OAS and the 
promise of development, for many of the families from different parts of the country, the BAP 
began as a promise of access to land and a better life. Everyone that I spoke to remembered how 
the INA or the national peasant organizations told them that they would be given good, ready 
and fertile lands once they arrived in the Aguán, that their lives would now be easy. Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. As they left their hometowns and communities, they 
remember how they thought that with this journey their former problems would be left behind 
and their struggles would have paid off. Marcelo remembers well that the tough life that they 
had back in Copán 
… forced us into organizing an association of the ANACH. There, we would each 
contributed daily six Lempiras, when the daily wage was two Lempiras. We got 
organized; we made a big sacrifice, to manage to have something left to eat... We 
applied for the land [that they were occupying], and after two years of waiting, 
the state tells us that they are going to sell us the land. An INA promoter came 
and told us that we had to make a contract regarding the land. However, it 
happened that there were a lot of precious woods in the land: cedar, mahogany … 
So he [INA promoter] comes back and tells us: “look, we can’t give you this land, 
but we have some other land ready, tecnified land in Colón. There – he told us – 
we are going to give each associate 10 hectares of land to work individually.” That 
made us happy, as we didn’t have anywhere to work… But the problems began 
when we got here…  
In his case, as in many that I encountered, the process of being “selected” – in a way very 
different way from what the Mission 105 document proposed – was found in the intersection 
between organization and conflict. They first organized themselves as members of a national 
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peasant organization – in this case ANACH – as they continued their struggle for land.47 
Marcelo does not mention it, but it is possible that at this moment they were occupying the land 
as a way of pressuring the state towards giving it to them under the new agrarian law.48 At that 
moment the state functionaries appear and inform them first that they could buy the land, but 
later that they cannot give them the land because of the valuable hardwood trees there. Then an 
alternative was offered: they can be moved to the Aguán, were they will have what at the 
moment appeared to him as “vast” lands: 10 hectares per family, which of course suggests how 
fragmented lands in the west were in this period. 
This reading of the agrarian reform and particularly of the BAP as a form of deactivation 
of agrarian conflicts makes sense. However, it is important to add that before 1977 the role of the 
state – in the form of the INA – was of enabling the migration towards the region, but the actual 
organizing and logistics of the trip were the responsibility of the peasant organizations  (Castro 
1994). 
Marcelo remembers that once they were ready, ANACH hired a convoy of trucks to take 
them and all of the possessions that they could carry from their hometown in Copán to the 
Aguán. They had to go with an armed escort, since the local population was against their arrival. 
Once there, their original group of families was divided up and added to diverse cooperatives. 
When I asked Marcelo about how he remembers the place when he first arrived. He mentions 
emphatically: “These really dense forests! There were big trees, really thick bush.” 
Shortly after Marcelo’s arrival on the left bank of the Aguán, in September, 1974, 
Hurricane Fifí struck. In the aftermath of the disaster, the types of families that were selected 
into the BAP seems to have expanded to include those from communities affected by the 
                                                        
47 A similar situation is described by Boyer (1982) for the south of the country. 
48 Marcelo does not remember the exact moment when this happened. However, he arrived in the Aguán 
in 1974, so we could speculate that it happened at the beginning of the 1970s. 
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hurricane. Further, the state moved from simple enabler to actual promoter of the migrations. 
By 1977, with the inflow of OAS funds, the INA had opened offices in Choluteca (south), 
Comayagua (center) and Santa Rosa de Copán (west), which began to select families in regard to 
three criteria: land with little agriculture potential, concentration of agricultural population and 
lack of agrarian reform lands (Castro 1994). The idea was not to create new cooperatives, but to 
fill the already existing ones. 
 We find an example of this in the lives of Eugenia and Marino. They had left Copán in 
the late 1960s in search of a better life in the north coast. After their relocation to the 
municipality of Esparta in the department of Atlántida, they built a champita (small hut made of 
palm leaves and mud-covered walls) close to a river. With Fifí this river overflowed and 
destroyed their champita, leaving them with their “arms crossed,” – without work – as Marino 
would phrase it. In the aftermath of the hurricane, the peasant organizations began the process 
of organizing the affected families. Just as in the case of Marcelo, this process was done by 
ANACH. They remember how they began the process of organizing and forming groups and 
were told that once they got to the Aguán, everything would be different and they would have 
land to work and food to eat, that everything was pretty much ready. Then, around five trucks 
arrived to take them to the Aguán. Eugenia remembers putting not only her clothes and other 
meager possessions, but also a few chickens that she had. However, once they got to the Aguán 
their difficulties continued: 
When we got here, we arrived with the two girls, we came to eat rotten maize, 
they gave us rotten fish and wet oatmeal, damp, and that had a bad smell, but we 
had to eat it because there was nothing else… Because of him [Ramiro], for the 
land is that we came. Then we started to see that there was no drinking water and 
it was then that I felt uncomfortable, ‘Damn! Let’s better go away from here,’ I 
told them. “‘No, he responded, ‘we already went and saw the lands, they are really 
good lands and we are going to make milpa.’ And my mom would also support 
me. She used to tell me, “‘no, daughter, to better yourself, you have to suffer, 
there is no water here, but we will find a way.’ We made champas with sheet 
metal, there we cooked and we took out water with plastic containers from some 
really deep wells. And most of the people were fighting over the little water that 
there was. And if we didn’t cover the well, the next day that we could come, we 
122 
 
would find frogs and rotten logs, everything would fall there, and we would pull 
out the container with water and frogs would be in there. So we would throw 
them away and drink the water. It was awful! I don’t even want to remember. 
Coming from very difficult contexts, framed by dynamics of dispossession and “natural” 
disasters, these impoverished families arrived in the Aguán with the promise that they would 
receive plenty of good land and that their lives would immediately improve. However, as we can 
see from these testimonies, these promises remained just that, promises, never to actually be 
realized. For Eugenia, her bitterness was very much grounded in her immediate domestic 
conditions; procuring subsistence became an almost nightmarish task. In the case of Ramiro, 
who according to Eugenia was behind the idea of moving to the Aguán, the trip was motivated 
by the hope of accessing land and with it, a better future.  
I tended to find this split in temporality in many of my interviews. For women, the trip is 
usually remembered in terms of the everyday difficulties of procuring basic subsistence and very 
much grounded in their immediate conditions. For men, the process is remembered rather from 
the perspective of the hopes they had of moving away from poverty, becoming landowners and 
being able to work for themselves. Both of these temporalities inhabit, of course, a present of 
ubiquitous poverty, but while provisioning and subsistence tend to be the standpoint from 
which women judge that past, for men the more salient elements are the ideas of being able to 
work and of being forever poor. 
In general, the memories of most of the people that I spoke to about this period, both 
“locals” and “outsiders,” were saturated by three overarching elements: first of all, nature and 
their struggles against it; second, the new dynamics that coming together and working with 
other people brought; and third, the tensions between producing milpa and the introduction of 
palm oil as a cash crop. I will turn to these topics in the next section. 
The production of the Bajo Aguán: nature, capital and a new laboring subject 
Nature as an external element (Smith 2008) is a pervasive theme in the memories of those who 
lived and arrived in the Aguán during the 1960s and 1970s. Words such as guaimil or jungle are 
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found often in their narratives. Eugenia and Marino remembered the place where they arrived 
as wild and socially empty:  “There was nothing, only monte [high wild grass]…” she tells me 
“there were only mountains and a part guamil down below.” “Most of it was guaimil, other than 
that, there was nothing at all,” Marino adds. 
In all of the different narratives, nature appears as something both external and opposite 
– as something initially operating against them –, but also as something exotic and potentially 
nourishing. Mosquito and snake bites, bad water, fevers and other tropical diseases were just 
some of the dangers that they had to face. Further, this was a strange nature, one that contrasted 
with the types of climate, animals and plants that they were used to in their hometowns in the 
west. However, at the same time, this nature provided them with new sources of nourishment 
through hunting and fishing. For example, Eugenia remembers this period as one of suffering, 
but also as one in which she had to turn collecting to feed her family: “there were a lot of 
tomatoes. When we couldn’t find anything to eat, we would go and cut them down, and roast 
them in the griddle, and that is how we fed the girls, it was terrible, terrible…” 
At the same time, it was also in working with and against nature that they began to 
transform the region and create a home. Initially this was done by transforming the jungle into 
milpa through their labor. We return to Eugenia: “when I saw the lot, it felt like my life had 
changed. We now ate good maize, I would take care of a chicken, now she would lay an egg, we 
were on our way, it changed, it made a difference…” 
Initially this production of nature – of turning this alien and hostile environment into 
home – was deeply intertwined or articulated with the idea of making milpa to sustain 
themselves and their families. This was a very deeply ingrained element in both the migrant 
families coming from the west and those that were already living in the region before the 1970s. 
These crops were seen as a form of safety; making sure that their families would not go hungry, 
or in cases such as that of Eugenia and Marino, that they would not go hungry again. It should 
come as no surprise then that in most cases, all the ones that I learned about at least, the first 
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thing that the members of the cooperatives did, was to clear the forest and make their milpas. 
For example, José remembers that one of the first things that they did in La Norteña cooperative 
was preparing and planting 100 hectares of maize. With support from the state bank, they also 
bought trucks to improve their productivity.  
Although they were producing the same crops that they had grown most of their lives, 
the productive process was different. In their hometowns peasant households were used to 
producing in small individual plots, oriented mainly towards their self-provisioning. Now the 
logic was different. In most cases, the land in the cooperatives was split between individual plots 
for each family and other ones to work collectively. Certain days of the week they would work on 
their individual plots and certain days they had to work collectively. Further, a portion of the 
collective production had to be for the market, as the debt payments had to be kept up. In this 
way a separation between production and household reproduction began. To be a member of a 
cooperative one had to work in the fields; thus, membership was dominantly masculine. Women 
had an indirect membership and their activities were limited to participating in the “housewife 
clubs” that were organized by the INA promoters (Ooijens et al. 1990). Their unpaid domestic 
labor was not seen as part of the productive endeavor of the cooperative.  
However, the fact that each household had access to an individual plot, in which the 
family might or might not be residing, meant that women could work on the side, rising minor 
livestock and some other crops.  Livestock raising was heavily controlled and families could only 
buy larger species such as cows with the permission of the board of directors of the cooperative. 
As we will see, this tenuous foothold that women may have had on the land, and thus the 
household’s subsistence pattern, would begin to change, as the general strategy of the BAP begin 
to shift towards more profitable cash crops.  In general, the introduction of these new forms or 
production and labor organization also meant a process of “agricultural intensification,” which – 
according to Michael Watts and Judith Carney (1991:652) – “…is about getting people to work 
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harder, a process that is social and gendered (getting some people to work harder than others) 
and that is typically coercive and conflictual.”  
Starting with the report written by the OAS to the letter of intentions signed between this 
organization and the Honduran government, cash crops, and particularly oil palms and citrus 
trees, figured importantly in the plan. However, once the actual cooperatives began to work, 
there was great reluctance by the members to make the shift. This was due mainly to the lack of 
knowledge that the peasant families had regarding the new crops. For example, Marino 
remembers vividly the first time he saw an African palm in the Aguán. He told me that initially 
people thought that the palm´s fruit could be eaten directly.  
However, in September 1974, when Hurricane Fifí crashed into the northern coast of 
Honduras, this situation began to change. Fifí has a central place in the testimonies of most of 
the people with whom I spoke. As we already saw, it was due to Fifí that Eugenia and Marino 
had to continue their journey, after their home was taken by a rising river. In Marcelo´s case the 
memory of Fifí has an even more conspicuous presence. “We came here on June 18, 1974. We 
wanted to work. The problem was that just as we were beginning, we get hit by Hurricane Fifí. 
That was unfortunate… During that season, my mom was a bit sick, and in that one [Fifí] she 
died.”  
Besides the passing away of his mom, Fifí also made great alterations to the landscape: 
“This used to be a wild forest! However, Hurricane Fifí cleared it up, the woods were left sparse. 
After that a wild fire started by the Honduras Aguán [village] and burnt all this side [Aguán 
river’s left bank]. It finished off the deer, tepezcuintle [lowland paca], the entire zone was left 
clean since then.” 
According to the different testimonies, after Fifí came three days of floods and hard 
winds that felled most of the trees in the hills. Later, no one knows if intentionally or not, there 
were great fires that devoured the trees and forest. At the same time, this destruction opened the 
door for the penetration and consolidation of cash crops such as oil palms and citrus trees in the 
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region. According to different reports on the BAP, the planting of the palms began as early as 
1971. However, for almost everyone that I spoke with, the introduction of this crop was related 
to Fifí. Not only did the hurricane help topple most of the forest cover – a requirement for 
planting the palms –, but it also put the cooperatives’ future and production plans in the hands 
of the INA.  
As we can recall from José’s testimony regarding the beginning period of La Norteña 
cooperative, they had received loans from the national banking system to finance their 
production and buy machinery, it was to be expected that all the other cooperatives had done 
something similar. Further, it is important to point out that the land was not given away for free 
to the cooperatives and they still had to pay for it through monthly installments. Thus, after Fifí 
the cooperatives were left in very bad shape: impoverished, with their production destroyed and 
deeply indebted.  The INA promoters “recommended” that they shift towards more valuable 
cash crops as the only way in which they could continue accessing loans and paying their debts. 
The cooperatives did not have much choice but to oblige. It is safe to say that while the 
introduction of these crops came hand in hand with the beginning of the BAP, it was after Fifí 
that their widespread production was consolidated.  
I will delve more in depth into the introduction of the palm oil industry in Honduras in 
the next chapter. For now it should suffice to mention that the move towards these cash crops 
had a clear transnational component. From the 1950s onwards the research unit of the Standard 
Fruit Company in Tela had been exploring alternatives to banana in response to the spread of 
the Panama disease. Oil palm was one of the crops that was particularly analyzed by the 
company. It is hard to connect directly the documentation from the Standard’s research 
department with the decision by the OAS to finance the BAP project in Honduras and a very 
similar project in the south of Costa Rica (Clare Rhoades 2011). However, there was a clear 
differentiation regarding the financing sources of the different projects of the BAP. In the case of 
the palm oil industry, the extension and promotion was financed directly by the OAS and 
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deployed by the INA. It is hard to come by reliable data in terms of how much money was spent 
on the different crops, but according to information from 1980, over $9 million had been spent 
in the cultivation of over 9,000 hectares (around a fifth of all the land distributed) divided in 54 
cooperatives (Reyes 1980:69). In comparison, no data is to be found regarding staple crops. 
From what I have been able to gather either indirectly from reports or from my interviews, what 
little credit was given for staple crops came from the Honduran state’s meager resources. This 
support was so limited and deficient that many cooperatives preferred to avoid credit altogether 
or to look for ways of shifting production towards oil palms.  
What we can see here is the agrarian reform cooperatives operating as a form of contract 
farming, in which the autonomous peasant enterprises “…survive in outward form only. They 
are formally integrated with, and subordinated to, various circuits of capital and the much-
vaunted independent  grower is little more than a propertied labourer, a hired hand on his or 
her own land” (Watts 1992:92). 
This situation – the promotion of the crop from above, lack of control over what to 
produce and the scant knowledge of it from below – had as one main effect a very low level of 
adoption and initial appropriation of the crop by cooperative members. For example, José 
remembers that, although the crop was supposed to be “theirs” as it was planted in “their” lands, 
most members would talk about them as “las palmas son del BID” [the palm trees are the 
property of the IADB]. Further, when speaking to various members of the cooperatives, they 
refer to themselves and the process of planting the palm trees in terms of the low wages that 
they earned, the hard conditions and how little profit they saw from the process. For example, 
Eugenia reflects on the process of planting the palm trees: 
They planted by pure pressure. Now you see how much the businessmen value 
the palm. It is exaggerated how much they pay for a planted tree. But now, for 
how much did they [the cooperatives] sell it? Imagine that they didn’t value it 
because the planting was given away, they didn’t get paid for the planting. 
Making the hole, I don’t know how it is called, all that process before production, 
they didn’t get paid. We had to figure out how we ate maize, we sold maize to buy 
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salt, sugar, and soap; but from the palm they didn’t receive money. So, we had to 
sell the eggs that the chicken laid to buy sugar, because it didn’t leave anything 
until the production began [oil palms trees take at least two years to begin 
production]. But then came the bigger problem, they got paid very little. I used to 
tell him ‘damn! Didn’t they used to say that once the palms started to produce, 
things were going to change?’  
Also, the planting of the palm trees created internal tensions within the cooperatives, 
particularly around the production of staple crops. During the first years, as the palm trees 
began to grow, it was possible to plant other crops. However, after two to four years this 
becomes impossible. Marcelo remembers that  
…when we finished clearing the land, came that issue of the promotion of 
planting the palm. We took out a loan and with trucks they finished clearing all of 
the land and we planted the palm, and between we planted maize. We always 
lived from eating maize, beans and rice, until the palm began covering the lanes 
and we left it there. Later, we began to cultivate on other areas. 
There were also clear gender differences regarding the experience of arrival and the 
spread of oil palms. Most women remember rather the impact that this process had on the 
nourishment and living conditions of their families. For example, Eugenia recalls the moment 
when the expansion of the area in oil palm began to be to the detriment of staple crops.  
“When the palm project arrived, they ran over the maize with bulldozers, without 
harvesting it. No, there was a lot of brain weakness. I would say ‘No! Women, see how they are 
destroying those milpas. Why are they destroying those milpas? Why didn´t they harvest them?’ 
‘No’ – the men would answer – ‘this project [the palm] must be, it must be now.’” Marino jumps 
in and adds “there where they ran over the milpas, they toppled everything. Afterwards in the 
project, 300 hectares of palm were planted. Then a time passed, around three years, for that to 
begin harvesting. We saw that the product that we took out of the palm was very cheap.” 
In general, these elements – lack of appropriation of the process, low wages and lack of 
control over what to produce – will be at the center of many expert explanations regarding the 
selling of the cooperatives in the 1990s; however, we are getting ahead of ourselves, as I will 
return to this topic in the next chapter. 
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A final element has to do with the tensions that arose from the move from individual or 
independent to collective labor.  In the case of those families that came from the west, as well of 
those already located in the valley, being organized in a cooperative and having to work 
collectively was not easy. As we saw in Luis’s testimony, both forms of organization were seen as 
oppositional and related to different social relations. In general, this move was experienced as 
the imposition of an external discipline that they were not used to. In the cooperative, they were 
told what to produce, when to work and what could be done or not. For example, in the first 
years of the cooperatives, although many families experienced high levels of poverty, the 
members could not work as day laborers outside of the cooperative. Eugenia remembers this 
situation vividly: 
And he couldn´t go and work in another place, although there was work in 
Guanchias [an older cooperative]. Those who went to work there had problems, 
because they couldn´t work in another place other than the cooperative. He 
obeyed, he didn´t go, but others would sneak out and go make their pesos over 
there, but sneaking around so that the board of directors didn´t find out, because 
if they got caught, they were sanctioned. The problem was that Guanchias would 
pay them five Lempiras per day, while there [in the cooperative] they only made 
two Lempiras. 
As we will see further ahead in this chapter, these forms of discipline were too much for 
many of the families – particularly for the men from the west – who decided to abandon the 
cooperatives and either stay in the valley as day laborers or migrate to other parts of the valley, 
often encountering and mixing with those informal flows that headed to the hills. Before turning 
to the history of those families that migrated to the Aguán outside the INA sponsored 
cooperatives model, we will describe the landscape of the Bajo Aguán towards the end of the 
1970s and beginnings of the 1980s.  
From virgin to productive lands, from guamil to oil palms 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s the landscape of the Aguán valley had been radically 
transformed. The 1950s and 1960s were marked by an escalation in the number and fierceness 
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of agrarian conflicts in most of the country. This made the Aguán an attractive target for both 
landless peasants and ex-banana workers who started to inch slowly towards the region.  
With the military’s deployment of the BAP, the 1970s saw yet another profound 
transformation of the valley’s landscape. Abandoned infrastructure was resuscitated and 
families were brought from other parts of the country to bring down the guaimil – the 
secondary forest that grew on top of the banana farms. They planted staple crops first and citrus 
trees, but later particularly oil palms. The weight of this transformation was carried mainly by 
the impoverished immigrant peasant who thought that in the Aguán their lives would improve 
dramatically and quickly. Reality was different from expectation and their struggles against 
poverty and dispossession continued, but in a different setting and under different conditions.  
For the men, joining the cooperatives meant adapting to the “time-discipline” (Thompson 1967) 
of collective labor, something that was never simple and that they resented as limiting their 
liberty. Further, they had little control over what was being produced and their relationship with 
their (supposedly) own land was in the form of a wage that barely covered their needs. For 
women, this situation meant looking for alternative ways to secure their family’s nourishment; 
from collecting to different forms of husbandry (pigs, chickens), they tried to create other 
sources of food or cash. However, as time went by and the palm oil industry extended across the 
land, these possibilities of diversifying provisioning became ever more complicated. It would 
seem that Carney and Watts (1991:672) are right, when they mention that altering “…property 
rights, narrowly defined as control over things, is simultaneously to transform social relations 
and reconstruct household production relations.”  
If we were to look at an aerial picture of the Aguán in this period, we would probably see 
a few paved roads and more dirt roads crisscrossing palm oil and citrus plantations and also 
connecting a bunch of small villages and three larger towns (Tocoa, Trujillo and Sonaguera). We 
would see that there was a clear contrast between the river banks, with both population and 
infrastructure tending to concentrate on the right one. Also, as we got closer to the hills, we 
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would notice that the plantations start to give way to the production of staple crops – although 
milpas can be seen scattered all over the valley – and that the bush grows thicker.  
So far we have looked at the Aguán from the optic of the valley – the lowlands closer to 
the river margins where the BPA was centered. However, this is not all the story and to better 
understand the region today, we must backtrack and follow the histories of those families that 
also migrated to the Aguán region during this period, but outside of the state-sponsored 
program and thus outside of the purview of the state and official history. 
The long way into the Aguán 
For many families the journey towards the Aguán was anything but straightforward. For those 
who remained outside of the peasant organization schemes that granted initial access to the 
agrarian reform cooperatives, getting to the Aguán tended to be the result of a long process of 
phased migration which often included whole families who, through a process of scattering and 
reunification, created complex migration routes. These routes tended to be organized mainly 
around three structuring elements: first, kinship – as the decision of where to move was usually 
influenced by the location of family members who offered support –; second, access to land – as 
in most cases these were families headed by males with a strong sense of independence and 
individual self-worth that made them leery of working in the banana plantations, the priority of 
the journey was always accessing land –; and nature – as many times the rhythms of the journey 
were punctuated by natural disasters such as hurricanes or floods. 
Probably two of the more paradigmatic stories I heard regarding this long and bumpy 
road were those of Gonzalo and Emilio. Gonzalo’s parents had migrated away from their 
hometowns in the western department of La Paz and he was born in 1959 in Santa Rita, in the 
department of Yoro. He remembers that when he was a kid, his dad had managed to buy some 
land and although there were times of poverty, his dad was able to hire day laborers to help him 
on the farm. When he was about twelve, however, his dad decided that the family needed to 
relocate to the department of Colón. When I asked Gonzalo why, he responded “you could say 
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that we were doing well over there, but the fame of Colón was too great, they had given it a lot of 
fame. And he [his dad] made the decision and said: ‘I am going to Colón’ and went to visit by 
himself.” 
He came back to Yoro very happy, because in Masicales, a town on the left bank 
of the Aguán river, people told him that if he planted 10 manzanas of milpa –
around 7.5 hectares –he would not know what to do with so much corn. His 
father was used to planting 19 manzanas in Yoro, so his response to this was that 
‘I want to try and see if I am capable of harvesting 10 manzanas.’ So he managed 
to get some land there in Masicales, he found 11 manzanas, and the people would 
laugh at him [for wanting to grow so much corn]. 
This supposedly ultra-fertile land made the Aguán an attractive beacon for land poor and 
landless families, particularly those coming from zones with poor soils. In Gonzalo’s case, it 
meant an improvement over the conditions of fertility that he had in Yoro. This fertility not only 
had to do with the qualities of the soil, but also with the type of slash and burn migratory 
agriculture practiced by many peasant families. This form of production involved a cycle in 
which the family would move into a forested area, cut down the trees and burn the high grass, 
and then plant milpa. Usually, this would lead to severe land erosion, so the yields would 
decrease significantly each year, making it viable for two years or so; then the family would 
migrate and start again (Williams 1986). This dynamic by itself already created a pattern of 
intense mobility and, as I indicated earlier, it articulated even with inheritance patterns. 
However, it was also connected to forms of social hierarchy and processes of dispossession.  
Many times, the only land that these families could access was already owned by a larger 
landowner, who would allow them to work in his land for one or two harvests in exchange for 
clearing the land – a step needed for cattle ranching –, and one or another form of rent 49. The 
Aguán — where the land was highly fertile and easy to obtain — was seen not only as a form of 
continuing this cycle, but as a way of breaking away from it and potentially prospering. As we 
can see from the tone in which Gonzalo refers to the process, this outcome was not necessarily 
                                                        
49 Hall et al. (2011) describe a similar geographical pattern in Southeast Asia.  
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assured. The decision to move to the Aguán was experienced instead as a process of 
impoverishment and dispossession: “Because they told him that in Colón [he could get land], 
and it was true then, but luck was not on our side and we failed.” 
It all started according to plan. Gonzalo’s father went first by himself to the department 
of Colón and got this firsthand account of the local fertility and access to land. Once he secured 
six hectares of land, he returned to Yoro to collect the family, leave the little land that he had in 
the care of one of his brothers, and move to Masicales. According to Gonzalo, “we arrived on 
March 5, 1974. I remember well. We came just in the middle of spring season. My dad, since he 
came, he came strong. As soon as we arrived, he says ‘it is time to work.’” 
 This form of masculinity, based on physical labor on the land is pervasive. Gonzalo 
always remembers his dad in these terms, as someone who took great pride in his capacity to 
work: “my father, he makes the milpa, it was something positive. He was very happy. So much 
maize could be seen growing. Below they were like sugar canes [the maize plants], on the top, it 
was an exaggeration the size of those cobs! My dad would even laugh; ‘this is my place’ he would 
say.” 
Nature, in the form of this ultra-fertile land, appears here like a blessing for Gonzalo and 
his family. As they harvested the milpa, the land of Masicales condensed a set of social relations 
that would translate into a better life. However, what nature gives, nature takes, and in 
September,  
Fifí comes in around midnight. That hurricane with water. Oh my god! And 
everything moving, and all that water! And then at sunrise the hurricane passed 
and the water was getting inside the house. There was a levee there, left by one of 
the [banana] companies. And the house was edging to one side and my father 
yells ‘Oh my god! The hurricane destroyed my milpa!’ 
The rain and wind lasted all night and the next morning they decided to move to the 
nearby town of Sonaguera and to never return to Masicales. A shelter was set up in the local 
parish, but after a few days Gonzalo’s dad decided that everything was lost and it was necessary 
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to start anew. Gonzalo remembers his dad saying “‘we already lost those lands. We should think 
no longer of the Masicales that was destroyed. Today, we are left in poverty. Let´s search for a 
place, I am going to look for a place to settle in the hills, in this town [Sonaguera] there is 
nothing for us to do, sons.’ So my father leaves for a place called Lorencito, above Sonaguera.” 
They remained in Lorencito for nine years. During this period they rented land and 
repeated the patterns of migratory agriculture that I already mentioned: “then, we would spend 
years making potreros [pastures] for the ganaderos [cattle ranchers]. There were times when 
they would only let us have one harvest and that was it; enter the lot, plant the milpa and work 
keeping it nice and clean. Then we had to leave and search for another place to start again.” 
By this time Gonzalo was in his early 20s, and his father decided once more that they 
should move in search of land that they could call theirs; up in the hills appeared to be the only 
way to go. Gonzalo reports that his father told him, 
‘Let’s go look son for a place where we can at least work, let´s look for a 
mountain. I have been told, that here in Colón there are empty mountains still, 
but that we can´t get there, because we don´t know the way. I´m going to search 
for the mountain.’ We had been ruined after all that happened [in Masicales], 
but, well, that is life. So we took off. My dad told my mom: ‘vieja, prepare some 
tamalones, I am going to go up those mountains.’ 
Their route was slow, as they inched forward and up the mountains. Gonzalo remembers 
it well: 
We started walking, I went with him, the other boys stayed back home with my 
mom. We walked, asking in each aldea, ‘Where does this path takes us?’ ‘To a 
place called Sabalito, but it is very far,’ they would respond. ‘And where are you 
headed?’ And we would answer, ‘we are looking for a place to work.’ And we 
would continue walking. In those times, there were almost no roads, only small 
paths going up and up the hill, little paths between guaimiles, pieces of mountain.   
Eventually they reach a place, far up the hills and at the end of the track that they have 
being following. There they found a house and asked the man who lived whether he knew where 
they could find land to work.  
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‘Don´t worry gentlemen. Tomorrow I will take you to a place and I am going to 
give you a piece of land. I am going to take up to the place [up the mountain] 
where we got to, and from there onwards we are going to give it to you.’ He told 
us, but half joking. We were so happy. Next day we woke up. His wife gave us 
coffee and then he took us up the mountain. ‘My son Noé and I got up until here. 
From here onwards is yours.’  
So we got out our machetes and began working. We worked until we ran out of 
tamalones. Then we stopped working and went back, bringing the news of the 
free land that we had found; and thus, we began to travel and travel and to work. 
And since we were the sons of Domingo, of my father, we went fixing mountains, 
guaimiles, doing things and planting. Until eventually my dad grew old. 
I would like to stop for a minute to reflect on some of the more salient elements 
illuminated by Gonzalo’s testimony. First, the journey that took his parents from the department 
of La Paz to the mountains of Colón was structured around dynamics of dispossession and the 
tensions between labor capture and flight. Each step was marked by both the search for land to 
work to improve their living conditions and the failure or loss of that dream. However, this 
search was not articulated only around having enough to eat or a piece of land to work; no 
matter how limited, those elements were always available. It was also shaped by a particular 
understanding of how the relationship with subsistence ought to be. Gonzalo’s dad was looking 
for land that he could call his without having to “give his lungs to someone else” – as peasants in 
Honduras tend to refer to toiling for other’s benefit – and that through his hard work would 
produce plenty for living well. To do so, he and his family ended up travelling continuously and 
eventually higher and higher up in the hills, further and further away from the sites of capital 
accumulation and state control. We can read this journey as one of flight from labor capture. 
Second, we can see how his patterns of mobility were defined or at least punctuated by a 
set of complex relationships of kinship and with nature. On the one hand, kinship took the form 
of following the family and respecting a certain form of authority that rested on his dad; his 
flight became his family’s flight. On the other hand, nature was understood by Gonzalo as both 
benevolent – as with the ultra-fertility of the lands in the Aguán – and destructive, as in the case 
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of Hurricane Fifí. Further, it was through their labor on nature that they fought against the 
obstacles of life; each cycle of dispossession was followed by one of migrating and more work.  
This second point is better exemplified by turning to Emilio’s story. Emilio was born in 
Copán in 1957. When he turned 17, he decided to move away and follow his grandparents who 
lived in “La Costa” (The Coast), as Hondurans refer to the country’s north coast. They had left 
Copán a few years before, due to a problem with the municipality in which they had lost their 
lands; as usual, migration began with dispossession. Emilio lived with his grandparents for a few 
years. However, life was never easy and they did not manage to access land, so they decided to 
move to Colón. This decision was influenced by the tales that circulated regarding the fertile and 
open access lands that could be found in this department, but also because one of the brothers of 
his grandparents was already living there and told him that there was a farm that he could 
negotiate to buy.  
Once in Colón, they settled in the hills just outside of Sonaguera, in the same town of 
Lorencito, but a few years after Gonzalo and his family had left. There he worked with his 
granddad taking care of the animals that they had: a few cows, pigs and chickens. Once there, he 
met his soon to be wife, María, who was also from Copán and whose family had also migrated to 
Colón. “We began [our life together], and then I got involved as a delegado de la palabra 
[church’s delegate of the word] and she also started working as a catechist. Working on the 
materials [for building a home] and on the crops, buying a few animals of our own; creating a 
formal patrimony of our own. Then, after a year we got married.” 
Not long after, they had to leave Lorencito, as Emilio’s granddad told him that he was 
going to give all of the land that he had to a younger son that he had with another woman (not 
Emilio’s mother). He and his family migrated to Olanchito in the department of Yoro. The 
decision to move there was informed by the fact that some friends from back home in Copán 
living there. Once in Olanchito Emilio was able to join an agrarian reform cooperative. Here 
again we can see how kinship structured the migration routes. First it was Emilio following his 
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grandparents to La Costa, then it was them following a brother to Lorencito, and then it was he 
– and the new family he was building with Maria – setting off to Olanchito, thanks to the 
support of friends. Also, from his grandparents’ losing their land to the municipality in Copán, 
to his having to leave to Olanchito, dispossession was always what triggered the start of 
migration.  
It is important to add that this is never a mechanical relation. First, dispossession has to 
always be read in a broader context. For example, Emilio’s grandparents losing their land to the 
municipality was part of a broader process of primitive accumulation in which land considered 
“national” was taken away from individuals and communities that had been living and working 
on it for many years (Boyer 1982). This process of dispossession did not necessarily translate 
into migrating towards the north coast. His grandparents could have stayed and worked as day 
laborers. Also, migrating to the north coast could have involved looking for work in the banana 
plantations, but it did not. Dispossession framed and structured the space in which particular 
groups could decide their fate and in the cases we have been exploring in this section, these 
decisions pointed towards flight and against labor capture and thus, to remain outside the 
purview of the state and the agrarian reform. 
The Aguán and its tensions 
So far in this chapter, I have analyzed the process by which hundreds of poor peasant families 
migrated from other parts of the country – mainly the west and south – and how they settled 
either in the valley or in the hills. I have shown how these patterns of mobility were deeply 
informed by the ways in which each family responded to the dynamics of dispossession in their 
hometowns. I have also demonstrated that their journeys towards the east – as Mission 105 
called it – far from representing an escape from dispossession and labor capture, became a 
reenactment of both in a different context. 
For those families that came and joined the cooperatives, access to land came at the 
steep price of reshaping their ways of being in the world. Social relations, revolved around the 
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production of staple crops, usually combined with day labor, and deeply ingrained ideas of 
independence and family labor. These had to give way to collective labor and external discipline, 
which shifted the balance even more from self-provisioning to wage labor. Once in the 
cooperatives, men had little control over what was produced. This was particularly salient after 
the destruction unleashed by hurricane Fifí, which delivered them into the hands of the INA and 
the oil palm promotion projects. I will delve more deeply into the relation between the 
cooperatives and palm oil industry in the next chapter, when I discuss the conditions that led to 
the sale of many of the cooperatives. At present, I would like to focus on a couple of related 
issues.  
First, in terms of the internal dynamics of the peasant household, the cooperatives – just 
as in any case in which the balance shifts more towards wage labor – meant a more acute 
differentiation between what was understood as production – collective male work in the fields 
– and reproduction –domestic “unproductive” female labor in the households. Thus, women’s 
contribution to the provisioning and subsistence of their families was rendered invisible. 
Further, as Roquas (2002) has argued, the Honduran agrarian reform was based on a “land to 
the tiller” model, under which access to land or membership is based on work being done on the 
fields; reproducing quite blatantly this production/reproduction split. Since women did not 
“till,” they could not have access to the land – membership in this case – and thus were placed in 
a very vulnerable position in regards to their partners and the cooperatives. For example, 
Roquas records various conversations in which women speak of the necessity of never leaving 
the home and trying to remain with their husbands, as this was the only way in which they could 
maintain a claim on the land. 
The way in which the cooperatives operated did not create a sense of belonging in 
relation to the land that was supposedly theirs; women were placed in a situation in which land 
was seen as more valuable –as it meant forms of nourishment for their families – but at the 
same time, with less leverage to “defend it.” As we will see in the next chapter, these two 
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elements combined in the aftermath of the early 1990s cooperatives’ land sales to place women 
at the forefront of the resistance against dispossession.  
Second, the differentiation between the peasant cooperatives and the independent 
peasant, to which Luis refer in such lively terms in his testimony, had a very particular effect in 
the landscape of the valley. The cooperatives, and thus the valley, particularly the right bank of 
the Aguán River, came to be associated with a set of practices and forms of social control. This 
was the place of the oil palms labyrinths, but also the seat of the INA; a place where you could 
find better access to services such as education and health, but also of tighter social control, 
discipline and little control over production. It was also a place with better infrastructure and 
better access to the market. This concentration of elements and services around the city of Tocoa 
created a set of binary relations with other parts of the valley.  
I have already mentioned the differentiation between left and right banks; let’s develop it 
more. While the more successful palm oil producing cooperatives – mostly affiliated to 
FECORAH – concentrate around the right bank, most of the staple crops producing ones –
mainly affiliated to ANACH – were located on the left bank. This had to do both with market 
access, but also with support by the state. However, this differentiation was not only in 
productive terms. It also reflected in the way in which the state approached each bank. As I 
mentioned, the most important state institutions were based in Tocoa or around the city. The 
only exception was the army, as the 15th Battalion is located on the left bank, close to the 
community of Honduras Aguán. Further, as I also mentioned, landowners always had a freer 
hand to deal with land occupations than those of the right bank. To this we must add, that the 
levels of state repression were – and are – always higher in the left bank than in the right bank. 
A second and even more crucial spatial differentiation was that between the valley – with 
its better infrastructure, access to market, public services and state support –; and the 
surrounding hills –which had less access to these elements, but due to that same social distance 
from capital and state, provided a greater sense of freedom and autonomy. 
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James Scott (2009) has argued for the Southeast Asian case that historically there has 
been a tension between the state – with its processes of subject formation and economic 
taxation – and certain “zones of refuge,” a notion that he borrows from the Mexican 
anthropologist Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (1967). These regions are at the margins and beyond the 
reach of the state, and various social groups there have organized themselves in opposition to 
the states from which they were fleeing,  an idea that Scott develops from his reading of Pierre 
Clastres (1989). He argues further, that this tension usually takes the form an opposition 
between the lowlands – as the place of control of the state – and hills and mountains as the 
privileged zones of refuge, due to their remoteness and the difficulties of controlling them.  
In a situation close to the one described by Scott, and that can be also found in other 
parts of Latin America (see for example, Herrera 2002; Turits 2004; Gordillo 2004), in the 
Aguán a deep contrast came to be produced between the valley and the hills. This difference was 
informed by different elements: social and physical distance from state power and sites of 
capital accumulation; the reasons behind people either settling in the valley or in the hills; and 
even climate, as people coming from the west, with their deeply ingrained sense of autonomy 
and independence, preferred the cooler temperatures of the hills to the warmer climate at the 
valley.  
Further, as time went by, and the grip of the INA and the state in more general terms got 
tighter, this differentiation expanded and extended to include a set of migration movements 
between valley and hills. In his book on the BAP, the Jesuit priest Angel Castro (1994) dedicates 
a whole section to those families that had decided to move and settle in the hills. He was 
particularly interested in understanding why anyone would decide to live in such a remote and 
isolated place. For him, this movement was from valley to hills in the mid to late 1980s was 
directly related to the high desertion levels that the cooperatives have: “besides the hard work, a 
peasant discipline was needed, to which you had to add the ecological conditions that weighed 
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down on their health, particularly that of the children. Due to this, in the cooperatives there 
were numerous desertions.” (p. 61).  
Castro found various reasons as to why people decided to leave the valley and move up 
the hills. One of his informants mentions: “I remained in Tocoa for three years. I was affiliated 
with a construction cooperative. But it was not successful because the treasurer stole the 
money… Only a few remained. There were attempts to work the land, but we couldn´t because it 
was occupied” (p. 113). 
According to another testimony, “a relative of mine who knew the place encouraged me 
to come. I sold what I had and bought in Jazmines [in the hills] a 30-hectare farm. I bought the 
house of someone who now lives in the valley. The land here is good; those who come love it 
here” (p. 114). 
The first thing to notice from these micro-vignettes is the importance of kin relations in 
the migrating patterns: most of the people Castro interviewed came to the hills because a 
relative told them that there was free land to be had. Second, the hills appear as an alternative to 
the problems in the valley, where access to land was all the time becoming harder. According to 
Castro,  
those who came [to the hills] between 1979 and 1984… share in common not 
having belonged to any organized group, either in the valley or their place of 
origin. Those who had participated briefly in a peasant settlement or in a 
cooperative had done so briefly and only while an already settled relative or 
friend provided them with a place. Also, for many, the hills appeared initially a 
place of safety, because they can experience the satisfaction of working for 
themselves, where nobody bothers you and you can cultivate everything. 
However, Castro continues telling us,  
… this safety is shattered because, either the land has to be bought from those 
who arrived first and enclosed large extensions… or they had to take possession 
of a piece of land deeper in the mountain; in this case, they ran the risk of being 
expelled legally, as it happened to a whole village that was evicted, since the State 
declared a good part of the mountainous territory national property and a 
forestry reserve. (p. 115). 
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Here we see again the hills as a space of freedom and survival. However, this now 
interacts directly with the closing of the agrarian frontier, which at the same time signals an 
open conflict with the state and it´s forestry policy. In this line, and according to the same 
author, the latter migrants to arrive the hills, from the 1980s onwards, were limited to three 
options: first, “working in someone else´s land that was yet to be cleared down, in exchange of 
having a single harvest,” since, if they wanted to keep the land they had to buy it; 2. “…move 
deeper into the mountain and clear a piece of land…”; and 3. “…finally, there were those who 
decided to go down to the valley, even if only in search of a free space to build their home.” (p. 
115). 
It is also important to add that, as I have been arguing, this differentiation between 
valley and hills did not only respond to a temporal dynamic, or that those who got up to the 
valley later, were forced to climb up the hills due to the lack of space. The hills also presented 
themselves as an alternative for those in search of safety and a sense of freedom, which for many 
peasants made it more appealing than what they understood to be the work in the cooperatives. 
One of those peasants interviewed by Castro in the hills affirmed,  
I don´t agree with the cooperatives, because you are under the charge of someone 
else and get fooled by the bigger ones. In the cooperatives, I am owner of my 
wage, not of my work and sometimes not even of the wage. That is why I looked 
for the hills. One is used to working, and here, there is no money, but there is 
plenty to eat. (p.117)  
Another of Castro´s informants mentions that “…people go off to the mountain so that 
they are not dominated and can do their own thing every day. In the cooperative, however, they 
have to work daily and have to follow mandatory rules. In the mountain it is better; the hard 
thing is to take out the produce (p.118).” 
These tensions – between left and right bank and between mountain and hill – will 
inform much of what I will be discussing in the next chapters. It is now time to move forward in 
time, to the beginning of the 1990s, to explore the situation of the cooperatives, their relation 
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with the palm oil assemblage, and the eventual sale of more than half the cooperatives that were 
created during the agrarian reform period. 
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Chapter 3.  The global palm oil assemblage: development, rent capture and 
primitive accumulation 
 
For Eugenia it all began with the cows. She remembers it well. In the mid-1980s, the cooperative 
that she and Martino belonged to had bought a few milk cows. These cows would rotate between 
the different affiliated families; for two days each they would care for them, and for two days 
each they would have milk for their children. “Oh! I was so happy every time the children went 
with their pots to bring milk to drink. When they began attempting to sell the cooperative, then 
they came and said ‘we have to sell the cows, because we are going to sell the palm trees.’” 
The discussion regarding the probable sale of the cooperative’s land – equated here with 
the palm trees – had begun some time ago, but it would not be until the cows came under threat 
in the mid-1990s that Eugenia, as well as other women, understood what was at stake and took 
action. She would soon move around the Aguán valley, looking for allies – any allies – that 
would aid her in her struggle against the selling of the land and thus, the loss of the cows. For all 
practical matters, her crusade to stop the sale of the cooperatives failed and by the end of the 
1990s much of the everyday life and landscape of the Aguán had drastically changed. In 
analytical terms, however, Eugenia’s struggle can be used to illustrate and analyze the complex, 
conflictive and multi-scalar process that led to the appropriation, by a limited group of large 
landowners and transnational companies, of around two-thirds of the agrarian reform land that 
was distributed before 1992. 
To tell the story of Eugenia´s struggle, we need to also tell other stories that are not only 
interconnected, but that are in many respects the same story. Nationally, the sale of the 
cooperatives must be understood as part of the broader process of structural adjustment and 
economic liberalization experienced by Honduras, and most of Latin America, from the 1980s 
and 1990s onwards. Globally, the interest in buying lands covered in African palm trees is part 
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of the broader process by which a set of different places of production, commercialization and 
consumption came to create what we could call the global palm oil assemblage.  
I would like to approach the topic of the sale of the cooperative lands through a twofold 
movement. In the first section of this chapter, I will explore the conditions of possibility of the 
land sales, by analyzing how the palm oil industry was assembled in Honduras. To do so, I will 
approach the issue from three different standpoints. Locally, I begin by picking up where the last 
chapter left off and describe the situation of the reform sector – as the agrarian reform 
cooperatives are collectively known – in the early 1990s, around the time that the sales began. 
Here, I will treat the Aguán and the reform sector almost as a closed system, in an attempt to 
highlight some of the main characteristics that help explain the sales, particularly the forms in 
which rent was captured. Next, I will move to the national scale to characterize very briefly the 
process of structural adjustment and its particular agrarian manifestation in the Agricultural 
Development and Modernization Bill (LMA). I am interested in showing the changes in the legal 
and regulatory framework that opened up the door for the sales. Finally, I step back and look at 
the historical rise of palm oil as a global commodity, the general characteristics of the industry 
and its introduction and consolidation in Honduras. It is important to add that I do not 
understand these three standpoints from an encompassment logic in which the local is seen as 
contained in the national and the national in the global. Rather, I approach them as a set of 
various processes that took place in different scales, but that folded back upon themselves, thus 
providing different vantage points from which to gaze at the conditions that shaped the process 
of land appropriation and dispossession.   
In the second part of the chapter, I will collapse these dimensions into the particular 
experience of the sale of one individual, Eugenia, whom we met in the last chapter, as a way of 
exploring both the process of dispossession and the particular forms that the palm oil ensemble 
assumed in the Aguán. 
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The rise of the global palm oil assemblage 
The starting point of my understanding of the palm oil assemblage is Michael Watts’ (2012) 
notion of the oil (or petroleum) assemblage. According to Watts,  
…an oil assemblage is … a coordinated but dispersed set of regulations, 
calculative arrangements, infrastructural and technical procedures that render 
certain objects or flows governable. An oil assemblage is a sort of vast governable, 
and occasionally very ungovernable, space. If the oil assemblage is a space of 
standardization, its operations, however, are always temporally and 
geographically contingent. (p.443) 
His focus is on the political economy of oil and of thinking about the different sort of 
relations that articulate the diverse spaces – always temporally and geographically contingent – 
of production, commercialization and consumption, in its different forms, of oil. According to 
Watts, “a key starting point is to see oil and gas as a global production network with particular 
properties, actors, networks, governance structures, institutions, and organizations (a global 
value chain in the industry argot) but what is, in effect, a regime of accumulation and a mode of 
regulation”  (Watts 2012). 
The use that I would like to give to the concept is somewhat different from Watts’, 
however. Rather than focusing on this from the perspective of the global – of how the global 
network articulates the different spaces of production, commercialization and consumption – I 
am interested in exploring how these articulations are initiated, gain traction and are 
institutionalized in those particular contexts. I borrow part of this understanding from the 
notion of ensemble introduced by Antonio Gramsci. In a section of the Prison Notebooks titled 
“What is Man?” he argues that: 
The  humanity  which  is  reflected  in  each  individuality  is composed  of  
various  elements:  1.  the  individual;  2.  other  men; 3.  the natural world. But 
the latter two elements· are not as simple as they might appear.  The individual 
does not enter into relations with other men by juxtaposition, but organically, in 
as much, that is, as he belongs to organic entities which range from the simplest 
to the most complex.  Thus  Man  does  not  enter  into  relations  with  the  
natural world just  by  being  himself part  of the  natural  world,  but  actively, by  
means  of  work  and  technique… It is not  enough  to  know  the  ensemble  of  
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relations  as  they  exist  at  any given  time  as  a  given  system.  They must be 
known genetically, in the movement of their formation. For each individual is  the 
synthesis not  only  of existing relations,  but  of  the  history  of  these  relations. 
He is a précis of all the past. (1971:352–353) 
I am interested in approaching the global palm oil industry from the perspective of how 
it informs or to a certain extent structures the three levels of analysis proposed by Gramsci. 
Phrased differently, I intend to analyze the ways in which different social groups and individuals 
are located and enter in relations with the broader processes of the regime of accumulation and 
the mode of regulation of the global palm oil industry, and their immediate geographical and 
historical context.50 With this in mind, I will now move to look at the three folds or entry points 
proposed before. I begin from the standpoint of the reform sector in the Aguán. 
First fold: the Aguán’s reformed sector just before the counter-reform 
In societies in which revenues depend on the commodification of nature, rent capture 
conditions the organization of economic activities. 
Fernando Coronil (1997:32), The Magical State 
As we saw in the last chapter, the Aguán had been the centerpiece of the agrarian reform project 
of the 1970s and 1980s. It had been mainly through the combination of the cooperatives’ cheap 
labor and the injection of financial capital by and through the state that a region that 
traditionally had been seen as empty and virgin became a landscape dominated by palm oil 
plantations, manned and controlled by the agrarian reform cooperatives and much more 
densely populated. However, by the mid-1990s and with the advent of the LMA, it came to be 
known as the “capital of the agrarian counter-reform” (Macías 2001). 
                                                        
50 I am interested in doing a similar shift to the one proposed by Gillian Hart (2002:294) to move away 
from globalization as a central analytical category: “Instead, the focus shifts to situated everyday practices, 
their spatial interconnections, and the changing forms of spatial organization of social relations, where 
those social relations are full of power and meaning, and where social groups are very differently placed in 
relation to this reorganization… It also directs our attention to the multiplicity of historical geographies, 
not simply as the effects of global flows but rather as constitutive of them.”  
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To place this shift in its context, between 1990 and 1994 more than half of the land that 
was distributed nationally during the agrarian reform was sold; in the case of the Bajo Aguán, 
this number rises to a staggering 73.8 percent,51 representing around 15 percent of the total area 
of the region (COCOCH 2010). The process that led to the sale of these lands was ruthless, 
combining both high and open levels of violence with more traditional “market” land 
transactions. However, as much as the external elements – such as the LMA – and the 
participation of large Honduran landowners are part of the explanations for the sales, a 
significant amount of the blame rests with the cooperatives themselves and how the reform 
sector operated in the Aguán.  
According to data from 1991, most of the land in production in the Aguán Valley was 
dedicated to cattle ranching; 16,000 hectares were in oil palms and 14,000 hectares in citrus 
trees. Around 30,000 hectares were under staple crops (maize, rice and beans) (Salgado 1994). 
At the time, growing oil palms was almost exclusively done by the agrarian reform cooperatives 
(96 percent) and a significant part of the extension dedicated to both citrus trees (around 30 
percent) and staple crops (around 47 percent) was also part of the land distributed to the 
cooperatives. This means that by the 1990s, the Aguán was divided between two main forms of 
production. On the one hand, the cattle ranchers maintained a dominant position in the region. 
On the other, there was a dynamic sector of cooperatives (over 130) dedicated to export-oriented 
crops (oil palm and citrus) and staple crops, mainly for the domestic market. As we saw in the 
last chapter, in most cases the cooperatives began planting staple crops, but eventually, and due 
to the pressure from INA and the massive leverage that it had in terms of debt and technical 
support, shifted towards export-oriented crops, particularly oil palm. However, not all 
                                                        
51 Twenty thousand nine hundred thirty hectares sold, out of the original 28,365 hectares distributed 
(COCOCH 2010:24). 
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cooperatives entered palm production, choosing instead to continue producing staple crops or 
combining these with other crops such as plantain and citrus trees, and renting land for grazing.   
In very general terms, the cooperatives that made the shift towards export-oriented 
crops were those that were older, located on the right bank of the river and closer to Tocoa. 
Since the state financed and promoted these cash crops to the detriment of staple crops, it 
concentrated on those places where its influence was stronger. Since the initial development of 
the Bajo Aguán Project was in the right bank, where most of the infrastructure and state 
institution were located, it was here also where the cultivation of these crops began. From there, 
they extended outwards spreading to most of the valley. Nineteen seventy-five, 1977 and 1979 
are particularly salient years in most cooperative members’ memories regarding the spread of oil 
palms. As the 1980s rolled in and the BAP began to run out of steam, the National Agrarian 
Institute (INA) lost interest in promoting and expanding the reform sector and the financial 
resources began to dwindle and with them, the growth of the extension of land dedicated to 
palm; thus the newer cooperatives had a harder time making the transition towards export-
oriented crops, as they received little to no support for the transition.  
The difference was also informed politically, as historically those cooperatives associated 
with the state-created and -sponsored Honduran Federation of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives 
(FECORAH) had more access to resources and state support than independent cooperatives or 
those associated with other peasant federations and thus also a better chance of turning towards 
oil palms and citrus trees. The state’s reading of the different cooperatives was deeply informed 
by the Cold War climate and the National Security paradigm, where anything that remained 
outside the direct control or interest of members from the state, was seen as a threat to the 
nation and thus justifying military intervention.52 For example, in 1977, the military occupied 
                                                        
52 For an in-depth ethnographic study on national security doctrine, see Leslie Gill’s (2004) study of the 
so-called School of the Americas. 
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the Isletas Peasant Enterprise (EACI), a major banana producer, incarcerating some of the main 
leaders. The reason for this occupation was the attempt by a group of members to promote the 
cultivation of staple crops and animal husbandry (maize, rice and pig production) as a way of 
attaining some sort of economic autonomy in their outgrowing relation with the Standard Fruit 
Company (SFC) (Posas 1992). 
In terms of livelihood, what the cooperatives produced made a difference. The initial idea 
of the Bajo Aguán Project (BAP) was to bring poor peasant families into the cash economy. For 
this to work, they had to be able to produce something for the market that would give them 
enough monetary return as to be able to both pay their debts to the state – in the form of loans 
for production and the payment for the agrarian reform land – and still have enough to sustain 
themselves. If we were to model this process from the perspective of the cooperatives, it would 
look something like this: the state, using international loans, injected money (M) into the 
reformed sector; that money was used to buy the means of production (C) for the cultivation of 
the crops; which later were sold to produce a profit (M’) that would allow the cooperatives to not 
only pay their off their loans, but have enough to sustain themselves and start the process anew. 
Formally then, we would have a system, from the perspective of the cooperatives, which looks 
like this: M – C – M’.  
This model of course resembles the formula of capital presented by Marx (1992) in 
Volume 1 of Capital. However, Indian Economist Kalyan Sanyal (2013) has made the persuasive 
argument that there are other types of economic enterprises that operate under this same 
model, but are ruled by a different logic. Dubbed by Sanyal as “need economies,” these 
enterprises begin with some sort of monetary fund (the INA funneled loans in our case), which 
is used to buy certain means of production (everything necessary to grow oil palms), which are 
then sold for a surplus. Now, unlike capitalist ventures, the need economies use just enough of 
this surplus in restarting the cycle, and the rest is spent in consumption for the members of the 
need economy. In this sense, if for the capitalist venture accumulation for accumulation’s sake is 
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the final goal, for the need economies it is full employment and making enough money as to 
assure each member a good enough income to survive. As we will see later, this was not always 
the case. 
In the next section I will discuss how the palm oil produced in the region was used 
outside of the region. At the moment I would like to focus on how this monetary surplus being 
created by the cooperatives (M’) was divided between debt payment and the social reproduction 
(wages) of the cooperative members. According to the three studies that analyze in some depth 
the process of the land sales in the Aguán (Macías 2001; Rubén and Funez 1993; Castro 1994) 
this was always a thorny topic, as one of the biggest and most constant complaints of the 
cooperatives had to do with how little revenue they received from the cultivation of oil palms 
and the alarming levels of internal corruption. Further, they connected their low incomes with 
the palm trees themselves. In the last chapter, we saw Eugenia’s and Marino´s reflections on 
this point, but they were not the only ones. Castro (1994:106) records in his book a member of 
the same cooperative that Eugenia and Marino belong to, claiming that “…in his cooperative 
things were not going well because [it seemed that] the palm trees were on the payroll…”   
Moreover, the issue was not only how little they got paid and how the palm trees seemed 
to be keeping a part of the profit. There were also tensions around the uneven distribution of 
income between the different cooperatives. Castro (1994) compares the income of an average 
member of two palm oil producing cooperatives with the income of the staple crop cooperative 
members. He finds that while the first two reported an income per member of around 300-400 
Lempiras a month ($150 to $200), the latter ones received a maximum monthly income of 
around 150 Lempiras ($75) (Castro 1994:109). If we take into account that the two cooperatives 
analyzed by Castro are from the left bank and were part of the later waves of promotion of 
African palm production, it is to be expected that their income was smaller than that of older 
cooperatives located closer to Tocoa. In fact, in the same study, Castro mentions that an 
informant told him that La Salamá cooperative, the first created in the Aguán, had a collective 
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biweekly income of 70,000 to 80,000 Lempiras (p. 108). In general, cooperatives from this 
period had around 50 associates, which meant that a good estimate of the monthly income of a 
member of La Salamá was of around 1,400 to 1,600 Lempiras ($700 to $800).Even after 
subtracting the income used to amortize debts and invest in equipment or production, the story 
told by this data is that there was a clear economic chasm between producing palm oil and 
producing staple crops; also that there were some evident differences among the cooperatives 
according to their location in the valley.  
In a rather different vein, through this process of differentiation, a moderately 
prosperous – by Honduran standards, that is – rural middle class was being created. This is, of 
course, one of the most salient features of the far more successful South Korean and Taiwanese 
agrarian reforms (Kay 2002). At the same time, it is also one of the main characteristics that 
Lenin found in the process of capital accumulation in the Russian countryside and that led to 
the creation of a well-to-do peasant stratum, which eventually hired the poorer peasants as wage 
laborers (Lenin 1956; see also Bernstein 2010; Shanin 1982).53  As we will see, the results in the 
Aguán were somewhere in between.    
In general, all the cooperatives had problems making ends meet, as debt service, volatile 
prices and embezzlement by cooperative leaders hit hard the earnings of even the palm oil 
producing cooperatives, as we will see later. However, while palm oil producing cooperatives 
were successful – albeit poor – need economies, members of the staple crop cooperatives had to 
look for outside jobs – mainly in the oil palm cooperatives or on the citrus tree plantations – to 
                                                        
53 This was not the only explanation given for the process of peasant differentiation in Russia. According 
to the Russian agricultural economist Aleksandr Chayanov (1966), the apparent inequality among  
peasant households had more to do with the location of the households in the demographic cycle than 
with  class dynamics (see Bernstein 2009 for a comparison of both thinkers). For the particular case of the 
Aguán, where most of the families enrolled in the cooperatives were located in a similar position in the 
demographic cycle, Chayanov’s approach does not take us too far. 
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round up their incomes, thus promoting a sort of permanent semi-proletarianization.54 
However, the fact that they were producing a central part of their diet meant that their reliance 
on wages was not as heavy as was the case for members of the oil palm cooperatives. This too of 
course, became a vicious circle in which what little income could be created through the sale of 
the maize, beans and rice, had to be used to keep up with debt service, thus forcing the members 
to work more outside of the cooperative. That was the price of not accommodating – either by 
choice or by a lack of it – to the designs of the INA and the Honduran state and the oil palm 
monoculture.  
The landscape of the Aguán in the 1990s was the result of how capital and labor flows 
were brought together and interacted with the particular physical and historical geography of 
the region.  The state – through a set of international loans – pumped capital into the region 
with the objective of creating a set of cash crop producing and politically docile cooperatives. 
Which crop they produced made a difference in their financial wellbeing; but which crop they 
produced was informed by their geographical location in the region, and this in turn had to do 
with the period in which each cooperative was formed and to which peasant federation they 
were affiliated, since all of these elements influenced whether they received state support or not. 
This situation was riddled with tensions and points of friction in which conflicts tended to arise 
within and among the cooperatives, as well as between the reform sector and state institutions.  
These conflicts centered mainly on how the surplus that was being produced by the 
cooperatives was being extracted and distributed. One thing that I found from speaking to 
people in the region and reading the scant written work on the topic is that people in the Aguán 
had an acute sense of what was going on. This was not clearly articulated or spelled out, but 
instead was spoken of in an indirect form. In general, they identified two main mechanisms as 
                                                        
54 For a development of the semi-proletarianization thesis see (Kay 1997; Moyo and Yeros 2005); for a 
critique, see (Bernstein 2006). 
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ways in which the value that they produced was taken from them. The first had to do with toiling 
for the benefit of someone else who profited from their labor. This mechanism was most often 
located in the relations between the cooperatives or the peasantry as a more extensive category, 
and other classes, such as the cattle ranchers, the banana companies or even the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) (recall in last chapter how they use to refer to the palm trees as the 
IADB´s property). The second mechanism had to do more with the relation with other members 
of the same class position and used to be spoken about in terms of corruption — of enrichment 
not based on producing value, but on capturing rent (what is known in organizational literature 
as “elite capture” (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013). In this sense, corruption seems to be operating 
in a similar vein to that described by Simon Turner (2007:125–26) for the Burundi case. He 
argues that “…corruption narratives seek to unravel power by trying to unveil hidden 
connections and causalities. In this manner they attempt to explain success of some politicians 
and the misfortune of others, relying on a perception of political power as depending heavily on 
hidden practices and on concealing true intentions.”  
These two mechanisms – speaking of toiling for the benefit of others and corruption – 
became a form of talking about the different types of class relations, as well as the processes by 
which internal differentiation within the reform sector were being produced. Let’s remember 
that initially the reform sector in the Aguán shared an egalitarianism born out of poverty. Both 
the immigrants and the local communities that came together in the agrarian reform 
cooperatives had very similar class backgrounds. However, as time went by, and as I have noted, 
internal differentiation within poverty arose, both within the cooperatives and among them — 
differentiation that manifested itself quite blatantly in their respective incomes. Thus, by looking 
at those points from where differentiation arose, we can look at the same time at how rent was 
being captured and by whom, thus getting a better idea of how the valley´s landscape was 
produced. 
155 
 
With this in mind, we can think of the points of rent capture as being located along three 
main axes: state-reform sector relations; relations among cooperatives; and relations within the 
cooperatives. Regarding the state-reform sector axis, this was the main and more evident point 
of friction in the region. As I have already mentioned in various places, the way in which this 
was first and foremost experienced was in the low “wages” that the members received in the 
cooperatives. I put wages in quotation marks because from the perspective of the state and the 
BAP, these were supposed to be funds advanced to the cooperative members from the future 
revenues that their land would generate (De Fontenay 1999).  
However, behind these low wages were more sophisticated forms in which rents were 
being captured from the cooperatives by the state. Besides the most evident question as to why 
poor peasants that were being settled on national land had to buy the land from the state, it was 
mainly through debt that rent was being extracted from the cooperatives.55 For example, once 
the oil palms began to be planted, the cooperatives were required to pay a fee of 65 Lempiras per 
hectare (around $33) over a period of 20 years. This was financed through the loans that the 
country had signed with the IADB and the USAID. Both loans had interest rates of 4 percent; 
however the state collected 11 percent from the peasant cooperatives (it was later reduced to 8 
percent) (Castro 1994), thus not only transferring the costs of the loans to the reform sector, but 
also making a profit in the process.  
If debt was one of the main forms of rent capture by the state, the other was to be found 
in the process of industrialization and commercialization of palm oil. Since the initial plan of the 
BAP, the idea was that an industrial sector would be developed to add value to the production of 
the raw material and thus vertically integrate the sector. This of course was oriented towards 
                                                        
55 The Chilean Jacques Chonchol (1962) argued that paying for the land – especially at market prices –
would negatively affect the agrarian reform in more general terms. According to him, the more money 
that was directed towards paying for the land, the less that could be invested in the other elements needed 
for production (roads, schools, etc.).  
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keeping a larger amount of value in the region and thus, an improvement of the cooperatives 
economic situation. Also, it would facilitate the process of rent capture, as the whole activity 
would be in fewer hands. It was also a necessary condition for the development of the palm oil 
industry, as the harvested fruit from the palms has to be processed quickly. 
 Already in 1975, the INA constructed a pilot harvesting mill. Later, in 1977 a second 
larger mill was constructed, and yet another one in 1979. Seeing that there was a profit to be 
made in this way, in 1979 the governing military junta issued two Decrees (774 and 810), giving 
birth to the Agro-industrial Cooperative of African Palm (COAPALMA) on February 18, 1980, 
with an initial capital of more than 35 million Lempiras (around $18 million) (Castro 1994). 
Initially, however, both the extracting mills and COAPALMA were administered directly by state 
structures, and thus the cooperatives were kept on the margins of the industrialization and 
commercialization process. The idea was that once the state recovered its investment and paid 
off its loans to international creditors, it would gradually cede control to the cooperatives. 
However, this idea was rejected by members of the cooperatives who felt that they had little or 
no control over their own production and went on strike on September, 1980, for more than two 
weeks. The main objective was to gain control over the direction and administration of 
COAPALMA and to have both the cultivation and industrialization would be under the control of 
the cooperatives and not the state. As a result, on March 31, 1981 the National Congress voted 
and approved Decree 52, which gave full control of COAPALMA to the cooperatives (Macías 
2001).  
Catherine de Fontenay (1999), in an article on the application of the “big push 
doctrine”56 in northern Honduras, has an insightful reading of the struggle over COAPALMA 
and the 1981 strike. I quote her at length:  
                                                        
56 The Big Push theory was first presented by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943; 1957) in the 1940s. According 
to this theory, underdeveloped countries needed to embark in large processes of capital investment and 
not in bit by bit programs. Further, Rosenstein-Rodan argued that the whole industry which was intended 
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Evidence suggests that the agency administering the mills, the National Agrarian 
Institute (INA), engaged in hold-up and rent-seeking itself. The local INA office 
was publicly denounced for activities such as ghost payrolling, stealing 
equipment, and other... [s]uch activities [that] increased the operational costs of 
the project, which was passed on to the cooperatives in the form of debt. 
Meanwhile all of the cooperatives’ earnings went toward servicing this debt. The 
‘wages’ paid to cooperatives, formally, their profits after deductions debt 
servicing, remained so low after inflation that they were described by the 
National Peasant’s Union as ‘a miserable wage that has no relation to their actual 
needs and the real price of the product.’ (p. 16) 
Although the 1980 strike was in response to exactly this type of behavior, the shift 
towards peasant control did not necessarily translate into a better performance. According to 
the same author: 
The cooperatives, now in control of Coapalma, found that whoever they 
appointed to manage Coapalma would hold them up. Ownership of Coapalma 
granted palm cooperatives equal voting rights and the right to supply Coapalma’s 
labor force of 400 from its members and their families. But the cooperatives, as a 
whole, failed to receive the full benefits of ownership, because corruption 
developed within Coapalma, particularly in its board of directors. Cooperatives 
complained in interviews that the Board ‘became wealthy overnight. They not 
only obtain high salaries, but they travel in luxury cars and they have built houses 
beyond their economic means.’ (pp. 16-17) 
Whoever was on top of COAPALMA was in a good situation to capture rent due to the 
dual role that they played. On the one hand, controlling COAPALMA meant basically controlling 
the commercialization and industrialization of palm oil in the whole region, and thus close to the 
totality of revenue produced by the sector had to pass through them, making the second-level 
cooperative –that is, a cooperative whose members are other cooperatives, not individuals– a 
highly profitable enterprise. On the other hand, since all of the oil palm cooperatives were at the 
moment members of COAPALMA (around 55), it became an organization with significant 
political clout; if the strike had shown something was that when the reform sector managed to 
gain some cohesion, it could confront state institutions directly. It should then come as no 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to be developed had to be approached and planned as a single massive entity. In more historical terms, 
this theory, or variations of it, has been the basis for large colonization or valley development projects in 
different parts of the world.  
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surprise that one of the direct effects of the strike was the decision of the INA to stop promoting 
the creation of new cooperatives – as they were becoming harder and harder to control (Castro 
1994).   
We understand contract agriculture as a form of production that “…entails  relations  
between growers  and  agro-capitals  which substitute  for  open-market exchanges  by linking 
'independent  family farmers'  of  widely variant assets  with  a central  processing,  export  or  
purchasing  unit which  regulates  price,  production  practices and  credit  arranged  in advance  
under  contract (Watts 1992:91). We can also see the case of COAPALMA as the first attempt to 
bring the whole palm oil industry in the region under external control. As we will see, this would 
not be the last time that this type of vertical integration was attempted nor the last time that the 
region’s peasant organizations would bring it to a halt. 
These two situations – the control of COAPALMA by the cooperatives and the decision of 
the INA to halt the promotion of new cooperatives – serve as a stage for exploring the second of 
the three proposed axes of rent capture: the relations among the cooperatives. Although all of 
the oil palm cooperatives were supposed to have equal shares of power in COAPALMA, in 
practice some cooperatives were more equal than others. According again to de Fontaney 
(1999:17), once the cooperatives took control over the board of directors,  
A subset of the cooperatives also profited from the situation, obtaining a 
disproportionate share of the high-wage employment at the plant and trickle-
down benefits when a member belonged to the Board of Directors. Such “inside” 
groups tended to be those closest to headquarters and the largest town (with 
some exceptions), perhaps initially because they had more contact with 
Coapalma, and their families had better access to education to qualify for clerical 
jobs at the plant.  
Apparently, corruption was profitable because “inside” cooperatives could extract 
rents from “outside” cooperatives. Coapalma functioned more and more as a 
monopsonist, purchasing cooperatives’ output and reaping high profits. The 
Board of Directors had broad discretion over the price of fruit, and was able to 
extract high rents without greater reprisal than a slight shift in factions at the 
following election. 
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More than creating something new, the struggle for the control of COAPALMA came to 
deepen the gap that existed between what de Fontaney calls the “inside” and “outside” 
cooperatives. These categories of “inside” and “outside” have a topographic element to them, as 
they overlap and give more substance to the geographical position of the different cooperatives 
within the landscape of the reform sector and the Aguán region. In general, the “inside” 
cooperatives were those closer to Tocoa, on the right bank and with a longer trajectory. The 
“outside” cooperatives were those further away from Tocoa, many from the left bank and newer. 
Federation affiliation also made a difference, as most inside cooperatives were associated with 
pro-government FECORAH, while outside ones tended to be affiliated with other federations 
such as the historically more combative ANACH. However, to have a fuller picture of the reform 
sector for this period we would have to add the staple crop producing cooperatives which were 
outside even of the purview of both the state and of most COAPALMA-affiliated cooperatives.  
Quoting de Fontaney yet again, we can see how costs were transferred to the outside 
cooperatives in favor of the inside ones: 
Internal documents from 1982 and 1986 verify that Coapalma collected 30 
lempiras per ton toward reimbursing the state bank... But comparing the groups’ 
total debts to the state bank in 1985 and 1989 suggests that Coapalma over-
charged groups by 67 percent on average, even at the 11 percent interest rate 
charged by the state bank. Simply incorporating this particular over-charge 
reduces the effective price by another 20 lempiras. And given that several insider 
cooperatives had no debts at all by 1989, it is likely that the burden of this 
overcharge fell on the “outside” cooperatives. (p. 18) 57 
                                                        
57 De Fontaney expands on this topic: “Beyond debts to the government for the initial planting costs, the 
cooperatives also incurred debts with Coapalma for some of their operating capital. Note that some self-
styled “outside” cooperatives continued to incur debts with Coapalma, which would seem irrational if 
Coapalma extracts rents from the reimbursement process. But engineer Erlindo Calix of Standard Fruit 
noted that in addition to price differences, Coapalma often incurred substantial delays in paying for the 
fruit, relative to Standard’s weekly payments. These delays were shorter for ‘inside’ cooperatives. Slow 
disbursement is likely to lead to debt among cooperatives, who were otherwise credit-constrained: six 
producers referred to the debt-trap cycle in their relations with Coapalma (Interviews,1995). Then 
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This situation had different effects. The first and most evident is that, at the same time 
that this surplus was extracted from COAPALMA in the form of debt service – above the level of 
the interest rate being paid by the state – it was also extracted from the outside cooperatives by 
the inside ones. Besides the impoverishing effect that this dynamic had, it also created 
differentiation among the cooperatives by forming a three-tier system that mirrored the class 
system described by Lenin (1956) for the nineteenth-century Russian case: on top the inside 
cooperatives, below the outside ones and at the bottom the staple crops cooperatives. This 
differentiation was also reflected in the political and social perspective that the different groups 
had of each other. For example, there has been a historical resentment from the outside and 
staple crops cooperatives towards the members of COAPALMA and other do-well cooperatives, 
such as La Salamá. This resentment gets articulated in the form of claims that they have been 
allied with the terratenientes [large landowners]. Moreover, that the “inside” cooperatives 
exploited the others not only through the debt relation with COAPALMA that I have been 
discussing, but also through hiring their labor, as many of the members of the poorer 
cooperatives tended to work as day laborers in the better-off cooperatives. 
Another example of this internal differentiation is that in 1986 there was a great drought 
that destroyed most of the staple crops harvest in the left bank. This led the cooperatives from 
this section to ask for help from the more economically solvent ones from the right bank. The 
request was rejected under the argument that in the beginning, when they first arrived in the 
Aguán, they had also suffered a lot (Castro 1994). 
As we can see from these two examples, the differentiation between cooperatives was 
explained through narratives of corruption that were heavily morally charged. I am not arguing 
that actual pocket picking and embezzlement took place, but it is evident that differentiation was 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
overcharging could be a simple way to pay different prices to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ cooperatives.” (footnote 
34, p. 18) 
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coming mainly from the forms in which rent was captured within the palm oil industry.  I would 
argue with Turner (2007:126) that “[c]orruption narratives are moral evaluations of the ways in 
which political power is being administered in society.” Or to phrase it differently, that these 
narratives of corruption were a way of talking about differentiation and exploitation. 
It is now time to move to explore the forms of differentiation that arose within the 
cooperatives. This differentiation moved along two main axes: gender and age, on the one hand, 
and in relation to the labor process on the other. Regarding the latter, with the process of 
production and industrialization of palm oil, the labor and production process went through a 
process of specialization with a more complex division of labor than the one that can be found 
for example, in the cultivation of staple crops. This situation had the effect of differentiating 
among the cooperative members, as some of them began specializing into technical or 
administrative positions and jobs. This specialization was done mainly through scholarships 
given by the state to both cooperative members and (mainly) their sons to go and study in state 
universities. However, the access to these scholarships and positions was mainly predicated 
upon levels of education and due to their closer location to Tocoa where the higher education 
centers (better high schools and university) could be found. This meant that most scholarships 
and the better jobs would go to members of the inside cooperatives. These scholarships and 
study opportunities included both academic and technical degrees in Honduran universities, as 
well as shorter study trips. Particularly noteworthy was the journey to Israel to learn of the 
cooperative system that was being developed there. With this specialization came also 
differentiation in wages and thus a tendency for some of the cooperative members and their 
sons to have a form of upper social mobility in COAPALMA (Castro 1994) and later on, 
especially after the sale of the cooperatives, to search for better paid jobs in the private sector. 
For example, many of the palm oil technicians hired by the private plantations after the sale of 
the cooperatives came from this same sector and were trained with public funds. 
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Another way in which the labor process induced differentiation within the cooperatives 
was related to the cooperatives’ legal framework. According to the law, all of the members had 
the possibility or being part of the administration of the cooperative that they formed part of. 
However, the law also stated that to be a member of the board of directors, you needed to know 
how to read and write. This meant a particular form of differentiation between base and 
leadership that was particularly pronounced in outside and staple crops cooperatives, as their 
members had less access to education. Also, it expressed itself in the crystallization of certain 
forms of leadership that could, and usually did, translate into practices of bossism, in which a 
few members could decide what to produce as well as engage in rent capturing practices. The 
creation and perpetuation of these types of leadership had a very important role to play in the 
sale of the cooperatives, as we will see later in this chapter.  
Regarding the forms of internal differentiation based on gender, it is important to 
remember Maureen Mackintosh’s (1989b:178) argument that, 
No new class emerges undifferentiated, least of all new elements of the working 
class under capitalism. There are numerous forms of differentiation which 
emerge as new firms create a workforce in their own image in different parts of 
the world: differentiation based on skill, on industrial branch, on age, on race, 
and on gender. Among these, the differentiation based on gender is a 
fundamental one because it is closely bound up with the organization of 
reproduction of the class which is in creation. 
As I discussed in the last chapter, the process of entering the cooperatives had the effect 
of rendering invisible women´s labor. First of all, the cooperatives reproduced and reinforced 
the differentiation between productive (in the fields) and reproductive (at the household) labor 
and thus, in a way, placed women outside of their purview. Further, since in the cooperatives, 
and particularly with the shift towards palm oil, families had to rely more and more on the 
market to acquire their basic goods and nourishment, women´s position within the household 
became more dependent upon men and their wages. As we will see later in this chapter, this is in 
part what was at stake for Eugenia in her struggle against the selling of the land and the cows. A 
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final form of differentiation and exclusion due to gender was inscribed in the agrarian reform 
law itself. According to this law, the legal title and membership in the cooperatives was 
exclusively for the head of household. This meant that with the exception of widows and single 
mothers, women were effectively excluded from direct membership – only 3.8 percent of the 
beneficiaries were women (Deere and León 2004:191) –, and thus, highly dependent on their 
male partners. Further, the fact that the agrarian reform legal framework was predicated upon 
the land to the tiller principle, even if single women were to access membership, they would 
have to work in the fields, as this was the only legitimate type of labor.  
Regarding the differentiation based on age, the children of the members of the 
cooperatives – other than individual inheritance of the membership – did not have any direct 
entitlement in the cooperative. For example, in those cases in which the cooperatives had to hire 
external labor, they tended to give preferential access to their own children. Further, very often 
the cooperatives did not have the opportunity to include them as members and thus, once they 
reached working age, they either had to move to another cooperative that had available member 
spots, look for a job outside of the agricultural sector or work permanently as day laborers. It 
should then come as no surprise that cooperative members were very invested in the education 
of their children as a way of both promoting upper social mobility and possible employment 
outside of the cooperative. 
I have shown the ways in which the circulation of capital within the reform sector created 
a set of frictions and conflicts. These conflicts were predicated upon how capital was injected 
into the region and how it came to be assembled – in the form of the cooperatives – with labor. 
Or to phrase it a different way, how surplus was pumped out of the cooperatives’ economy and 
divided among the different actors involved, including some in the cooperatives themselves. 
This division was informed not only by the crop grown, but also by the geographical position 
within the valley and the cooperatives’ political affiliations. Differentiation processes also arose 
within the cooperatives, due in part to the specialization of the production process, but also to 
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gender and age positions. All of these different dynamics placed the different individuals 
involved in particular, and many times antagonistic, relations with the cooperatives; understood 
as an assemblage of relations between the individuals, their context (both political and 
economic) and nature, represented here by their relations with the land and crops and activities 
that were enacted. We will see later in this chapter how these elements came to affect the 
position of the cooperatives in regard to the sales of the estates. 
So far we have treated the reformed sector in the Aguán region as if it operated in a 
vacuum. This was necessary to show the particular forms in which capital came to interact with 
labor and nature in the production of the region’s landscape. In the next section, we will to turn 
to the institutional changes brought by the process of structural adjustment, which opened the 
door for the sale of the cooperatives. 
Second fold: Structural adjustment and modernization in the countryside 
It must be established from the beginning that the Modernization Law is fundamentally 
an ‘agrarian count-reform,’ that has as its main purpose to block peasant’s access to 
land… dismantle the capacity for development of their trade and economic organizations 
and pass the management of the agrarian conflict, from the Government, to individuals’ 
decisions. Then, of course, the weaker ones will not have another choice but to get 
organized, which will lead to an increase in the number of agrarian confrontations. 
Juan Ramón Martínez, 1990 
By the 1970s the development project that had given the agrarian reform a central place began 
to show signs of running out of steam. On the one hand, the picture shown by the economic 
indicators was anything but encouraging, particularly in terms of growth. On the other, as the 
crisis of the Fordist accumulation regime began to hit home in the global North, a significant 
part of the costs were transferred to Latin America in the form of what is usually known as the 
“debt crisis,” whose roots we find in the 1970s, when the development models began to rely 
more and more on variable interest cheap loans by private banks and consortia.  On the other 
hand, neoliberalism, as an ideological project with a very clear class component (Duménil and 
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Lévy 2004), was rising as a newly legitimate approach to economics and development policy, 
enthusiastically endorsed by the IFIs. 
These elements together came to create a context in which the role of the state in the 
economy was profoundly questioned and an alliance of, mainly, industrial and commercial 
economic groups – who had been born or strengthened at the cost of the state during the 1960s 
and 1970s – began to push for a set of reforms and to take formal control of the state. This move 
reflected a set of class interests from within, with economic and political pressures from without 
(mainly by the IMF and WB); giving as a result what is known as the Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP).  
The argument behind the SAP was very simple: the increased influence and presence of 
the state in economic matters had created a set of imbalances that needed to be remedied. To do 
so, it was important to tackle directly these imbalances, but also to limit the levels of state 
interference, in order to unshackle the market and allow it to allocate resources in a more 
optimal manner. Known popularly as “el paquetazo” (the big package that clobbers you) Decree 
18-90, which signaled the most notorious, although not the only agreement between the 
Honduran government and the IFIs, unleashed a set of forces that would deeply transform 
Honduran society.  
Regarding the need to balance national financial indicators (mainly the budget deficit, 
balance of payments and inflation), the SAP revoked customs import duties in order to 
accelerate trade and economic liberalization. At the same time, through the devaluation of the 
Lempira, it attempted to stimulate exports and take advantage of Honduras’s “competitive 
advantages” (mainly, cheap labor and natural resources, including land.). The SAP also 
eliminated state subsidies to the economy, abandoned the control of prices for the internal 
market, and promoted the privatization of national companies in strategic sectors such as 
telecommunications.   
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In practice, these “adjustments” were experienced as shocks that rocked the entire social 
fabric of the country. Not all sectors were affected the same way, of course. On the side of the 
“losers,” we had mainly the already fragile and small middle class, as well as the urban and rural 
poor who experienced increasing levels of unemployment and (massive) underemployment, 
including the loss of around 2,000 public-sector jobs; reduction of real wages and ability to 
consume; inflation and an increase in the cost of living and public services; and a redirection 
and increase in the price of credit, due to modifications in the rate of interest (Barahona 2005). 
In terms of the economic power groups, the biggest loser of this process was the cattle ranching 
elite – that traditionally had been an important part of the hegemonic fractions – and those 
sectors, mainly of organized or independent peasants, that produced for the internal market. On 
the other side of the road, the biggest “winners” of the SAP were the exporters, particularly the 
garment sector (maquila), as well as the domestic monopolies and oligopolies (mainly 
foodstuffs), and the banking sector.  
In general, it would appear that Cáceres and Zelaya (2011:5) are right when they argue 
that “between 1990 and 2009, and under the shelter of the [currency] devaluation, the 
liberalization of the prices of goods and services  (or the lack of governmental  control over 
prices) and the privatization of  state services, the Honduran entrepreneurial elite enriched itself 
very acutely and actively, at the cost of the social rights of the population.”  
Probably one of the most affected sectors was the agriculture. Although the 
developmentalist period had translated into a process of constant urbanization of the national 
population, the rural sector continued to be important in terms of production and employment. 
However, with the SAP came an increasing focus on export-oriented crops, to the detriment of 
staple crop production for the internal market; as well as the liberalization of imports that 
translated into Honduras becoming a net importer of staple crops (white and yellow maize, 
sorghum and rice) (Rueda-Junquera 1998). 
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In practice the agrarian aspect of the SAP took shape in the form of two bills: the Land 
Titling Program (LTP) from 1982, and the Agricultural Sector Modernization and Development 
Law (LMA) of 1992. The LTP project – mainly bankrolled by the USAID (over $20 million) 
budget (Jansen and Roquas 1998) – responded in part to the escalation of the agrarian conflict 
in the country towards the end of the 1970s and the open defiance and opposition of the 
FENAGH against the agrarian policy (Jansen and Roquas 1998). The main objective of the LTP 
was to allocate land more efficiently to producers, thus opening up access to credit and technical 
assistance. Also, the granting of legal property rights was to become the cornerstone for the 
creation of a land market (Salgado 1994). In practice, what the LTP did was increase the price of 
land, thus making it harder for land poor and landless families to have access. Also, although it 
was oriented towards those sectors not included within the scope of the agrarian reform, by 
granting full and individual title to occupants of national and ejido lands, it weakened the 
peasant movement and brought into the market lands that used to be outside its scope. Further, 
by allowing the titling of farms between 0.1 and 10 hectares, it legitimated smallholding 
[minifundio] (Salgado 1994).  
Jansen and Roquas (1998) describe how the implementation of the LTP came to create 
new conflicts over land, as “formal” and “informal” property claims clashed. Also, in a vein 
similar to Michael Mann’s (1984) infrastructural power, the LTP allowed the state agrarian 
institutions to penetrate the rural communities and gain more control of who had access to 
what. According to these authors, one of the effects of this was the increasing perception that the 
state was only the judiciary and its presence was only felt as an enforcer of property rights. As 
Vinay Gidwani (2008a:87) has argued for the Indian case regarding the expansion of the state 
under the development imperative, “…dispersion and proliferation of the state apparatus had an 
electric political effect, producing disagreements and conflicts wherever it came into contact 
with society.”  
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 The LMA came to be known as the Norton Law, because of the active participation in the 
drafting process of U.S. economist Roger Norton. In formal terms, the LMA did not abolish the 
agrarian reform, but merely modified provisions for titling land, selecting beneficiaries and 
defining the obligations of the state. The Law was the agrarian equivalent of the SAP and 
operationalized changes to the sector such as those mentioned above. However, its influence 
was nowhere felt harder than in the area of agrarian reform and land tenure. The Law assumed 
that without clear property rights and tenure security, there could be no investment and thus no 
economic growth or job creation. The LMA came to transform dramatically much of the agrarian 
reform framework that had been in place since 1972. The causes for acquiring land for 
redistribution were reduced to two: being over the private land ceilings or having been idle for 
the last consecutive 18 months. Also, tenure security over land was expanded. For example, 
national and ejido lands sold to private individuals had to be titled within six months. Further, 
small farms could be titled, regardless of their size.  When the INA would now assign land to 
beneficiaries it would be in the form of a title with a mortgage lien and individual plots could be 
titled as part of the land distributed. Also, cooperatives could title their land and the 
indivisibility of their property was abolished so that cooperative lands could be divided into 
individual plots.  
According to Esther Roquas (2002) another important change was the abolition of the 
“land to the tiller” principle that had been present in both the 1962 and 1975 agrarian reform 
laws. This allowed for the separation of ownership from working on the land, as now, according 
to article 64, land had to be only “adequately exploited.” Further, the definition of a 
smallholding was reduced from ten hectares to one hectare (Pino, Thorpe, and Corea 1992). 
Finally, women were, for the first time, accorded all the rights of other agrarian reform 
beneficiaries. However,  
Feminist organisations considered the abolition of discriminating criteria in the 
Law of Modernisation to be an important step because it embodied a political 
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decision to do something for rural women. On the other hand, they argued that 
the state did not provide the necessary conditions to make women able to be 
'competitive and efficient', as the law stipulated, such as relieving them of the 
burden of reproductive work or changing gender constraints. The female 
president of COCOCH pointed out that women will never be able to work in 
agriculture on a full-time base (a legal requirement for becoming beneficiary of 
the law) because of their housekeeping duties. She considered that women thus 
do not qualify to obtain land from the state through the arrangements of the Law 
of Modernisation. (Roquas 2002:178) 
What this meant is that Honduran agrarian law went from being clearly tilted in favor of 
men, to gender neutral, which in practice had a similar effect. Women were not excluded in the 
letter of the law, but by not actively trying to correct existing gender biases, it left the results to 
the actual application of the law and in these terms women continued to get the shorter end of 
the stick.   
The combined effect of the LTP and the LMA was a massive concentration of land in the 
hands of a small number of Honduran (male) landowners and foreign banana companies. The 
effect on the reform sector was massive. According to the Coordinating Council of Honduran 
Peasant Organizations (COCOCH), one of the most important peasant organizations in the 
1990s, in the period between 1990 and 1994, of a total of 56,587 hectares that were originally 
distributed through the agrarian reform, 30,587 – that is, 53.6 percent – were sold (2010: 24). 
Nowhere was the impact of this process more strongly felt than in the Aguán and the palm oil 
industry was the most important actor involved. Before turning our attention to the process of 
land sales in the Aguán, it is important to take first a detour, and describe the process by which 
palm oil became a global commodity. 
Third fold: Palm oil’s rise as a global commodity 
 The first modern or colonial encounter with palm oil was in the mid-seventeenth century, when 
Portuguese explorers mention its use for food preparation in West Africa, close to the coasts of 
what is now Nigeria and Liberia.  It is clear that initially its use and production was largely 
centered on Africa and that it would not be until the 1830s that large-scale international 
commerce in palm oil began with the deliberate encouragement of the British government. 
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There is a deep connection between the decline of the African slave trade and the rise of the 
palm oil as an international commodity. As the slave trade became riskier, merchants continued 
the search for more profitable and stable venture, such as palm oil. The development of this 
commerce was so significant that eventually the area between the Benin and Calabar Rivers, 
came to be known as the Oil Rivers (Corley and Tinker 2008:4). 
If the birthplace of the industry is to be found in West Africa, its development as a 
plantation and industrial crop would begin in Southeast Asia. According to legend, the African 
oil palm was introduced to Asia from Mauritius and Amsterdam in the form of four seedlings, 
which were planted in botanical gardens in Indonesia (Kongsager and Reenberg 2012). The first 
large plantations were created in Sumatra in 1911 and in Malaya in 1917. Initially the Sumatra 
sector grew faster than the Malayan one. However, the Japanese occupation of this region 
during World War II set back the whole industry and  it would only be in the post-war period 
that  Malaysia (the former British Colony of Malaya) and later Indonesia would come to 
dominate the industry (Corley and Tinker 2008).   
Since its take off in the 1960s, production and trade in palm oil has increased constantly. 
In terms of production, it has gone from 1.5 million Metric tons (Mt) in 1961, to over 30 million 
Mt in 2009, which represents an average annual growth rate of 7 percent. This increase has 
meant that in the last few years, palm oil has surpassed soybean oil as the world’s primary 
vegetable oil (Teoh 2010) and accounts for around 32 percent of  global vegetable oil production. 
Since the 1980s Asia has become the geographical center of the industry, accounting for 88 
percent of total production, with Indonesia (46 percent) and Malaysia (39 percent) in the lead 
(Kongsager and Reenberg 2012). 
In terms of the production process, palm oil combines three elements that must be taken 
into account. First, it has a relatively long initial period before it goes into full production. The 
whole process is divided into four different stages: (1) a nursery period of around 12 months, 
before it can be transplanted to the field; (2) after two to two and one-half years, the oil palm 
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begins to yield fruit; (3) more oil can be extracted from the fruit when it is fresh, thus it must be 
transported to the mill in less than 24 hours; and (4) the oil is extracted from the fruit in the mill 
and is ready for different industrial uses. Due to this long idle initial period and the necessity of 
siting mills close to the plantations, palm production requires significant initial investments in 
fixed capital (Kongsager and Reenberg 2012; Carrere 2006). 
Second, palm oil production, particularly in the stage of harvesting, has proven resistant 
to mechanization. The competitive advantages in the industry thus rest almost solely on the 
price of labor. Most of the growth in the production of the crop has been achieved through an 
increase in the area planted rather than through yield improvements. This situation has tended 
to segment the global market into two main camps. On the one hand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
account for almost all of the world’s exports (over 90 percent of the total). In other parts of the 
world, such as Latin America and Africa, most of  production is aimed at either  domestic or 
regional markets (Corley and Tinker 2008). Also, it is important to emphasize  that palm oil 
production is located solely in “developing countries in the humid tropics” (Teoh 2010:2).  
Third, one of the reasons for the success of the palm oil industry has to do with its 
versatility and multiple uses. From foodstuff to industrial lubricants, palm oil can be found all 
around us in everyday life, and although it is mainly used as an ingredient in the manufacture 
and further processing of food products,58 other potential uses are being developed. Probably 
the most controversial of these other uses has been agrofuels, particularly biodiesel. It is hard to 
figure out how much of the global palm oil production is going into the production of fuels. 
However, when we look at the amount of palm oil used for non-food purposes, we find that in 
the 12-year period between 1998 and 2010, it increased 450 percent to represent around 27 
percent of total production (Kongsager and Reenberg 2012). This is not the place to develop a 
                                                        
58 According to Cheng Hai Teoh (2010:4), palm oil “…can be found in more than 50 percent of the 
packaged products in supermarkets, ranging from cooking oils, margarine, ice cream, cookies and 
chocolates to soaps, detergents and cosmetics.” 
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fully fleshed out analysis of the agrofuel industry (see, Colchester and Chao 2013; Carrere 2006; 
Fortin 2011; White and White 2012; Searchinger and Heimlich n.d.). However, there is a clear 
linkage between the food and non-food uses of palm oil, as “in recent years, due to the demand 
for biodiesel, the prices of vegetable oils have become linked to those of mineral oil” (Kongsager 
and Reenberg 2012:14). Palm oil has become the quintessential “flex crop,” that is, a crop with 
multiple and flexible uses, pointing towards the “…interconnection between and implications of 
the restructuring of agrofood, feed, and fuel complexes.” (Borras et al. 2012:846). 
Taken together, these three elements give some particular characteristics to the palm oil 
industry. First, due to its flexibility and increasing demand – related to its leading position 
regarding vegetable production – it has become a very profitable activity. Second, due to its 
needs in terms of fixed capital (production and transport infrastructure), and the long waiting 
period before receiving significant returns, the palm oil industry is highly capital intensive.59 
Further, the necessary geographical concentration of the industry – as mills must be close to the 
plantations – makes it particularly susceptible to vertical integration. Finally, since its 
competitive edge is linked to the price of labor power, it must strive towards the capture of 
cheap labor, as well as the promotion and enforcement of particular forms of production that 
rely heavily on time-discipline and work intensification. 
To summarize, then, the palm oil industry needs large amount of initial investment and a 
particular sort of institutional environment and forms of regulation that promote vertical 
integration and the capture of cheap labor. This situation places two actors in the middle of the 
palm oil assemblage. On the one hand the state, in its role as a mediating actor between scales 
and enforcer of regulatory norms (Grundmann and Darnhofer 2010; Borras, McMichael, and 
Scoones 2010). On the other, it is the IFIs, international banks and transnational companies 
                                                        
59 According to information from the transnational corporation Unilever, in 1988 the cost of establishing a 
10,000-hectare oil palm plantation was approximately $75 million (RAFI 1988:8). 
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that can mobilize the financial capital necessary to jump start this sort of activity (Carrere 
2006).  
All of these elements come forward in a particularly salient manner in the ways in which 
the development question is approached. Thus, for the particular case of the palm oil industry, 
since the 1960s, both the World Bank and the IADB have injected millions of dollars60 into the 
creation of the necessary conditions for its development (public infrastructure, mills, seeds, 
etc.). According to Tanya Kerssen, 
Most of the projects were implemented in the public sector in the 1970s. These 
were of a more classic “development” orientation, focused on building state 
capacity through the construction of processing plants, mills, roads, extension 
services and credit facilities to develop smallholder farms and in some cases 
outgrower schemes (contract farming). But when public sector financing for 
agriculture decreased to a trickle in the 1980s and 90s, the Bank’s private sector 
lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), began ramping up 
investment to agro-export projects… IFC funding targeted much larger 
operations and moved down into the palm oil supply chain, with substantial 
investments in trading, refining and manufacturing.  (2013:54–55)  
In plain words, during the developmentalist period, the support from IFIs was directed 
at supporting and promoting state-driven development projects, such as the BAP in Honduras. 
However, with the rise and consolidation of the neoliberal strategy from the 1980s onwards, the 
policy emphasis shifted and aimed at transferring those assets and the surpluses produced from 
the public to the private sector.  As Rob Cramb suggests,  “the surge in profitability of plantation 
crops has thus created opportunities for political elites at various levels (national, state, and 
local) to plunder these once-marginal but now valuable land resources” (Cramb 2011:275). 
 
 
 
                                                        
60 Since 1965, the WB has committed around $1 billion to over 35 palm oil projects around the world, with 
about half of the projects located in Indonesia (Teoh 2010:11). 
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Honduras in the palm oil assemblage 
“Ode to the African Palm” 
You came when we least needed you 
and remained longer than we expected. 
You displaced the ancestral kapok tree that used to 
rise upon my fields 
and shook off the maize that filled my 
plains… 
Oh, African palm! 
neither white, nor black… 
red and bloodied. 
You are not from the Aguán  
neither of the peasants 
nor from Honduras or Central America. 
You are of the looters that ruin us, 
of Facussé and his killers. 
— Chaco de la Pitoreta (2012:67) 
 
For the particular case of Central America, according to Richardson (1995:1), the early history of 
the oil palm industry is deeply intertwined with the history of the United Fruit Company. The 
first African palm seeds are said to have arrived in Honduras in either 1927 or 1929 via the 
banana company. These first seeds came from different genetic lines (from Sumatra, Sierra 
Leone, Belgian Congo and Malaya) and were planted in the Lacetilla botanical garden, just 
outside the city of Tela, on the north coast (Umaña 1998). It is unclear whether these first oil 
palm samples were brought to Honduras for ornamental purposes, as an  alternative to the 
Panama disease-riddled banana plantations, or as a possible way of diversifying  production, 
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one of the company’s dreams since the early years (Richardson 1995). Based on the results of 
experiments with these first samples, in the late 1930s the first commercial palm oil plantations 
were developed by Pedro and Arturo García in the hacienda Birichiche in El Progreso, Yoro 
Department, in northern Honduras. From there, similar projects began in San Alejo, also in the 
Honduran North Coast, Quepos (Costa Rica) and Tiquisate (Guatemala) (TechnoServe 2009; 
Umaña 1998). 
By the 1960s, these first experiments had showed that palm oil was a viable option for 
UFCO. From 1962 onwards, the Company’s strategy included a much firmer commitment to the 
development of its palm oil sector. For example, in 1965, UFCO acquired the vegetable oil 
processing and sales organization, Numar, thus vertically integrating its vegetable oil enterprise. 
Also, in 1967 the Company established its first oil processing facility in Honduras and in 1969 it 
purchased the Nicaraguan Compañía Aceitera Corona (Richardson 1995). This was also a decade 
of expansion of the area planted with oil palm in the UFCO-promoted plantations.  
It seems like a striking coincidence that just as the industry was starting to show signs of 
being a successful business, the BAP was formed with the idea of increasing palm oil production 
by creating a group of peasant cooperatives. Further, it is important to note that similar 
smallholder palm oil projects were being promoted in countries such as Costa Rica and 
Malaysia, where in late 1958, the newly independent government created the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA). This scheme was so successful that by 1985, FELDA 
accounted for 32 percent of the area planted in Malaysia and around 25 percent of the total 
production of that country’s oil (Corley and Tinker 2008). 61  
This connection between UFCO’s interest in palm, the Honduran state’s proposed 
development projects and the IADB’s agreement to bankroll these, begs for a better analysis that 
I can provide at this moment. For my interests, it suffices to say that just as the global palm oil 
                                                        
61 See (Robertson 1984) for an in-depth case study of the early FELDA experience.  
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industry was beginning to gain some steam in the 1970s, it also became a viable business option 
in Honduras. Initially, due to the conditions of both the local elites and the particular needs of 
the industry outlined above, the only way in which it could take hold and develop was through 
this particular articulation between the BAP as an expression of an aspiring developmental state, 
UFCO’s commercial interests in the emerging market, and the IADB’s willingness to bankroll 
the project. Let’s explore this articulation. 
One of the reasons that the development of the palm oil industry began to take off in the 
1960s is the reframing of the relationship between population growth, technology and 
development that was taking place among the international agencies. According to a FAO 
(1992:n.p.) report on the organization’s involvement in the world,  
In 1960, the world's population reached three billion. For the first time in human 
history, global population had increased by one billion people in a mere thirty 
years: it was the start of the so-called 'population explosion'. Food problems 
could not be solved simply by the distribution of surpluses which had 
accumulated in industrialized countries in the 1950s: they now required that food 
production be stepped up in the countries where it was most needed. It was 
obvious that solutions would not materialize solely through providing 
information and advice, but that support had to be provided in the field in order 
to promote and hasten agricultural development at country level. 
Further,  
In 1964 the Organization and the World Bank jointly created a cooperative 
programme through which FAO could assist Member Nations in the 
identification and preparation of agricultural development projects suitable for 
World Bank financing. From being mainly an advisory body, FAO had become an 
operational organization, assisting countries to prepare overall development 
plans, helping to execute major projects and helping countries to obtain finance 
for national development.  
In this context, in Honduras in the 1960s palm oil was promoted as not only a way of 
correcting the national deficit in edible oil production, but also as a way of promoting  local 
industry and thus moving in the direction of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
(Jimenez 1992). The promotion of the palm oil industry could thus be seen as central to the 
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Honduran developmentalist project, as it connected industrial development in the countryside 
with industrial development in the cities. 
The oil palm industry in Honduras: the case of Miguel Facussé62 
It is useful to introduce here the story of Miguel Facussé and his Dinant Corporation, as a way of 
exemplifying the connections between the development of the palm oil industry, the state and 
the local elites. The story of Facussé’s rise to being one of the richest persons in Honduras is an 
illuminating one; it is also deeply intertwined with the development of the palm oil industry. 
The son of Palestinian immigrants, with an entrepreneurial tradition that produced much 
success in the garment industry (both for exports and domestic retail), Facussé founded the 
Corporación Cressida in the early 1970s, dedicated to the manufacturing and commercialization 
of light industrial products, ranging from prepared foodstuff to detergents and soaps. Part of 
Cressida was a small soaps and detergents plant known as Químicas Dinant, founded with $7 
million in loans from Bank of America and Lloyds Bank International. To be able to access these 
funds, the National Investments Corporation (CONADI63) served as guarantor for the 
international banks.  
By the 1980s, Dinant had grown from a small plant to a much larger corporation 
dedicated to the production of foodstuffs, detergents and soaps; palm oil was a crucial raw 
material for its production. At the time, most of the palm oil came from the reform sector mills, 
such as COAPALMA. Attracted by the profits that he saw could be made by moving down and 
controlling more of the production chain, Facussé began building a competing extraction plant 
in the Aguán.  
                                                        
62 This section is based on (Anonymous n.d.; Cáceres and Zelaya 2011) 
63 Created in 1974 by Oswaldo López Arellano´s government, the CONADI´s objective was to attract and 
promote industrial investment in the country. Among CONADI´s functions, was to serve as guarantor in 
cases where local entrepreneurs needed external financing from international banks.  
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But the State, under pressure from Coapalma, revoked Facussé’s building permit 
for the Aguán, and he had to build halfway between the Sula and the Aguán 
valleys. Facussé claims that Coapalma used its profits to influence the 
government, and alternately bribe and threaten cooperatives into signing a 
petition against his plant. (De Fontenay 1999:11)  
This first failure did not deter Facussé, but it was clear that changes in institutions would 
be needed for his business to grow. It is around the 1980s that Facussé joined the Honduran 
Progress Association (APROH). APROH was made up of businessmen and army officers –
including the infamous General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez64 – who were interested in opening 
the country´s economy and profiting in the process.65 This Association was the political brains 
and muscle behind the rise of neoliberalism in the country. One of its main objectives was to 
direct the transition from military to civilian governments that began in 1982 with the 
declaration of a new constitution and the election of Roberto Suazo Córdoba as President. 
During Suazo Córdoba´s government, Facussé served as presidential economic counselor. One 
of his recommendations was that the country should strengthen its economy by limiting foreign 
capital and currency drain and that the foreign debt that many of the local companies assumed 
under the mantle of CONADI and other public corporations, which had them on the brink of 
bankruptcy, should be converted into internal debt. Once this was done, the government could 
recover the money spent paying off these debts by selling the assets of the recovered companies 
to the local private sector. In the case of CONADI, these debts rose to around $2.5 billion.  After 
                                                        
64 Álvarez Martínez was one of the founders of the infamous 3-16 Battalion. Using techniques similar to 
those of the Argentinian death squads, and advised by Argentinian officers, the 3-16 was created in 1981 
as a counterinsurgency elite unit and was responsible for the disappearances and killings of over 200 
people during the 1980s (CONADEH 2002). 
65 It is also important to point out that the APROH had a clear and quite explicit anti-communist agenda. 
According to the Honduran political scientist Ernesto Paz (1984:19) in the mid-1980s, “[t]he number one 
priority of the APROH is the fight against communism, which is why it is allied with similar organization 
in the country, as well as CAUSA International, an organization linked to the Unification Church led by 
reverend [Sun Myung] Moon, and lately, the Cuban-American Foundation.” 
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buying off these debts, CONADI held assets distributed among 68 companies, including 
Facussé´s Químicas Dinant.  
This process of privatization was formalized through a set of public auctions in 1986 and 
1988. However, from the perspective of the state they were a failure, as the companies’ assets 
were sold at prices below their real values and in some cases promissory notes were accepted. 
Who never complained about the way in which this unfolded was Facussé. And how could he? 
After a complex process of negotiations both above and under the table, he managed to maintain 
control over his companies and to not pay off a penny of the debts he acquired. By 1993 he had a 
presence in all of Central America as owner of the firms that distributed the brands Colgate-
Palmolive and Maseca (processed maize for tortillas), among others, which were then grouped 
under Corporación Cressida. In 1994 Facussé sold his regional patents to the international 
corporation Colgate- Palmolive for $40 million and in 2000 he sold Cressida to the 
transnational company Unilever for $323 million, keeping only Dinant Corporation under his 
direct control. 
With the money accrued from these moves, and the legal changes implemented by the 
LMA, Facussé and his Dinant Corporation now had the chance to return to the Aguán, acquire 
lands and deepen the vertical integration of his palm oil enterprise.  
Explaining the birth of the capital of the agrarian counter-reform 
Once it began, it spread like wildfire. After Isletas sold its lands to the Standard Fruit Company 
on May 5, 1990, the transfer of agrarian reform lands to a handful of Honduran landowners and 
transnational companies began to spread like a plague. As the process of structural adjustment 
– mainly in the form of the LMA – opened up the legal floodgates, money, devalued by the same 
process of structural adjustment, began to flow into the Honduran countryside in search of 
profits and cheap assets. In a context framed by a reform sector lacking production incentives, 
heavily indebted and with little or no support from the state institutions, there were plenty of 
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willing sellers and cheap lands to be found; and when they were not found, they could be 
manufactured through bribery, threats, deceit and blood.   
There is not an exact measure of just how much land was alienated. According to what I 
would consider a low estimate, more than half of the over 56,000 hectares that were distributed 
during the agrarian reform period were “legally sold” between 1990 and 1994; the number rises 
to almost 74 percent in the case of the Aguán (COCOCH 2010:24). A different study calculates 
that in the period between when the first cooperative was sold in the Aguán (Buenos Amigos, 
July, 1991) and 1997, 28,806.7 hectares had been alienated (Macías 2001:206–208).66  
According to the prevailing narrative, the main forces behind the process of 
dispossession were the “foreign” large landowners Miguel Facussé, Reinaldo Canales and René 
Morales. In formal terms, their foreignness is disputable.67 However, more important for my 
argument is the fact that this narrative places the full brunt of the process of dispossession 
outside and above the Aguán. Outside of the Aguán, because by claiming that this was done by 
foreigners, it was possible to mobilize a nationalist discourse that articulated easily with what I 
have called in Chapter 1 the myth of the rich but impoverished nation. In this case the nation’s 
wealth takes the form of the fertile lands of the Aguán, which cannot be enjoyed by Hondurans, 
because foreigners – Miguel Facussé, Reinaldo Canales and René Morales – have hoarded them. 
                                                        
66 There is a clear discrepancy between the numbers presented between Macías and COCOCH. This 
number of 28,806.7 hectares is larger than the amount of land that according to COCOCH was distributed 
in total in the Aguán (28,365 hectares). The discrepancy probably has to do with the way in which the 
Aguán region is understood, as sometimes only the Bajo or lower Aguán is included, while in other 
moments, the whole Valley of the river basin is included.  
67 In the case of Facussé, whose story we recounted above, these claims are based on his Palestinian 
ancestry, although his family has been living in Honduras for over a century (González 1992:191). In the 
case of Morales, he was born in Nicaragua, but moved to Honduras 1979 and since then acquired 
Honduran nationality. His brother Jaime Morales also lived in Honduras between 1979 and 1996 and was 
Daniel Ortega’s vice president in Nicaragua from 2007 to 2012. Finally, Canales’ history is harder to track, 
but he is often identified as of Salvadoran descent.  
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Above the Aguán, because placing the full blame for the land sales at the feet of these men and 
the state effaces the internal complexities, tensions and conflicts that were already in place in 
the region before the actual sales even began. Further, this narrative reproduces the idea of the 
state as some sort of monolithic, almighty entity acting and preying upon the communities. I 
want be clear, my aim here is not to take the responsibility away from these businessmen or 
from state institutions; as we will see next, these large landowners were certainly the biggest 
winners of the dispossession cycle, with the public institutions as either spectators or enablers of 
the process. Further, as we saw above, Facussé had a central role to play in promoting the 
structural adjustment plan and creating the conditions that made possible the privatization of 
the palm oil industry through his maneuvering with and over the CONADI.  
According to Macías (2001:94), the three bigger buyers of agrarian reform lands were 
Facussé (who acquired 34 percent of the land sold), Morales (23 percent) and the Standard Fruit 
Company (8 percent). This data is probably an underestimate, as in many cases the larger 
purchasers would also use surrogate buyers or would buy from people who had bought first. 
This would seem to corroborate the idea of the big foreign buyers. However, the reality is not 
that simple. In their study on the sale process on a national scale, Ruben and Funez (1993) 
locate three main sectors in the early moments of the land sales: Isletas-Ilanga-Rigores (left 
bank), Saba-Olanchito (middle to upper Aguán basin), and Corocito-Dos Bocas (from the plains 
to the mouth of the Aguán River). It is noteworthy that these three sectors are outside the 
immediate scope of the BAP zone and contain those cooperatives that I located as either 
outsider or staple crops cooperatives. It is also important to take into account that the first 
cooperative that they mention as being sold, the 9 de Noviembre, was purchased by members of 
the army. In fact, for the Corocito-Dos Bocas sector, most of the buyers were politicians 
(members of the national Congress), members of the armed forces or former members of the 
board of directors of COAPALMA. According to these authors, most of the acquisitions studied 
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were done in an irregular manner and at very low prices. In most cases, the cooperatives that 
were sold cultivated staple crops.  
Although Ruben and Funez’s study accounts only for the initial moment of the sales 
process, it is illuminating in several regards. First, in the beginning, the patterns of cooperative 
sales overlap with the differentiations among the cooperatives that I mentioned before; the first 
cooperatives to sell were the outsider and staple crops cooperatives. Second, once the legal 
restrictions on reform sector land sales were eliminated, the ability of individuals to capture 
rents through COAPALMA translated into a deepening of the differentiations within the reform 
sector, as the sale of cooperatives to former members of the board of directors of COAPALMA so 
crudely illustrates. Third, certain local actors managed to mobilize and use particular forms of 
state power to facilitate the processes of dispossession. Since most of these actors were 
connected to state institutions, such as the national congress and the armed forces, it would 
appear that the possibility of mediating between scales – the regional and the national in this 
case – opened up a space for primitive accumulation. It is commonly believed in the Aguán that 
many army colonels “received” lands as payment for their help in the process of dispossession, 
which, if accurate, only seems to validate this argument. Fourth, it should be clear from the 
previous points that the land selling process was not only legitimized by state institutions, but 
also enabled by them in multiple other ways.  
Other studies of the land sales in the Aguán (Macías 2001; Castro 1994) seem to agree 
with these arguments, including the larger incidence of sales in the left bank and the staple 
crops cooperatives. However, they also present another line of argument: although there were 
high levels of repression and violence in forcing reluctant cooperatives to sell, it is also true that 
many of the sales were done willingly or at least in a peaceful manner. According to this 
argument, there were both external and internal reasons for the sales. Among the external 
reasons, we find, first of all, the passing of the LMA, which allowed the sale of cooperative lands. 
Second, many cooperatives were highly indebted and thus were forced to sell the land to pay off 
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their debts and make at least some profit in the process. Third, there was an attack from the 
private sector and the government itself, claiming that since the cooperatives were so indebted 
and the production of palm oil was no longer profitable – due to a drop in international prices in 
early 1990s –, that the reform sector had been a failure and that it was time to let the market 
take over. Finally, since the cooperatives had received so little financial and technical support 
from the state and since most of the peasant families had remained deeply impoverished no 
matter how much work they had put into the cooperatives, there was a very limited sense of 
“ownership” by the members. Thus when the chance came to make a quick buck on land that 
was seen as worthless, most cooperatives decided to pull the trigger.  
Regarding the internal reasons for the sales, the argument was much more 
straightforward. The cooperatives that sold did it because they were not organizationally strong 
enough, there was lack of unity and their members were not sufficiently politically conscious to 
understand that land was more than a simple asset. The reasons for these organizational 
weaknesses ranged from lack of internal political education by the members, lack of 
organizational and political education by the agrarian reform institutions, the inherited sense of 
individualism and the Honduran peasantry’s historical difficulties with collective labor; 
argument that in general could be extended to most peasantries on the world (see for example, 
Wolf 1969; Fabricant 2010).  
From this narrative follows its opposite: why some of the cooperatives did not sell. Here 
the main reasons given are the higher education levels of their members – as members of La 
Norteña explained to me when I posed the question –, the higher levels of unity and 
organizational experience, as in the case of La Salamá,68 or the fact that some cooperatives had 
                                                        
68 The case of La Salamá cooperative is usually given as an example of how successful the reform sector 
could be. Before the 1970s and the beginning of the BAP, Salamá members had been organized by a 
Spanish priest into a collective production cooperative, so by the time the cooperatives began to be 
formed, they had a head start. This particularity is usually cited to explain why they did not sell. However, 
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been created by former workers of the banana companies, and – because they were composed of 
proletarians — were no longer burdened by peasant individualism.  According to this narrative, 
with the sales those that had it tough were the ones that did not sell, because they had to suffer 
through the decrease in palm oil prices in the 1990s, while the members of the cooperatives that 
sold were happy enjoying the money that they had received. As we can see, most of the blame is 
placed here on the inability of some of the cooperatives to fully evolve and leave aside their 
Honduran peasantness and become modern, organized and disciplined.69 
Also, this sort of narrative effaces the regional internal differentiations and tensions that 
existed within the valley and among the reform sector. Such narratives are good at explaining 
and framing the general process of the sales. However, they are not very good at explaining the 
patterns of the sales. Allow me to explain. In his study on the land sales in the Aguán, Macías 
(2001) goes into some depth regarding the sale of the San Isidro cooperative to Facussé for over 
$900,000 in February, 1994. Regarding the reasons for the sale, Macías mentions that former 
members of the cooperative told him that 
Internally, they emphasize that the main problems were the deficient pay (many 
times it was not enough to cover basic expenses), the precarious conditions of 
some groups and administrative corruption. Also, COAPALAMA paid low prices 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
no one, including La Salamá members, mentions the support that they received from Dutch companies 
and HONDUPALMA – a second level peasant cooperative such as COAPALMA but located in the Sula 
Valley – to sustain their enterprise.  
69 This reasoning goes against some of the literature on the topic – with the important exceptions of 
Chayanov (1966; Bernstein 2009) and van der Ploeg (2010) – that see cooperatives as going through a 
cycle that inevitable leads either to a transformation more along the line of a firm or disintegration (Cook 
1995). According to this, the only way in which cooperatives can survive over time is if there is a strong 
sense of “member commitment,” which refers to the set of extra-economic incentives and sense of 
belonging that the cooperative can provide to its members (see for example, Österberg and Nilsson 2009; 
Bhuyan 2007). Thus, selling, rather than remaining as cooperatives, should be seen as the norm and not 
the other way around. 
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per ton of fruit. To these internal elements, external causes must be added, such 
as the promulgation of anti-reform laws. (p. 96) 
In this same line, one of the cooperative members also told him that  
Our cooperative did not have any standing debts with anyone. The main reason 
[to sell] was to stop being enslaved by a few who never went to weed the oil palm 
plantation or cut down the fruit, but who are the ones getting richer as a result of 
corruption, and that we could not take it anymore. (p.97) 
Although there were no debts, there was a feeling that the cooperative was not a fruitful 
endeavor due mainly to elite capture. Income was limited and tended to concentrate in the 
hands of a few who could extract rent (corruption). Also, there was a feeling that not all of all 
associates worked as much as everyone else and that COAPALMA was also extracting rent from 
them. Actually, this complicated relationship with COAPALMA was the starting point of the 
sale. About four months before the actual sale, the members of the San Isidro Cooperative began 
to explore the possibility of leaving COAPALMA and selling their fruit to another extracting 
plant. However, once the board of directors started to visit extracting mills outside the Aguán to 
explore this possibility, they were constantly told that they could not buy fruit from the San 
Isidro cooperative, because there was an agreement with COAPALMA (De Fontenay 1999:17).70 
In this search for an alternative buyer, they visited Miguel Facussé’s extraction mill. He gave 
them the same answer, but mentioned that what he could do was to buy their assets and land. 
The board of directors discussed the matter and decided to sell. Once the decision was taken, 
                                                        
70 She mentions that: “Coapalma may also have protected its market from competition by blocking 
producers from leaving the Aguán, an extreme form of entry-deterrence. Several politically influential 
cooperatives did in fact leave Coapalma, giving up their share in its assets and any future profits. But 
other, less powerful groups claim to have encountered difficulties when they tried to exit. The one paved 
road connecting the Aguán to the Sula valley and the rest of the country is guarded by a military 
checkpoint; all such checkpoints have been repeatedly criticized for extracting bribes from truckers to 
allow passage… The Aguán checkpoint was accused of barring exit from the Aguán by all but the above-
mentioned influential groups on behalf of Coapalma.” 
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they organized a general assembly with the rest of the members of the cooperative and informed 
them that they were going to sell.  
Macías’ interpretation is noteworthy. For him, this is a clear example of how a few 
members – the board of directors – decided to negotiate under the table and sell the cooperative 
without informing the membership. He also questions why they decided to sell to external 
capital – Facussé – rather than to local investors. According to him: 
It is curious that most of the groups [cooperatives] that disintegrated opted to 
offer their assets to external investors and not to local groups that had shown 
interest. Examples include the Salamá and Guapinol cooperatives. Both tried to 
buy from some groups, but these opted to sell to someone from outside, rather 
than to someone from home. (2001:100) 
For him, the explanation for this behavior was corruption, as the members of the sale 
negotiating committee accepted having received over $110 stipends from Facussé during the 
process. I did not find anything in the published accounts, nor in my own conversations with 
former cooperative members, to contradict this interpretation. In fact, in those cases where the 
board of directors or particular members – as we will see soon – refused to sign and sell, death 
threats and even assassinations were used to force the deals. However, this interpretation 
renders invisible several elements. It paints a picture of pervasive corruption in which the San 
Isidro cooperative, in response to COAPALMA corruption, falls for Facussé´s trickery and 
decides to sell the land. 
Other interpretations are also possible. For example, that the motivation behind the sale 
was to break out of the control that COAPALMA – seen from the perspective of the cooperative 
members as an external actor – had over them, as they could not sell their production to the 
higher bidder. Here, selling could be interpreted as a way of retaining some sort of autonomy 
and going against COAPALMA’s enclosure. We could also read the process along the lines of 
social differentiation and rent capture already mentioned in this chapter, but also as another 
example of the intensity with which the Honduran peasantry resists the idea of working for 
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others. Ironically, we can see here a similar situation to the one described in relation to the 
strike of 1981.  
As I showed before, the expansion of the palm oil industry during the developmentalist 
period in the Aguán had created a set of contradictions and conflicts that ran along three axes 
(reform sector-state; among the cooperative; within the cooperatives). These contradictions 
created various forms of differentiation and positioned the different individuals and groups in 
particular positions in regards to both the cooperatives and the palm oil industry in general. 
Once the LMA lifted the restriction on selling reform sector lands, vast amounts of capital 
entered the region and circulated within and among the cracks left by the previous processes of 
differentiation. This capital, as in the case of Facussé, was amassed through pillaging the state, 
but was also typical of the way in which industrial capital was amassed in the country (light 
agroindustry based on raw materials such as palm oil). Without it being a mathematical rule, it 
is clear that what I have been calling outsider and staple crops cooperatives had a greater 
tendency to sell their land and assets than the insider ones, which had access to the points of 
rent capture (processing and above all COAPALMA) and social capital (education above all). 
This is in part why many cooperatives preferred to sell to external investors than to local ones; 
not only were stipends distributed and skulls crushed, but the wounds from disputes between 
the different cooperatives were still very raw.  
The particular rhythms of the global palm oil ensemble also had their say in the matter. 
As we can see in figure 1, the period of the BAP, from its beginning in the early 1970s to its 
closing in the mid-1990s, is framed by two cycles in the international prices of palm oil. The first 
cycle is one of growth and instability, until it peaks in 1984. From there, a new cycle begins, in 
which prices maintain their instability, but remain lower. The down cycle coincides with the 
transfer of COAPALMA´s control to the cooperatives, the withdrawal of the INA´s support to 
the cooperatives and what most cooperative members remember as a very hard time, with little 
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profits. This of course placed the cooperatives in a very vulnerable situation, which was 
deepened by COAPALMA´s profit squeeze (high rent capture with low prices).  
For investors such as Facussé, this down cycle was a blessing in disguise. Since he had 
sold his companies in dollars, he was able to take advantage of the double devaluation that was 
taking place in Honduras. First of all, due to the SAPs, the Lempira had been deeply devalued 
and there was rampant inflation. This meant that he could buy land in the Aguán at low prices. 
Second, part of the offensive against the reform sector by the neoliberal governments was to 
devalue the work that they had done and to ask them to lay back and let the market take over.71 
Finally, since for Facussé and others, the buying of the plantations meant strengthening their 
process of vertical integration, they could not only absorb losses for a while, but could also make 
up what they lost from the low prices of palm oil through their control of  other parts of the 
processing process. From this perspective, the sale process could be seen as the effects of the 
coercive laws of competition that Marx so eloquently refers to in Volume I  of Capital (1992). 
However, it is important to remember that this was not the case of capitalist firms competing 
among each other, but of large and subsidized capitalists against deeply impoverished and 
fragile need economies (Sanyal 2013), where the transfer and concentration of assets took more 
the form of primitive accumulation than of “market rationalization.” 
                                                        
71 With no lack of irony, President Rafael Leonardo Callejas (1990-94), referring to agrarian reform 
beneficiaries, asked: “Why are they not going to sell if it has been their lifetime work and effort? … I do 
not agree with those who believe that it is a step back for the Agrarian Reform. On the contrary, it is the 
culmination of a process. Now, a peasant can receive 500,000 Lempiras for his hard work” (quoted by 
Suazo 2012:73) 
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Figure 5. Palm oil, $/mt, real 2010$ 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Summarizing, the traditional interpretations of the land sales during the 1990s in the 
Aguán place most of the blame on a limited set of internal and external conditions of the 
agrarian reform cooperatives. Externally, the blame is placed on the LMA, the land hunger of 
foreign large landowners and the lack of state support for the cooperatives; remarkably, no 
mention is made of the drop in the international prices of palm oil in the late 1980s (see figure 
5). Internally, the lack of appropriation of the cooperatives by its members, the inherent 
individualism of the Honduran peasantry and the ubiquity of corruption are presented as the 
main reason behind the sales. I have presented instead a much more complex picture, one that 
includes these elements, but places them within a broader political economic context.  
From the early development of the BAP, a process of differentiation began to take place 
within and among the cooperatives. This differentiation tends to be rendered invisible in most 
analyses of the Honduran agrarian question, due to the tendency to gather all of the 
cooperatives into one single category: the reform sector. However, as I have shown in this 
chapter, the differentiation between “inside” and “outside” cooperatives is crucial to understand 
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the general outline of the land sales process. This differentiation is also important to understand 
why many of the cooperatives decided to sell their lands to an external actor such as Facussé, 
rather than to other cooperatives within the region. This situation speaks not only to the sort of 
resentments and frictions that were festering within the reform sector, but also to how 
COAPALMA and its capacity to concentrate market power had become a crucial arena of 
contention. If in 1981 the cooperatives affiliated to the second level cooperative had gone on 
strike to recover some of their control over the value produced by the palm oil industry  – and 
thus blocking the “control grab”72 (Huggins 2014) attempted from the state –, in the early and 
mid-1990s cooperatives such as the San Isidro decided to sell their land before bowing to the 
almost monopolistic control that COAPALMA had over the regional market. Irony aside, what 
these two cases show is just how much value the cooperatives placed on retaining some sort of 
control over their production. More than a struggle over vertical integration or capitalist 
exploitation, their struggle was over being able to sell their production to the best bidder.   
Another element to be taken into account is the context of global economic liberalization 
and the drop in the prices of palm oil, which allowed businessmen such as Facussé to both 
enrich themselves at the expense of the state (not paying his debts), and use their newfound 
dollars to buy land at really low prices in highly devalued Lempiras.  
 
So far my approach to the topic of the sales has been basically from “above,” as I have 
focused in the structural reasons of the sales. As I have been arguing, this is the space on which 
most of the explanations of the sales move. However, severely lacking from these narratives is 
the presence and experience that particular groups had within the process. Phrased differently, 
                                                        
72 Control grabbing refers to the capacity to control, either directly or indirectly, land and other associated 
resources such as water, as well its actual and potential uses, in order to corner the benefits. In this 
particular case, I am referring to the attempts of controlling COAPALMA and thus, the potential 
monopsony position of this second level cooperative over the region’s palm oil market. 
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these narratives present the sale from a highly masculinized perspective that effaces the 
experience that women had on the process. This in part makes sense; in the end it was clearly 
men who sold the cooperatives. But at the same time, this account forgets that although the 
agrarian law did not see women as involved, they had also been part of the whole process of 
creation of the Aguán and thus, also had a stake in the fall of the reform sector. In the next 
section I return to Eugenia’s story – with which we began this chapter – as a way of seeing the 
process of land sales from a more concrete standpoint, one that is also grounded in her 
experience as a woman. At the same time, her story allows us to return to the topic of 
monetization and the introduction of the palm oil industry, and its effects within the peasant 
households. 
Of cows and oil palms: experiencing primitive accumulation 
Eugenia´s testimony regarding the sale of the cooperatives’ land is a particularly useful window 
into the shared experience of many women who witnessed how their husbands, brothers and 
fathers sold the land that they had received and fought for through the BAP. In terms of content, 
there is nothing exceptional about her story; I heard many similar ones told by very dissimilar 
women all over the Aguán. However, what makes Eugenia´s testimony special is the way in 
which she tells it and the very profound reading that she makes in retrospect of the loss of the 
cooperative’s lands. My aim in this section is to use her particular story as a way of 
characterizing and bringing to life some of the central characteristics of the process of land sales, 
as it was experienced by women.    
For Eugenia, the sale of the land and the dissolution of the cooperative were done in 
three strikes, all of which were connected to the introduction of the palm oil industry. In the 
first, the place where they lived was separated from where the oil palms were located. In the 
second, they lost the cows. In the third and last one, it was the turn of the land to be lost. 
Thinking about that period in retrospect it all becomes clear to her. These three strikes that 
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could appear disjointed actually had a deep connection and were part of a broader process. As 
we will see, for her this was a profoundly gendered process as well. 
In the last chapter I described Eugenia and Marino’s journey to the Aguán and the 
difficulties that they encountered once they arrived at the cooperative. Initially, they lived on the 
land that had been designated for them. There was no difference between where they lived and 
the lands that they worked, initially with milpa, later mixed with oil palms and finally as a palm 
oil monoculture. These were lowlands close to the river and thus vulnerable to floods. The board 
of directors informed them that because of this, they could not live in that place anymore, that 
there was a new housing project nearby and that they would move further uphill to a less flood-
prone area. Eugenia does not remember the exact dates of the housing project, but by looking at 
documentation of other cooperatives, it would appear that it was around the mid to late 1980s. 
Eugenia believes that this was not such an innocent move. She tells me, 
Now I understand. The directors used to tell us: ‘look, we cannot stay here.’ But 
we had been living there for a long time; I gave birth to all my children there. And 
they would say: ‘we are no longer going to live here because the river can sweep 
us away, it is better to move up there, we have to buy land and move up there’ So 
they bought a piece of land and divided up into lots and we all moved up here. 
The separation of the place of residence and the oil palms meant two things for Eugenia. 
First, it would be easier to sell the land if no one was living there and if the people had their own 
home plots, distinct and distant from the land cultivated with palm. Second, it meant spatially 
separating women’s work from men’s work and this, as we will see soon, had a profound effect. 
As I have discussed in various points of this chapter and the last one, the creation of the 
cooperatives resulted in a clearer differentiation in terms of gender positions. Particularly after 
the cooperatives began to concentrate only on oil palms, the household’s provisioning rested 
more and more on the wages received by the men for their work in the fields. This of course, 
made the women more dependent on their partners and the domestic work that they did was 
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rendered invisible, as it did not produce money. What the housing project did was to inscribe 
this differentiation on the landscape of the cooperatives, as both spaces became separated.  
The relocation also had an effect on land uses by women. Before the housing project, 
there was less differentiation regarding the land used to keep and feed the few cattle that the 
cooperative had and that each household could buy, as long as they had the board of directors’ 
approval. This meant that women spent more time together, taking care of the livestock, 
growing and harvesting some vegetables, picking up wood, collecting water, looking after the 
children and washing laundry. However, once they moved up to the new housing project, the 
plot that each family had was distinct and separated from those of other families, and the 
linkages and collective spaces for women became fewer, deepening the differentiation between 
the private and the public spaces and who could operate in each. 
Then came the second strike, the sale of the cows. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the cooperative had bought collectively around 85 cows, which would rotate between 
the different families. Individual families could have their own cows and other livestock, such as 
pigs, as long as they received permission from the board of directors. In the context of the 
relocation to the housing project, two things happened that opened the way for the selling of the 
cows. First, the relocation was connected to the decision that had already been taken a few years 
earlier to only cultivate oil palms. Not only did keeping cows distract cooperative members from 
their monoculture dreams (more area dedicated to oil palms equaled more money from the 
sales), but also, in the new place of residence, there was supposedly no available space to keep 
animals. Second, with the separation between the family plots, the cows had also become a sign 
of internal differentiation and generated frictions between families.  
Eugenia remembers that when she first heard that the cows were going to be sold, she 
was opposed: 
They began wanting to sell the cows and I come down fighting for nothing. Now I 
understand that I was fighting for nothing. I wasn’t a member; he [Marino] was 
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the member. I told them ‘no, you are not going to sell the cows.’ I spoke with the 
president and asked him ‘why do you want to sell the cows? Don’t sell the cows. 
Look how many children are going to be left without milk.’ He responded ‘what 
happens is that you are against us selling the cows, because you know that if we 
sell them, you are going to have to sell yours also.’ And I insisted, that no, that 
that was not the reason. ‘Look, what has been decided, has been decided, and no 
one can stop it’ he responded. 
She continued to mobilize and got together the other women of the cooperative to 
discuss the issue and get support. 
I went and spoke with some women. I told them: ‘Women, we cannot let them 
sell the cows. Give me money because I am going to go and denounce the sale on 
Radio Tocoa.’ Now I laugh, because I went to do nothing. I spoke on the radio 
about how the cooperative was selling the cows, I thought I was denouncing, but 
in the end it was for nothing. 
In the end, her efforts were not successful and the cows were sold for around half what 
they were worth. Further, other members of the cooperative responded to her attempts in anger, 
and pointed out that the reason that she did not want the cows to be sold was because she was 
taking advantage of the cooperative: 
I was so mad at them! I told the president that they were giving away the cows 
almost for free. And another woman that was with him turns around and says to 
me ‘let them sell the cows! You are against because you are living off the 
cooperative, putting your children to study, that is why it hurts you that they are 
selling the cows. They are going to sell the palm trees also. It is too much, you are 
here preparing your children, and we here like dumb people that are left with 
nothing.’ I responded that she didn’t put her children to study because she didn’t 
want to. That she had the opportunity also, and that I wasn’t taking a cent away 
from the cooperative to have them study. You should have seen the fights! But at 
the end, they sold the cows. 
After the sale of the cows, there was a change in the board of directors and if the former 
one had sold the cows, the new one was intent in selling the land with the oil palms. The process 
by which the lands were sold was quite clearly gendered. In a process similar to that of the sale 
of the San Isidro cooperative, the members of the cooperative began to discuss the possibility of 
selling their land a few months before the actual deed.  
The reason for the sale, according to Marino, was that since in the government of 
Callejas the cooperative’s debts had been forgiven and now they could think about following the 
195 
 
steps of those other cooperatives that had already sold – Buenos Amigos, Guanchias – and see 
how much they could get. Internally, things were not looking good. The price paid for palm fruit 
was low and many felt that COAPALMA was taking the lion’s share. Further, there was a feeling 
that not everyone was working as much as they were supposed to. Marino remembers what they 
used to discuss: “That there were people that didn’t want to work and they would just pretend; 
that there were a lot of people just trying to live off of the others. Others would say that some of 
the members were too old and didn’t get any work done. So then it was decided that it was better 
to sell.” 
These discussions would take place among the “palm trees,” as they refer to the plots 
covered by the oil palms, to make sure that women would not find out about them. According to 
Eugenia, they were worried that the women would find out and oppose the sale. This comment 
was a clear reference to her, as she was the most vocal voice against the sale. However, she 
always maintains that she is quite sure that most women were also against losing the land. 
Marino also remembers that of the 40 or so members that the cooperative had, only 
eight were against the sale and that they were threatened.  
Then, we didn’t agree with the sale. The eight that were against, we say no, that 
we didn’t agree. If they wanted to sell the cooperative, it was better to divide up 
the land and give each member the 12 hectares that they were entitled to. But one 
of them said: ‘no, with this gun that we have, we are going to cut down whoever 
gets in the way of the sale. It can’t be that because of one or two are against, we 
stop the sale. That is all we have to say.’ 
At the end, very much due to these threats, the decision was taken to sell the land. 
Eugenia knew about all of this because Marino would tell her about these meetings. Once she 
heard that the men had decided to sell, she resolved to do something about it. Sensing that 
gender differences were important in regard to the relationship with the land, she turned to 
what she saw as her natural allies, the other women.  
I gather about five women and told them: ‘Look here, we can’t allow the sale of 
the cooperative. We have to stop it. What are we going to do? What are we going 
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to do with all those children? What are we going to eat? Where are we going to 
find a place to plant maize to sustain our children? Look how many boys and girls 
we have!’ 
For her the land had nothing to do with COAPALMA’s corruption, nor with the prices 
being paid for the fruit, nor with the critiques regarding the unequal payment or amount of work 
done by the different cooperative members. For her, the land had to do with the self-
provisioning of subsistence items and the possibility of sustaining their families. This had 
nothing to do with her not knowing what was going on in these spaces; Marino would tell her 
everything about it. It grew out of a different relation with the land, one that was not as 
mediated by money as that of the men and thus more interested in those other uses and 
relationships that it could, and did, sustain. The way in which she remembers and narrates this 
episode contrasts not only with Marino’s, but in more general terms with most of the male 
testimonies that I heard. Just as I mentioned in the last chapter regarding the memories of the 
migration process, the memories of the land sales tend to split into the male perspective of 
money and work as against that of women, much more oriented towards the dynamics of 
provisioning and subsistence.  
This difference should not be naturalized. I believe that it is the result of the 
differentiated positions from which men and women lived the shared experience of 
dispossession. Stuart Hall et al. (1978:394) argue that “[r]ace is the modality in which class is 
lived.” For the case of the Aguán I would make a similar case for gender: gender was the 
modality in which class is lived, but also the modality in which dispossession is remembered. 
Regarding her crusade against the sales, Eugenia remembers: 
They [the other women] told me that I was right and they gave 5 Lempiras each, 
so that I could go and look for someone that would come and talk to the directors 
and convince them to stop the sale. We couldn’t find anyone. I went to the 
neighboring cooperative, and they told me that they couldn’t intrude in the 
business of another cooperative. I went to the church and asked the priest to help 
me. He drove me all the way out to Progreso, to HONDUPALMA. I desperately 
spoke to them, asking them for help to stop the sale, that there were a lot of 
women who didn’t want to lose the lands. They told me that they could intercede, 
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but that people had already decided. They of course thought that they could run 
into some trouble if they got involved, but me, I wasn’t aware of this, I never 
wondered what could happen to me. 
Eventually, both Marino’s and her lives were threatened, but she continued to look for 
help, any help she could find, to try to stop the sale. Then, one day Marino told her: 
‘I am not going to sign. They say that if a single person refuses to sign, that they 
can’t sell the land.’ How quickly did they win over the rest! Only he was left 
against! 
By then, everything seemed like a lost cause. The only thing stalling the sale was 
Marino’s signature and eventually a more concrete death threat came. Eugenia describes the 
situation to me. Marino was standing by a tree near the corner of his plot sharpening his 
machete when “a member of the cooperative arrived at our house asking for Marino. I told him 
where he was and they spoke softly, I couldn’t hear what they said. Once he left I asked Marino 
what he had told him. ‘He told that if I didn’t go and sign, they are going to kill me.’” 
She was inconsolable. For her, losing the land meant losing pretty much everything: “I 
was crying. I wanted to be thousands of women so that I could stop the sale of the land. Those 
that didn’t do milpa, it was because they didn’t want to. It was God’s blessing to harvest maize! 
Any seed that you planted would grow up thick! We had maize to eat and to raise animals; but 
no, they sold the land.” 
In Eugenia’s narrative, there is a deep connection between gender positions and the 
continuum between self-provisioning and wage labor and for her the sale had been a men’s 
deed. This thread in a sense connects the three strikes that I have described. First, with the 
relocation, came an even more severe separation between the domestic space and the place of 
the oil palms. This not only paved the way by literally moving them away from the land, but also 
separated women from the land and deepened the gap between self-provisioning and 
wage/market dependency and their possibility of making claims upon the land. Second, the sale 
of the cows not only showed the new differentiations between the households, but more 
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importantly, came to deepen ever more this gap. Without the cows – and other livestock for that 
matter – and with all of the land covered with oil palms, the scales were clearly tipped away 
from self-provisioning and towards wage labor. Finally, the sale was the logical conclusion of 
this process. 
Her reaction to the money that they received from the sale – about $75 0– is also 
revealing: 
I told Marino to keep that money away from the house, to deposit it in the bank. I 
didn’t want to know anything about that money! I tell you, the men took the 
money and spent it on foolish things, they bought guns, and they went insane! 
Everybody went insane. I used to tell them when I ran into them in Tocoa, that 
they should be careful with their money. What are you going to do when it runs 
out? And they would respond that I was pestering them because I didn’t want to 
sell. And now, if you go and ask, everybody will tell you that they were against the 
sale! You can go and ask! Nobody! Of course, it is because they are left with 
nothing. It was horrible; I came down sick and everything. And you know? For 
over a year I would not speak with the directors, maybe more. 
While most people used their money for individual consumption,73 Eugenia did not want 
to know anything about that money. For her it represented the loss of the land – that linkage 
with self-provisioning – and that could not be replaced. For example, their home has concrete 
block walls, but she was adamant that I should know that they had done that with their own 
labor and not from the money that came from the sale. She makes a profound reflection on this 
matter: 
Now life is different; it is different not having a piece of land. It is different and it 
is terrible. Never, never I tell you; after they sold the land we don’t know what an 
ear of maize is, what a maize plant is. We buy everything. First we used to buy 
Maseca,74 but now we figured out that it was better to buy an arroba of maize. 
Like they say, nobody dies of hunger, but it is not the same. Take for example the 
                                                        
73 There is an agreement in the different studies that explore the issue of the sales that the former 
cooperative members spent most of the money that came from the sales on this type of consumption. 
Although a lot of them spent a part of it on improving their homes – concrete block walls and sheet metal 
roofs –, most of the money was spent on guns, domestic appliances and liquor.  
74 A brand of industrial corn flour. 
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case of the firewood. You know what I told them one day that they were gathering 
to discuss the sale? ‘Men, stop talking about selling the land! Once you have sold 
it, you won’t even have where to find some firewood! Now, now we can go and 
bring our own firewood and we can go and fish wherever we want; you are going 
to remember these things once you sell the land.’ They told me that I didn’t know 
what I was talking about. And look what is happening now. Whoever goes there 
[to the oil palms] for a piece of wood is left there. There is fish, I think, but 
nobody can go fishing, because they run into trouble. It was terrible! Life without 
land is very hard, because with a piece of land you can at least do a little milpa 
and grow some beans, and at least one has his maize and beans, but like this, it is 
very hard. It used to be a gift of God! Imagine we didn’t have to buy plantains; we 
could just go and take them. It was the most beautiful thing, to have one’s land, 
but without land… Look how we are doing now. I tell Marino that he should go 
and see who would give him a piece of land to make milpa, but he tells me that he 
is embarrassed to do so, after he had land and sold it. 
Epilogue: What is accumulated by primitive accumulation? 
For in practice it has turned out that primitive accumulation is an incomplete and 
recurring process, essential to capitalism´s continuing life.  
— Retort Collective (2005:75), Afflicted powers. 
In this chapter and the last one, I analyzed the process by which a group of land poor and 
landless peasant families from the country’s south and west left their places of birth and arrived 
in the Aguán region in search of land and above all, a better life. This journey was marked by 
significant changes in terms of their class positions, as they went from being land poor and 
landless peasants, to cooperative members or mountain settlers, to landless rural workers or 
some combination of the above. This was also, however, a journey of continuous 
impoverishment framed by an ongoing process of primitive accumulation and class 
differentiation that run also along gender lines. 
Primitive accumulation must be understood as the process by which labor is 
accumulated. According to Marx (1993) in the Grundrisse, this accumulated labor takes two 
distinct – albeit interconnected – forms: objectified labor and living labor. Objectified – or past 
labor – refers to labor that has already been spent in the production of commodities and the 
transformation of the landscape. Living labor, rather, refers to the living subjects who have the 
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capacity to labor and thus are potentially workers. This idea of potentiality is important; I will 
return to it in a second.  
Both forms of labor were crucial in our story. The phase of the ongoing process of 
primitive accumulation that begins in the Aguán in the early 1990s tends to be seen mainly as a 
process of dispossession and concentration of land. However, this is only a part of the story. 
Large amount of objectified labor had been literally grounded in the region in the form of roads, 
levees, houses, extracting mills, wells, and so on. Also, significant amounts of public funds were 
invested in the preparation for production of the palm oil plantations. For example, in the case 
of the BAP, it is estimated that 11,000 hectares were planted with oil palms, for an initial total 
cost of $100 million, and involving around of 7,000 producers, which represented more than 
44,000 direct dependents (Pino, Santacreo, and Dunnaway 2002:2). This included both the 
infrastructure necessary for the industry to develop (roads, the Puerto Castilla port, extraction 
mills), as well as the planted plots. Let’s remember from the previous chapter that this planting 
was basically done for free by the cooperative members. All of this past labor came to produce 
the regional landscape and laid down the conditions for the development of the palm oil 
industry in the Aguán and Honduras.  
Figure 2 shows the historical pattern of growth of Honduran palm oil production. The 
biggest growth in production takes place in the mid-1980s, but the curve of growth begins to 
steepen towards the late 1990s. Taking into account that oil palm plantations take two years to 
begin production, but hit peak production after around 7-10 years, it is clear that this 
development and consolidation of production was the direct result of the cooperatives’ labor and 
in effect a subvention the new owners received from the state and the cooperatives. 
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Figure 6. Honduras: Palm oil production (metric tons) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 2013 
  
Not only past, but also living labor was accumulated in the process. However, it was not 
only a case of separating the potential laboring bodies from the means of production, from their 
ability to self-provision. For living labor must be turned into a subject willing and able to 
produce under the control of capital he must be turned into a worker. In the case of the Aguán 
and the palm oil industry, it was necessary to create a subject different from what was 
understood as the traditional Honduran peasant. The worker had to be fixed to a place, able to 
work collectively and according to a certain discipline and temporality determined by the palm 
oil industry.  
This was not an easy or immediate result, of course. It was the result of the disciplinary 
and production forms that were introduced and exercised through the creation of the 
cooperatives; the tension between the mountain as a space of freedom against the valley as a 
place of discipline and repression. Besides this discipline and temporality, it was important that 
this new subject – this worker – knew and understood oil palm cultivation and took it in as his 
own. Having workers who knew the terms used and the forms of planting, harvesting and taking 
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care of the oil palms were necessary conditions for the industry to flourish. Thus, with the sale of 
the lands not only the plantations were accumulated in private hands. This knowledgeable and 
disciplined subject was also “freed,” and with it a cycle of primitive accumulation that had 
commenced with the beginning of these land poor and landless peasant families’ journey 
towards the Aguán had come around full circle: from landless and poor, to landless and poor, 
but now versed in the (mono) culture of palm oil.  
However, to leave here would be to repeat what Silvia Federici (2004) has located as one 
of the greatest shortcomings of Marx’s and most of his epigones understanding of the process of 
primitive accumulation: ignoring and thus rendering invisible the particular experience of 
women. For her, it is necessary to understand primitive accumulation as an ongoing process in 
which it is important to highlight certain phenomena, such as:  
(i) the development of a new sexual division of labor subjugating women’s labor 
and women’s reproductive function to the reproduction of the work-force; (ii) the 
construction of a new patriarchal order, based upon the exclusion of women from 
waged-work and their subordination to men; (iii) the mechanization of the 
proletarian body and its transformation, in the case of women, into a machine for 
the production of new workers. (Federici 2004:12) 
As I have been discussing so far, all of this process of primitive accumulation was, and 
continues to be, deeply gendered. Not only did men and women experience it in different ways, 
the process in itself came to transform the relationships between them and to create a divide 
between productive (paid) and reproductive work (non-paid). In the words of Judith Carney and 
Michael Watts (1990:211), “…external production relations… are fashioned and shaped by 
internal (domestic) social processes; struggles around the point of production are, in other 
words, inflected inwards or ‘domesticated’.”  
In the case of the Aguán, primitive accumulation was domesticated along the thread of 
monetization and the particular balance between self-provisioning and wage labor. The process 
of organizing in the form of cooperatives meant that the reproduction of households rested ever 
more on wages. This deepened the dependency of women on their male partners in a twofold 
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movement: on the one hand, women were basically blocked from both wages and property, as 
only males could be members (apart from female heads of households). On the other, with 
monetization came the separation between production and reproduction. This separation came 
to be inscribed on the landscape, as the story of Eugenia illustrates so well. As money became 
cooperatives’ highest priority, every piece of land that could be covered in oil palms became 
important. Thus, place of “residence” and of “work” were separated and having a place to keep 
the cows became less important. This differentiation also changed the relationship between the 
members of the cooperatives and the land. While for the men selling the land meant selling a 
bad business and receiving more money than they ever had seen, for women like Eugenia, it 
meant losing their foothold, however fragile, on the conditions of self-provisioning and thus, at 
least the illusion of autonomy, as the loss of their shared spaces and spatial mobility so forcefully 
shows.75  
The traces left by this shared experience of dispossession were also quite different across 
gender lines. The fact that women remember more from the standpoint of subsistence, while 
men from that of money and work, gives us an important methodological cue: had I only 
interviewed men – as all of the studies on the land sales do – I would only have learned about 
the internal dynamics of the cooperatives, the terrible labor conditions and corruption by the 
cooperative leaders, thus effacing the experience of women and the effects that this process of 
primitive accumulation had on the households and their relations regarding land and market.  
I would like to finish this section in a more provocative tone. One of Federici’s (2004) 
main arguments in Caliban and the Witch is that one of the reasons for the witch hunt – for the 
aggressive attacks upon women during the medieval period in general – was to remove their 
presence from the frontlines of the revolutionary struggle taking place against the feudal 
dominant classes (to which capitalism should be read as a conservative counter-revolution.) 
                                                        
75 For a similar argument for the Nicaraguan case, see Montoya (2003). 
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According to Federici, primitive accumulation had to be deeply gendered to secure a particular 
form of male over female domination that would keep in check women´s revolutionary 
potential. From Eugenia’s story, particularly her efforts to stop the sales, the argument could be 
made that a similar gendering process was needed to assure that primitive accumulation – the 
land sales – would take place. By separating women from the land and by undermining their 
position within the communities and limiting them to the household, they were in no position to 
try to stop the sales. One has to be careful when posing these types of arguments, as it is easy to 
fall into a naturalization of gender. In this case, my argument is grounded on the particular 
experience of the women that I met in the Aguán, and whose possibilities of stopping the land 
sales were deeply curtailed by the position that they had in relation to the cooperatives and the 
land. 
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Chapter 4: Between state, church and capital: creating subaltern narratives in the 
Aguán  
By the late 1990s, the agrarian counter-reform and primitive accumulation set in motion with 
the land sales in the Aguán were thoroughly consolidated. The tension between the valley and 
the hills remained. But the freedom that could formerly be found in the latter was limited, as 
land access became ever more difficult and productivity levels dwindled after more than ten 
years of a slash and burn agriculture had destroyed much of the fertility of the soils. In the 
valley, the concentration of land and industrial power by a handful of palm oil investors had 
come to shift many of the local dynamics: need economies were supplanted by capitalist 
ventures. With this shift the regional market was disrupted as surpluses were pumped outside 
the Aguán. This in turn translated into generalized impoverishment as less money circulated in a 
region and there was less access to land. Moreover, the remaining palm oil cooperatives lost 
much of their power and their meager political autonomy, as the coercive laws of competition 
became the new game in town. Finally, at the same time that former cooperative members were 
torn between migrating yet again, or remaining in the region as day-laborers, women lost their 
tenuous foothold on self-provisioning of their households and thus found themselves in an even 
more precarious situation. 
 As the agrarian counter-reform consolidated and impoverishment and inequality 
worsened, the Catholic Church and the Jesuit priests who arrived in the mid-1970s began to 
voice a counterhegemonic discourse. Placing the tension between valley and hills at the center, 
these priests embarked on a political project that sought to improve the situation of region’s 
poor by bringing both geographic spaces together and propounding ideas citizenship and justice. 
This project was unable to gain much traction before the late 1990s, but in the aftermath of the 
land sales many people began to see the Jesuit’s historical narrative and political practice as 
more meaningful.  
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From the mid-1980s onwards, under the banner of the Pastoral Social (PS; Social 
Concerns Ministry), the Church had attempted to bring all of its different social projects under 
one roof. In the wake of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated the North Coast in late 1998, the 
government delegated efforts at relief and reconstruction in the region to the Church. 
Through a general and brief overview of the activities of the Catholic Church and the 
Pastoral Social, this chapter analyzes the following topics:  the situation of the Aguán in the late 
1990s and the characteristics of the hegemonic bloc that consolidated around palm oil 
monoculture; the complex role played by the Church, as both a parallel state and as a 
counterbalance to the regional hegemonic bloc; the Jesuits’ emerging historical narrative about 
the region — and the practice that this informed – which provides a frame for understanding the 
cycle of land recuperations that came in the aftermath of Mitch; the impact of Hurricane Mitch 
and how the Church saw Mitch as a golden opportunity to push forward its social 
transformation agenda. Finally, I argue that although there are multiple historical narratives 
regarding the turn of the century in the Aguán, in general all of them are covered by the 
overarching one articulated by the Jesuits. This narrative can be understood as a myth that 
articulates past with present and that proposed a particular political program. 
The hegemony of monoculture: palm oil and political power  
According to Peter Marchetti (1998:8), a Jesuit priest who arrived in the Aguán in the late 1990s 
(and who later left the Church):  
Standard Fruit [Company], Facussé and Morales are not citizens in the Bajo 
Aguán, but of the globalized world, and know very well how to pillage the local 
resources to enrich themselves and take advantage of the local traditionalism to 
increase their modern excesses. The companies operate without caring about the 
regional development, just like the banana companies did at the beginning of the 
20th century. With the [agrarian] counter reform, the levels of economic activity 
in the valley plummeted because the three companies import most of their 
supplies and service structures. They are modern enclaves in a sea of misery. 
During the period prior to the 1990s agrarian counter reform, a sort of virtuous circle 
existed between the cooperatives, understood as need economies, and the regional market in 
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which they spent most of their money. This “virtuous circle” was of course riddled by 
contradictions, conflicts and tensions, as we saw in the last chapter, but after the land sales, this 
(somewhat) virtuous circle gave way to an enclave model in which a few investors came to 
control the industry and the surpluses created were pumped out of the region in a much more 
direct fashion than before. This control was achieved not only through the concentration of land 
and labor power that I described in the last chapter, but also through what is known in the land 
grab literature as a “control grab” (Borras et al. 2012; Alonso-Fradejas 2012; Huggins 2014).  
The palm oil industry is very susceptible to vertical integration and monopsonistic 
concentration of power, particularly in the phases of processing and commercialization. The 
bigger processing mills – particularly those owned by Facussé and Morales and to a lesser extent 
those of COAPALMA and the Salamá cooperative – are able to control the prices and large 
shares of the market, even without owning all of the land covered with oil palms. This not only 
concentrates considerable power in a few hands, but also increasingly placed palm oil 
monoculture at the center of the life in the Aguán region. For example,  regarding the living 
labor that was “freed” with the sale of the cooperatives, Marchetti (1998:7) mentions that: 
The [former] members [of the cooperatives] used a part of their inheritance 
[from the sale of the lands] in various forms: the majority to drink more, have 
more women, a very large group to buy cars, urban houses, [or] to migrate to San 
Pedro Sula, La Ceiba or Puerto Cortés; a third group (10 percent) to buy houses in 
the hills, to buy cattle and deepen the desertification and floods through 
extensive cattle ranching; a fourth group to start microenterprises in the valley. 
[Finally] around 20 percent of the ex-members are working for Facussé and 
Morales earning 60 percent less than what they used to make as [cooperative] 
members. 
With these “inheritances” spent, most of this labor came to be under the control of the 
palm oil monoculture. In this regard, all of the studies on the region (Macías 2001; Castro 1994; 
Marchetti 1998) agree that the next step in the process was generalized impoverishment, with 
those families that formerly had been in the cooperatives taking the brunt.  
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When we move from the valley to the hills, the situation was significantly worse. Not only 
were there fewer wage labor and commercialization opportunities available than in the valley, 
there was less access to basic services such as education, health or electricity. Moreover, after 
ten years of slash and burn agriculture the hills were deeply eroded. Erosion and destruction of 
the land in the hills was also an indirect effect of the agrarian counter reform, since peasant 
families were forced to move to the hills in search of land or to escape the exploitative relations 
in the valley. 
Producing hegemony in the Aguán  
As a corollary to impoverishment and dispossession, there was also growing institutional 
fragmentation and an absence of social and political organization outside and against the 
concentration of power by the palm oil larger companies. Paul Jeffrey (2002:49), a Methodist 
missionary and longstanding reporter in Honduras, describes how in this period:  
With the agrarian cooperatives in a process of dissolution, with the patronatos 
[community based councils] plagued by party politicization and with 
dysfunctional popular organization, the citizens of the Bajo Aguán valley were left 
with very few options to act in a coordinated and organized manner to resolve 
their problems.  
This lack of social organization and the sense of permanent crisis and social and political 
flux produced a situation that facilitated control by a hegemonic alliance of palm oil 
entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers and army colonels that had deep ties with functionaries in 
different parts of the Honduran state. It would be a mistake to think that this was an 
organizationally structured alliance. It involved instead certain general and basic consensuses 
regarding which were the best conditions for capital accumulation and for maintaining elite 
domination in the region. The glue that held this coalition together was a deeply ingrained anti-
communism, which made it easy to distinguish the good from the bad and that served to 
legitimize the use of force against any opposition. 
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This loose alliance managed to maintain control over the region with a combination of 
coercion and to a lesser extent consent. In terms of coercion, the military has been historically 
the only state institution with a constant presence and a stable foothold in the region. It has 
been the cornerstone of control there since the early years of the Bajo Aguán Project (BAP). I 
already mentioned in the previous chapter the case of Isletas, the active participation of 
members of the armed forces in the process of land dispossession, and how they were paid in 
kind for their aid. But there were other forms of control besides direct intervention. It is worth 
remembering that up until 1996, Honduras had a compulsory military draft. This was often used 
by people with access to the military to remove individuals who were deemed rebellious or as a 
way of settling personal scores. In many cases whether a young man was drafted or not 
depended on connections and class and political affiliations (Cameron, Dorling, and Thorpe 
2000). 
In Honduras the structures of domination – and the resulting institutionalization of 
hegemony in the form of the state – have historically combined a vertical line of command with 
a very diffuse and disjointed presence in the regions. Geographically organized from the city of 
Tegucigalpa, the Honduran government line of command begins with the figure of the 
president, expresses itself regionally through the members of the national congress, the 
municipal governments, and the communities, where it takes the form of the patronato76 
[community level councils]. Is through this line of command that public funds flow; thus, these 
posts are crucial for political control since they operate as the links between geographical scales. 
This model operates on the idea that through these strategic posts, votes flow from the bottom 
to the top; at the same time as public funds, projects and political favors flow from top to 
bottom.  This makes these public posts highly strategic and contentious spaces, where local, 
                                                        
76 The Patronatos are part of the Spanish Colonial legacy. They were in charge of raising funds and 
organizing the communities’ patron saint´s days. 
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regional and national elites, organized in a two-party system, struggle to maintain control 
through sets of strongmen who operate as enablers and gatekeepers, controlling the flows in 
both directions. In their relationships with the communities, these strongmen would distribute 
the access to resources, such as electricity or new schools, based on political party affiliation and 
in the form of personal favors that stand out in the landscape, since many of the schools and 
community health centers that dot the region are named in honor of such “benefactors” or their 
family members. At the same time, these strongmen are powerful figures in their own right – 
usually local businessmen or cattlemen, often with ties to illicit organizations (thievery, money 
laundering, and drug trafficking, among others) – that see in these public posts the possibility of 
consolidating their positions and accessing different types of resources (from the use of the 
military and police to settle personal scores, to utilizing public funds to gain popular support). 
By the early 1990s opposition to this hegemonic bloc was almost non-existent. 
Historically and mainly due to the high levels of repression, the left’s presence in the Honduran 
political system had been tenuous to say the least. Moreover, in a remote place –in terms of 
media coverage and presence of state institutions, particularly the judiciary –such as the Aguán, 
the military was able to operate relatively freely against anything that emitted the slightest leftist 
odor. The agrarian counter reform brought significant changes in the role and weight of 
different groups and significantly weakened sectors that had earlier served as counterbalances to 
the hegemonic bloc. 
Before the 1990s, INA exerted control over the peasant cooperatives through debt and 
direct intervention. Nonetheless, in the Aguán and particularly after the 1981 COAPALMA 
strike, the cooperatives had been able to carve out some autonomy and to a certain extent push 
the peasant confederations to which they belonged beyond their comfort zone. With the 1990s 
and the agrarian counter reform, the peasant movement was greatly weakened and divided both 
nationally and in the region. In the case of COAPALMA, it went from between 40 and 50 
affiliated cooperatives in the 1970s and 1980s, to around 19 in 1998 and from around 14,000 
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cultivated hectares to around 750. The opening up of the regional palm oil industry meant that 
survival would now be mainly determined by the coercive laws of competition (Marx 1992); 
thus, the cooperatives had to function more and more as commercial enterprises, to be very 
careful with their public image and to steer clear of anything that might connect them with the 
political left.  
The situation of the national peasant movement was not any better. The development of 
the national peasant confederations was very much entangled with the agrarian reform process. 
This meant that over time, as their affiliates became more consolidated as cooperative members, 
the push to organize landless peasants diminished. By the time the agrarian counter reform 
came around, it became impossible for these organizations to muster any sort of coordinated 
resistance (Ríos 2014). 
In sum, the aftermath of the agrarian counter reform in the Aguán shifted the balance of 
power in the region. The new hegemonic alliance was organized around a group of local cattle 
ranchers – who had been the dominant class fraction in the period prior to the BAP in the 1970s 
–, the new investors in the palm oil industry –with René Morales and Miguel Facussé at the 
helm – and a group of colonels that provided the military muscle. This was a diffuse and loose 
alliance, which in political culture terms, came together around a set of shared interests and a 
deeply ingrained anti-communist commonsense.  
There were not many opposition options available. The peasant movement was in retreat 
after the agrarian counter reform. The small peasant individualism of many inhabitants, an 
economic structure organized mainly around agriculture and the near absence of a middle class 
meant there were not many options for organizing opposition to the new hegemons. The only 
institution at the time that had the resources and legitimacy to mount some sort of opwn 
opposition to the regional hegemonic bloc was the Catholic Church.  
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The Church in the Aguán: creating citizenship in the agrarian frontier 
Historically, the Church has had a very important role in Honduras. Because of the historical 
institutional weakness of most public institutions, the ruggedness of the terrain and the highly 
dispersed population, the Catholic Church has had in many cases to “play the role of the state” 
and provide services such as education, healthcare and the registration of births (Martínez 
Peláez 2011; Martínez 1998). The Church’s presence, role and relation with the communities 
have been uneven through time and space and different regional formations can be found, with 
different church orders promoting different forms of relating with their parishioners.  
This is not the place for a full account of the Church in the Honduras or in the Aguán. 
For our purposes, the story begins in the late 1960s. Before 1968, all church work in the region 
was coordinated from Trujillo by the Vincentian Priests and there was no priest in Tocoa. 
However, this changed that year with the arrival of the Spanish Franciscan priest Jaime 
Pratsdesaba. He bought a house in Salamá, a small village close to Tocoa, and initiated his 
religious work. Seeing the high levels of poverty and the lack of access to land in the community, 
Pratsdesaba began to organize a group of 45 parishioners to occupy national lands in the vicinity 
that had been grabbed by local cattle ranchers. Once they managed to “recuperate” the land, 
based on the social teaching of the church, the Spanish priest organized the same group of 
parishioners to work collectively and created the Salamá Cooperative.   
In 1972, seeing how much the region’s population was growing, the church decided to 
create the San Isidro Parish, based in Tocoa, to extend its work over all of the region. Also, 
according to the Jesuit priest Guadalupe Carney (1985), in 1974 Bishop Jaime Brufau of San 
Pedro Sula asked the Jesuits to take over the Trujillo Diocese, which contained the four small 
parishes in the department of Colón, including Tocoa. The arrival of the Jesuits in the region 
coincided with the development of the BAP. From the beginning, the Jesuits were very active in 
the region. Thanks to the close relation that existed between the ANACH and Father Carney, 
their work was oriented mainly around organizing and supporting peasant cooperatives. These 
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were all priests influenced by Liberation Theology who tried, as they would say, to create “the 
kingdom of god on earth.”  They were particularly active in the area of political training, 
especially through their radio schools – teaching reading and writing as the basis for 
organization – and through the formation of delegates of the word.77 
In those early years, as I described in the last chapter, the situation in the region was 
quite complex and conflictive. The Jesuits tended to be in the thick of the struggle for land, but 
also were usually the first to denounce injustices taking place within the cooperatives 
(corruption and violence above all). They were very worried about the process of differentiation 
that was going on around the palm oil cooperatives. Speaking of how they did not pay their day 
laborers a fair wage, one of the priests remembers that they used to say “if these cooperatives 
continue to go this way, they will end up being organized terratenientes [large landowners].” 
Unlike the INA and most state institutions in the Aguán, the Church worked in both the valley 
and the hills, and thus probably had the clearer picture of the types of contradictions that 
existed between these spaces.  
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a set of events took place that shifted the 
ways in which the Jesuits approached their political work in the communities. First, on June 25, 
1975, the corpses of 14 people who were heading to a national hunger march in Tegucigalpa were 
found in the Hacienda los Horcones, in the Department of Yoro. Among the dead were the 
American priest Jerome Cypher and another priest, the Colombian Iván Betancourt. Perpetrated 
by members of the Honduran army with the support of local cattle ranchers,78 the massacre was 
                                                        
77 Delegates of the word are lay members of the community who are trained by priests to preside Sunday 
religious celebrations as well as to explain and study the Bible with the rest of the community. Usually 
selected for their leadership skills, delegates of the word have much more of a political than a religious 
role, as historically their training has been connected to Liberation Theology. 
78 Including Manuel “Mel” Zelaya’s dad, José Manuel Zelaya, who in fact was the owner of the Hacienda 
los Horcones. 
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understood as an attempt by the military government of the general Alberto Melgar Castro, to 
stop the increasing militancy and radicalism of the peasant movement. The fact that two priests 
were among the victims was a clear signal to the major allies of the peasants of what could 
happen to them.  
The effect of the Horcones massacre within the church was massive. In the aftermath of 
the killings, both the military men and the big cattlemen intensified their attacks against the 
Church and its link with opposition political parties such as the Christian Democrats. As a 
result, the Bishops’ Conference sent an order to all parishes to lay low and fire anyone affiliated 
with the left-oriented parties. This basically meant a retreat from any open political activity. 
Father Carney (1985:347) comments bitterly  on this in his autobiography: “from that time in 
1975 until today [1979] it is very notable how the Catholic hierarchy, the majority of the priests 
and also the laymen in Honduras retreated from any social commitment and became 
nonpolitical and very anticommunist.”  
The second event came about six years later and its location and impact are 
circumscribed to the Aguán region. As I mentioned in the last chapter, in September 1981 the 
cooperatives affiliated to COAPALMA went on strike to demand more control over the second 
level cooperative. The organizing which led to the strike was the combined effort of both the 
peasant federations and the Church and, as we saw, it effectively  stopped the control grab 
attempted by the state.  
Once the strike was won, however, it became evident to the priests that corruption and 
state control were not going to end with a change of administration. When the time came to 
elect who would make up the board of directors of the “new” COAPALMA, the church tried to 
organize and push for a more independent group of leaders to take over. However, in the end 
the members elected to the board were the ones that had been involved previously, had close ties 
with the state, and that were seen as corrupt. For the priests, this was a clear signal that there 
was not much to be done with the cooperatives in the valley. Corruption had rooted too deeply 
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in the organizations for the social change that was needed in the region to come from there. 
Further, at the time, it was easy to see that the settlers of the hills had been less tainted by the 
palm oil monoculture, were poorer and in need of more help. From this moment on, the 
Church’s approach would truly be a “preferential option for the poor,” as father Pedro Arrupe, 
Superior General of the Jesuits, wrote in 1968 in a letter to the Jesuits of Latin America. This 
decision would have its consequences down the road. 
A particular reading and understanding of the region came out of these experiences and 
the forms in which the Jesuits worked in the region. Because the Church was the only institution 
operating both in the lowlands and the hills, their reading of the region was much more rounded 
than that of other organizations, such as the cooperatives, which derived their understanding of 
the regional conjuncture only from their experience in the lowlands. Further, the fact that the 
Church was already present in the Aguán even before the arrival of the first cooperatives and 
that it had had in different periods members with long traditions of political organizing and 
leadership in different parts of Central America, 79 allowed this group of Jesuits to have a better 
grasp of the regional history as a whole and turn it into a meaningful political narrative. Phrased 
differently, due to the particular experiences of its members and the historical role and position 
of the Church in the region, Jesuits such as Marchetti or Carney were in a privileged position to 
                                                        
79 For example, Father Carney had been working close to ANACH long before arriving to the Aguán. In the 
case of Peter Marchetti, he is a Harvard-trained economist, who arrived in the Aguán in the late 1990s 
after an extended period of work in Nicaragua as a priest and as an economic advisor to the Sandinista 
government. His high profile was intended to strengthen the work that had been done in the previous 
decades in the region by the Company of Jesus. Worth mentioning also is Ricardo Falla, a Guatemalan 
Jesuit and anthropologist who led the Pastoral Social before the arrival of Marchetti and had by then a 
longstanding relation of work with displaced indigenous communities in Guatemala (see, Falla 1994).  
 This sort of political experience was not limited only to the priests, but also to some of the 
Pastoral Social’s lay staff, such as Berkeley-trained U.S. geographer Jennifer Casolo, who had been 
working with various church and relief organizations in El Salvador until her arrest by Salvadoran 
government troops in November 1989.   
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take the “fragmented and episodic” elements of the Aguán’s subaltern histories – in both 
lowlands and hills – and turn it into a historical narrative that could gain traction on the ground, 
as it related directly to the experiences of many of the communities in the region. It is also 
important to point out that this was necessarily a retrospective view, one that ordered what on 
the ground was felt as disjointed events.  
Probably the most polished version that we can find of this reading is the one presented 
by Peter Marchetti in a 1998 working paper for the San Isidro Parish titled “Hamlet sin Príncipe: 
an analysis of the Impact of Agrarian Modernization in the Lower Aguán River Valley.” For 
Marchetti, three elements were crucial to understand the Aguán region: first, the process of 
colonization and the differentiation between valley and hills that came with it; second, the need 
to understand the Aguán as an agrarian frontier; and third, the non-presence of the state in the 
region.  
Regarding the first point, the colonization process, for Marchetti the whole BAP was 
doomed to fail from the beginning. He declares, 
The agrarian reform had as its fundamental axis the African Palm monoculture 
by cooperative enterprises. The State was not the least concerned or nor did it 
respect the development of the models of peasant household production. It did 
not matter that hundreds of millions of state subsidies rained upon the agrarian 
reform enterprises in the valley. Neither the State nor the municipal governments 
gave a droplet of public services for the peasant communities of the hills and 
mountains. 
The result of the agrarian reform in the valley were palm oil enterprises full of 
corruption and cooperatives without the participation of the members; in the 
hills the result of the spontaneous Colonization was the development of a 
migratory agriculture and extensive cattle ranching, with enormous ecological 
consequences. (p.5) 
At the same time that this happened in the valley, the hills were also being colonized in 
the form of three successive waves. For Marchetti, as we saw earlier, the first wave was done by 
the people living in the valley at the moment the cooperatives were founded and who decided to 
migrate up the hills in search of land. Regarding the second wave,  
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…at the beginnings of the 70s it was the waged peasants that escaped the 
cooperatives towards the mountains. They preferred producing with dignity in 
the mountains to living in poverty in the valley and waiting for the oil palms to 
mature. This second wave sent messages to their families in the hot and worn out 
land in the West of a promised land, where 30 cargas [loads] of maize could be 
harvested with just clearing and burning, without fertilizers or much work, due to 
the goodness of the Gramoxone [a commercial synthetic herbicide]. The bean 
plants were beautiful and 15 quintals could be harvested without any problem of 
plant diseases. (p. 4) 
And finally, “[t]he poor from the West came in a third wave — a truly human avalanche. 
This spontaneous peasant Colonization populated the national lands in the hills and mountains 
of the valley with twelve thousand families — six times more than the State Colonization project 
in the valley” (p.4). 
It is important to note how in Marchetti’s analysis the spaces of the valley and the hills 
are understood as a dichotomy much as my peasant interlocutor Luis described them (see 
Chapter 2). While the valley was a place of exploitation and working for others, the hills were a 
place of freedom and labor for one’s own benefit. Further, nature was more generous and 
allowed for traditional agriculture to flourish with almost no need of agrochemicals. Finally, 
particularly after the third wave of migration, the hills had come to be home to the poorest of the 
poor, who happened to also be the largest group in the region and one that was rendered 
invisible because of their location outside of the purview of the state – that is, outside of the 
palm oil monoculture – and with little to no political clout. 
For Marchetti, the Aguán region – but particularly the hills – had to be understood as an 
agrarian frontier, where  
The violence against nature was repeated against the local society. The cattle 
ranchers of the agrarian frontier are the cowboys of the North American Western 
movies... In the three municipalities of our Parrish, it is estimated that there are 
800 murders each year. More than half of these killing happen as part of the cycle 
of vengeance among poor peasants. This represents a murder per household in 7 
percent of the families in our zone –war-scale violence levels. Nobody speaks 
about this violence, because no one is allowed to speak. Reporting a homicide to 
the authorities is suicide within the culture of the agrarian frontier. If the 
murderer is a cattleman, the public law and order forces will not do anything. If 
the killer is a poor peasant, the police are unable to capture him as he escapes up 
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the mountain. When faced with a murder it is better to stay quiet, escape with 
your family or kill the family members of the perpetrator. No community would 
offer support to the forces of public order because they [feel they] are not citizens 
and have no rights in that sense. Anyone who speaks with the police is a person 
marked for death. (pp. 5-6) 
Moreover, this violence between humans and against nature had other repercussions 
when nature strikes back:  
The forests absorb and reduce the speed of the water running down towards the 
valley´s rivers. Migratory agriculture in a short time eliminates enough forest 
protection in the hills, particularly in the focal points of the extensive cattle 
ranching, as to produce a flood in 1974 with the rains from [Hurricane] Fifí, 
which cost hundreds of lives. Hurricane Juana in 1983, of a much lesser intensity, 
produced more deaths due to the enormous increment in the deforestation 
during that decade. Since 1983, there has been more desertification and more 
floods. The palm oil and banana companies have made massive investments due 
to abandoned infrastructure and the construction of protection levees. The sand 
and dust from the levees has replaced the natural protection of the forests in the 
river basins.  
In 1993 strong rains that lasted only a few hours produced the same human 
disaster as the 1993 flood, taking more than 70 lives in the small hill community 
of Abisinia, and producing great destruction in the city of Tocoa. It was the right 
sign to celebrate the first anniversary of the [agrarian] counter reform and the 
Agrarian Modernization Law. 
Violence between people and violence against nature come together in the agrarian 
frontier to create a stateless situation, the third element in Marchetti’s account. Where “there is 
neither legal order nor citizens, only political and economic caciques, as the violence and 
insecurity increase on a daily basis” (p.7). 
For Marchetti, at the root of the problems in the Aguán was the lack of a state that would 
guarantee justice and the rights of the people and that would strive to improve the conditions of 
the poor. However, this lack of a state was not seen simply as an absence of public institutions or 
a lack of justice in judicial terms. According to Marchetti, the biggest lack in the Aguán was of 
citizenship. For him it was a dream to believe that there was a chance of creating a more just 
society in the region by taxing the rich and having state institutions present. Rather, the solution 
lay in  
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…creating a citizenship of rural poor, willing and able to pay their taxes for the 
state services. With a local citizenship, the foreign enclaves and the Hondurans 
that live like foreigners in their own country, would have to change their 
neoliberal attitude of making the environment and the others pay for the costs of 
their enrichment. (p.8) 
In addition, 
…the only result without citizenship is a more rooted and hard to question 
[political] verticalism. The quality of the professional services goes down; 
bureaucratic corruption is transformed into bureaucratic/feudal corruption, the 
administration ends up being very similar to the Spanish administration during 
the conquest and the maintaining of the Indian communities outside of any legal 
scheme. (p. 8) 
This idea – the necessity of an active citizenship in the Aguán – would become the 
central guideline of the political and social practice of the Jesuits in the region. From the late-
1980s onwards, and under the banner of the Pastoral Social, the priests and lay staff of the PS, 
began to embark in a set of activities, projects and programs aimed at raising consciousness, 
increasing levels of organization and improving the living conditions of the population in very 
direct and concrete ways. In this sense, from the beginning, the PS was stuck in a complicated 
situation. On the one hand, it worked to organize the poor around access to rights and effective 
citizenship. On the other, it provided services – such as education and health – that should have 
been provided by the state. 
We find a clear example of this tension in the case of the Socorro Jurídico Program 
(SJP). Under the idea that there can be no citizenship if there is no justice, this pro bono legal 
aid program was created in 1988 and was one of the first organized by the PS. Initially serving 
Tocoa, but eventually with a presence in the entire region, the SJP’s main objective was to 
improve the communities’ access to justice. To do so, the SJP tried both to organize the 
communities and provide a direct service. Regarding the direct service, the SJP provided the 
region’s poor pro bono legal aid in its offices. Most of the people coming to receive this service 
were women and most of the claims had to do with family law matters (alimonies, parental 
recognition and child custody, among others). This would seem to point to the non-presence of 
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the judiciary in the region, even for the most basic sort of legal services. The fact that the 
regional office of the Public Prosecutor was only opened in the mid-1990s, and as a result of the 
pressure of the PS, is another indication of this non-presence.  
In terms of community organization, the SJP moved in two directions. First, it attempted 
to promote a culture of peace and of alternative forms of conflict resolution, which supposedly 
would contrast, and eventually supplant, the eye-for-an-eye logic that was so pervasive in the 
region and that reflected the reality of the agrarian frontier, as characterized by Marchetti. To do 
so, they would work directly with the communities, figuring out which were their main problems 
and trying to find solutions, either directly using their own means, or by pressuring the state to 
fulfill its duties. Also, to operate as a liaison between the SJP and the communities, the figure of 
the legal promoter was created. Legal promoters were men and women from the communities, 
usually close to the Church, who received basic legal and paralegal training and who were 
supposed to be the first line of legal defense of the communities. Second, through their contact 
with the communities they would collect local grievances and together with other organizations, 
would push the state around certain claims. Two examples of this are the installation of a Public 
Prosecutor’s office in Tocoa and the regional mobilization against obligatory military service in 
the mid-1990s, which eventually gained enough national traction so that the Honduran state 
ended the draft in 1996. 
The PS operated around five main structures. Besides the SJP, it had a sustainable 
agriculture program, through which it tried to promote more ecologically friendly forms of 
agriculture in the hills, at the same time as promoting a responsible use of natural resources, 
such as water and forests. There was also a health program, oriented mainly towards alternative 
medicine and sanitary organization and education for both the communities and families. 
Fourth, they created a gender and development program in which Eugenia, whose story I 
presented in the last two chapters, was deeply involved, and that attempted to improve the self-
esteem of women and open up spaces in which they could be active participants in the 
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transformation of their families and communities. Finally, there was an alternative community 
commercialization program, which tried to tackle the peasants’ lack of market access and their 
lack of means of transport. This involved moving their produce from the hills to the markets in 
the valley and bringing basic provisions that could not be found in the hills from the valley. 
In sum, the Jesuits were stuck between becoming a sort of parallel state, covering that 
which the state was supposed to provide, at the same time that they tried to organize the 
population to force the state to fulfill its duties. It was the old question of paternalism versus 
popular organization, which had become such a hot topic within the Latin American left from 
the 1960s onwards, and the debates regarding the difference between reform and revolution (see 
for example Villegas 1972; De Sousa Santos 2005). This tension came up in a lively way when I 
asked a former longstanding member of the lay staff of the PS whether she thought that during 
this period – the late 1990s and early 2000s – they had played the role of the vanguard or the 
role of a parallel state. After some pondering she responded somewhat bitterly: “we thought that 
we were the vanguard, but really we were a parallel state.” 
I have already mentioned that the PS had a clear bias towards the hills as against the 
valley in their work. This did not mean that they did no work at all in the lowlands, but that the 
type of work that they did there was quite different. If in the hills there was this constant tension 
between vanguard and parallel state, in the valley they focused mainly on supporting, financially 
but also through political training, those incipient organizations that were trying to take form in 
the region. They were particularly interested in creating spaces of confluence between the 
communities in the hills and the ones in the valley. This was never an easy venture.  
While in the hills most of the problems resulted from a lack of access to public services 
and markets, in the valley the main problems had to do rather with lack of access to land or well-
paid work and of basic civil and labor rights. Further, there was a clear difference in the sort of 
leadership that the PS found in each space. According to organizers from this period, most of the 
leaders from the hills came from the western regions of the country, had less political experience 
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and tended to be slower at assimilating new knowledge and forms of organizing. In the case of 
the valley, there was a greater tendency for leaders to come from the southern section of the 
country, with far more experience in political organizing. Also, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, 
many of the families that migrated from the valley to the hills did so running away from the 
forms of collective labor and discipline present in the lowlands. They tended to be far more 
suspicious of any kind of leadership and more inclined to resolve their problems with their feet 
(migrating) rather than organizing. 
All of these differences made the creation of spaces of confluence both important and 
difficult. Probably the most paradigmatic example of these attempts came in 1988, when the PS 
and the National Rural Workers Central (CNTC) invited participants of every popular group or 
association in the region – big or small – to unite under an umbrella group called the Permanent 
Assembly of Popular Organizations of the Aguán (APOPA). This effort was done in conversation 
with left popular leaders from Tegucigalpa who were trying to create a broad national movement 
that eventually could capitalize electorally. APOPA combined vanguard politics with a populist 
discourse. However, as we might expect from the organization’s profile, it ended up being 
monopolized by the interests and leadership coming from the valley. Further, once the implicit 
electoral agenda behind the creation of the organization became evident, there were clashes 
between the CNTC and the PS over strategy and eventually APOPA dissolved in bitter infighting. 
For the PS and the Jesuits this became another example of why community organization and the 
focus on the hills were the only viable way to go. 
At the same time, through a very slow, disarticulated and painful process, different 
groups were beginning to organize around shared grievances, mostly related to access to land. At 
the moment these were quite isolated processes with very few channels of communication 
among them; as a priest told me “in Colón there is a lot of organization, what we don’t have is 
unity.” Nonetheless, at the same time, certain fractions of the Honduran left were also pushing 
towards the creation of a new national political party with some of the remnant leaders of the 
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once strong peasant movement involved. In this context, everything seemed to be pointing 
towards the agrarian reform as that broader project that could come to resolve many of the 
problems in the region. The PS accordingly shifted the emphasis of its strategy towards 
organizing a broad agrarian platform that could push towards re-launching the agrarian reform, 
but this time including the interests and necessities of the hill communities, as well as 
combining it with a citizenship perspective.80 
The agrarian reform as the path to the future 
On August, 7, 1998, the PS sponsored a forum in Tocoa titled “Together Let’s Strengthen the 
Agrarian Reform.” The forum was seen as an effort to take advantage of the renewed interest 
that part of the national left had in the agrarian reform as a way of capitalizing electorally, as 
well as the arrival in office of new government officials who seemed to be more supportive of the 
peasant movement. Particularly important had been the appointment of Aníbal Delgado Fiallos 
as the new executive director of the INA by the newly elected President Carlos Flores Facussé, a 
nephew of Miguel Facussé, who had come into office in January, 1998.  
The forum became a space in which different regional actors were able to share their 
experiences of the processes of agrarian reform and counter reform in the Aguán. The opening 
                                                        
80 There is of course a close relationship between citizenship and land within Western legal and rights 
history. Immanuel Wallerstein (2003:651), in his historical review of the idea of citizenship, shows that 
there is a close relationship between landed property and citizenship. According to him, after the French 
Revolution citizenship came to encompass two types of rights: passive – the right to the protection of the 
person, of property, of liberty, etc. – and active – the right to public and political advocacy and 
representation. Passive rights are universal, while active are limited to particular segments (historically 
white, male and bourgeois). In this way society can be based on equality (passive rights), at the same time 
that it excludes (active rights). The boundaries between these two types of rights have shifted throughout 
time and “[t] he story of the nineteenth century (and indeed of the twentieth) has been that some (those 
with privilege and advantage) have been attempting to define citizenship narrowly and that all the others 
have been seeking to validate a broader definition. It is around this struggle that the intellectual theorizing 
of the next 200 years centered. It was around this struggle that the social movements were formed.” 
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speaker, a member of the regional branch of the labor union of INA employees, inaugurated the 
session with the following words: 
From the former Capital of the agrarian reform in the Bajo Aguán, receive a 
fraternal welcome, hoping that this First Peasant Forum may allow us to reflect 
on the land sales of the different peasant enterprises, which have cost so much 
sacrifice, sweat and even death. Today they [the lands] are being hoarded by 
national and foreign investors. Also, may it serve to get to know the policies that 
the current government intends to implement in terms of agrarian reform. 
Welcome be all to this Peasant Forum. (Altiok 1998:7) 
The first speaker to follow these welcoming words, a regional representative of INA, 
emphasized how land could not be seen as some simple and basic raw material, but as the 
foundation of life itself, as well as the necessity that the peasant movement had of uniting. 
However, at the same time, he spoke of the importance of efficient and competitive production, 
where the peasant was to be, above all, an important actor within the market. Moreover, 
following the liberal mantra of personal responsibility, he laid at the feet of the peasant families 
the responsibility for their own development.  
The two next speakers, both important members of the PS, took the stage and addressed 
directly the type of interpretation presented by the INA representative, presenting in broad lines 
the historical narrative that I characterized in the previous section. According to them, the 
blame was not so much on the peasant families of the cooperatives as on the types of policies 
that the INA had promoted. For example, according to Peter Marchetti, the then general 
coordinator of the PS: 
The agrarian reform in Honduras was not planned or driven by Hondurans. It 
was one of the ten conservative and counter insurgency agrarian reforms that 
were planned by the USA under the Alliance for Progress… In the Bajo Aguán… it 
was designed and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank, a bank 
under strict US control. It is fair to say that the Agrarian Modernization Law and 
its planning were part of the great Agricultural Transformation Project of Miguel 
Facussé, one of the great Honduran entrepreneurs.  
This alien model implemented a top-down technocratic agrarian reform, in which the 
actual members of the cooperatives had little say. It had fostered multiple levels of corruption 
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and coercion by government officials and national and local peasant leaders. Then, once the 
LMA had taken hold and inaugurated the neoliberal era, the INA and the agrarian reform 
structures in general had allied with big capital – with Miguel Facussé at the helm – to convince 
the cooperatives to sell and thus leading to the current situation of pervasive poverty. 
After these official presentations were given, it was time for the members of the 
cooperatives to speak, which produced some of the most memorable moments in the forum. I 
will not dwell on the speeches here (but see Casolo 2009 for a detailed gender analysis of the 
context). What interests me more is how they speak of a bitter moment, in which the reform 
sector was licking its wounds at the same time that those who had sold were coming to regret 
their decision to sell. It was also a finger pointing moment, as blame was directed at the INA for 
the way the agrarian reform had been deployed, at the businessmen and companies that were 
profiting from the sales, and at the male leadership of the cooperatives that had been corrupt 
and had sold the cooperatives’ assets. It was also a moment to rethink the need for agrarian 
reform to improve the life of those living in the Aguán and the crucial role that the state had to 
play in this regard. 
As the forum was closing down, it was the turn of Aníbal Delgado Fiallos to take the stage 
and present his position as the new director of the INA. His words clearly revealed the type of 
agrarian reform that the government was thinking about. Early into his speech, the INA’s 
executive director mentioned that 
It is important to propel a deep process of agrarian reform… Logically, one thing 
is what is ethically desirable and another thing what is historically possible. That 
is why we at the INA have relaunched an idea of the agrarian reform that would 
be possible under the political, social and economic conditions of Honduras and 
within the frames of the standing legal norms. (Altiok 1998:15) 
 What was this historically viable agrarian reform? One organized around three main 
principles: first, a broad land titling program, as well as the promotion of the access to land of 
indigenous groups; second, a process of reconversion empresarial, which can be literally 
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translated as business restructuring, and referred mainly to making profitable businesses out of 
the staple crops producing cooperatives, even if it meant producing something else; and third, 
the institutional strengthening of the INA, to make it more efficient and transparent, which 
included not repeating “the errors of the past” and excluding those who had sold land from any 
future participation in agrarian reform projects. As we can see, undoing the sale process or 
embarking on a broad redistributive program was not to be part of this “new” agrarian reform.  
However lukewarm Delgado Fiallos’s proposal might have been, the forum came to a 
close with an atmosphere of optimism and hope. At least he had come and had winked at the 
peasant movement and the idea of re-launching the agrarian reform could become a reality. If 
anything, this could be taken as an open door that the peasant movement could knock on and 
open up more ground as it had always done: by applying pressure through land recuperations. 
But just about two months after the forum, Hurricane Mitch crashed into the impoverished 
North Coast of Honduras, and this new hope would become mixed with despair, salting old 
wounds, creating new ones and above all, revealing the deep set of contradictions that had 
brought the Aguán into being. 
Hurricane Mitch and the wounds of the Aguán 
There is no such thing as a natural disaster. In every phase and aspect of a 
disaster – causes, vulnerability, preparedness, results and response, and 
reconstruction – the contours of disaster and the difference between who lives 
and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus. 
At all phases, up to and including reconstruction, disasters don’t simply flatten 
landscapes, washing them smooth. Rather they deepen and erode the ruts of 
social difference they encounter. 
— Neil Smith (2006:n.p.), “There’s No 
Such a Thing as a Natural Disaster”  
Mitch, the hurricane and later tropical storm, hit the Central American Caribbean Coast on 
October 26-27, 1998. The fourth strongest storm in the history of the Atlantic Basin, it struck 
Honduras the hardest, leaving a trail of destruction and misery. Mitch was not your typical 
storm. From the 28th of October and until early on the 30th, it hovered over the sea and then very 
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slowly – between the 30th and the 31st – it began to move inland, first as a hurricane and then as 
a tropical storm that ended up covering most of the country. Due to this erratic behavior, it was 
initially thought that it would not be too destructive and that its effects would be circumscribed 
to the North Coast. Thus, the country was ill prepared to deal with what was about to happen.  
More than the winds themselves, it was the rains that came with the storm that did most 
of the damage. In some regions the amount of rainfall in a couple of days was the same as the 
yearly average (Olson et al. 2001) and it was estimated by some farmers to have had the effect of 
ten years of rain (Holt-Giménez 2002). In the end, over 5,000 Hondurans died, more than 
8,000 disappeared and around 285,000 people lost their homes. Around 60 percent of the 
nation’s infrastructure was seriously damaged and around 70 percent of the crops were lost – 
including coffee, bananas and pineapples – which represented a loss of over $800 million in the 
agrarian sector alone (Olson et al. 2001). This means that around 38 percent of the Honduran 
population was directly affected by the hurricane, which caused total damages equivalent to 72 
percent of the gross national product (FAO 2010). For all practical purposes, at the end of 1998 
Honduras was surviving off of the foreign aid that began to roll in once the level of destruction 
became evident. The levels of the aid received were substantial. For example, the per capita 
foreign aid received by Honduras jumped from $50 in 1997, to $129 in 1999. Food aid 
shipments jumped from 21,000 tons in 1997 to 169,000 tons in 1999 (Morris et al. 2002).  
However, if Mitch as a natural event occurs at the end of October 1998, the conditions 
that made it possible for Mitch to become the type of dramatic disaster that it did had been 
many years in the making. For example, a study by the FAO (2010:2) that explores the 
relationship between land tenure and natural disasters, concluded regarding Mitch that 
A century of environmental degradation, poverty, unequal access and 
distribution of the land and military conflicts, together with almost eight months 
of droughts due to the El Niño phenomenon in 1997-98, contributed to aggravate 
the effects of the hurricane, causing floods of a greater intensity that should have 
been expected from a storm with these characteristics; emphasizing the social 
and environmental vulnerability of the region.  
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The heavy rainfall was the most destructive characteristic of Mitch. This rain fell on hills 
and mountains that were heavily eroded from slash and burn migratory agriculture.81 The 
settlement of poor peasant families along the river banks and creeks aggravated the situation 
and led to landslides and floods. Just as Neil Smith (2006:3) describes for Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans in 2005, these floods did not simply flatten the landscapes of the valley, but rather, 
“…they deepen[ed] and erode[d] the ruts of social difference they encounter[ed].”  
The ways in which natural processes mixed with political economy to create a profoundly 
disastrous effect (Watts 2013) were quite evident in the Aguán region. Here, the combination of 
water, mud and debris that resulted from the heavy rains, came flowing down the hills and into 
the valley, following the patterns left by the cracks and crevices created by the processes of 
internal differentiation that I have been describing in this and the previous chapter. Jennifer 
Casolo (2004) gives a vivid description of this process: 
[T]he high winds and floodwaters washed away over three thousand homes (the majority 
simple mud and stick structures) and damaged another ten thousand. Most valley 
communities lost their water pipes. Forty percent of the crops were destroyed. All 
temporary and permanent banana workers lost their jobs, the temporary ones without 
compensation. Almost every bridge in the Aguán was washed out, as well as four 
kilometers of paved highway… It lay bare, at least in the eyes of the eighty percent who 
had been vulnerable before Mitch, that development policies had developed large-scale 
agribusiness, but not much in terms of infrastructure and social services for the majority 
of the population. (p. 42) 
 
Particularly salient in this “laying bare” were the levees constructed by the palm oil 
investors on one side of the river to protect their plantations from the constant flooding of the 
Aguán River. These levees,  
                                                        
81 In fact, a study carried out in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in the Central American region shows 
how the plots of those peasant farmers that used agro-ecological methods, as opposed to the forms of 
migratory and traditional agriculture that I have been describing, presented more topsoil, field moisture 
and vegetation. Further, “On average, agroecological plots lost 18 percent less arable land to landslides 
than conventional plots and had a 49 percent lower incidence of landslides” (Holt-Giménez 2002:10). 
229 
 
…had left the inhabitants of small towns and neighborhoods exposed to the 
swelling river’s full force on the other side. Valley and hill-dwellers alike also 
traced the high losses of mountain soil and crops back to the counter-reform. 
While not exonerating the slash and burn practices of small farmers, many 
people associated overuse of the hill land with plummeting prices in the de-
capitalized valley and a widening of the frontier by former cooperative members 
turned cattle ranchers. (p. 43) 
For example,  
Miguel Facussé bought the cooperative Quebrada de Arena. He then invested in 
levees to protect the oil palm. The Aguán River, unable to overflow into the palm 
plantations, washed over 420 homes, completely destroying the 38 houses made 
of mud and straw. (p. 43, fn 94) 
The aftermath of Mitch: reconstruction as citizenship formation  
Hurricane Mitch came to reveal – to lay bare – the effects of the particular form in which the 
Aguán’s landscape had been produced. In this way, the patterns of destruction left by Mitch and 
the patterns of dispossession left by the agrarian counter-reform seemed to overlap, with the 
expansion of the oil palm monoculture right in the middle. An example of this came just a few 
days after the rains from Mitch had stopped. Jennifer Casolo, who at the time was working for 
the PS as coordinator of the gender and development project, wrote in her notes: 
As I open the door to the parish, two men approach me—persuasive, persistent, 
refusing to be peripheral.  “I am José,” says the larger (5’6”) of the two.  This 
perhaps thirty-year old man, thin, wearing shorts, his legs streaked in mud, holds 
out his hand to me, “We are from Prieta.” 
Prieta occupies one of the first cards in my mental rolodex.  The four bridges 
between Tocoa and Prieta now resemble islands with their adjoining sides 
washed away.  Two days earlier, we, three parish health workers and myself, had 
jumped the wide cracks and dragged ourselves by rope through the river water 
that ran over our heads, to reach Prieta.   20 kilometers from Tocoa center, it 
qualifies as one of the hardest hit of the eleven valley communities located on the 
western side of our parish.   Water from the raging Aguán, unable at first to 
hurdle the levy that protected the nearby banana plantation, took vengeance by 
swallowing the 250 homes of the village.  The wealthier had fled in their trucks in 
the middle of the night.  The poor, the majority, had survived by occupying the 
only two-story building in town, the cooperative’s version of the “company” store.  
Now they were “lodged” under plastic sheeting along the highway and in the 
dank, cold African palm processing plant a village away.  
‘We are not members of the cooperative, we are the day-laborers.  We live in the 
mud houses along the river.  Our homes have been washed away.  Our jobs no 
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longer exist.  The cooperative members have received aid, but they don’t share 
with us.  We have no food, no clothing, no work.  Their cement block homes are 
filled with mud, but at least, are still standing.  We have nothing left.’ 
This marks my first acquaintance with what will continue to happen for the next 
couple of weeks as hundreds of people from the outlying valley and mountain 
villages make their way through knee high mud, destroyed trails, dangerous 
rivers, to inform us of the state of their communities: homes leveled, crops 
destroyed, meager jobs lost.  They approach the Catholic Church, which during 
the repression of the 80s and the structural adjustment policies of the 90s served 
as ‘the good state’ in juxtaposition to the national government, to say:  ‘help!’ 
As we can see from this long quote, Mitch literally rendered visible the deep contrasts 
that existed in the region in terms of location (between hills and valley)  and class (between 
cooperative members and day-laborers, for example). Further, it highlighted and brought even 
more to the fore the role of the Catholic Church as a sort of parallel state in the region. From the 
beginning, the Catholic Church, and particularly the PS, took the lead in disaster relief. Besides 
the use of its buildings as shelters, the PS used its cars in the rescue effort and helped organize 
the collection of food, drinking water and medicines.  
This position by the Church came to be formally consolidated as the state decided by 
November 1998 to dump much of the relief labor – distributing food aid and organizing and 
controlling the shelters, for example – on the church. This reflected both the lack of logistical 
capacities shown by the state and the generalized suspicion by both Hondurans and foreigners 
about the levels of corruption in most public institutions, both nationally and locally (Falla 1998; 
Jeffrey 2002). This became particularly clear after the May 1999 donors meeting in Stockholm 
between the Central American governments and five European countries, the IMF and the 
World Bank. During this meeting the parties negotiated conditions for the reconstruction aid at 
the same time that NGOs and some grassroots organizations lobbied to make sure that the 
negotiated aid included a commitment to increasing local participation in the process. Thus, “by 
signing the Stockholm Accords each Central American government committed itself to 
decentralization, citizen participation, transparency, environmental protection and the 
promotion of gender and ethnic rights” (Casolo 2004:43). 
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This sort of negotiation at the international and national scale had clear effects at the 
local level.  In particular, the requirements set in terms of transparency and democratic 
grassroots participation in the process of reconstruction connected well with the PS’s own 
objective of creating an active citizenship in the Aguan. For the Jesuits then, the disaster was 
seen as a way of advancing their social transformation agenda. In 1999 the PS in the Aguán 
began a massive program of work for food, which was bankrolled by the USAID and supported 
by Catholic Relief Services. In the end, the PS came to channel around $7 million worth of food 
aid to over 678 affected villages and neighborhoods (Casolo 2004). 82 
Using these funds as a lever, the PS determined that in order for the communities to 
access this aid, they had to organize themselves into Local Emergency Committees (CODEL). 
This requirement was informed by the particular reading that the PS had of the region and of 
the local patronatos, which were seen has highly corrupt, controlled by the traditional political 
parties and with very low levels of accountability, democratic participation and gender inclusion. 
In contrast, the CODELs were designed to be non-exclusionary and to create a new more 
participative and democratic political culture, which could eventually translate into the creation 
of a new breed of citizens. In this sense, the members of the CODELs were elected by village 
assemblies that were to be involved in both the definition of the emergency assistance and 
reconstruction plans. All the members of the community were encouraged to participate and 
there was a requirement of at least a 35 percent female participation of the committee. Further, 
to limit the possibility of any one person concentrating so much power, the CODELs were 
organized in committees according to the communities’ felt needs or interests (housing, 
                                                        
82 The food for work program included the construction of ditches and houses, as well as schools, drinking 
water wells, and latrines and clearing and rehabilitating roads. In many cases, the formula used was 
similar to the one proposed in the initial BAP. The Church would provide the materials and the 
communities, organized in the CODELs, would provide the labor. Also, the people participating in the 
labors received different types of foodstuff.  
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infrastructure, health, gender, education, among others). At its peak, the number of CODELs in 
the region reached 551 and in general the model was seen as a success, not only because it 
proved a very efficient way of distributing and using humanitarian aid, but also because it 
created levels of community and popular organization never seen before in the region (Jeffrey 
2002).  
By mid-1999, once the emergency period had ended and foreign aid began to dwindle, 
the question for the PS and other grassroots organizations in the region became how to 
consolidate and build upon what had been achieved with the CODELs. Changing the word 
emergency for development in the name of the committees allowed keeping the same initials, 
and the CODELs began to work in long term development programs. However, a few problems 
arose in time. The first and most important one was that this organizational form, however 
democratic and participatory, was highly dependent on funding from the PS. Thus, once the 
work for food program ended the incentives to continue working in the CODELs diminished.  
The second problem, which is closely related to the first one, was the relation between 
the CODELs and the other organizations present in the region. The CODELs were organized in a 
way in which anyone and everyone could participate, regardless of their background or 
affiliations. This came to paper over differences based on class, gender and national political 
affiliation. During the emergency period in the aftermath of Mitch it was easier for people to 
come together due to their shared experience of the disaster. However, as time went by, these 
sorts of differentiation came back again to the fore. Also, as the next campaign period began 
gaining steam in the run-up to the 2001 elections, organization through the political parties — 
traditional sources of patronage — became a priority. This hit the CODEL movement 
particularly hard, as many of the most renowned leaders were involved in the up and coming 
left-oriented party Unidad Democrática (Democratic Union).  
In general, through a slow but constant process, some CODELs began to disappear and 
others shrank or weakened as the better off people and the cooperative members began to 
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withdraw, making the CODELs a peripheral space in the communities. Here gender and class 
lines became strong again, with women and the poor among those that remained invested in the 
committees.  
It is, however, essential to recognize the importance that this form of organization had in 
the region. A 2000 report on popular participation in the Aguán, estimated that to June of that 
year, little less than 10,000 people were directly involved in the CODELs, which represented 
roughly 45,000 households involved (Schmid 2000).83 More important than these numbers, 
was the qualitative effect that the CODELs had. Not only did they come to dispute and disrupt 
the traditional forms of political organizing, they also brought people together, which allowed 
for both political formation and the creation of spaces in which the experiences and memories of 
dispossession of the cycle of agrarian counter-reform could circulate. Further, by putting people 
together to discuss the reality and the problems of the region, they allowed for disaggregated 
grievances to be woven together in the larger fabric of the region’s history, creating and 
disseminating a shared discourse that would come to inform and organize new struggles.  
Nonetheless, the central issue in the region continued to be agrarian, with access to land 
remaining as the most important topic. The CODELs, due to both their initial interests and 
forms of organization, were hardly up to the task of organizing around these issues and 
eventually were overtaken on the ground by other types of organizations. These organizations 
were new, since in most cases they had new names and different discourses than those of the 
peasant movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Under those new clothes, however, the regional 
history of the Aguán, with all of its contradictions and patterns, continued to vibrate. We will see 
the form it took in the next chapter.  
 
                                                        
83 To have a better idea of the coverage of the CODELs, according to the 2001 census, 246,708 people 
were living in the Department of Colón.  If we consider an average of four people per household, this 
means that more than half the population of the Department were indirectly involved in the CODELs. 
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Epilogue: of myths, collective memory and political legacies 
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. 
And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, 
creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary 
crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from 
them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world 
history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language. 
Karl Marx (2008:12), 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon 
In and through their practice in the Aguán, a group of Jesuit priests came to articulate an 
understanding of the region’s past, its present and a political chart for the future. According to 
this reading, the Aguán was the result of a limited agrarian reform, captured by elites, which 
created a pool of cheap labor in the form of the cooperatives. These cooperatives had little 
support and control over their own fate and the beneficiaries ended up being no more than 
glorified plantation wage laborers. With the passing of the LMA came the selling of the 
cooperatives’ lands – most by illegal means, but also because of the corruption of the 
cooperatives’ leaders – and with it, the transfer of the sweat and labor of the families that had 
toppled the forests to create the palm oil plantations to a group of foreigners that cared little 
about the families’ fate. 
The present within this historical narrative was even bleaker. With the cooperatives 
gone, the region had turned into a plantation economy, controlled by foreign palm men – that 
doubled as drug barons in the case of Facussé84 – and transnational companies that exploited 
                                                        
84 Honduras is a central piece in the route that connects the point of cocaine production in South America 
with the U.S.  market. For example, according to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, “…as much as 87 percent of all cocaine smuggling flights departing South America first land in 
Honduras. The Northern Atlantic coastal region of Honduras is a primary landing zone for drug-carrying 
flights. The region is vulnerable to narcotics trafficking due to its remoteness, limited infrastructure, lack 
of government presence, and weak law enforcement institutions. Transshipment from the North Atlantic 
coastal region is facilitated by subsequent flights north as well as maritime traffic and land movement on 
the Pan American Highway” (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2013). 
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both people and nature to accumulate capital. The situation in the hills was even worse, where 
pervasive poverty and rampant violence against and among people and nature had created an 
almost barren landscape. All of these elements had come together around Hurricane Mitch. 
Finally, in terms of the prognosis for the future, it was clear for the Jesuits – particularly 
at that moment for Marchetti – that an active citizenship had to be created to improve the living 
conditions in both the hills and the lowlands. This active citizenship would be able to create a 
new relationship with both the state and nature and the fundamental subject would be, above 
all, the hill peasants and the “healthier” sectors of the peasant and social movements of the 
lowlands. This reading changed a bit after Mitch, when it became evident that housing and 
access to land in more general terms were what could bring together the grievances of both the 
lowlands and hills. From here on, the idea was that a relaunch of the agrarian reform was the 
way to stitch together these two differentiated spaces and create a broader social base for social 
transformation. We can think about the resulting strategy as the promotion of an “agrarian 
citizenship” (Wittman 2009) in the Aguán.  
I heard many variations of this narrative, emphasizing at times certain elements, or 
organizing them in different forms, depending of the position of the people doing the telling.  
This overarching historical narrative allowed for different groups to understand and position 
themselves and their experiences in regard to what was taking place in the region. This was 
particularly important in a place like the Aguán, which has been in a process of constant flux, 
with people coming and going and overlapping processes of migration and dispossession. I will 
present two examples to explain a bit more what I mean. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 However, due to the fact that the Aguán operates mainly as a transshipment zone – with few 
clashes between groups for territorial control – and that drugs in the region have not necessarily impacted 
directly, but rather in connection with the agrarian dynamics that I am interested in, the topic is not 
analyzed in any depth in this study. 
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In the next chapter I will characterize the history of the Authentic Peasant Movement of 
the Aguán (MARCA) and of the Peasant Movement of Rigores (MCR). In the case of MARCA, 
the variation of this historical narrative revolved around the idea that they were the sons and 
daughters of those who had sold or had the land taken illegally away from them in the early 
1990s. However, in one of the new groups that they created in the lands that they have recovered 
as “theirs,” there was not a single person that had been a member, or a daughter or son of a 
member, of the original cooperative. Rather, most members of the new group were part of a 
younger generation that had either been raised in the region – but had never worked in the 
former cooperatives – or had arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s and thus had no long-
term roots in the region. 
The current group of people in the MCR has been the result of two waves of migration 
into the Nueva Vida community. It took me while to realize this, as the historical narrative that I 
would usually receive tended to collapse both waves into a single process. The most noteworthy 
element is that of the original organizers – the first wave –, only five families remained in the 
movement and I was yet to meet them.  
From these and other cases, it became evident for me that the broader historical 
narratives – the different variations  articulated into Jesuits’ overarching one – operated as 
anchors or upon which different particular historical experiences could be hung or organized. 
Thus, the later arrivals at the MCR could see and understand themselves as part of a process 
that had begun long before their arrival; or the members of MARCA could justify themselves as 
sons and daughters of those who lost the land. I would argue that we can understand a narrative 
such as the one articulated by the Jesuits as an “origin myth.”  
As Portelli (2010:153) argues, “…a myth is not necessarily a false or invented tale; rather, 
it is a story that becomes significant as it amplifies the meaning of an individual event (factual or 
not) into a symbolic and narrative formalization of a culture’s shared self-representations.” 
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In this case, this mythic historical narrative gives meaning and historical coherence to a 
set of shared experiences of struggle and dispossession in the current context of the Aguán. 
Following Portelli’s (1997) framework, what I am calling here a mythic historical narrative was 
of course the result of a set of individual memories that came to be abstracted or detached from 
their singularity, to be institutionalized – understood, repeated and appropriated – by a larger 
collective. 
It is in this sense that I understand that the memories of struggle and dispossession that 
circulate in the Aguán – but that came to be gathered and organized around the template 
formalized by the Jesuits – as collective ones. This detachment or abstraction from the 
individual in the form of myth have allow these memories to transcend those who experienced 
them directly and to dwell – to become “present time” in Benjamin’s (1968) terms – in the class 
position of the impoverished peasantry in the Aguán.  However, as Enrico Augelli and Craig 
Murphy (1997) mention in discussing Gramsci’s interpretation and elaboration of Sorel’s ideas, 
the myth not only tries to articulate past with present, but also to posit a future.  
In a similar reading that navigates closely between Gramsci and Sorel, Rhina Roux 
(2005) argues that in the process of (nation) state formation, the creation of (national) myths is 
crucial. Following Sorel, she states that “‘myth’ does not mean in this case, as it does in everyday 
language, a legend or a false narration. Rather, it means the existence in the collective 
imagination, of representations regarding an undetermined future in time that motivates human 
beings towards action” (p. 13).  These myths, which might change through time, help to 
articulate different social groups/class positions, since they “map” and help locate the 
relationship among these groups, and between these groups and society in general. Myths 
organize:  
the fabric of bonds that reproduces the order in the individuals’ minds and 
behaviors regarding both themselves and their relations with others, as well as 
the set of rights, obligations and restrictions that, de facto or de jure, constitute 
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and recreate a mode of commanding and obeying, a mode of being subdued and 
of rebelling and a form politics. (pp. 18)  
For the case of Mexico, Roux argues that this myth was linked to the land. According to 
her, the idea that Mexico’s territory was the immemorial patrimony of its indigenous 
communities was so deeply ingrained in the commonsense of the subaltern groups that not only 
had it survived through different cycles of dispossession, but it also had to be incorporated in 
the governing pact that came out of the Mexican Revolution, in the form of article 27 of the new 
constitution. For example, "[a]gainst the cold liberal utopia of an atomized society of abstract 
individuals, united by the invisible ties of the market, these rebellions placed in front the 
redeeming myth of the community, whose symbolic representation was the land, time and time 
again” (Roux 2011:14). 
In the case of the Aguán, the myth was also linked to land, but in a rather different 
manner. In this case, national land had been used by the state to create the cooperatives, which 
later had been illegally alienated. They, the nation´s sons and daughters, were the real citizens, 
not the foreign large landowners that were hoarding their land. Peasants were thus entitled to 
righting the wrongs of the past through a new agrarian reform in which, just as their forefathers 
did in the 1970s and 1980s, would “recuperate” these lands for their use. In terms of the 
mapping presented by this myth, the logic was mostly a Manichean one. On the one hand, you 
had the good and redeeming poor Honduran peasants who would recuperate the stolen land. On 
the other, you had the bad foreign rich landowners (René Morales, Reinaldo Canales and Miguel 
Facussé), who had stolen the land for their enrichment. The myths were not only Manichean, 
but also profoundly nationalistic and with religious overtones.  
Of course, this type of mythical historical narrative made certain elements salient at the 
same time that it rendered others invisible. I would like to mention two cases. First, although 
the more refined and overarching form of this myth came from the Jesuits, in general the 
tensions between hills and lowlands tend to be overlooked by most of the different variations, 
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including those by people who came from the hills. In this case, as I explore more in depth in the 
next chapter, the experience of the people living in the hills is subsumed in that of those living in 
the lowlands. This probably has to do with the fact that most of the more vocal leaders and 
peasant organizations in the region come from the lowlands. However, I think that it also has to 
do with the “visibility” of both spaces. While the lowland experience has always been in the 
shadow of state and capital – to borrow Steve Striffler’s (1997) evocative formulation –, the hills 
one – that of the people without history (Clastres 1989) – remained constantly beyond the view 
of both.  
The other experience that has been deeply negated in this historical myth is that of 
women. As I showed in the previous chapter, women’s experience of both the cooperatives and 
the sale process were part of a broader shared experience, but at the same time had to be 
differentiated. This differentiation escapes most of the characterization of the history of the 
Aguán and the Jesuits’ formulation is no exception.  
However, it does appear in flashes and moments, as in the case of the forum titled 
“Together Let’s Strengthen the Agrarian Reform,” which I mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
There the claim that “women would not have sold” came to have significant resonance in the 
form of a speech by Lastenia Méndez –the wife of a former BAP beneficiary and member of the 
PS´s women´s group. According to her, the main reason behind the sales was not the rampant 
levels of corruption or the violent manner in which the large landowners came after the land. 
Rather, at the center of the cycle of dispossession had been the fact that women had been 
excluded from the process. Further, she “…reminded men and women that the place they lived 
and worked, the Aguán, was also the product of rural woman’s arduous labor; work that men 
had not acknowledged and that had been drastically altered without women’s consent” (Casolo 
2009:413).  
According to Casolo, this speech and the sentiment that it generated in those 
participating in the forum had a deep impact on how the topic of gender figured in the land 
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recuperation carried out by the Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MCA), to whose history I turn 
in the next chapter. The disruption of these masculinized narratives would also appear in the 
individual memories of people such as Marielos – whose interpretation of the coup I presented 
in the introduction –as they tried to make sense of the difference between their particular 
experiences and the overarching narrative.  
For example, I met few people with a more ingrained nationalistic understanding of the 
agrarian conflict in the Aguán than Marielos. For her the contradiction between poor peasants 
and rich palm men was central. However, the exclusion and dispossession of poor Salvadoran 
peasants had no place in her narrative, even though her father had been one of those excluded 
and dispossessed Salvadoran peasants. Also, for her the tension between the idea of a unified 
peasant movement and her experience as women tended to come up against each other. For 
example, she remembers that during the initial period of the land occupations, both men and 
women would work, cook and suffer together, but that once the land had been “won,” men 
would go back to oppressing women and treating them as if they were less and under their 
control.  
I will elaborate some more on this topic in the next chapter, when I analyze the peasant 
movements that were created in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. However, before moving to 
that I would like to point out the importance that going beyond this type of historical myths has 
when working and studying subaltern groups. I would argue that the recovery of the experience 
of these subaltern groups is crucial to interrupt or destabilize the type of dominant historical 
narratives that try to negate their existence. However, at the same time, it is important to 
interrogate the ways in which these myths and collective memories are also divided internally 
(Portelli 2010), shedding light on certain experiences and at the same time as rendering others 
invisible. 
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Chapter 5. “We are the agrarian reform!” Palm oil, the state and the struggle over 
land and value in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch  
The multitude as a political force was born into –out of– the experience of defeat. 
— Retort Collective (2005:4–5), Afflicted Powers 
 
The aftermath of Hurricane Mitch came with an escalation of peasant agitation that seemed to 
reanimate the history and legacy of the peasant movement during the 1960s-70s golden age of 
agrarian reform. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Aguán. The destruction left by 
Mitch exacerbated older tensions and contradictions at the same time that it opened up space 
for the Catholic Church and the INA to operate in favor of some of the peasant groups. The 
result was a group of new peasant movements which, navigating the tensions between a 
fragmented and deeply patronage-based state and a palm oil industry controlled by a handful of 
powerful palm men, attempted to carve out some living space within the valley.  
There is an overarching tendency in recent studies of the Aguán – whether  journalistic 
notes (Carasik 2013), NGO reports (Bird 2013) or academic activist literature (Boyer and 
Peñalva 2012; Kerssen 2013) – to present the contemporary peasant movements as a unified 
entity with a single history.85 One explanation for this may be that most of the bigger and better 
known movements, such as the Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MCA) or the Unified Peasant 
Movement of the Aguán (MUCA), have names that refer to the region as a whole. I would also 
suggest that this picture of unity and coherence has something to do with the overarching 
                                                        
85 Vinay Gidwani and Dinesh Paudel (2012:262) identify a similar situation in Nepal regarding the Maoist 
movement. According to them, “‘Maoist’ is a retrospective description of heterogeneous peasant uprisings 
that was contingently articulated as a movement in the mid-1990s. Condensing this heterogeneity under 
the label ‘Maoist’ risks obscuring the long histories of local struggles as well as the diverse conditions and 
unanticipated events that made the Maoist movement possible.” 
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historical narrative described in the last chapter and with how different people and 
organizations tend to “attach” or locate their own particular experiences within it. There is,  
Figure 7. Location of peasant movements analyzed 
 
 
moreover, a tendency to focus on the more paradigmatic cases, leaving aside some of the smaller 
and lesser known ones. This clearly has to do with resources, as certain organizations, without 
being exactly rich, have access to a significantly larger amount of money and technical capacities 
to get their story out. Finally, since the larger movements are located in the lowlands, the history 
of the peasant movement as a whole tends to be told as irradiating from there, rendering 
invisible, or at least making it very hard to glimpse, the histories of those communities and 
movements located in the hills. 
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There is also some truth to the idea of the single overarching historical process, as there 
are shared elements between the movements and shared experiences between their struggles. 
Nevertheless this should be understood as a form of unity in diversity, in which the broader 
shared experiences and elements branch out into different particular trajectories that are shaped 
by the internal differentiations and tensions, as well as the transnational forces, that came to 
produce the Aguán region. 
 The most important difference between these peasant movements is the one between 
what I call “hills” and “valley” peasant movements. On the one hand, hills peasant movements 
refer to those movements that were created in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and that were 
initially formed mainly by landless peasant families from the hills surrounding the Aguán valley. 
These were families with little to no organizational experience in the cooperatives and with very 
little knowledge of oil palm monoculture. They tended to target for recuperation lowlands 
estates on the left bank of the river that in most cases were not covered by oil palms. Thus, 
initially, they dedicated their effort to reenact the sort of agriculture that they knew best, slash 
and burn production of staple crops. However, eventually the attraction of monoculture became 
very strong, forcing these movements to seek paths towards the palm oil industry, mostly as 
sellers of labor power, but ideally as producers of the raw material.  
A valley peasant movement, on the other hand, refers to those created by former 
cooperative members and a younger generation that claims to be their sons and daughters. Born 
into or molded by the oil palm monoculture, these movements organized around the idea that 
their lands had been taken away illegally in the early 1990s. They targeted former cooperative 
lands on both the left and right banks that were cultivated with oil palms in full production.  
Unlike the hills movements, these organizations’ and communities’ intentions have always been 
directed towards the oil palm monoculture, but as raw material sustaining need economies and 
as a way of keeping for themselves a larger cut of the surplus they produce. 
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In this chapter, I will analyze the historical trajectory of three such movements, focusing 
on the period between the sale of the cooperatives and the 2009 military coup that ousted the 
democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya. My aim is to shed some light on the way in 
which these movements navigated the tensions between state and capital in an attempt to 
consolidate a foothold in the region as landowners. I am particularly interested in showing that 
the Aguán region has become a social formation overdetermined by the oil palm monoculture. I 
will begin with the cases of the Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MCA) and the Peasant 
Movement of Rigores (MCR). These two are the quintessential hills peasant movements. While 
the MCA is the direct result of the organizing efforts of the Catholic Church in the aftermath of 
Mitch (see Chapter 4), the MCR had a much more spontaneous birth, with little to no initial 
external support. Next, I will present the case of the Authentic Peasant Movement of the Aguán 
(MARCA). Unlike the MCA and MCR, MARCA is a valley peasant movement born on the left 
bank. Beginning in 1996 with its attempts to recover the lands that it asserted had been illegally 
taken by Miguel Facussé and René Morales, it is also one of the first movements of this kind. 
Finally, I will briefly characterize the situation of these movements in the aftermath of the 2009 
coup, as a way of bringing together some of the chapter’s claims about the structuring of the oil 
palm monoculture. 
Before moving to the cases, it is important to add that this chapter’s temporality is a bit 
tricky. With very few exceptions, most of the historical reconstruction of the movements was 
done through interviews and memory workshops in the communities. In this sense, specific 
dates of particular events were sometimes hard to corroborate. Also, it was impossible at times 
to disentangle current events and processes from previous ones, contradictions tended to arise 
between different people’s accounts, and arguments would break out in the workshops 
regarding when certain situations took place. This means that even if I had wanted so, it would 
have been impossible to resort to what Trouillot (1995:14) calls the history “storage model.” In 
this model, “…history is to a collectivity as remembrance is to an individual, the more or less 
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retrieval of past experiences stored in memory.” Further “[w]ithin that vision, memories are 
discrete representations stored in a cabinet, the contents of which are generally accurate and 
accessible at will.”  
This chapter should be read instead as a way in which people’s past – and more 
importantly, the narratives that they construct of their past – inhabits and informs their 
understandings of their present. I combine data referring to the past with my own observations 
and their comments on the present to flesh out processes that are important for understanding 
the current state of these organizations and the region as a whole. Stylistically, I decide to 
refrain from quoting my respondents extensively, as this would have made the narrative 
significantly longer and more complex than what I have space for in here. Rather, what I present 
is my own elaboration based on the different narratives and variations recorded in an attempt of 
transmitting in a clearer manner the more general story.  
Arriving in the Promised Land: the MCA and the re-launching of the peasant 
movement in the Aguán  
In September 2000 the Guatemalan Jesuit priest and anthropologist Ricardo Falla (2000:n.p.) 
wrote an essay titled “Land Occupation Opens the way for Agrarian Reform” in the Nicaragua-
based journal Revista Envío. Falla begins his article with a short description: 
Around midnight on May 14, 700 landless peasants [families] of the Aguán, on 
Honduras’s northern coast, occupied lands that belonged to the now dismantled 
Regional Military Training Center (CREM) and that are currently claimed by 
local cattle ranchers and farmers. A number of armed attacks by the ranchers 
against the encampment set up by the peasant squatters culminated in the death 
of rancher Diógenes Osorto on July 27, but the occupation continues and is 
proving to be a transcendental event. 
For Falla, there were three reasons why this land occupation was “transcendental”: The 
first was historic, because of the role played by the CREM during the 1980s as the place where 
the United States trained the Salvadoran army and Nicaraguan Contras. The second was 
socioeconomic, since “this occupation seems to be rekindling the much-needed idea of agrarian 
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reform and could lead to the launching of a new, effective agrarian reform model as a way to 
fight rural poverty.” The final reason was geopolitical, because “The CREM lands in the 
department of Colón’s Caribbean coast area act as a corridor for drug-trafficking activities.” 
Without reading too much into his words, it is clear that Falla saw in the agrarian reform 
a key that would open the future of the country in those three directions (historically, 
economically and socially and geopolitically). For the Guatemalan priest, there were, moreover, 
…two factors that favored the creation of the MCA [Peasant Movement of the 
Aguán]. One was the space opened up by President Flores’s government when it 
appointed Aníbal Delgado Fiallos director of the National Agrarian Institute 
(INA) at the beginning of 1998, as he had enough backing to start formulating a 
new agrarian policy. The other was Hurricane Mitch, which forced many poor 
people to emigrate from the riversides and other high-risk zones where they 
lived. In several of the country’s departments, peasant organizations were able to 
attract the floating mass of people searching for land. In the Aguán, Mitch also 
made it necessary to organize using new methods and demands to help the 
population. The Trujillo diocese, and particularly its Pastoral Social coordinated 
by Pedro Marchetti, played a decisive role in this task. The Pastoral Social 
initiated the organization of Local Development Committees (CODELs) … as an 
alternative to the traditional and politicized local boards, or patronatos…The 
competitiveness and tension that had previously existed among the different 
national peasant organizations began to dissipate for the first time around this 
joint effort. 
Regarding the people involved in the occupation, Falla explains that  
The peasants who occupied the CREM lands were not from the surrounding 
areas... The Campesino Enterprises were organized in the departments of Colón, 
Olancho, Yoro and Atlántida, and when the decision was made on May 10 to 
occupy the CREM lands and was announced to certain government officials in 
Tegucigalpa as a sign of the year 2000 Jubilee, the peasants hired 50 trucks to 
meet up at a crossroads near the CREM lands four days later. From there, they 
would enter the former US military base at midnight. 
What Falla fails to mention is that in most cases these families came from the hills and 
had not been part of the cooperatives that were sold in the 1990s. Most had a direct or indirect 
relationship with the Church, either as Delegates of the Word, lay workers or through kinship 
ties with these. This land occupation and Falla’s interpretation of it have to be understood as a 
particular way of approaching the topic of agrarian reform, one closely tied to the reading that 
the Aguán’s PS had of the region and in accordance with the political practice that it had 
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followed since the late 1980s (see previous chapter). When Falla wrote this article, he was living 
in La Ceiba, a city two hours from Tocoa, but he had been in charge of the Tocoa Parish’s PS just 
a few years before.  
There was something effectively new about this approach to the agrarian reform. 
Historically, the rhythm and velocity of the agrarian reform process in Honduras had always 
been set by the pressure exerted by the peasant movement through land occupations or 
recuperations, as they are commonly known. However, the complement of this pressure was 
state support for reform, which waxed and waned. In this case, the designation of Delgado 
Fiallos created a more welcoming attitude toward reform, but in reality it was the combination 
of the PS’s support on the ground and international aid that spurred the state on in this 
particular case.  
The roots of the MCA 
If we had to locate a starting point for the MCA, it would probably be the forum “Together Let’s 
Strengthen the Agrarian Reform,” which I described in the previous chapter. This is not because 
the MCA actually took shape at that moment, but because the central elements were starting to 
come together in an embryonic form.  
First, we had Aníbal Delgado Fiallos’s attendance to the forum and his lip service to the 
need for a new agrarian reform. In addition, a group of mid-level functionaries sympathetic to 
the peasant movement were also to be found in the INA and Delgado Fiallos’s words signaled 
the opening of a space for action and support that they did not have before.  
Second, a confluence of interests in the Church seemed to point towards an agrarian 
reform process. On the one hand, there were efforts to obtain legal titles for peasants in the hills 
that formed the Sustainable Agriculture Movement, which necessarily required direct 
negotiation with the state. On the other, through the Socorro Jurídico (legal assistance) 
program there was a growing sensibility to the difficulties of those cooperatives that had not 
sold, but were not part of COAPALMA.  
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I was able to speak to various members of the Tocoa PS of this period – including 
Marchetti – and there seems to be an agreement that what eventually became the MCA and the 
Guadalupe Carney community – of which I will say more in a moment – was the logical result of 
the types of reasoning and conversations that were being held in this period. However, there is 
also agreement that Hurricane Mitch and the particular role played by the Church in the 
emergency and reconstruction period speeded up the process. 
Hurricane Mitch was a catalyst on several different levels. First, due to the particularly 
devastating impact that it had on the hills surrounding the valleys of the Aguán, Lean and Sula, 
a whole layer of rural poverty that had been hiding in clear view came literally walking down the 
hills into the major lowland towns and cities searching for refuge. They had lost their homes and 
crops in the disaster, making the housing question one of the fundamental and urgent needs. 
Second, the large amounts of aid money that were funneled to the country and the central role 
that the church had in the distribution, allocation and use of these funds, gave it the material 
tools to advance in such a project. This was particularly clear for Marchetti, who saw in this 
situation a window of opportunity to try to build citizenship from below through the CODELs 
(see previous chapter). Third, already before Mitch crashed into the Honduran north coast, 
there were talks by the national peasant federations about trying to come together and re-launch 
the movement. There is a saying in the Honduran left that “everything begins and ends in the 
Aguán,” so the idea of “restarting” the peasant movement from the Aguán made sense. Finally, 
there was the matter of finding the place in the Aguán where the project could be carried out and 
that was in accord with the legal limitations set by the LMA. The opportunity in this regard came 
from an unlikely source, as I will explore in the next section. 
The Regional Military Training Center (CREM):  from counter-insurgency 
hotspot, to home of the “new” peasant movement 
What eventually became the home of the MCA had been a U.S. military base known as the 
CREM. The history behind the land is a curious one which I heard several times from many 
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people – from MCA members to human rights activists based in Tegucigalpa – with different 
levels of detail, but with a very similar discursive structure. According to this narrative, whose 
more refined version can be found in the papers of the Church,86 the story of this piece of land 
begins in 1965 when the INA gave six thousand hectares of uncultivated land that had belonged 
to the Truxillo Railroad Company between 1912 and 1942 to Fausto Fortín Inestroza. This was 
an illegal transaction. First, national land could not be used for anything other than agrarian 
reform – which giving six thousand hectares to a single individual certainly was not – and 
second, because there was a prohibition on selling this sort of land (agrarian reform), which is 
exactly what transpired in 1977. In that year, Temístocles Ramírez, a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican 
origin, bought a bit over 5,700 hectares from Fortín Inestroza. This added another layer of 
illegality, as according to Article 107 of the Honduran constitution of that time, foreigners could 
not own land near the country´s coasts or international borders.  
In 1983 the plot thickened when, at the express request of the U.S. government, the 
Honduran state expropriated Ramírez’s lands to build the military training base known as the 
CREM. This base operated as a training school for the Honduran, Guatemalan and El 
Salvadorian armies, as well as for the Nicaraguan Contra. However, in 1987 Temístocles 
appealed to the U.S. government, demanding compensation for the lands he had lost. This in 
turn led the House of Representatives to withhold $17 million of a $51 million loan to the 
Honduran government until the latter paid that amount of money to Ramírez. Thus, in effect, 
the Honduran taxpayers paid $17 million to have the U.S. install its base in their territory. At the 
end of the day, the lands were paid for with foreign loans and legally defined as “fiscal” or 
national lands belonging to the Honduran government. 
In the early 1990s, as the military conflicts in the Central American region waned, the 
U.S. “returned” the lands to the Honduran state. This meant that it could and should be used for 
                                                        
86 Most of the information for this historical reconstruction comes from Fundación Popol Nah Tun (2011). 
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agrarian reform purposes, as they were national “fiscal” lands. However, the newly approved 
Municipalities law in its article 68 allowed local governments to sell and title national and ejido 
lands in their jurisdictions. This reform, which by the way did not last long – the changes to 
article 68 were reversed just three months after being approved –, did not include “fiscal” or 
national lands such as the CREM. Nonetheless, between January and May 1991 the Trujillo 
municipality sold these lands to local cattle ranchers, retired colonels and politicians for a grand 
total of less than $50,000, even though the state had paid $17 million for them less than a 
decade before. Two years later, in 1993, the Honduran congress requested the attorney 
general´s office to transfer the lands to the INA to be distributed among landless peasants. In 
practice, they remained underused and occupied by the illegal claimants until 2000. 
The next time that the issue of these lands came up was in 1999, during the donors 
meeting that took place in Stockholm to discuss the post-Mitch reconstruction projects that each 
Central American country had and how they would be funded by the international community. 
According to almost everyone that I spoke to regarding these lands, during his speech in this 
meeting, Honduran President Carlos Flores Facussé mentioned that in Trujillo there were 
“fiscal” lands that would be used for the relocation of those left without homes after the 
hurricane.87 
And thus the missing piece of the MCA puzzle came into place. By mentioning these 
lands in these terms, Flores Facussé had created the perfect opportunity for the Church and the 
INA to come together around a very concrete political project. The fact that these were “fiscal” 
lands meant that it entered within the legal framework of what the INA could do in terms of 
agrarian reform (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the connection with the housing crisis meant that it 
was easier to draw a line connecting the recuperation of these lands with the reconstruction 
                                                        
87 I have been unable to verify whether President Flores actually said this in his speech. 
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efforts, thus making more justifiable the active participation of the church. Let’s turn now to the 
process of organization of the movement. 
The prehistory of the MCA: from the hills and beyond to the coast of Trujillo  
If there seems to be a consensus on the status of the lands of the former CREM, the same cannot 
be said regarding the process of organization that led around 600 families to enter the lands of 
the former military base on May 14, 2000. The initial step taken was to start locating and 
organizing the families that would take part in the land recuperation. This was done collectively 
by the Church – specifically by Roque Jacinto, the coordinator of the Socorro Jurídico program 
–, the INA – with Román Valdés of Sonaguera taking a particularly active role – and the 
representatives of the national peasant federations (ANACH, CNTC, ACAN and to a lesser extent 
AHMUC and FECORAH).88 Using their different networks, particularly those of the Church´s 
delegates of the word, groups of landless peasants began to be organized all over the 
departments that were hardest hit by Mitch: Colón, Yoro, Olancho and Atlántida.  
Initially, the requirement was to be poor and landless, but through a later process of 
“depuration,” those people who had been part of the cooperatives that had sold the land during 
the early 1990s were banned, which in practice meant giving preference to those families 
dwelling in the hills before Mitch.  
These groups began to take part in meetings that began in late 1998, in which they would 
be informed of the history of the lands of the CREM and the peasant movement in the Aguán, 
the importance of collective work and of the need for a new agrarian reform, thus galvanizing a 
collective memory close to the one organized by the Jesuits (previous chapter) for the 
movement. In some cases, these groups were created on top of the CODELs, but in most cases, it 
was kinship and friendship ties which brought them together.  
                                                        
88 National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH); National Rural Workers Central (CNTC); 
National Peasant Association (ACAN):  Honduran Association of Peasant Women (AHMUC): and 
Agrarian Reform Cooperatives and Enterprises Federation (FECORAH). 
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For example, David, Mario and Roberto are brothers. Born and raised in the Department 
of Yoro, they arrived in Colón as kids in the early 1990s with their parents and settled in a 
community located in the hills just outside Trujillo. By the time Mitch crashed in, all three of 
them were married and living in different parts of the Aguán region. David worked as a 
construction worker in Tocoa. Mario –the youngest – was still living with his parents and 
Roberto was living in a neighboring community. With the hurricane Mario and Roberto, as well 
as their parents, lost their homes and lands and relocated temporally to David´s rented house in 
Tocoa. There, Esteban, the brother of Ana (David’s wife), who used to work in the INA, told 
them that they were organizing groups of poor peasants families to relocate in some national 
lands in Trujillo. This is how the three brothers, their parents and respective families became 
enrolled into the movement.  
Once the groups were created, INA functionaries would help them organize into 
Empresas Asociativas Campesinas (EACs, literally Peasant Associative Enterprises) of between 
10 and 30 families. These function very similarly to cooperatives, but do not fall under the 
cooperatives law. This was of course a requirement to become beneficiaries of the agrarian 
reform. However, as we will see later, the requirements and structure of this type of organization 
generated some frictions later on. Once the EACs were created, they had to enroll in one of the 
different national peasant federations and pay dues of around $50 (per EAC) to jumpstart and 
sustain the organization.  
Once these groups were established, general meetings began to take place in Tocoa with 
representatives of the EACs from the different departments of the North Coast. During these 
meetings, logistics and other administrative topics were discussed and either on the 13th or the 
19th – there is no consensus on this detail – of April, 1999, the founding committee was created, 
with representatives of the different national peasant federations. On May 10 the founding 
committee began to use all the means possible to let it be known that they intended to 
recuperate the lands of the CREM. And on June 4, 1999, they presented Delgado Fiallos with a 
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plan to recover those lands, which led the INA to carry out the first field inspection and to 
inquire into the legal status of the lands. However well-intentioned the INA director may have 
been, this process moved forward slowly, as the Institute was a heavily bureaucratic institution 
and many ministries were unwilling to help, something that has always been interpreted by the 
members of the MCA as proof of corruption.  
After a year of waiting for the legal process to move forward, the group of organized 
EACs decided to take matters into their own hands and recuperate the lands of the CREM 
directly. By then, there were 40 organized and INA-recognized EACs, as well as various working 
committees that mirrored those of the CODELs, creating two parallel structures. By then, as one 
of the leaders of the community told me, they were “an organized peasant movement without 
land.” Initially, the idea was to enter the lands earlier in the year; however, they received word 
that the local cattle ranchers who had taken the land illegally were waiting for them with armed 
men. They moved back the date to the 14 of May.  
On that day, or night rather, the organized families made the trip to the former CREM in 
around 50 trucks, buses and cars. All of the people involved remember that it was pouring rain 
that night. They also recall that the organizers assured them that there would not be any 
problems, that they would be welcomed and that there was some basic housing in the old 
barracks on the military base. This was not the case. As they approached the former CREM, they 
could hear bursts of AK-47 gunfire, as the guards of the cattle ranchers shot into the air to try to 
intimidate them. Emilio, whom we met in Chapter 2, remembers how his little daughters were 
scared and asked what was all that noise was, and that he told them that “…those are fireworks, 
they are welcoming us, they are happy to see us.”  
The soldiers guarding the gates to the former CREM put up a token resistance for a few 
minutes, but were quickly overwhelmed by the large numbers of people coming in. Once the first 
truck went past them, the rest followed and began unloading. There were no shelters to be found 
from the rain, and the families were forced to do the best that they could to put up nylon tents or 
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rustic lean-tos covered with wild palm fronds. This was the end of the journey, but it was just the 
beginning of their struggles. 
Organizing extraterrestrials: The birth of the MCA and the difficulties of carving 
out something new 
In one of my visits to Tegucigalpa I had the chance to speak with Laura. She is a middle-aged 
woman who had worked for the Tocoa PS during the late 1990s as part of the Socorro Jurídico 
program. Now a lawyer based in Tegucigalpa, she remembers well the discussions regarding the 
MCA that took place around the PS. During our conversation, I asked her opinion regarding the 
occupation. Her response was quite revealing: “The recuperation of the CREM was like bringing 
aliens [extraterrestrials] and dropping them in the middle of a field. Most of them did not know 
the place, did not necessarily know each other and definitely were not welcomed by the 
surrounding communities.” As we will see, this is a very apt way of characterizing the early 
history of the MCA.  
As I mentioned, even before the peasant families entered the land they had created a set 
of commissions that mirrored those of the CODELs. These working commissions were: logistics, 
security, health, infrastructure, discipline, faith team (a sort of ecumenical space), production, 
sports and arts, legal affairs, education, information and propaganda and the women´s team. 
Each one of these working commissions had different tasks. For example, the logistics 
commission was in charge of obtaining enough food to feed all the families, the security 
commission was a sort of community militia in charge of doing guard duty and protecting the 
community from the constant harassment of the cattlemen’s guards and the police.  
Below these commissions were the EACs, each of which elected its own board of 
directors as well as two representatives each for the movement´s general working commissions. 
Above the commissions there was the board of directors and the general assembly. The board of 
directors was composed of a member of each of the peasant federations present in the 
occupation (ANACH, CNTC and ACAN). The general assemblies were open to the public, but not 
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everyone had a vote; only one representative of each EAC (45), a member of each commission 
(12) and the members of the board of directors (3) could vote (a total of 60 votes).  
It would be in such a general assembly that on the 18 of May – just 4 days after entering 
the lands – that the community would receive its name. There was a debate between two names: 
San Isidro, patron saint of the farm workers (santo patrono de los labradores), whose day is 
May 15 (one day after they entered the lands); and Guadalupe Carney, in honor of the U.S.-born 
Jesuit priest who dedicated his life to the peasant struggle and was disappeared by the 
Honduran military in 1983.89 After a close vote, the assembly chose to name the community 
after Guadalupe Carney. Two days later, on May 20, during another assembly, the question of 
how to present themselves to the outside world came up. After a long discussion in which 
different possibilities were presented, they decided to name their movement the Peasant 
Movement of the Aguán (MCA). One of the concerns mentioned regarding this name was that it 
could render invisible other struggles for land that were occurring then and that might occur in 
the future in the region. However, the idea that won was that this movement was of all the 
peasants of the valley, even when not all of them took part in the formal organization. Most 
importantly, from the perspective of the leadership closer to the Jesuits, the movement should 
aspire to influence and rekindle different agrarian struggles in the region. 
During the early months, the atmosphere combined effervescence, fear and hope. There 
were daily general assemblies and the commissions were working hard trying to both survive 
and improve living conditions, with a particular focus on procuring basic services such as 
education and health.  Everybody knew that entering the lands of the CREM did not 
immediately translate in an actual control of the 5,700 hectares that they were disputing. To 
                                                        
89 Father Carney had disappeared while participating in an ill-fated guerrilla incursion from Nicaragua 
that was quickly crushed by the military soon after it crossed into Honduras. This probably also 
contributed to the elites’ hostilities  to the peasant organization taking up his legacy (see Martínez 2006 
for a characterization of the guerrilla, this period and the death of Father Carney). 
256 
 
remedy this situation, they moved in two directions. On the one hand, they began doing road 
blockades in front of their new home, which just happened to be the highway that connected the 
rest of the Aguán valley with the international port of Puerto Castillo. This stopped the flow of 
banana exports and aimed to pressure the government into regularizing their tenure over the 
recuperated land. On the other, the commissions organized occupation tours, in which all but a 
few of the men and women that were left to protect the main camp and the children would 
march together to one of the many properties into which the original lands had been chopped up 
during the 1991’s sale, take control over the plot, leave some people to defend it and move to the 
next one. This tended to be a dangerous, as in many cases the plots were protected by armed 
guards left by the erstwhile “owners.”  
These practices had two main and contradictory effects. Internally, they helped 
strengthen the collective social bonds of the MCA, which was basically a group of quite diverse 
people who did not know each other well before the occupation of the CREM. In the process of 
recovering the different plots and working in the commissions they were literally producing 
unity and the organization. Externally, however, it was a whole different story. First, there was 
the animosity and virulent reaction of the local cattlemen, who also happened to be influential 
people in the political life of the nearby city of Trujillo. Second, just try to picture that you live in 
Trujillo or one of the nearby villages. All of a sudden, over 600 families appear out of nowhere, 
occupy a number of plots of land and begin staging road blockades and clashing with the armed 
guards and the police. Further, you start to hear in the media and in the streets that they are 
bunch of land usurpers and thieves — or tacamiches, a pejorative term used to refer to 
organized peasants in Honduras.90  
                                                        
90 It is hard to pin down exactly what tacamiche means and so far my attempts to track its historical roots 
have been unsuccessful. In general, it appears to refer to rebellious or insurrectionary peasants. For 
example, Brent Metz (2010:294), mentions that between the 1960s and 1990 local elites in Copán and 
Ocotepeque in Western Honduras, referred to “…Guatemalan Ch’orti’ political refugees as tacamiches, or 
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This aura of danger and rejection around the newly created peasant community was 
heightened by the levels of violence that took place in the clashes between the MCA and the 
guards and police. For example, on July 27, 2000, there was a fierce clash with the guards of 
Henry Osorto, a former army colonel who claimed ownership over the former CREM lands. In a 
exchange of gunfire between both groups, Diógenes Osorto, Henry’s brother, was shot dead. 
Henry, an important figure in Trujillo, whose home stood as an affront on a hill in the middle of 
the lands claimed by the MCA, swore revenge, and tensions in the region were on the rise, to the 
point that the word in Tegucigalpa was that civil war had broken out in the Aguán (Falla 2000). 
In the end, the situation was brought somewhat under control with the intervention of a high-
level commission named by the president himself, but as we will see later, this blood feud was 
far from over.  
Some of the most painful memories that I heard from the people in Guadalupe Carney 
was related to this rejection by the surrounding communities during this period. Women, in 
particular, remember how in the hospital in the city of Trujillo – a 10- to 20-minute drive from 
their community – doctors and nurses would refuse to take care of patients that came from the 
“invasion” – as the Guadalupe Carney community was referred to. Moreover, according to 
people in Guadalupe Carney, pregnant women were not only refused service but told that it was 
better if those “little tacamiches die.” To go to Trujillo to buy supplies or access services such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
guerrillas…” Also, in 1994, in a community called Tacamiche, between the cities of La Lima and El 
Progreso in Northern Honduras, a group of former workers of the Tela Railroad Company responded to 
the Company’s decision to close the plantation plots in that sector by occupying around 800 hectares of 
land. Their idea was to produce maize for self-consumption and to request that the INA give them the 
land. However, both the banana company and the state responded with repression, which in turn led to 
increasing resistance, as the CNTC mobilized its bases to protect what came to be known as the 
“Honduran Chiapas” (Posas 1995). This episode, one of the first big mobilizations after the approval of the 
LMA in 1992, probably added a new layer to the meaning of tacamiche, as it is usually attached to 
organized peasants connected to the agrarian reform. It is in this terms that the notion is used in the 
report of the Truth Commission (C.V. 2012).  
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health or education (from the beginning, there was a local school in the camp, but it initially 
covered only primary school) was deeply painful, since people would constantly hurl insults and 
call them murderers and thieves. 
Danger and rejection tended to reproduce and exacerbate each other and had the effect 
of creating a subaltern identity by negation, in a process similar to that described by Ranajit 
Guha (1999:18) for the Indian colonial period: “…he [the subaltern] learnt to recognize himself 
not by the properties and attributes of his own social being but by a diminution, if not negation, 
of those of his superiors.”  
The more the peasants were rejected, the more they organized themselves to survive and 
the more friction this created with their hostile and alien surroundings. This solidified a 
particular identity as a community always in the struggle (siempre en la lucha).  It also closely 
connected to their religious roots – remember that many of the members were former delegates 
of the word and that much of their support came from the PS – and they tended to relate their 
experience with that of the “chosen people” of Israel. For example, in the celebration of the 
thirteenth anniversary (2013) of the MCA, I saw a sign that freely paraphrased the Bible’s 
Exodus 19: 1-4: “They came down from the hills to make their tents, in honor of the lands for 
which GOD gave them the keys.” 
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Figure 8. “They came down from the hills to make their tents, in honor of 
the lands for which GOD gave them the keys.” 
 
In terms of gender relations, the process of organization was one of flux. Most of the 
MCA families came from the surrounding hills and were used to forms of subsistence based on 
self-provisioning, with little to no collective labor outside of the extended kinship group. Once 
they entered the CREM lands, they were forced to work together, both as part of the EACs and 
also because every pair of hands was needed to build the community. Women faced a double 
work load, as they continued to take care of most of the domestic chores at the same time that 
they took part in the organization’s working committees and many also worked in the fields 
shoulder to shoulder with men. Initially, and for a period of about two years, no one was allowed 
to work outside of the organization. This meant that most of the provisioning came from either 
their work on the land or the humanitarian aid they received through the Church in the form of 
a food for work program (I will return to this topic later). Thus, there was little money 
circulating in the community. 
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 It is important to point out also that many single women took part in this occupation in 
an attempt to provide for their children and access a piece of land.91 This meant an even heavier 
workload, since to be a member of an EAC, it was necessary to work in the fields or in the 
committees. However, in most cases the women I spoke to remembered this period as one in 
which there was a lot of solidarity and spaces for women to work and spend time together. 
Chores such as carrying water, laundry, collecting wild vegetables and watching the children 
were done collectively, as their surrounding were seen as dangerous. Also, in a situation that I 
came to hear often in participants’ accounts of different peasant movements, the initial period of 
organization of struggle is remembered as one in which gender differences and inequalities were 
somewhat flattened. Women were allowed to participate freely in political activities and they 
considered important members of the organization. While most of the domestic work continued 
to fall on women, men became more active in doing chores such as looking after the children or 
cooking.  
Finally, according to Casolo (2009:408–09), the claim that “women would not have 
sold,” carried over into the occupation, and including women within the whole process was seen 
as crucial. According to her,  
Six months after the occupation, Guadalupe Carney’s leadership and 
representative assembly, at that time 95 percent male, cast a historic vote. They 
approved land rights and assembly membership for single women heads of 
households, joint title and assembly membership for both adults in the case of 
couples, and political education and skill-training workshops for families. 
                                                        
91 It is very common in Honduras’s rural areas for a man to leave his wife or partner and relocate 
somewhere else with a younger woman to repeat once more the pattern. The result is a significant number 
of single women who have to raise their children by themselves. The fact that gender plays such an 
important role in having access to land means that women have to constantly search for male 
companionship. The result is high levels of competitiveness between women that reinforces this form of 
almost nomadic masculinity. 
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As we will see later on, the carrying over effect of these “changes” or decisions would not 
last long, as the gender pendulum would swing back in the other direction, once the 
organization managed to better consolidate its position on the ground. 
A tale of failed projects and incomplete solutions 
At the same time as the members of the MCA struggled to carve out a living space in the former 
lands of the CREM, they entered into a set of relations with other institutions. This was of course 
essential in their attempts to stabilize their position in the zone and be able to improve their 
living conditions. It is within the constellation92 or force field of these relations and how they 
were deployed that we can begin to understand the form that the MCA took. 
I already mentioned the tense and volatile relation that the families of the Guadalupe 
Carney had with their surroundings. However, at the same time that these struggles organized 
the local scale, they were also enmeshed in networks of support and solidarity that operated on 
different scales. On the legal front, it was the movement’s strategy from the beginning to try to 
formalize their tenure over the land as quick as possible. When they embarked in road 
blockades, it was to pressure the government in this direction. The fact that the INA’s executive 
director was sympathetic to their pleas was important, as he visited the community on June 4, to 
discuss possible ways of resolving the issue. This was, however, a very slow and complex 
process, in which the different institutions involved did everything in their power to obstruct a 
movement that was seen as questioning the new agrarian property regime. Legal action against 
the government, with pressure in the streets and the plots was the strategy followed.  
                                                        
92 I borrow here, and deploy freely, Theodor Adorno´s (1973:163) notion of the “constellation.” According 
to the German philosopher, in a constellation, “[t]he history locked in the object can only be delivered by a 
knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of the object in its relations to other objects – by the 
actualization and concentration of something which is already known and is transformed by that 
knowledge.” 
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The results of this strategy were mixed. It was effective in allowing them to get a more 
stable foothold in the lands that they were claiming. On October 12, President Carlos Flores 
Facussé visited the community to distribute the first nine definitive land titles and to commit to 
signing a decree to compensate the former “owners” for the land they lost. These two elements 
beg for further explanation. As I mentioned earlier, the former CREM lands had been chopped 
up and divided into individual and private plots in the 1991 sale. This meant that each one of 
these plots had a legal deed; in total there were over 40 plots. Receiving title to nine of these 
was, of course, an important event. As one former member of the MCA’s board of directors in 
this period reported, “with this we now felt that we had really settled down on the land.”  
Compensation for the former owners was a much thornier topic. According to Honduran 
agrarian law, since these were “fiscal” lands, the state did not need to pay for them. However, it 
did have to pay for the “improvements” made on the land (here “improvement” means any sort 
of investment: trees planted, levees, buildings or other infrastructure constructed). The first 
problem was that once the President left the community he seemed to have forgotten his 
commitment to sign the executive decree. Thus, confirming that the relation between peasants 
and state is forever mediated by mobilization and conflict (Wolf 1969; 1966), 2001 began with 
the people from the MCA blockading the road again to remind the President of his 
commitments. These new blockades lasted around nine days and involved a few clashes with the 
police. This action led the President to sign executive decree 92-2001, which allocated nearly $2 
million to pay for the improvements. However, according to members of the MCA’s board of 
directors of this period, half of that money was used by the INA to pay “institutional costs” and 
only 23 properties were legally transferred to the MCA.93 There was also the problem of how the 
improvements were calculated, as in the end the appraisals of the properties were hugely 
inflated. A peasant from the MCA, for example, recalled how in the evaluation of the 
                                                        
93 Eventually, in 2007, President Manuel Zelaya would distribute another 18 titles. 
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improvement on one of the plots, it was claimed that there were about $10,000 worth of lime 
trees, but in reality there were only two old trees that had not even been planted by the supposed 
owner. The question of the lands’ value has never been truly resolved, and it became an ever-
present encumbrance on the organization, which has had to spend large amounts of money over 
the years on the legal battles. 
On a more everyday level, the role of the Church was crucial. At the same time as the 
MCA struggled to legalize their situation on the lands, they also began creating the community 
of Guadalupe Carney and much of the work that went into this was bankrolled by international 
cooperation94 channeled through the Church. For example, one of the first things that needed to 
be done was clearing the land where the homes would be constructed and dividing it into the 45 
sectors in which the EACs would settle. All of this work was done by the people of the 
community – both men and women – and financed through the program of work for food. The 
PS created two foundations (San Alonso Rodríguez in 1999 and Popol Nah Tun in 2003) to 
distribute and allocate the funds that initially were coming as part of the post-Mitch 
reconstruction process, but later also for particular development projects. In this way, from 
2000 and until around 2006, the Guadalupe Carney community received a significant amount 
of funds in the form of productive projects or the like (see Cano 2010). These projects ranged 
from the promotion of crops such as rice or vegetables, to cattle grazing and the creation of 
small female-run and collectively-owned convenience stores. International NGOs or 
organizations would visit the community and support it in different ways. For example, through 
a project sponsored by an Italian organization, a youth and arts group was created, as well as a 
                                                        
94 Which in the U.S. is understood rather as “aid.” 
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community radio. Also, a “house of culture” was built using only local materials and taking 
advantage of a site of thermal waters, a small guest lodge was constructed.95 
In most cases, people in the community today view these projects as failures. Rice was 
introduced as a cash crop, but this did not take into account how dry the lands were, the 
problems of installing irrigation systems, or the lack of markets where it could be sold. A chicken 
raising project was implemented, but the animals chosen were for modern farms and could not 
survive the harsh conditions of the settlement and died. The thermal waters lodge never 
attracted much tourism because it was not very well publicized and also, according to the people 
from Guadalupe Carney, visitors were scared of trying to stay there.   
It is easy after reading this to conclude that here as elsewhere these sorts of development 
projects come from outside and above  and do not really improve the living conditions of the 
poor (Ferguson 1990; Incite! Women of Color Against Violence 2007). Even more 
problematically, this sort of project created a patronage system in which the community came to 
rely heavily on funds and projects from outside, without much installed capacity left in the 
community. Once the cooperation agencies began to pull back in the mid-2000s, much of the 
organizational fabric began to unravel. The glaring absence of the state remained a constant, 
and one that continuously reminded the PS of their role as a parallel state and of the failure to 
construct active citizenship through the process of agrarian reform. 
Organizational tensions and the eventual crisis 
The MCA was organized around working commissions and a general assembly that were made 
up of members of the EACs. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the EACs and the 
movement were one and the same thing. Just as in the case of the cooperatives, the nucleus and 
                                                        
95 There were also many projects that in the end were never developed. The most astounding one was the 
proposal, by a member of the PS, to install a maquiladora in the community to employ the young women.  
I heard an army colonel propose something similar as a way of resolving the current agrarian problems of 
the region. 
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principal objective of the EACs is production for consumption (need economy) and not 
necessarily political change or even political organization.  In contrast, the MCA, as a result of 
the alliance between the peasant movement and left-oriented Jesuits, was supposed to be the 
beginning of a radical process of transformation in the Aguán, a spearhead of an agrarian reform 
process from below that would sweep away the old structures of domination in the region. 
For EACs to be mobilized politically, however, something had to be missing in regards to 
their productive cycle (M-C-M’; as we saw in Chapter 3). In the case of the 45 EACs that formed 
the MCA, this was foremost land. The organization was understood as the necessary vehicle to 
access land and in turn, much of the unity of the movement rested on this aspiration. With this I 
am not trying to say that the only reason that the MCA existed was to access land, since the 
relationships that could be built around this access were  also very important (work, education, 
health, housing, etc.) — a sort of agrarian citizenship, to use Wittman’s term (2009). My point 
rather is that the center from which the connections between EACs and MCA gravitated was 
precisely the issue of access of land, or rather its recuperation. This tended to create a 
disjuncture every once in a while when the more immediate issues came against a broader 
political understanding. Let me illustrate. 
In the early days of the recuperation in 2000, the struggle to recover the land generated 
a high level of internal unity, as was clearly shown in the recuperation tours that the movement 
carried out. At that moment, unity came before anything else, because this was the most certain 
form of success and survival. At that time there was no clarity regarding how they would 
organize themselves to work the land. Simplifying a very complex set of internal discussions, we 
could say that in the end they had to decide between three different models of tenure and 
collective work. The first one was promoted by the INA. According to functionaries of the 
institution, the easiest and quickest way to resolve the issue was to push for a single land tittle 
for the whole 5,700 hectares and create a second-level cooperative – similar to COAPALMA – 
that would group together the 45 EACs. This model was rejected offhandedly because most of 
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the members feared that by having a single title, it would be easier for a few corrupt leaders to 
control everything and eventually sell the land. It is important to remember that most of the 
people in these EACs came from the hills and had a tendency to distrust any form of leadership 
above them, had very limited experience in political organizations and were not tend very open 
to the idea of collective work. Most members only knew the people that were part of their own 
EAC, and these tended to be organized around kinship and friendship ties, which also made it 
complicated to trust strangers. For example, David, Mario and Roberto, whom I introduced 
previously in this chapter, were organized into an EAC formed mainly by family members and 
neighbors of their home in the hills outside Trujillo and initially did not know anyone outside of 
this close circle. 
The second alternative was to keep everything as a collective property until they 
managed to recover all of the land and then divide it in equal pieces between all of the EACs. 
This way unity and strength in numbers could be sustained. Finally, the third option was to 
organize a raffle that would define the order and location of the land that each EAC would 
receive; this was the option that won. This decision meant that the way in which the former 
CREM had been divided among the different cattlemen and retired colonels remained intact 
even after the MCA took control. It also meant that the sizes of the plots that each EAC would 
receive would be uneven, but also that what they would find growing on the land would be 
different. For example, some of the plots were planted with oil palms, while others only had 
thick bush. Because the lands were quite dry, location would make a world of difference in terms 
of income. It also meant that for the 23 EACs that received their land titles first, the incentive to 
join the struggle to recover the rest of the land destined for the remaining EACs diminished 
significantly. Finally, it also meant that some of the EACs, the ones that were favored by the 
raffle, would be able to begin working at once and for most of them this was the most important 
thing. Had they not joined the organization in search of a piece of land to work? 
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This tension between the political and the economic – between the EACs and the MCA – 
became even more evident after a significant amount of the external cooperation funding that 
the community received was cut off in the second half of 2005. From the beginning, the board of 
directors and the MCA’s structures – as the working commissions are known – were financed 
directly through external funds; EACs did not have to pay dues. Once the funds stopped coming 
in, various commissions – such as arts and sports – simply stopped functioning and the board of 
directors had a harder time getting its work done. The organization as a whole entered a crisis.  
The situation worsened in 2008, when on the early morning of August 3 a group Henry 
Osorto’s armed guards fired upon a group of MCA peasants and detained a 13-year-old girl from 
Guadalupe Carney for around 30 minutes. The community responded first by calling the police, 
which told them that they could not intervene, and then by taking manners into their own 
hands. Around 300 people surrounded Osorto’s home, which is located on a hill in the middle of 
what used to be the CREM. The guards responded by firing into the crowd, killing one of the 
peasants, which in turn led to the MCA’s security team to fire back and close in on the house. It 
is not yet clear how, but the house went up in flames, with a final death toll of 11, including 
Henry Osorto himself and most of the people present in his house. This action can be seen as an 
illustration of what Guha calls the “modality of inversion”: “… a political struggle in which the 
rebel appropriated and/or destroyed the insignia of his enemy´s power and hoped thus to 
abolish the marks of his own subalternity” (Guha 1999:75). 
After the “Casa Quemada” incident (burnt house) – as it is commonly known –, the 
levels of repression and persecution by the local police forces and armed guards of the MCA 
increased. Arrest warrants were issued against the leaders of the organization, whether they had 
been present at the shootout or not, which forced 18 of them to escape to Nicaragua for a few 
months until the tension subsided. This in effect decapitated the MCA as an organization, 
leaving most of the decisions to be taken either by the local representatives of the national 
peasant federations or the EACs themselves.   
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When the hills meet in the valley (1): between the political and the economic 
What I call the tension between the political and the economic can be seen as a condensation of 
the contradictions between hill and valley that I have been discussing in the last 2 chapters. The 
people that made up the MCA were mainly peasant families that in the period prior to Hurricane 
Mitch had been dwelling in the hills that surround the valleys of the Aguán, Lean and Sula. With 
very few exceptions, due to the restrictions in the selection process (people who had been part of 
cooperatives that sold could not take part), they had no experience in collective enterprises such 
as EACs or cooperatives. They were used to producing staple crops such as maize and beans, 
using slash and burn agriculture, and had little experience in producing for the market. Once 
they joined the collective endeavor of the MCA and the Guadalupe Carney community, however, 
they were confronted with many of the forms of discipline that had created the tension between 
hills and valley in the first place (see Chapter 2).  
Because much of the initial organization was done through the Church’s networks, with 
members of the PS very involved in the process, the MCA members borrowed forms of 
organization from these sources. For example, the process of selection and creation of the 
working commissions replicated how the CODELs were organized. At the same time, however, 
to be agrarian reform beneficiaries, they had to be organized as EACs. And, if we remember 
from the previous chapter, it was exactly against this type of organizing, and the forms of 
patronage and corruption that it engendered in the cooperatives, that the Jesuits created the 
ideas of the CODELs as a counterbalance.  
This tension between hills and valley, took also a very particular form in relation to the 
palm oil assemblage. Scattered throughout the former CREM lands there were plots planted 
with oil palms. Initially this was seen as a nuisance rather than as a blessing by those who 
received this land. According to Emilio, this had to do with the fact that most of the people had 
never seen oil palms before, nor did they know how to work with them, as they had labored most 
of their life making milpa. He remembers that he himself did not know much about the crop but 
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that he met a guy that worked as a truck driver in San Alejo, close to El Progreso, where there 
are oil palm plantations. He asked him a few questions about how the work was done and he 
began cutting and collecting the fruit from scattered plants that could be found in the different 
plots. He remembers that at that time, the early 2000s he could leave the fruit bunches on the 
road with no fear that anyone would steal them. This lasted until the mid-2000s when more and 
more people came into contact with the crop, particularly by working as day laborers in the oil 
palm plantations that can be found close to the Guadalupe Carney. Once the members of the 
cooperatives were allowed to work outside of the community, the oil palm monoculture began 
moving quickly into the center of everyday life in Guadalupe Carney.  
The fact that most of the productive projects financed with cooperation funds had failed 
meant that in the end the EACs were left with limited options. Those whom luck had rewarded 
with plots that had oil palms had the chance of a precarious existence as need economies, 
producing raw materials for one of the extraction mills located around the former CREM. For 
the rest, life became a complex combination of different sorts of activities, such as growing 
meager milpas – due to the poor quality of the soils – some form of meat or milk husbandry or 
selling grazing grass as animal feed. Others worked as day laborers on the oil palm plantations – 
owned by Miguel Facussé and René Morales – close to the community. In all of the cases, the 
limitations and problems for male youth, which I described in Chapter 3 in discussing the BPA 
cooperatives, remained. With very few opportunities to join one of the EACs as members, young 
men were also forced to look for work as day laborers. As I will mention shortly in discussing 
MARCA, these dynamics were deeply gendered. 
 For the peasants, this constellation of activities aimed at escaping poverty by retaining 
some control over the value they produce. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, Honduran peasants 
refer to working for someone else’s benefit as “giving their lung.” This for them was the most 
important thing to avoid, however unavoidable it might turn out to be. The idea and necessity in 
many cases of having to work for Facussé or Morales, taking into account the infamous position 
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that these figures have in the peasants’ understanding of the region’s history is profoundly 
painful. The oil palm monoculture is understood as the only viable way out. If they can plant 
their own oil palms, then they do not have to give their lungs to the palm men, but can keep 
their earnings and improve their lives. According to this logic, land and labor could be mixed in 
a way that value is retained within the community. However, for this form of the labor theory of 
value to come alive, money capital is also needed to jumpstart the process of production. In 
contrast to the BAP cooperatives of the 1970s and 1980s, today it is nearly impossible for the 
new EACs to access enough credit or financial support to cover the initial high cost of an oil 
palm plantation. And here we come back to the failure of the externally financed productive 
projects and the lack of financial resources within the EACs.  
At the end of the day, their fates seemed to be inextricably entangled with that of the oil 
palm monoculture. In the best case scenario – need economies producing raw materials for the 
palm men’s extracting mills – they are able to retain a larger fraction of the value they produce. 
However, as the case of COAPALMA shows, unless they are able to move up the production 
chain, it is unlikely that these enterprises would be able to eventually include the younger 
generation, which would be forced to continue working on the larger plantations or moving all 
together outside of the region.  
It would seem that there is no escape from the oil palm monoculture. In the case of those 
EACs whose plots are covered in oil palms, the fruit must be sold for cash. Cash that then is 
distributed among the members so they can provide for their families. Oil palms, due to their 
productive process, exclude the possibility of combined farming; you either dedicate all of the 
available land to them, or you produce something else. In the cases of those EACs whose plots 
do not have oil palms, the incentive for collective labor is limited, as the different households’ 
provisioning depends more on wage labor in the neighboring oil palm plantations. With this 
process of monetization, the separation between paid and unpaid labor – with its deeply 
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gendered dynamic (described in the last 2 chapters) — begins anew. This is labor capture by 
other means. 
The members of the Tocoa’s PS saw in the MCA and the Guadalupe Carney community a 
chance for rekindling the agrarian reform in the region. However, as much as they tried, they 
were unable – and maybe even unwilling – to manufacture an alternative to the oil palm 
monoculture. In practice, by following the organizational blueprint of the state – with its heavily 
disciplined cooperatives and EACs – the end result was a reenactment of the process of labor 
capture experienced by those families that arrived in the region in the 1970s and 1980s as part 
of the BAP. The context and specific conditions were different, of course, but the broad strokes 
were basically the same: impoverished peasant households, unused to the disciplines of 
collective and organized labor, and with life histories predicated upon movement and migration 
were turned into disciplined workers fixed to a specific place. 
I will continue to develop this argument in the next section, as we move from the 
experience of the MCA, to that of another hills peasant movement: The Peasant Movement of 
Rigores.  
The Peasant Movement of Rigores: from poverty in the hills to poverty in the 
valley 
The Peasant Movement of Rigores (MCR) is centered near the community of the same name on 
the Aguán’s left bank, about 30 minutes by car from Sonaguera, and about 40 minutes from 
Tocoa. To get there, you have to go past the village of Rigores until you reach a large Guanacaste 
tree. Known by the people of the neighboring village as either the Guanacaste Colony or as the 
“invasion,” the official name that the families that live there give to the community is Nueva 
Vida, or new life.  
The history of the area in which the village of Rigores is located is tied up with that of 
natural disasters in the region. According to some of the earliest dwellers, before 1974 the zone 
was covered with trees and thick bush, with just a few scattered houses and no road to speak of. 
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This began to change in the aftermath of Hurricane Fifi in late 1974. It seems that Rigores was 
the closest area to the Aguán river on its left bank that was not flooded after the hurricane and 
many of the people who lived closer to the river and either were rescued or managed to escape 
on their own, ended up in this place. Refugees flocked to the community and began building 
houses and occupying land to make milpa. For those who arrived later or were unable to gain 
access to these lands, the journey continued up into the hills, where they repeated the patterns 
of the migratory agriculture that I have discussed in previous chapters.  
Sometime in this period, several cooperatives affiliated with FECORAH were created in 
the region, but they never received support to shift to oil palm production, since they were from 
the left bank and part of the “outside” cooperatives that I discussed in chapter 3. The soil in the 
area is very hard and dry and not particularly fertile, which meant that production was never a 
lucrative activity. In the case of the cooperative Unión Rigores – located exactly where the MCR 
was to later be founded – the 41 members planted a few hectares of milpa and tended to rent 
their land out to local cattle ranchers for grazing. The members of the cooperative did not live on 
their lands, but in the neighboring village of Rigores.  
Around 1996 or 1997, a group of poor peasants took advantage of this situation – absent 
owners and seemingly idle land – and invaded the 662 hectares assigned to the cooperative. 
Unable to recover their lands, Unión Rigores decided to sell them to a local cattleman, Federico 
Rivera. According to Macías (2001), the sale was for around $250,000, however, among the 
people in the community I heard of prices as low as $10,000, and according to Juan, a lawyer 
who later worked for the MCR, the land sold for around $45,000, which was the amount the 
cooperative supposedly owed in loans to the state. Juan also asserted that the sale was signed 
solely by the secretary – which is illegal – and was never sanctioned by the INA – which is also 
illegal.  
According to Luis, one of the founders of the MCR, it was around this time that they 
began discussing the possibility of occupying these lands. But it would not be until the aftermath 
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of Mitch in late 1998 — when many people from the community and the surrounding area lost 
their crops and lands — that they would move forward to take the land. Unlike what we saw in 
the case of the MCA, the members of the MCR were not initially organized in EACs. However, 
there are two contradictory versions regarding the initial organization of the movement. 
On the one hand, according to Luis, they were simply around 70 families from the village 
of Rigores and its surroundings or from across the Aguán River in the right bank community of 
Las Mangas, who had all been left landless and homeless by Mitch. In contrast to the MCA, they 
did not receive any support whatsoever at the beginning, which in part reflected in the lack of a 
more formal and legal organization before entering the lands. Moreover — and also unlike the 
MCA — the MCR lacked a coherent narrative about how the lands had been illegally acquired 
and why the movement had the legal right to occupy them. In this case, and Luis was quite 
adamant about it, they entered into the lands “a punta de huevos” – literally by “pure balls” – 
because they were hungry and needed that land.  
On the other, according to Juan’s account, the initial movement was organized by 30 t0 
35 former members of Unión Rigores, who were against the sale and wanted to recover what 
they deemed had been taken illegally from them. To increase their number, they began to let 
people in and it is here where people like Luis fit into Juan´s narrative.  
Juan’s version is more pervasive than Luis’s among both members of the MCR and of the 
peasant movement. What is important to point out is that here, as in the case of the MCA, the 
possibility of making a claim about the illegality of the previous acquisition of the lands was 
crucial. Peasant organizers and leaders in Honduras generally understand that for a successful 
land recuperation you need two things: pressure on the land – actually occupying it – and a 
plausible legal claim. The legal claim, moreover, must be articulated within a particular 
semantic framework, “…a common language or way of talking about social relationships that 
sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can 
occur” (Roseberry 1994:361). 
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In the case of the Honduran peasantry, this common language has to be that of the 
agrarian reform legislation and tradition. This, of course, explains the centrality of focusing on 
national or former agrarian reform lands and the meaning that is given to the notion of 
“recuperating,” as against occupying land. It also speaks to the political tradition  inaugurated 
during Carías regime of respecting private property above everything else, with the state – the 
military, really – as its fundamental guarantor. 
This harks back at the discussion of how more institutionalized historical narratives are 
woven and selected from among different individual memories and experiences (Portelli 2010). 
It also points to the importance of exploring how understandings of the past are created in 
particular contexts and in relation to particular political objectives (Trouillot 1995). For 
example, Luis’s interpretation of the beginnings of the movement is based on a rather 
masculinized version of the labor theory of value, according to which land belongs to those who 
need it and can claim it. This form of legitimizing property is quite generalized among peasants, 
but would not be very useful in court. Juan’s interpretation, on the other hand, reconstructs the 
situation rather from a legal standpoint, close to what the agrarian law would see as a legitimate 
claim on the land. Also, it is a version closer to the Jesuit template that I presented in the 
previous chapter. 
This is not to say that one is “true” and the other “false,” but rather to indicate that 
historical narratives and truths are always manufactured in the present and reflect the political 
necessities present at that moment. There might come a time when the need for legal 
legitimation of the origins of the movement will no longer be needed and then Luis’s 
interpretation might circulate more freely. In any case, my own research has led me to believe 
that what probably happened was something in between, that they did not have legal advice 
initially, and that hunger and poverty were the true and only motors behind the organization 
and commitment to entering the land.  
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Where there is a clear consensus is that on May, 23, 2000, at around 2 a.m. – about a 
week after the MCA entered the lands of the former CREM –, 60 to 70 families entered the 662 
hectares of the former Unión Rigores cooperative. The first thing they did once they entered the 
land was to clear the land and begin planting two hectares of watermelon and four of milpa. At 
this time, they were working collectively and as a single group. Also around this time they 
received support from a small national peasant federation called the National Diversified 
Peasant Federation of Honduras (FECADEH), which put them in contact with some lawyers. 
According to Juan, these lawyers presented a claim in the INA against Federico Rivera, the man 
who had bought the lands of Rigores. However, in contrast to the case of the MCA or, as we will 
see later, of MARCA, the claim was not against the illegality of the ownership of the land, but 
rather that Rivera was violating the agrarian law´s 500-hectare land ceiling.  They began 
organizing the families into six EACs to claim possession of anything over that ceiling, which in 
this case were the 163 hectares over the 500-hectare ceiling.  
The INA vowed to begin an investigation, but according to Juan, the institution, “as 
usual,” delayed the process, giving Rivera enough time to split up the property and divide it 
among three different people, thus eliminating the problem of the land ceiling. The decision to 
target the land ceiling was risky. On the one hand, it made the legal process easier, as the limit 
on the amount of land that a single person could have was clearly specified in the agrarian 
reform legislation. On the other hand, as it meant legitimizing Rivera´s ownership over the 
other 500 hectares of land. 
At the same time that this was happening on the legal front, the families that had entered 
the lands were constantly harassed by both Rivera´s guards and the police. According to Luis, 
they were evicted every other day or so, for a total of 17 evictions. However, these evictions 
tended to be non-violent, as the police would come and tell them that the land was not theirs 
and that they had to leave. They would pick up their things, move to the village of Rigores and 
once the police left, they would enter again. Sometimes the evictions would be much more 
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violent and a few times, some of them, including Luis, would be taken by the police for a few 
hours and then left free. This dynamic had an effect that was probably sought by both the police 
and Rivera: to delay the situation, giving Rivera some time to split up the land and wear down 
the would-be occupiers without leading to an all-out confrontation.  
The second wave of migration and the revival of the movement 
It is not clear exactly how long this dynamic lasted. However, around 2002-2003, the number of 
families involved had dwindled to 15 or 20. Because of the harassment and the fact that many 
had houses in the nearby village, most of the members stopped living on the lands they were 
trying to recuperate; this of course made maintaining a foothold on the property ever more 
difficult. It is also around this time that they changed lawyers. The new lawyer was named 
Obdulio Fuentes, and he began to speed up the process of obtaining legal personality 
(personería jurídica) for the EACs and registering them as legal entities with the INA. Fuentes 
also presented a new claim against Rivera, this time alleging that he was not using the land 
productively.  
Fuentes, however, ended up being more of a nightmare than a blessing for the peasants, 
as he tried to milk as much money as he could from them and continued to delay the process, to 
the point that eventually the INA dismissed the uncultivated lands claim. Just when it became 
evident that with him the process was going nowhere, he sold two of the EACs legal entities to 
another group of peasants who barged in and managed to take hold of around 200 hectares of 
the best lands.  
While this was transpiring in the legal area, the few families still engaged in the 
occupation began looking to attract new members, as a way of strengthening the movement and 
making it more difficult to evict them. This was done mainly through kinship ties: someone is 
family of someone who is a friend of someone who is looking for land. If previously most of 
families came from the neighboring villages, in this case most came from farther away, mainly 
from the hills surrounding Sonaguera. Most were migrant families from the western region of 
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the country – mainly Copán – who had been part of the phased migration into the hills of the 
Aguán (see chapter 2) and who had either lost their lands to Mitch in 1998 or found themselves 
in a position in which they could not hold onto lands up the hills.  
 To explain this second point, I need to make a brief pause and go back to January 10, 
1974. On this date, and as part of the reforms pushed forward by the military government, the 
Honduran Forestry Development Corporation (COHDEFOR) was created. With the founding of 
this institution, the state claimed ownership over all national forests, no matter what their legal 
status was. The idea was to create fiscal income in this way and thus promote national 
development. However, COHDEFOR never received enough resources to fully carry out its 
mandate. In the early 1990s, with the passing of the LMA, the situation changed somewhat, as 
the property of forestry resources was returned to the legal owners of the land, but with heavy 
restrictions on their exploitation. It is in this period that most of the conflicts between hillside 
communities and COHDEFOR began (for the case of the eastern region of the country, see 
Munroeaic, Southworth, and Tucker 2002; Tucker 2008).  
Castro (1994:144), for example, mentions that by the mid-1990s, the agrarian frontier in 
the Aguán was almost totally occupied, which led to families to move even further up the 
mountains. But “…this also meant the risk of eviction by the Honduran Forestry Development 
Corporation (COHDEFOR).” These restrictions become even stronger after Mitch, when the 
inflow of cooperation funds would give the Corporation enough funds for the first time to fully 
enforce its norms (McSweeney 2005). 
This was, for example, the case with Gonzalo, whose story we began in Chapter 2. We left 
his story when he was living with his parents and wife in the mountains above Sonaguera in the 
small community of Lorencito. By the late 1990s, his parents had already left to live in 
Sonaguera, due to their advanced age and the lack of social services in the mountains. He also 
told me that he was beginning to feel tired from all the hard work and scant output that he could 
get up in the hills. This led him to decide to sell the land he had (six hectares or so), but this 
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proved impossible. According to Gonzalo, the land registry office refused to recognize his rights 
to this land, because it contained forest that could not be touched, and thus he could not work 
on it, nor sell it. It never became clear to him why this happened, but it very likely had to do with 
COHDEFOR´s enforcement. Gonzalo also told me of another person who lived close to him and 
who began to double the usual wage rate for bringing down the forest found in his property and 
thus managed to keep his land and use it as he pleased.   
Gonzalo eventually decided to abandon his plot in the hills and move to Sonaguera with 
his elderly parents. There he heard from a friend of his father in law, who also used to live in the 
hills, that there was a group of peasants that had already won some land and that was seeking 
new people to enroll. This is how he first learned about the occupation that was taking place in 
Rigores. He went to visit and liked the lands and the community, although he was surprised to 
see that no one was living on the recuperated lands. He went back to Sonaguera, picked up his 
family and moved to Rigores. 
Creating a community from scratch: the creation of the Nueva Vida  
With the arrival of these new families, the situation began to change. Most of them were younger 
families with more energy, and since they did not have a house in the nearby village to fall back 
on, they had more to lose and greater resolve. This created frictions from the beginning. First of 
all, the “new” families – as they called themselves – felt that only those that were residing 
permanently in the occupied lands should be members of the EACs and the movement. This led 
to some of the “old” members who were still in the organization to leave the movement; in 2013, 
there were only about five “old” families left. 
A second tension was between Nueva Vida (New Life) – the MCR community – and the 
nearby village. Everything seems to have been good and merry when the people involved in the 
recuperation were also tied by kinship and friendship to the people who lived in the village of 
Rigores. Things changed as more and more unknown families, many with clear indigenous 
background, began to pour in and settle. It is around this time that the community began to be 
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dubbed “the invasion.” People describe these early years much as those in Guadalupe Carney 
talked about their own initial period, though the levels of physical confrontation and repression 
were less in Nueva Vida than in Guadalupe Carney.  
With the arrival of this second wave of immigrants things also began to improve, or at 
least consolidate. The San Alonso Rodríguez Foundation (FSAR) – one of two foundations the 
PS created to channel cooperation funds into the region – began working with the community 
sometime around 2002. The Foundation began providing basic construction items and trying to 
promote diversified forms of agricultural production (a subject we will return to later). They also 
hired Juan in 2003, a Ceiba-based lawyer, to come in and try to resolve the situation in favor of 
the MCR. It is also around this time that people from Nueva Vida began to hear that Rivera was 
requesting a new and more definitive eviction of the community. 
According to Juan, most of 2004 was spent in negotiations, trying to get Rivera to sell 
the lands to the INA, which in turn could assign them to the EACs. After the approval of the 
LMA, this had become the only way in which the INA could intercede in favor of peasants if the 
land was private property, as the possibility of expropriation was eliminated in the new law. This 
meant that after the courts had rejected the claims presented against Rivera, agrarian reform via 
the market was the only way to go.96 
As part of the process, the INA sent a commission to assess the land and valued it at 
close to $650,000, a price that Rivera, who had bought it for less than a tenth of that price, eyed 
approvingly. However, according to Juan, the sale fell through because the functionaries from 
INA that presented the offer to Rivera asked for a kickback for enabling the deal. Federico 
Rivera would not have any of it and backed out.  
                                                        
96 It is important to remember that at this period in time market-led agrarian reforms were on the 
upswing in Central America, as well as in many other parts of the world (Lahiff, Borras Jr, and Kay 2007). 
280 
 
With the breakdown of the negotiations, Rivera became more intransigent, calling 
openly for an eviction and threatening the people from the MCR with guns. The conflict began to 
escalate, reaching a peak in April 2005, when two leaders of the MCR – Santos Aguilar and 
Odilio Acosta – were gunned down by unknown killers in the village of Rigores. It was not too 
hard to point the finger at Rivera, who died not long after the killing, and at his son Eric Rivera, 
who continued pushing for either an eviction of the MCR or a payment of around $5 million.  
Executive Decree 18-2008 
I mentioned earlier that on March 31, 2008, little more than a year before being ousted by the 
military, President Manuel Zelaya signed executive decree 18-2008. It is worth digressing here 
for a minute to expand the discussion of that measure. The signing of this decree resulted from 
pressure by peasant movements on the ground combined with increased levels of agrarian 
conflict in the countryside (Ríos 2014). Some of the most relevant aspects of the decree were: to 
make an inventory of agrarian law cases that had been pending for at least two years in the INA, 
the National Agrarian Council (CNA) or the Supreme Court; to acquire those lands that were not 
subjects of pending agrarian law cases, but that were occupied by peasant families; the issuing of  
close to $36 million in agrarian debt bonds to compensate owners for these lands; and, allowing 
the INA to expropriate in those cases in which the disputed property was proven to be national 
land. The decree also created a special commission to provide follow-up and enforcement.  
The decree had a twofold effect. On the one hand, the reaction by the large landowners 
was of total rejection, both legally – with the Honduran National Federation of Farmers and 
Cattlemen (FENAGH) questioning the decree’s constitutionality in the Supreme Court, which 
led to its repeal after the coup97 – and politically, with a steep increase in the levels of violence 
                                                        
97 The action of unconstitutionality by the FENAGH was based on ten points of which I will mention four 
to illustrate. First, that the commission created violated the principle of equality, as the landowners only 
had one representative, while the peasant sector had at least three votes. Further, according to the 
FENAGH, the fact that in many cases the peasants were usurpers of land would make them a “privileged 
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against peasant communities. In the Aguán, as the epicenter of much of the conflict in this 
period, we find various examples, but I will mention just two. First, the increasing harassment of 
Henry Osorto against the MCA, which eventually led to the Casa Quemada incident in August, 
2008. Also, the gunning down of the MCA leader Irene Ramírez, on June 11, just one day after 
he spoke in a local radio station in Trujillo in favor of the implementation of the 18-2008 in the 
former lands of the CREM.  
On the other hand, the decree fueled the dreams of many peasant communities and 
movements that saw it and President Zelaya more generally as manifestations of a commitment 
to them that had been lacking since at least the 1970s and as providing the possibility of, at last, 
receiving legal access to lands for which they had been struggling for almost a decade. This came 
to seal a political alliance between Zelaya’s government and the peasant movement, and also 
reflected a growing sentimental bond between those families involved in the movement and the 
figure of Zelaya.98 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
class” within the commission. Second, that the decree violated various principles present in the 
constitution, including the right to property and the right of legal equality and security. Third, that the 
fact that the 18-2008 created a commission with powers to expropriate private lands, it was going against 
the current agrarian law (the LMA).  Fourth, that due to these elements, the decree contradicted 
international trade agreements, such as CAFTA, particularly in the aspects related to legal security and 
the protection of private property.  
It is clear how central was the concept of private property within the whole claim. It is particularly 
interesting the mention of CAFTA, which would seem to place international constraints on domestic 
agrarian policy and land redistribution (see Mattei and Nader 2008 for a broader discussion on the 
relation between law and dispossession). 
98 This was of course not only the result of the passing of this decree. It had to do with a set of populist 
policies that came to reshuffle much of the patronage system and improve the living conditions of the 
poorest in very concrete ways. For example, when the country entered the Venezuela bankrolled 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), the Venezuelan government donated trucks and 
agricultural machinery that was distributed among the peasant movements. For example, in the case of 
Rigores, they received two trucks. 
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It seems impossible, or at least inappropriate, to suggest a direct correlation between 
Decree 18-2008 and the ousting of Zelaya on June 28, 2009. However, it is impossible to deny 
that the decree constituted a breaking point, one in which the stakes were raised and the stage 
set for even higher levels of confrontation. A clear example of this took place just five days 
before the coup. On June 23, 2009, at around 1:50 in the afternoon, Fabio Evelio Ochoa, the 
UD’s major candidate of Tocoa, was returning home after an interview at a local TV station in 
which he spoke in favor of the controversial “fourth ballot box.”99 A group of gunmen opened 
fire on the Ford pick-up truck in which he was traveling. He received a bullet to the head, 
another to the back and two more in his left arm. He survived miraculously, albeit with severe 
brain damage.  
The attempted murder of Ochoa condenses most of the tensions and contradictions 
linking the Honduran agrarian crisis with the national political one. As a member of the UD, he 
was one of the main organizers behind the popular consultation or “fourth ballot box” vote that 
was to take place on June 28th; as leader of the Aguán-based popular organization COPA (to 
which I will refer more in a moment), he had been a vocal advocate for Decree 18-2008 and for 
MUCA – a movement we explore briefly later in this chapter – against Miguel Facussé and his 
Dinant corporation. This dispute concerned lands that Facussé seized illegally during the 1990s 
agrarian counter-reform. 
                                                        
99 The “fourth ballot box” (cuarta urna) was a vote that was supposed to take place on June 28, 2009, the 
day of the coup. The objective was to ask the population’s opinion regarding the possibility of convening a 
constituent assembly to rewrite and transform the 1982 constitution. For the sectors opposing Zelaya, this 
was seen as a clear sign that he wanted to reinstitute presidential reelection and remain in power beyond 
the end of his presidential term in 2009. It is known as the fourth ballot box because initially the idea was 
to place an extra ballot box – besides the ones for presidential, legislative and municipal elections – for 
people to vote in this regard. However, due to the pressure against the inclusion of this extra ballot box in 
the national elections, Zelaya decided to detach it from the national elections and turn it into a non-
binding poll, to see whether people agreed or not with the idea of a new constituent assembly. 
283 
 
For the case of the MCR, Decree 18-2008 had been received as a blessing, as their case 
had been included on the priority list. However, as I indicate later in this chapter, the coup 
would come to shut this door. In any case, the struggles around the Cuarta Urna and Decree 18-
2008, show vividly the connection between local and national conflicts and the way in which 
what would appear to be an isolated and relatively small movement, such as the MCR, was 
deeply entangled with other events taking place elsewhere. It also serves as a good corrective to 
the dominant way in which the coup has been approached, as abstracted from the agrarian 
dynamics of the country. 
When the hills meet the valley (2): organization and production 
In this section, I describe how collective work operates in the EACs and some of the tensions 
that it creates. This is, in effect, a second part of “when the hills meet the valley,” because much 
of that discussion is also applicable to the MCA case. First, just as in the case of Guadalupe 
Carney, the basic unit of spatial organization in the Nueva Vida community is the EACs (six in 
this case). There are six quadrants or sections, one assigned to each EAC. Each section is divided 
into a set of house plots, one for each family. Just as in Guadalupe Carney, these plots have a 
size of 1 manzana (0.75 hectares). I would argue that the decision to keep this size, instead of 
something smaller that would give them more collective space for the EAC´s cultivation plots, is 
a reflection of the background of many of the families, used to living scattered either in the hills 
surrounding the Aguán or back in the more mountainous lands of Copán. 
The cultivation plots are separated from the residential area. Here again, they were 
divided into six sections and each EAC can split it up and use it as it pleases. There can be some 
variation in this regard between the EACs. For example in Guadalupe Carney, there were some 
which had so little land or else the whole plot was covered by oil palms, so the EAC members 
preferred to work the whole extension collectively. In other cases all the assigned land was split 
into individual plots without leaving any collective land. The MCR’s EACs were a combination of 
both, which seems to be the norm in the Aguán for EACs or cooperatives not solely dedicated to 
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oil palms. Here, each member is assigned an individual working plot, usually between 0.75 and 
1.5 hectares, to do with as they please. A larger section is kept and worked collectively. In most 
cases in the Nueva Vida community, families would plant milpa, beans, plantains and cassava in 
their individual plots. In the collective ones there would be some combination of these staple 
crops and more commercially oriented ones, such as citrus trees. In 2014 they were also 
preparing to plant some oil palms (a topic I will return to later). With the support of the FSAR, 
they have also been creating demonstration plots with more diversified production, including 
vegetables, watermelons and other fruits. Because of the lack of irrigation – there is no running 
water, nor electricity – and the constant threat of evictions, people tend to cultivate seasonal, 
rather than permanent, crops. 
In terms of labor, the most common formula is a division of the working days. Each 
member has to work three days a week in the collective plots under the supervision of the EAC’s 
work coordinator, who is selected for this task by the general assembly. The other three days, the 
members can do as they please and either work in their individual plots or look for wage labor 
outside the community. If a member is unable to attend one of the collective workdays, he can 
either send a representative – usually a son or a brother – to cover for him, or he can pay the 
EAC a flat rate for the day. Work in both the individual plots and the collective ones tends to be 
done my men or their sons. Only in the cases of single women did I find women working the 
fields, since as I mentioned before, this is a requirement for becoming and remaining a member 
of the EAC. Just as in the case of the MCA this meant a double workload and even a third load 
for the women who, in addition to being members of an EAC, are also the teachers at the 
community’s primary school. This logic and practice of land to the tiller,100 which is so ingrained 
within the Honduran peasantry, places severe restrictions on single women. For example, I met 
                                                        
100 I characterized this logic in Chapter 2. The idea is that to have access to land you must work on it. As 
Esther Roquas (2002) shows, this reflects a clear gender bias, as women – due to the traditional division 
of labor – tend not to labor in the fields. 
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a woman whose EAC’s board of directors would not allow her to have a boyfriend, because this 
would mean that if they ever got married, that he would also have rights to the land.  
Further, particularly in the poorer EACs, women are expected to do exactly the same 
type of farm work as men, no matter their particular condition. I learned of a case in another 
peasant movement, where a 15-year-old woman, who had inherited the membership rights from 
his deceased father, was forced to do heavy labor in the fields into her seventh month of 
pregnancy. She ended up losing her baby and came close to losing her own life. When I 
discussed this situation with other men from the community, they would say that it was really 
sad, but what could they do? As one of them said, “I am not going to enslave myself just so that 
she can be relaxed. She should have a man to take care of her.” We see here again the 
generalized and very ingrained assumption that land ownership is necessarily a male-centered 
issue. 
Virtually all EAC members engage in some form of wage labor in the oil palm or citrus 
plantations near the community. I mentioned that there was not much cash circulating in 
Guadalupe Carney; this is even more so in the case of the Nueva Vida. In general, none of the 
productive activities that take place in the community produce any sort of monetary surplus. 
The few sales of maize and plantains, moreover, are to local “coyotes” or intermediaries, who 
pay significantly under the market price. This makes employment as day laborers, or as 
permanent workers in the case of many of the sons of members who cannot become members, a 
necessity for almost all males. For women, the situation is also constrained. They are all but tied 
to their homes and domestic work and have very few options for social mobility. In Nueva Vida, 
unlike in Guadalupe Carney, access to education is very limited. The options for teenage girls are 
to either help with the domestic chores or search for very badly paid work as domestic help in 
neighboring villages. The only exception I found was a family led by an exceptional woman, who 
worked all her life in the fields, but managed to see her four daughters through school. Two of 
them were the community’s teachers. 
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The land to the tiller principle collapses here, since actual practice is to provide land to 
men. Within this property regime – understood as the formal and informal norms and practices 
that regulate property relations –, the only way to access land is through labor in the fields. 
Women’s access to land was thus mediated either by a working partner or by taking on the 
double workload as a sort of surrogate man. This places severe restrictions on women’s 
autonomy and forces them to navigate a very complex social landscape. Gossip is always 
directed at single women and especially at those who are forced or decide to do things in a 
different way from the norm. Other forms of violence are also used to keep them in line. The 
EACs try to control women’s personal life in terms of who they see or go out with. Single women 
are constantly harassed by their supposed colleagues in the EACs and cooperatives, who tell 
them that they are going to be thrown out unless they have sexual relationships with them. 
Laura, a 30-year-old single mother of five and member of one of MARCA’s EACs, told me how in 
her early days in the Enterprise, she found out that there was a wager going around to see who 
would be the first one to seduce her and take her to bed.  
Further, even on those cases were women could have access directly to land, their 
capacity to exploit it was limited, as they could only rely on their close kinship relationships – 
usually a brother or an older son – to pool the extra labor necessary to work their individual 
plots and participate in the sessions of collective labor of the EACs, as well as taking care of their 
traditional domestic tasks.  
All of these elements position women in very particular places within their communities 
and in relation to land. Here, land is not only a resource, but as we can see, a thick knot of social 
relationships that link men and women with each other, but also with much broader processes, 
such as the monetization of subsistence and the oil palm monoculture. 
Enter the monoculture: the lure and barriers of the palm oil assemblage 
The EACs of the MCR recently initiated an effort to cultivate oil palms commercially. The case of 
the MCR is very revealing, as it shows the different layers of complexity that the articulation 
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with the oil palm assemblage involves. First, it is worth thinking about the centrality that the oil 
palms have in a community that does not produce them and is mainly populated by families that 
did not know about them before they arrived there.  
One day, I was chatting with a group of kids (around 8 to 12 years old) about Nueva Vida. 
I asked them what was it that they felt that their community had that could not be found 
anywhere else. One of the kids responded negatively, “It has no light [electricity], no running 
water and no palm trees.” This is for me one of the best examples of the sort of overlap that 
exists in the minds of many residents of these communities between oil palms and wellbeing or 
development. It is striking — and not uncommon in the Aguán — that such modern promises as 
electric energy and running water are conflated with oil palms (for a similar argument for South 
East Asia, see Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011).  
To understand how this comes about, we can begin with the sort of contrasts that are 
articulated around the palm trees. First, recall the discussion in chapters 2 and 3, where I noted 
that the development of the palm oil industry in the region was one of the main objectives 
behind the state’s promotion of the BAP.  This translated into a significant amount of 
investment in both infrastructure and the creation of plantations. All of this past labor had the 
effect of creating an uneven geographical development in the Aguán manifested in the tensions 
that I described in those chapters, fundamentally the ones between hills and valley and between 
the left and right banks of the Aguán River. When we look at the Nueva Vida community, it is 
located in the left bank and most of its inhabitants come from the hills. From this perspective, 
the most immediate difference between their poverty and the less severe poverty of other 
communities nearby is the lack of oil palms.  
This differentiation is lived in a much more everyday form, particularly for the youth. 
The road that passes in front of the community goes to one of Facussé’s more important and 
infamous palm oil plantations, Finca Panamá. This means that Nueva Vida residents see every 
day the workers passing by to or from their work on the plantation, riding motorcycles, using 
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their smartphones or talking about what they are going to do with the money they earned. This 
proximity to Finca Panamá creates other contradictions, since at the same time that the oil 
palms are seen and indirectly experienced as a means to a better life, they are also understood as 
a dangerous place and a place of death. Several disappearances and murders have taken place 
among those oil palms, involving the private security guards that patrol the plantation. 
The oil palm has to be understood within a social field that is organized by both these 
forms of attraction and the barriers that limit and condition how the different communities can 
enter in relations with the palm oil assemblage. I would argue that both the lure and the barriers 
are fundamental to understanding what I term the movement of the oil palm monoculture to the 
core of everyday life in the Aguán. In fact, part of the reason why this lure is so strong has to do 
with how hard it actually is to enter the palm oil assemblage as producers for these EACs. As we 
saw in chapter 3, the initial operating costs are quite high and there is no production of fruit for 
at least two years. For a community as poor as Nueva Vida, pooling enough resources in each 
EAC to buy the seeds has been a big struggle. The fact that they are unable to obtain credit and 
that there is no state support for palm production by smallholders is just one of the barriers that 
they have to confront.  
Another barrier to take into account has to do with acquiring seeds or seedlings and the 
certification of the oil palms. There is a whole sector of the palm oil assemblage that has to do 
with the growing and selling of seeds and seedlings to jump start production. There are, of 
course, different types of seeds and types of palms available, with quite significant differences in 
the prices. These differences do not have to do as much with the levels of production, but with 
the quality of the fruit and of the oil that can be extracted. The EACs obviously had to buy the 
cheapest seeds available, which will ultimately have an effect on the quality of their output.  
In 2003-04 an international organization called the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil 
Production (RSPO) was created. According to Adrienne Johnson (2012:3), 
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The  RSPO’s  objective  is  to  ‘increase  synergies’  …  between palm  oil  
production,  environment  and  livelihoods.  Beginning  in  2003  in  Southeast  
Asia,  this institution  has  sought  to  create  a  space  for  commercial  interests  
(e.g.  Unilever,  Cargill)  to negotiate  with  representatives  of  local  actors,  
especially  farmers,  and  cooperatively  devise production  regulations  to  ensure  
socially  and  environmentally-sound  production. 
In the 10 years since its creation, the RSPO has been pushing for criteria that would be 
needed to have a plantation or mill certified. Although the coverage of this form of certification 
is still limited, as very few companies and countries have fully embraced it, in the future it might 
have a significant impact on the palm oil assemblage, particularly in light of the criticism that 
the industry receives regarding the environmental and social costs of oil palm production. In 
regions like Central America, were most of the production is for domestic or regional markets, 
this form of certification would probably give rise to a two-tier market, in which certified palm 
oil, with its requirements of higher investment, would go to the export and regional markets, 
while non-certified oil would be left for domestic markets, driving down prices and living 
conditions for the producers in the latter sector (see Galt 2014 for the case of horticultural 
production in Costa Rica). 
While there are several requirements to become certified through RPSO, I will just 
mention two that apply particularly to the case of the MCR’s EACs. First, the RSPO Principles 
and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production Criterion 2.2 reads: “[t]he right to use the land 
can be demonstrated, and is not legitimately contested by local communities with demonstrable 
rights.” And one of the indicators is “Documents showing legal ownership or lease, history of 
land tenure and the actual use of the land.”  
This criterion is, of course, full of good intentions. According to Johnson (2012:10), With 
land registration and proof of land ownership, it is believed that no other third party – 
individual, company or community – can contest the rights to one’s land. This will lead to 
smooth relations with surrounding communities and ultimately a problem-free plantation 
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environment.” This, of course, is a steep requirement for a community such as the Nueva Vida, 
where the dispute over land is longstanding and complex. 
According to RPSO criterion 4.7, in the plantation “An occupational health and safety 
plan is documented, effectively communicated and implemented.” What this means is that 
workers must use the correct gear and have received training in the handling of the chemicals 
used on the plantation. This again reflects noble intention, but it effectively blocks smallholders, 
such as those in Nueva Vida, from certifying their production.  
This is not the place for a fully fleshed out critique of the certification process in the palm 
oil assemblage (but see Johnson 2012; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; World Rainforest 
Movement 2010). What I am interested in pointing out is how this sort of regulation that 
operates on broader scales articulates with the concrete reality of the particular sites where the 
palm oil assemblage has taken hold. In the case of Nueva Vida, we can see the sort of tensions 
that are created between the lure of the oil palm as a symbol and materialization of such things 
as electricity, running water or motorcycles and the barriers that structure and condition the 
community’s articulation with the palm oil assemblage.  
MARCA: righting the wrongs of the past and carving out a space within the oil 
palm monoculture 
By looking at the history of the MCA and the MCR we have been moving so far along a thread 
that links the hills with the valley. In both cases, the great majority of those families involved in 
the land recuperations came from the hills surrounding the nearby valleys and had no previous 
organizing experience within the reform sector. It would be a mistake, however, to think that all 
of the movements that sprouted in the aftermath of the agrarian counter-reform followed this 
pattern. Already in 1996 – two years before hurricane Mitch crashed into the Honduran north 
coast – a group of former members of three cooperatives (El Despertar, San Esteban and La 
Trinidad) on the left bank of the Aguán river had initiated legal action to block the sales of their 
former lands to Miguel Facussé and René Morales.  
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What began with these legal complaints would turn into a 16-year process in which these 
former members had to navigate a political and economic terrain framed by the tensions 
between state and capital. As what eventually came to be known as the Authentic Reclaiming 
Peasant Movement of the Aguán (MARCA), they struggled to recover the land that they 
considered had been illegally taken away and to carve out a space within the region’s oil palm 
monoculture. Stuck between a transnationally oriented group of Honduran large landowners 
betting on the production of palm oil and a highly militarized but fragmented state, MARCA’s 
struggle is, on the one hand, that of constant shifts and combinations of legal and direct forms of 
pressure and negotiation with different factions within state institutions and other peasant 
organizations. On the other, it is one of constant tensions and accommodations to adapt their 
collective forms of production to the particular rhythms and needs of the global palm oil 
assemblage. 
The sons and daughters of those who did not want to sell: between the memories 
of dispossession and struggle 
I went into some depth in Chapter 3 regarding the process of the sales of the cooperatives in the 
Aguán. Here I will only introduce a few elements needed to frame the history of MARCA and its 
approach to that cycle of dispossession. I will focus on the case of the El Despertar cooperative, 
since this is the one that I came to know best, but certainly there is a shared experience between 
the three cooperatives that started the movement and many other cooperatives all over the 
Aguán region.  
It is worth adding that this shared experience gave rise to a different historical narrative 
than that articulated by the Tocoa Parish’s Pastoral Social, although I would argue that its 
overarching scheme is essentially the same. In this case, because the initial participants were 
mainly former cooperative members who had lived in the valley, their actions were not animated 
by a sense of being the chosen people who came down from the hills, as in the case of the MCA. 
One of the things that most struck me from my conversations with MARCA´s older members 
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was how Mitch was not really a salient element in their memories. This, of course, presents a 
major contrast with the accounts of people in MCA and MCR. In fact, the only three points on 
which both narratives overlap is their finger pointing at the “foreigners” (Miguel Facussé, René 
Morales and Reinaldo Canales) as the main culprits behind the sale of the cooperatives; the 
approval of the LMA in 1992 as the starting point of the wave of dispossession; and the claim 
that their actions should be understood as an agrarian reform with historical roots going back to 
the 1970s. 
While the narrative of the Pastoral Social is based solely on a set of memories of 
dispossession (Hart 2006), that constructed by MARCA also integrates memories of struggle 
that connect their own situation with the longer history of the Honduran peasant movement and 
particularly with the “golden age” of the 1970s. MARCA’s narrative centers on a constant 
struggle against both the large landowners (capital) and their hired lackeys in the state. 
Moreover, unlike the MCA and the MCR, where most of the members are of a similar age and a 
somewhat similar migrating history, in the case of MARCA, there is a combination of older 
former cooperative members, who began the struggle and arrived in the region as part of the 
BAP, and a younger generation of both men and women who were either born in the region or 
arrived as infants and who claim the legacy of the peasant movement and vowed to right the 
wrongs of the past. As we will see later, this generational aspect significantly influenced the way 
in which the movement developed.  
Righting the wrongs of the past: the legal struggle against dispossession 
For the founder members of MARCA, everything began with the illegal sale of the lands of the 
cooperatives. As I showed in chapter 3, the sales combined both high levels of violence with 
“normal” market transactions in which the presence of a few “bought” members on the board of 
directors was crucial in finalizing the sales. In the case of El Despertar, on March 5, 1994, the 
board of directors authorized the president of the cooperative to negotiate and sell 636 hectares 
of oil palm lands to the company Oleo Palmas de Centroamérica, whose majority partner was 
293 
 
René Morales. Just as in many other cases, there was no clear consensus within the cooperative 
as to whether to sell or not, but in the end the sale was enforced from within by death threats 
against those opposed.  
It is clear that in the process of sale of every cooperative there was some sort of 
resistance, but this tended to consist of quite isolated and disarticulated processes in which one 
or two members simply refused to sign and sanction the sale. In this case something similar 
happened initially, but after the sales were carried out, opponents were nonetheless able to 
come together. How did this occur? Location and kinship ties likely had something to do with it. 
In terms of location, in most cases what you would have is a set of scattered communities 
belonging to the different cooperatives and divided by oil palm plantations. The result was a 
pattern in which the members of the cooperative would come into contact with each other, but 
not necessarily with those from other cooperatives. However, in the case of El Despertar, La 
Trinidad y San Esteban, their spaces of dwelling – the result of housing projects similar to the 
one described for the case of Eugenia and Marino in Chapter 3 – are contiguous, while their pil 
palm fields are located at some distance. Thus, the working lands are separated, but their 
dwelling spaces are one next to one another, making them immediate neighbors.   
In terms of kinship ties, it is worth remembering Marcelo’s story. When he arrived in 
1974, he was part of an organized group back in Copán. However, once in the Aguán the group 
was split up and the different families were added to different cooperatives in the region. This 
had the effect of creating a kin network between different cooperatives, as people who knew 
each other from before and who in many cases shared family ties were scattered in different 
places. In many cases, moreover, members also moved between cooperatives. Marcelo, for 
example, was originally part of the San Esteban cooperative and later moved to El Despertar, 
both of which eventually became part of MARCA. These movements of people created social ties 
and means for information and the memories of dispossession and struggle to circulate and thus 
creating closer and stronger bonds across cooperatives. 
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These two circumstances allowed those who had opposed the sales in each cooperative to 
come together, share their experiences and embark on a collective project. It is important to add 
that this unity came after the sales, in 1996, when they presented their legal claims against the 
sales of the three cooperatives. According to one MARCA founder, they began to organize after 
they found out that they had sold more land than had initially been negotiated. Supposedly, 
when the sale was finalized, the idea was that each member was going to be left with an 
individual plot. One day he noticed that the few cows he owned were loose in the streets. When 
he went and asked one of the members of the board of directors, he told him that the 
cooperative had sold everything.  
He immediately took off to Trujillo to try to figure out what had occurred. Asking around 
in the courtroom, he found out that not only was it true that they had sold all of the land to René 
Morales, but also that leading members of the municipal government had been involved in the 
process. A local lawyer told him that he should go to Tegucigalpa to figure out the whole process 
better. He slowly but surely managed to follow the paper trail back to René Morales and a note, 
dated March, 5, 1994, in which the cooperative’s board of directors authorized the cooperative’s 
president to sell the lands to Morales.  
Two things became evident after this inquiry. First, that there was a clear connection 
between businessmen such as Morales and the local governments and that the peasants could 
not count on finding support there. Second, the sale had been illegal. The LMA had opened up 
the possibility for agrarian reform lands to be sold, but it had two important requirements: first, 
the sale had to be approved by the cooperative’s general assembly and second, the sale had to be 
sanctioned and permitted by the INA. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled in the sale of 
these cooperatives. The aforementioned note that authorized the sale was only signed by the 
members of the board of directors – not the whole general assembly – and there was no 
documentation suggesting that the INA had approved the sale.  
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Armed with this information, they were approached by a lawyer who assured them that 
their case was as good as won and that they did not even have to pay him, because Morales 
would be forced to pay once he lost the case; things however, did not pan out in this way. A few 
months after the legal claim was presented, their lawyer told them that it had been cancelled. 
Why? Because they did not have the money to pay Morales back his “investment” (the sale 
payment), nor to pay the lawyer his fees! Hypothesizing that he had been paid off by Morales, 
the former cooperative members moved on, found another lawyer and started the process anew.  
This pattern repeated itself several times. Each time they would hire a lawyer and pay his 
fees, only to find out later that their legal demands had been either cancelled or forever stalled. 
However, far from deterring them, this gave them a sense of purpose and unity. They became 
increasingly convinced that they needed to become stronger and that they needed to increase 
their numbers. This was not particularly difficult, as the region in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
was awash with grievances and poverty. In November 2005, a total of 28 groups from both the 
right and left banks came together to create the Unified Peasant Movement of the Aguán 
(MUCA). As MUCA, the social composition of the group changed a bit. While the founders –
those from El Despertar, San Esteban and La Trinidad, who eventually became MARCA, as we 
will see later – were all former members of the sold cooperatives, most of the newcomers were 
younger and some were children of former cooperative members. Most had little to no 
experience working the land and many of them had worked in construction or as school 
teachers. What seems to have brought them all together was a grinding poverty that turned into 
a hunger for land as a way of improving their lives.  
We can see here a similar pattern to that of the MCR. The original founders sought to 
attract other poor peasant families to beef up their numbers and, since these newcomers have a 
different historical trajectory, a somewhat different group emerged. The requirement of a 
plausible legal claim makes them paper over any differences and consolidate a single historical 
narrative. 
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The road blockade of the 5,000 machetes: from legal struggle to direct action 
The creation of MUCA was the clear reflection of a region that combined a population strangled 
by poverty with massive riches produced and amassed around the oil palm monoculture. This 
movement can be understood as the coming together of historical grievances – the 
dispossession of the lands and what could have been and was reflected in the surviving 
cooperatives – and images and dreams of a better future for the disenchanted and impoverished 
youth. In both cases, the target of their frustrations was the same: the “foreign” palm men that 
controlled most of the monoculture while excluding them. We find again negation as the first 
step of identity formation within the peasant movement. 
This means that just as the MCR and the MCA were a reflection of the tension between 
hills and valley, with the Church as transmission belt, MUCA was a condensation of the 
conjuncture in the lowlands and how the last cycle of dispossession was experienced there. 
Thus, to understand MUCA and its particular combination between “old” and “new,” it is 
necessary to have a better grasp of the conjuncture, particularly of how the national situation 
related to the region. In brief, the mid-2000s was a tense period in Honduras as a whole. 
Twenty years after the signing of the 1982 constitution and the (supposed) transition to 
democracy, the state did not necessarily look better than it had then. The economy showed clear 
levels of stagnation at the same time that regional differences sharpened, with the most of the 
meager levels of production concentrated around San Pedro Sula and the maquila industry and 
Tegucigalpa in the center of the country (UNDP 2006).  
Politically, the rule of law operated under the logic of what Marvin Barahona (2010) calls 
a “parallel state,”101 in which the law is upheld when it reinforces the interests of the political and 
economic oligarchy – manifested in the form of a two party system –, but is totally ignored and 
                                                        
101 Not to be confused with the idea of the Church as parallel state that I presented in the previous chapter. 
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dismissed when subaltern groups try to upheld their rights, as was clearly illustrated by the 
experience of the founders of MUCA before 2005.  
This political situation was also present in the election that saw Mel Zelaya elected as 
president in early 2006. Although he came from the very same families and social groups that 
formed the traditional political and economic oligarchy, Zelaya’s campaign emphasized the idea 
of civic participation and from the beginning it was clear that he had some sympathy for and a 
more open posture towards the demands of social movements. In fact, it was this invitation of 
the social movements to the political ball – an event usually reserved for the elites organized in 
the two-party system – that prompted, or made necessary, the coup. Promoting social policies 
was one thing, inviting in new actors – especially such wretches – was simply unacceptable for 
the country’s elites. 
This is also a period in which new forms of political organization from below began to 
take shape. The promotion of the SAP divided the more traditional social movements in 
Honduras, such as the peasant and union movements (only the teachers’ movement retains 
some sort of relevance). This fractioning left a void that slowly came to be filled by regional 
popular movements that responded to very concrete grievances and conflicts related to topics 
such as natural resources, human rights and access to public services.  Among the better known 
of these regional groups was the Civic Council of Popular and  Indigenous Organizations of 
Honduras (COPINH), which links Lenca communities in the west (see Graham 2009), the Black 
Honduran Fraternal Organization (OFRANEH), based in Garifuna communities on the north 
coast (see Anderson 2009; Brondo 2013), and the Western Regional Community Council (PRO), 
which connects local patronatos from the northwest, mainly around topics such as access to 
social services (see Sosa and Ortega 2008). All of these regional movements have longer 
histories of course. What is particular about the mid-2000s conjuncture is that they began to 
come together to form some type of national platform. As a result of this dynamic, there was a 
298 
 
greater dialogue between the different movements and coordination of their strategies and 
tactics.102 
The Aguán was not immune to this dynamic. I already recounted in the previous chapter 
the story of the Permanent Assembly of Popular Organizations of the Aguán (APOPA) and of 
how it dissolved in the mid-1990s. A few years later and under a similar name, the Popular 
Organizations Network of the Aguán (COPA) was created to coordinate the different regional 
efforts. Just as in the case of APOPA, the organization was an expression of the social and 
political reality of what was happening in the valley, but with a limited grasp of the tensions 
between hills and valley. In general, its membership continued to come mainly from the regional 
unions and particularly from state functionaries. However, because of the region’s social 
composition and the increasing unrest around land issues, they had come closer to the concerns 
and organizing attempts of the peasantry. 
MUCA was a condensation of these conjunctural elements: the new members with 
different tactics and social backgrounds, the older traditional history of the peasant movement 
and the agrarian reform sector in the Aguán. A change in strategy also came out of this 
combination. If up to 2005 they had been content with trying to recover their lands through 
legal means, with the influx of more and new people, many with experience in other forms of 
popular mobilization, their strategy shifted towards direct action. The first such action, one that 
is well remembered as a foundational moment, came on February 7, 2006, when some five 
thousand MUCA members – armed with machetes — blockaded and occupied the principal 
bridge to Tocoa – thus cutting off the town from the rest of the country – in order to request a 
resolution of their demands. They remained on the bridge for four days, until a commission sent 
                                                        
102 As far as I know, there has not been any systematic effort to reconstruct and study this moment of 
confluence of the different regional expressions of the Honduran popular movement. This is an important 
and glaring gap in our knowledge of the country, as it is clear that what later became the resistance 
movement against the coup has its roots in this effort. 
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from Tegucigalpa sat down to negotiate and reached agreements regarding not only the return 
of the lands that had been illegally taken away (the older group), but also the distribution of land 
for the landless (the younger group). This was the first time that MUCA approached the topic in 
this way, using pressure to force the government to negotiate directly.  However, it also turned 
into a new lesson: what was agreed by the government under pressure would be forgotten once 
the pressure was lifted. The government never honored these initial agreements and MUCA was 
forced to take to the streets again. 
Afterwards, MUCA members decided that a way of moving forward would be by 
combining legal processes with the traditional show of strength of the Honduran peasant 
movement: the occupation/recuperation of disputed lands. On January 7, 2007, they attempted 
to recuperate the disputed lands of La Concepción cooperative on the right bank. Their 
reasoning was that since this was one of the legal cases more advanced, a little nudge in the right 
direction would produce success. This was a miscalculation, however, as they were evicted after 
five days on the land. 
They were not discouraged, and on June 8, 2009, less than a month before the coup, 
they decided to raise the stakes and go directly for the central axis of capital accumulation in the 
region: the extracting mills. Early in the morning that day, they entered and occupied the 
Exportadora del Atlántico extracting mill – property of Miguel Facussé – in Quebrada de Arena 
and remained in control for a few hours before they were evicted. This time the strategy had a 
major effect, one that was clearly shaped by the moment. As we saw in the MCA case, 2008 saw 
a significant escalation of the conflicts between cattle and palm men, on the one hand, and 
peasant organizations, on the other. This escalation was reaching quite disturbing levels and 
President Manuel Zelaya seems to have been worried about having the beginning of a civil war 
on his hands. Less than ten days after the extracting mill occupation, on June, 17, Zelaya himself 
travelled to Tocoa to meet with the leadership of MUCA and sign a set of agreements. More 
importantly, a special commission, made up of representatives of MUCA, the executive branch 
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and the Agriculture and Livestock Secretariat (SAG), was created to pursue a negotiated solution 
to the conflict. This seemed to appease the members of MUCA, who had already seen Zelaya’s 
efforts to resolve the country’s agrarian conflicts – particularly those of the Aguán – with the 
signing of Decree 18-2008. All of these processes would come crumbling down less than two 
weeks later when Zelaya was ousted by the military and flown in his pajamas to Costa Rica.  
A tale of oil palms: the coup and the Aguán 
The three movements that I have presented so far in this chapter were deeply affected by the 
coup and the ousting of Zelaya. In this section, I would like to outline some general elements 
and round up the stories of the three peasant movements, as well as wrap up some of the 
findings of the chapter by looking at the overdetermination of the oil palm monoculture in the 
region.  
MCA: from stagnation to crisis 
Already before 2009 the situation in Guadalupe Carney was complicated. Poverty was rampant 
and the MCA’s structures – as the working commissions were known – had fallen apart after 
international cooperation funds disappeared in 2005-06. Somewhere around 2007 it was 
decided to pass control of the movement to the representatives of the three peasant 
confederations involved (CNTC, ACAN, and ANACH). Because of the high levels of poverty and 
the failure of the EACs to become viable enterprises, many people began to abandon them. This 
manifested itself in three different ways. First, people would sell their membership in the EAC 
but would keep their lot in Guadalupe Carney, thus deepening the difference between political 
and economic organization. Second, those memberships began to be sold illegally on the black 
market for prices that were out of reach for a poor or landless peasant family (around $50 
thousand). This led to the suspicion that money laundering by local drug barons was also 
involved. Third, young men, in particular, have been migrating to the United States as the only 
survival strategy left to them. The marks of this exodus can be seen all over a community full of 
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single mothers living in corrugated steel roof and cinderblock houses and in the tales of success 
abroad, but also tragedy, that circulate in Guadalupe Carney.  
As I mentioned earlier, the MCA had a particularly active role in the drafting and 
promotion of Decree 18-2008. This had given the movement some notoriety among the 
Honduran economic and political elites, and it is perhaps not surprising that on the 28th of June, 
just as Zelaya was being kidnapped, the Guadalupe Carney community was surrounded by army 
and navy commandos. Far from weakening the movement, this reanimated the community’s 
sense of being in resistance and struggle, and its members again took to the streets to protest the 
coup. This in turn led to the army to place a permanent camp within the community and on 
December 15, more than 500 soldiers entered the community to search for guns but came out 
empty-handed. This raid had been prompted by media reports that painted the Guadalupe 
Carney community as a terrorists and guerrilla lair.103 
The people of Guadalupe Carney were nevertheless not deterred, on April 6, 2010, 210 
families decided to recuperate 510 hectares of El Tumbador, an oil palm plantation controlled by 
Miguel Facussé, but which was part of the original 5,700 hectares of the CREM. Initially, there 
was an agreement with Facussé’s security team that as long as the families remained within 
those 510 hectares, which were clearly part of the original CREM, there would be no problem. 
Most of the families involved in this recuperation came from those EACs that had had 
particularly bad luck with the allocation of the lands and either had too little land for the 
number of members or really poor lands. El Tumbador was covered in peak producing oil palms 
and thus became an important source of income for these families.  
Just four months later, in August, a second group of families decided to occupy the 
remaining lands of El Tumbador that were not included in the original CREM, which led 
                                                        
103 One of the most sensationalist of these notes even mentioned that the Palestinian organization Hamas 
was preparing terrorist cells in the region. 
302 
 
Facussé evict both groups from the whole plantation. The situation did not finish there. On 
November 15, 2010, 120 people arrived in the early morning at the gates of El Tumbador in an 
attempt to recuperate these lands once more. They were received by the gunshots from 
Facussé’s security guards and supposedly from members of the navy who were disguised as 
security guards. According to various accounts, the final toll in what came to be known as the “El 
Tumbador Massacre” was the extra-judicial execution of five members of the MCA, four more 
gravely injured, an attempted murder of yet another MCA supporter, and four arbitrary 
detentions with inhumane and denigrating treatment. These actions, according to these same 
accounts, were perpetrated by an armed group composed of private security guards, supported 
by a unit from the Fifteenth Special Forces Battalion based in Río Claro, Trujillo.  
After this, the economic crisis of most of the EACs – many of which were not even active 
– was augmented by a political one. Poverty, outmigration and high levels of violence, in which 
the oil palm monoculture – as in the case of El Tumbador – combined with increasing drug 
traffic and military and police persecution, had become the reality of the community. 
Nonetheless, the vibrant history of the peasant movement is immediately evident when one 
visits the community for the annual celebration of its anniversary or when one sits down with 
the men and women who were the protagonists of this history and begins to share their 
experiences. 
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“Welcome to the 13th Anniversary. Guadalupe Carney” 
 
 
MCR: starting anew yet once more  
In Nueva Vida, the coup was also received with grief, pain and despair. They were not 
surrounded by the military, but it was clear that they had been placed on a black list, due to their 
presence in the list of groups that would benefit from Decree 18-2008. In this case the rent 
capturing mechanisms that organize the Honduran state are noticeable. I already mentioned 
how the land had been overvalued and how the first attempt at a sale fell through, due to INA 
functionaries’ attempts to receive a kickback. This situation of using the MCR plight to make a 
personal profit by government functionaries did not stop with the election of José Lobo as 
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president in November, 2009.104 The new general director of the INA, César Ham, brought a 
much more personal and patronage-oriented style. For the MCR, this meant taking care of the 
case himself and negotiating directly with the Rivera family. According to Juan, the lawyer who 
had been working with the MCR, this led to the purchase of the 662 hectares by the INA for a bit 
less than $3 million in 2010. While I consider the source reliable, I was never able to 
corroborate this information. 
The problems did not stop with the sale. Two years after the coup, on June 24, 2011, the 
Nueva Vida community suffered the worst eviction of its history, one that would leave a 
permanent scar in the collective memory of the community. Around 9 a.m. that day, both 
military and police forces arrived at the Guanacaste tree at the main entrance of the community 
and informed them that they had an eviction order. Between the disbelief and despair, the 
people of the community moved between trying to save some of their possessions and 
presenting resistance to the law enforcers. At 2 p.m. the eviction began with relentless violence 
and a show of force by both police and military, who swept into the community, burning down 
houses, shooting and killing livestock and chopping down the few orange trees that the EACs 
had planted. Bulldozers tore down the homes of those who had houses with cinderblock walls. 
At 9 p.m., when the eviction finished, few signs remained that an entire community had been 
housed on those lands.  
According to Casa Alianza (2012), an international NGO dedicated to the protection of 
the rights of children, the eviction left most of the community’s kids with post-traumatic stress 
and deeply ingrained fear of the police and military, as I was also able to corroborate during my 
fieldwork. According to an evaluation of the material losses done by the FSAR (2011), the 
number of affected people was 493, more than half of whom were minors (18 years old or less). 
                                                        
104 It is worth remembering that this was the first post-coup election and that Lobo’s government was not 
recognized internationally by everyone. 
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All of the community and productive infrastructure was destroyed, for losses of over $500,000. 
More importantly, several women who were pregnant at the time lost their babies as a result of 
the stress and the teargas. 
This eviction prompted international solidarity and scrutiny, which lessened the 
intensity of the repression. The very next day, the men of the MCR entered the land again to 
make sure that they did not lose their claim. They were unable to work, however, as the lands 
they were attempting to recuperate were under constant surveillance by the police, and they had 
lost everything, so starting their milpas anew was also difficult. The homeless families had to 
move to the community center of the neighboring village of Rigores and many decided to 
abandon the movement. 
After a few months, whole families moved back to the Nueva Vida to try once again to 
rebuild their lives from scratch, always with the fear that the community could be evicted again. 
Some of these fears became a reality. On September 16, after two policemen lost their lives in a 
shootout with an armed band close to the Nueva Vida, the police entered the community again 
searching for weapons and the perpetrators. They found neither, but the belongings of several 
families were destroyed, 22 men were severely beaten and taken to Tocoa for interrogation and 
the 16-year-old son of one of the MCR’s leaders was kidnapped and tortured, before being 
liberated. 
The history of the Nueva Vida in the aftermath of the eviction can be characterized as a 
constant state of instability. For those who remained, it became a clear confirmation of what 
they already knew after Mitch, that they no longer had anywhere to go. Unlike the Guadalupe 
Carney community, were many young people have migrated to the U.S., in Nueva Vida it is hard 
to find families with members abroad. This has nothing to do with lack of desire to leave, but 
rather with a form of bare life that leaves little space to create the sort of surplus needed to 
support a migration to the U.S. In terms of their hold over the land, things have looked up 
somewhat. All of 2013 was spent in the process of finally giving the six EACs that form the MCR 
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legal control over the land they occupy. It has been a long and tortuous process, in which the 
leaders of the movement have had to travel constantly outside of the community presenting 
round after round of paperwork, which of course puts great economic stress on such an 
impoverished community. The lack of will by many of the functionaries of the INA to ease the 
process is quite evident. In the end, an arrangement materialized that will sell the land to the 
EACs, which will have to pay a debt of around $2.5 million over 20 years. This is, of course, 
impossible producing solely maize and beans; even if the land were already covered in mature 
oil palm it is hard to imagine how they could cover such a large debt. 
The people of Nueva Vida are narrowly stuck within the oil palm monoculture, both 
economically and as part of the larger social field. Working as day laborers in the citrus and oil 
palm plantations is a necessity. Also, the MCR as a whole, and with very limited support from 
outside, is trying to inch up the production chain, by planting palm trees and becoming a raw 
material producing need economy, an attempt that has encountered various barriers. However, 
with the sword of Damocles of debt hanging over their heads, they will hardly have a choice.  
Finally, the families of the MCR have experienced closely the connection between oil 
palms and violence in the Aguán. The police raid on the community on September 16, 2011, was 
prompted by an armed clashed between the police and one of the several armed bands that rob 
oil palm fruits in the region (to be sold on the black market). As I mentioned earlier, the 
neighboring Finca Panamá has become a nucleus of the struggle over land between peasant 
communities and the palm men’s armed guards. On July, 2, 2012, the independent (non-
affiliated) peasant Gregorio Chávez Aranda disappeared in the area of the Panamá farm. Four 
days later, after a tireless search, his family found his body buried in Lot 8 of Finca Panamá. 
Chávez was the fourth peasant that had disappeared close to the Panama in the preceding year 
or so. However, this was the first time that search parties had been able to enter the property. 
The La Panamá community, which is located next to the oil palm plantation and is composed 
mainly of former cooperative members that sold that same plantation to Facussé in the 1990s, 
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reacted with outrage and occupied the property, giving birth to the Gregrorio Chávez 
Refoundational Peasant Movement (MCRGC), which in turn has become one of the most 
conflictive land recuperations in the region. Violence and dispossession, as well as images of 
improvement and resistance, overlap in various forms with the oil palms. 
Figure 9. Invitation to the commemorative festival of the eviction, Nueva 
Vida community 
 
 
MARCA: the coup as a catalyst 
For the peasant organizations grouped together in MUCA, the coup was a sign that they needed 
to raise the stakes. One of the leaders of MARCA remembers how that day – June 28 in the early 
morning — they were gathered in a school on the right bank when they heard about the ousting 
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of President Zelaya. They began to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that if they 
were “real men,” they would have to fight with what was theirs, “with balls” (i.e., with courage). 
This form of highly masculinized speech referred to a reading of the coup as the response by the 
economic and political elites to Zelaya’s attempts — however half-hearted and insufficient — to 
resolve the agrarian crisis in favor of the peasant organizations.  
From the first days after June 28, the peasant movements of the Aguán – MCR and MCA 
included –threw their weight behind the National Popular Front of Resistance (FNRP), the 
broad alliance of organizations against the coup, and constantly travelled to Tegucigalpa and 
other places to protest and demand the return of Manuel Zelaya as the legitimate president. 
With the repression increasing and the de facto election of José Porfirio Lobo as president in 
November, the members of MUCA decided that “if we are going to die anyway, we might as well 
do it in the lands,” as one of the leaders of the organization told me. They began organizing 
synchronized and massive land recuperations for the end of the year. On December 9, 2009, in 
the early morning, around 600 families occupied between 21 and 26 plantations on both river 
banks, for a total of nearly 20,000 hectares. This, of course, was met by several attempts to evict 
them, but once the news of these occupations reached the ears of the population, many landless 
families of both the Aguán and other places, flocked to join them. According to MUCA, their 
membership increased to over three thousand families (MUCA 2010). This increase in the size 
of the movement made it almost impossible to evict them all, especially since they knew the 
terrain better than the police and military and would sometime vanish from one lot just to 
appear afterwards in another.  
This forced the hand of the government and, in February 2010, negotiations began 
between MUCA and the government. MUCA’s demands were straightforward: 20,000 hectares 
of cultivated lands (oil palms), as well as the reinstitution of the commission that Zelaya had 
created just before being deposed and that was supposed to organize the process of acquisition 
of the lands possessed by Facussé, Morales and Canales. The government’s counteroffer was 
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very limited: a much smaller amount of land, close to 3,000 hectares, which the peasants would 
have to pay in their totality to the current owners, as well as the establishing a set of “co-
investment” agreements with Facussé’s Corporación Cressida and Morales´s Agropalma. 
According to these agreements – basically a form of contract farming105  – MUCA´s EACs and 
cooperatives would be forced to sell all of their production to these companies, accepting 
whatever price that they offered.  
In the end, the agreement signed by both members of MUCA and President Lobo was 
somewhere in between these two proposals. The government agreed to purchase 3,000 hectares 
of oil palm lands and another 3,000 hectares of uncultivated lands in the first three months, 
with another 1,000 cultivated and 4,000 uncultivated hectares one year later, for a total of 
11,000 hectares. An arbitrated price of over $6,000 per hectare was determined by specialists.106 
The resulting total price would be paid to the landowners by the state, which would then collect 
the payments from MUCA at a low rate of interest. The government also committed to providing 
the 2,500 MUCA families health services, as well as schools and the construction of 200 houses 
in two years.  
In mid-April 2010 the agreement was signed. According to MUCA, it was signed at 
gunpoint, as on April 7, the government deployed over 7,000 soldiers and policemen in the 
region, which led to higher levels of repression and the murder, under mysterious 
circumstances, of four members of MUCA. Nonetheless, MUCA viewed the agreement as a 
victory since it was the first time that they had managed to pry anything away from Facussé. 
                                                        
105 I touched on this topic of contract farming earlier in this chapter and will return to it briefly in the 
conclusion. Also, there are several review works with deal with this topic in more depth (see for example, 
Little and Watts 1994; Bijman 2008; Rehber 2007). 
106 According to (Ríos 2012), this price is significantly higher than the one presented by an agronomist 
hired by INA of over $4,000 per hectare, which was also virtually the price that Facussé had requested 
initially (he wanted a differentiated rate between cultivated and non-cultivated lands). According to the 
author, both prices are unpayable for the peasant organization in any case. 
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Their members were relocated into six settlements on the right bank: La Aurora, La Concepción, 
La Confianza, La Isla and El Marañon. At the time of writing (early 2015), MUCA had still only 
received around half of the land promised and none of the social services. Once again the state’s 
promises lasted as long as the peasant organizations’ pressure was on the ground, only to be 
forgotten once the pressure was gone. This also left MUCA in a very limited space – less than 
five hectares per family – which contributed to suffocating them economically. This has brought 
pressures on associates, particularly single women and older men, to leave the EACs. We can 
locate then a cycle in which peasant movements tend to attract new members in the moment of 
occupation and direct struggle for land – when they need strength in numbers –, only to try to 
diminish that number once they are in control of the land, in an attempt to improve the 
household-to-land ratio.107 
The agreement also meant a split within MUCA. The members of the former 
cooperatives El Despertar, La Trinidad, and San Esteban – which I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter – as well as San Isidro, located on the right bank, refused to sign the agreement. 
According to them, they did not need to pay for the land, because they had not sold it, and 
decided to go on with their legal claims, thus giving birth to MARCA.  
The members of MARCA continued their struggle for the land they deemed theirs, 
combining presence in the lands in the form of occupations, with the continuation of the 
lawsuits in court. Nevertheless, they changed their legal strategy. If formerly they had been 
denouncing the illegality of the sales to Morales and Facussé, now they moved against the 
former boards of directors that had approved the sales. In the case of El Despertar, but with 
similar situations in the other cooperatives, the then president of the board of directors 
                                                        
107 Nashieli Rangel Loera references a similar dynamic within the Landless Workers Movement of Brazil 
(MST), which she calls an “ever increasing spiral.” 
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responded to the demand against him by accepting that he had acted illegally and that the 
cooperative´s agreement to sell should be nullified.   
The legal process dragged on for almost two more years, during which time the members 
of MARCA would occupy one or two of the claimed estates for as long as they could, until they 
were evicted. The occupations would last between a few hours and a few months. This was a 
harsh period for the families. They were harassed and several members were killed – both in 
clashes with the security forces and in targeted assassinations–, and identified MARCA 
members were placed on a black list and were unable to work on the oil palm plantations in the 
region. They survived from the solidarity of their neighbors, the palm fruit that they could cut 
during their occupations and the remittances that the sons of some of the leaders would send 
from the U.S. to support the movement.  
Eventually, on June 29, 2012 – two full years after the coup – the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of MARCA, giving it full control over the El Despertar, La Trinidad and San Isidro 
cooperatives (they had gained control of San Esteban in May, 2011). This was, of course, 
received with great joy by the members of the movement. They remember how on that date they 
went over to the plantations with members of the police to carry out the eviction order against 
Agropalma. They would tell me with great pride how they used to be the ones evicted by the 
police and the private security guards, but now it was their turn to evict the palm men. This joy, 
however, was short-lived. On September 22 of that same year, Antonio Trejo, the lawyer who 
had led the final legal offensive, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Tegucigalpa while he 
attending a wedding. The news brought great grief to the members of MARCA, who began to 
fear the beginning of a new cycle of evictions. They were right. In September 2013 the San Isidro 
cooperative was evicted, followed by evictions in El Despertar and La Trinidad in May 2014. 
These evictions have meant an actual reversal of decisions of the Supreme Court and illustrate 
unmistakably the ease with which powerful interests in Honduras can bend the law. 
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Figure 10. Cross marking the place one of MARCA’s martyrs was killed 
 
 
Epilogue: the overdetermination of palm oil 
But circuits of capital are bound up, in the longer term, with circuits of sociability –
patterns of belief and desire, levels of confidence, degrees of identification with the good 
life of the commodity.  
Retort collective (2005:26), Afflicted Powers.  
The oil palm monoculture is at the heart of life in the Aguán. It animates it and lubricates the 
cogs of the regional forms of domination. It determines the way in which the region is 
articulated into other larger wholes: the Honduran state and the global palm oil assemblage, 
among others. But it also defines in very concrete ways how particular lives are lived and ended. 
Palm oil is of course not a living being, but it is in its history that we can read, as it were, the 
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history of the Aguán as both region and landscape. Palm oil structures the Aguán: “…[it] 
exhibit[s] tendencies – lines of force, openings and closure which constrain, shape, channel and 
in that sense, ‘determine’”  (Hall 1985:96). 
From the way in which the Honduran state, in accord and with the support of the IFIs, 
went about assembling labor, capital and land to create the BAP, came the roots of a process that 
led in this direction. It was not the only possibly trajectory, but as time went by, and living labor 
turned into objectified labor in the form of the plantations and the levees to protect them from 
floods, the fate and life of the region became more intrinsically linked to that of the palm trees. 
For as Stuart Hall (1985:98) reminds us,   
…a technically competent but politically insubordinate labor force is no labor 
force at all for capital. Therefore, the more important task is cultivating that kind 
of labor which is able and willing, morally and politically, to be subordinated to 
discipline, the logic, the culture and compulsions of the economic mode of 
production… 
In this case, for palm oil to take the place that it has in the Aguán, it had to become a 
force both politically, culturally and ideologically. Laborers cultured in the monoculture had to 
be cultivated and with it, a whole semantic field – a common sense – that would allow them to 
make sense of their concrete experiences and ways of being in the world was also created. This 
sense was not homogeneous, as different people lived it from different positions, nor was it 
necessarily coherent.  According to Gramsci (1971:348), the common sense is a set of immediate, 
unconnected facts just taken for granted and non-critical assertions on reality and the “way in 
which things are,” where “…in a whole range of judgments common sense identifies the exact 
cause, simple and to hand, and does not let itself be distracted by fancy quibbles and pseudo- 
profound, pseudo-scientific metaphysical mumbo-jumbo.”  
Common sense is conservative and helps preserve the status quo, with the idea that 
things are “naturally” like they are. This is a useful way of thinking about the role that oil palms 
play in the Aguán. Oil palm has been constructed as the only viable crop in the region in 
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economic (better price in the market) and environmental (flood resistant) terms. At the same 
time, oil palm plantations are seen as spaces of danger and violence and as an opportunity to 
leave poverty behind. They are presented as a dangerous monoculture that destroys ecological 
diversity at the same time that they are the key for a better future for the local poor. The oil palm 
is the development wager of the state at the same time that it is understood as creating an 
unruly landscape, in which illegal activities such as gun running and drug trafficking can 
flourish. All of these contradictory elements live together, side by side, creating a situation in 
which the “naturalness” of the dominant position of the palm oil industry goes unquestioned. It 
is important to remember that the expansion of the crop in the region has not been carried out 
only by large industrial producers, but that peasant cooperatives, EACs and non-organized small 
and medium-size farmers have also enthusiastically adopted palm cultivation.  
With this I am not trying to say that there are no conflicts or disputes around the palm 
oil industry. My analysis of the forms of differentiation and the conflicts over land should have 
left that clear. My argument, rather, is that due to the type of historical development of both the 
industry and the region, there is a consensus regarding its importance and centrality. Further, 
that what we find is a situation in which the Aguán region – directly in the lowlands, but also 
indirectly in the hills – is overdetermined (Althusser 1969)108 by the palm oil industry.  
Labor–capital conflicts in the Aguán valley center around how the profits of the industry 
are distributed. More obviously, during the reform period, the locus of conflict was around what 
I have called the points of rent capture. After the sale of the cooperatives, it shifted towards the 
                                                        
108 According to Louis Althusser (1969:101), “…the ‘contradiction’ [between labor and capital] is 
inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found, inseparable from its formal 
conditions of existence, and even from the instances it governs; it is radically affected by them, 
determining, but also determined in one and the same movement, and determined by the various levels 
and instances of the social formation it animates; it might be called overdetermined in its principle.” 
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forms in which different groups come into contact and are articulated with the industry. From 
the standpoint of the palm men, the peasant families of the region should come into contact as a 
docile wage labor force, or in the worst case – as the co-investment proposal shows – as contract 
farmers with little or no control over the market. On the other side, from the perspective of  
peasant organizations such as MARCA, the objective is to become raw material producers, but 
with some control over to whom they sell and with the eventual possibility of mimicking La 
Salamá or any of COAPALMA´s cooperatives. For others such as MCR, their goal is also to 
become raw material producers, but in their case, this is a steeper challenge, which brings us to 
some of the thornier topics. 
 By looking at this oversimplified characterization, it might seem that there is not much 
difference between the different positions. However, those differences are crucial. The co-
investment model, pursued – reluctantly, I must add – by people such as Facussé, is organized 
around two conditions: controlling the purchase price of the oil palm fruit and assuring that the 
land has to be paid by the peasant organizations.  In economic terms, it means that the 
organizations would be trapped and fully dependent on the large plantations and their mills. 
Moreover, the fact that the organizations have to pay for the land means that it becomes a form 
of rent capture. In political terms, this debt trap means two things. On the one hand, it 
legitimizes the rights that Facussé, Morales and others claim over the land, which is a thorny 
issue for organizations such as MARCA. On the other, it means that the peasant organizations 
have to remain docile and avoid any attempt at independent production. It is exactly against this 
logic that the cooperatives mobilized in 1981 to gain control over COAPALMA and it is exactly 
the same reason behind the decision of MUCA to reject the co-investment proposal.  
I already mentioned how the legitimizing possession becomes an issue for organizations 
such as MARCA. This of course should not foreclose the possibility of a contract agriculture 
scheme. As a leader of this organization told me, “I don´t know why Facussé is so obsessed with 
these lands, if he lets us keep them we have no problem selling him the [oil palm] fruit.”  
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Here the topic of property over land becomes crucial. In Latin America in general, 
property over land has not only to do with holding an asset, but about prestige and power. The 
fact that much of the history of the continent is based on domination structures based on 
possession of land as a form of controlling labor goes a long way in explaining this. As Adolfo 
Gilly has argued for Mexico,  
[a]ll the Mexican revolutions, with their bloody struggles over political power, 
have gravitated around ground rent. Who controls this power decides who owns 
and who usufructs the land and water, which in kind affirms and consolidates the 
existing power. The root and reason of the tragedy are the existence and destiny 
of the Mexican people; its recurrent theme, its leitmotiv, are land and power.  
For the Honduran case, this has been one of the historical reasons behind the land 
owning elite’s opposition to the agrarian reform. I would argue that for people such as Facussé 
and Morales, the idea of “giving away” this land is unacceptable, not because of economic 
reasons – even without co-investment contracts there are not many options when it comes to 
selling to the extracting mills –, but because it would mean allowing their property rights to be 
questioned, and with them, their role in society and the source of the rent they accrue. 
According to Marx (quoted by Harvey 2006:360), “an attack upon one form of property... might 
cast considerable doubt on the other form [ownership of the means of production].” 
Finally, as I have argued throughout this and the previous chapters, the process of labor 
capture and consolidation of the oil palm monoculture was also deeply gendered. The journey 
towards the Aguán began a process of transformation of the roles and dynamics between men 
and women, both within and outside the household. From the beginning, one of the central 
objectives of the cooperatives under the BAP was to create a new type of peasant subject, one 
disciplined, bridled to one place and oriented towards the market. This meant that the 
subsistence of their households should rest more on wages or other forms of monetary income 
than on self-provisioning. With this shift, came the heightening of the differentiation between 
paid and unpaid labor and between public and domestic spaces. It also meant the rise of a new 
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property regime based on the idea of land to the tiller, which in practice tended to collapse into 
land for the men. All of these shifts resulted in larger and more intensive restrictions upon 
women and their access to resources and control over the provisioning of their households.  
The land occupations that took place in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and that have 
been the subject of this chapter attempted to return to the path of the agrarian reform. At least 
in the heads of some of the people in the PS behind these efforts, the idea was that things could 
be done differently this time. Reality has shown that in the end, the creation of these new 
peasant movements became a form of labor capture by other means. The fact that the new 
organizations decided or had no choice but to take the form defined within the agrarian reform 
legislation, meant that in practice the results in terms of the relations of production were similar 
to those of the BAP. By the early 2000s, the palm oil monoculture totally dominated the region, 
leaving little chance for other forms of production to become viable alternatives.  
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Conclusion 
Exploring and then narrating the historical process of a region is a process similar to that of 
braiding hair. You begin with a lot of individual hairs – some of them in knots, some of them 
straight – that you must begin to comb carefully. Then, you organize them into strands; you 
might try to make sure that they are all of the same thickness, but they will always be uneven. 
Finally, you begin to weave the strands together, making sure that they are tight, but not so tight 
as to pull out the hairs. What you are left with at the end is a single braid in which the different 
strands are visible, but not in a homogeneous manner. At times, one of the strands is visible, 
while others hide behind it, just to appear in the next twist in connection to other ones that we 
could not see before.  
I began the process of writing this dissertation with scattered personal field notes, 
meager secondary sources and transcriptions of the individual memories of men and women 
who live or have lived in the Aguán. I then brushed them carefully in search of patterns and then 
proceeded to weave them together into a narrative representation of the historical 
transformation of the region. At the end – and to continue with the hairstyle metaphor – what I 
was left with is a four-strand braid, in which each strand represents one of the main processes 
that connects the historical trajectory of the region – both as it was and as it is remembered – 
with its tempestuous present. These four strands were: 1. The perspective of passive revolution 
to approach the process of state formation in postcolonial Central America; 2. The tension 
between labor capture and flight as a way of approaching the topic of agrarian reform, in the 
midst of different processes of dispossession and struggle; 3. The consolidation on the ground of 
the global palm oil assemblage and the move to the center of the region´s life of oil palm 
monoculture and; 4. The process of creation of historical narratives in the Aguán, as the tension 
between individual and collective memories. In what follows, I will briefly characterize each 
strand from the vantage point of the situation in the region in 2014, as a way of laying out clearly 
my main arguments. 
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First strand: from passive revolution to its unraveling  
I used Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) notion of passive revolution – as well as its reinterpretation and 
critique by Kalyan Sanyal (2013) – to think about the historical processes of political domination 
and struggle in postcolonial Honduras. My idea was to approach how different groups came to 
be positioned in the dynamics of political and economic domination and in the uneven 
geographical and institutional patterns that were produced in the process.  Following Abrams 
(1988) warning that what we usually think is the state is nothing more than a reified and reifying 
mask that hides the tracks after the deed, my emphasis was necessarily on the political practices 
of the different groups in contention.  
From this starting point, I was able to interrogate the ever-present national myth of the 
rich but impoverished country, which tries to explain the country’s continued failure to progress 
and develop as some sort of innate inability of its population – peasants in particular – to work 
and exploit the abundant natural riches.  Seen from this perspective, we can find a thread that 
connects the policies to attract the banana plantations with the Bajo Aguán Project in the 1970s 
and recent attempts by the government to create “charter cities” (Davidson 2012)109 in the 
country. Progress and development have always been something to be imported in the form of 
either “better” labor, capital or knowhow.  
There is little new here and much of the critical literature on development makes the 
same argument. What I am interested on is how in a country like Honduras, or Central America 
                                                        
109 According to economist Paul Romer (Fuller and Romer 2012), a “charter city” resembles in general 
terms a special economic zone, that is, a space within a “host” country that is ruled by differentiated 
economic rules (tariff exemptions, for example). However, the charter city scheme would also include its 
own differentiated political and legal rules. The idea behind this is quite simple. By creating these sorts of 
spaces, abstracted from the institutional and cultural failures that keep third world countries 
underdeveloped, economic growth will thrive and eventually become an example and force that radiates 
out to the rest of the country. As we can see, the principle is basically the same as that present in the 
original BAP (chapter 2). 
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in more general terms, this idea of the rich but impoverished country is connected with the 
narrative of the failed states (see for example, Ghani and Lockhart 2008). According to this sort 
of analysis, certain states have failed when they are unable to guarantee basic social rights to 
their citizens or a healthy business climate. In the end, what it all boils down to, is the failure by 
certain states to retain the monopoly over violence within their borders. For example, according 
to Paul Collier (2009), the history of modern state building has been the resulting balance 
between the concentration of political power – understood as the ability to exercise violence – in 
the state, and the ability by citizens to enforce fiscal accountability on that same state. Other 
explanatory frameworks under the overarching rubric of failed states focus rather on the 
relationship between natural resources and development.  
In what is generally known as “political Dutch disease,” a negative relation is proposed 
between natural resources and generalized economic development. Phrased differently, the 
more natural resources a country has, the less economic development it will experience. There 
are plenty of explanations for this (for a review, see Ross 1999), but basically, the idea is that in 
countries where rent extraction is the central economic activity, the concentration of this rent in 
one or two industries – oil is usually the example given – takes away the incentives for the state 
elites to construct consensus among the population (low fiscal accountability in terms of 
Collier’s framework). As a result, non-democratic regimes rise to power and vicious infighting 
between groups to control the points of rent capture ensues. Although this sort of analysis tends 
to focus on oil producing countries, it is evident how Honduras – and probably Guatemala and 
El Salvador for that matter – could also fit within this analysis.110 
The failed state/resource curse literature has come under heavy critique from different 
angles. Particularly, critics argue that this is a highly ethnocentric approach, that it tries to 
                                                        
110 According to the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index, in 2013 Honduras was ranked 75 of 178 countries. 
Guatemala, the highest ranking country in Central America, was ranked 70th (see: 
http://ffp.statesindex.org/). 
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present the supposed history of the Western countries as an abstract universal and that very 
little attention is paid to the specific ways in which states are shaped. For example, according to 
Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton (2002:75), in an article that approaches the failed states 
literature from a political economy of security perspective, 
[o]ur  aim  has  not  so  much  been  to  generate  an  alternative conception  of 
‘failed  states’, but  with presenting  an alternative  to  the construction of ‘ failed  
states ’  as political  practice.  It  therefore  behooves  us  to  highlight  how  the 
‘state’   element  within  the  notion  of  ‘failed  states ’   is  neglected,  sanitised  
and presented  within  a  benign  form  of  political  order.  Perhaps,  therefore,  
rather  than focus  on  ‘failed  states’ ,  increased   attention  should  be  granted  
to  the  ‘ failed universalisation ’   of  the  ‘ imported  state ’   within  the  post-
colonial  world. 
As I have shown in this study, much can be advanced in this direction by playing close 
attention to the relation between the institutionalization of political practice – state formation – 
and the ways in which the agrarian question is framed. I will return to the topic of the agrarian 
question later on. Regarding the process of institutionalization of political practice, approaching 
the development of the Honduran postcolonial state from the Gramscian perspective of passive 
revolution has been particularly fruitful.  
From the standpoint of passive revolution, rather than the history of a failed state, what 
we find is a story of “success,” in which an incipient and rather weak would-be bourgeoisie 
managed to create the conditions for capital accumulation despite the presence of conservative 
and non-capitalistic sectors of the elite and highly mobile subaltern groups. In postcolonial 
Honduras, state, class and nation, came to be formed together. It was in the process of trying to 
create and control the points of rent capture that a set of institutions – both formal and informal 
– were produced to position, make sense, police and regulate the positions of the different 
groups in the country. In fact, part of the reason that most postcolonial attempts at progress or 
development, have focused on one particular activity in one particular space is that this 
approach allows for easier vertical integration and thus, easier and more stable control over the 
points of rent capture.  
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However, more than trying to construct a counter-narrative from which “failure” is read 
as “success,” I think the point is to unpack what is being understood as failure or success and by 
whom. The fact that the Honduran state has “failed” to move more than half of its population 
above the poverty line should not obscure the fact that the history of businessmen such as 
Facussé has clearly been one of success. As Abrams (1988) argued more than two decades ago, 
our focus should been how political practice is institutionalized and then hidden behind the 
almighty mask of the state.  
For the specific case of Honduras, the processes of state, class and nation formation have 
always been riddled by contradictions and conflicts in which the resulting equilibriums of 
coercion and consent have been spread unevenly both geographically and socially. Socially, a set 
of agreements and pacts allowed for the creation of an alliance between the incipient bourgeois 
class fractions and the more conservative sectors organized mainly around the cattle haciendas. 
In contrast, the relation between dominant and subaltern groups has been forever based on 
coercion. Geographically, a clear differentiation was created between the north coast as the 
“banana republic” – with San Pedro Sula as its “industrial” capital – and the rest of the country 
as the “non-banana republic” – with Tegucigalpa as the seat of political power.  
It would be under Carías’s dictatorship that this form of domination would consolidate 
into a specific state form, laying down the framework upon which later governments and 
political projects would be created. Besides the attempts at showcasing the process of political 
succession as democratic, there were the basic principles or understandings upon which this 
state form was built. These were understood “…as a particular moment in a continuing struggle 
between different interests in which, as it were, a specific configuration of power carrying with 
its particular historical legacies is, for however long or short a time, congealed” (Crehan 
1997:27). The first principle was that private property – and particularly landed private property 
– was sacred; the second, that subaltern groups should never be allowed into hegemonic 
alliances, to the detriment of the dominant class fractions in contention; and the third, that 
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coercion more than consent should always govern the relations between dominant and 
subaltern groups, but that the levels of coercion should never be allowed to become class-on-
class open confrontation, what Darío Euraque (1996) recognizes as the cycles of “reform and 
reaction” of the Honduran political system. 
Since at least 1956, every military coup in Honduras has been related to the breaching of 
one of these principles, including the ousting of Manuel Zelaya in 2009. According to 
mainstream lore (as presented for example by Di Iorio 2010; Martínez 2010), the main reasons 
behind the 2009 coup, were that Zelaya had promoted a political climate of confrontation 
between social groups and intended to mimick his “friend” Hugo Chávez, create a communist 
regime in Honduras, and rewrite the constitution to remain in power beyond his presidential 
period. It is worth noting that one of the initial reasons for Zelaya to approach the Venezuelan 
government – and Petrocaribe more specifically – was the generalized resistance he 
encountered domestically to his attempts to lower fuel prices by renegotiating the formula by 
which the costs of oil imports were calculated.  
Early in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Marx (2008) mentions that history tends 
to repeat itself, “once as tragedy, and again as farce.” This formulation appears to hold perfectly 
well for the Honduran case. One of the first things that the newly elected president Juan 
Orlando Hernández did, once he took office in January 2014, was to propose a change in the way 
in which oil imports are calculated, so as to lower the domestic prices of fuels. Moreover, in this 
very different, post-coup context the idea of changing the constitution as to legalize the 
presidential reelection was openly discussed and even agreed upon –including in a very public 
debate in the national press. Irony aside, what this shows is that it was not necessarily Zelaya’s 
specific policies or proposals that led to his ousting, but rather the manner in which they were 
advocated. Zelaya’s response to the refusal by most of the traditional sectors, organized around 
the two party system, to support what by almost any standard were visibly reformist and hardly 
radical policies, pushed him towards the only ally that he found: the social movements. With 
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this “turn to the left” by Zelaya – as this alliance is usually dubbed –, came a significant shift in 
his rhetoric and his way of doing politics, as the government relied more and more on popular 
mobilization in the streets and on Venezuelan petrodollars in the bank.  
However, it is not enough to say that Zelaya – in a similar manner to Villeda Morales in 
1963 – violated the principles of the Honduran passive revolution and that was that. Since at 
least the 1990s, molecular changes within the dominant groups had come to deeply transform 
the political landscape and to put in question the state form of unstable equilibriums 
inaugurated by Carías. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, in the 1980s a group of entrepreneurs –
many, such as Facussé, of Middle Eastern descent – rose within the ranks of the Honduran elites 
through a process of pillaging of public resources. Organized around economic activities such as 
textiles, finance, agroindustry and telecommunications, this “new” group was able to utilize the 
opportunities opened by the “neoliberal wave” to rise to the top, displace some of the traditional 
elites and “capture” the state structures (Meza et al. 2008) either directly – as in the election of 
Miguel Facussé’s nephew, Carlos Flores Facussé, as president in 1998 – or indirectly – by 
exercising influence through pressure groups such as APROH or the National Association of 
Industrialists (ANDI). This is the side of the Honduran history that should be read as a 
“success.” 
As in the rest of Latin America, with the neoliberal turn came the opening of the national 
economies and an even larger emphasis on exports and the privatization of public assets. The 
result was an institutional structure that included both the new liberal policies and institutions, 
alongside older ones that had been the direct result of previous political arrangements, such as 
the INA and the agrarian reform legislation. At the same time, following again a continent-wide 
pattern, with the rise to power of the new dominant bloc, the old logic of checks and balances 
between classes and fractions of classes as the form of legitimation of the state was discarded in 
favor of short-term social and economic compensatory measures. This of course meant the 
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unraveling of historical understandings about the relations between subaltern and dominant 
groups, as well as increasing reliance on coercion to secure domination. 
Nowhere was this unraveling felt stronger than in the agrarian sector. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 3, in the 1990s the approval of the LMA opened up the door for a massive transfer of 
lands from the reform sector to a small group of private entrepreneurs. This can and should be 
read as a breach of the “moral economy” (Watts 2013; Scott 1977) that had come to regulate 
relations between peasants and state since at least Carías. But also, both the LMA – and its 
predecessor, the LTP – should be seen as attempts by the elites to expand the realm of private 
ownership to the detriment of national and collective forms of property. This necessarily created 
a whole new layer of conflict in the Honduran countryside. 
Movements such as MARCA embarked on long and strenuous processes to reclaim what 
they deemed had been illegally taken from them. But many other “new” peasant movements –
such as the MCR – targeted lands that they recognized as “national” – since under the former 
legal framework agrarian reform lands had to remain within the reform sector even when they 
had been “privatized” under the LMA.  
It would be wrong to write off these types of clashes as based on the peasant 
organizations’ lack of knowledge. One of the aspects that struck me most during my fieldwork 
was how much these organizations knew about the lands they were “recuperating.” They always 
knew how large they were, who were the supposed owners and under which principles of the 
agrarian legislation they could be claimed. I remember speaking with a peasant organizer about 
land that they wanted to recuperate from the Honduran Livestock Fund (Fondo Ganadero) on 
the left bank of the Aguán River. He could tell me precisely how much land was involved and 
that they were targeting the land ceiling of close to 600 hectares. He also knew that they would 
probably be evicted soon after entering, but for him this was a just cause, as those were former 
agrarian reform lands and they were poor families in need of land. 
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 I would argue that rather than a lack of knowledge, these points of friction suggest 
differential temporalities operating at the same time. While the new property regime 
inaugurated under the LMA operates on a temporal understanding of “from now on” – erasing 
former social understandings of what is legal and desirable–, peasant organizations operate with 
a longer historical perspective in which their claims hark back to how things were and how they 
should be. It was this deeper historical perspective that Manuel Zelaya evoked –probably 
unknowingly– with Decree 18-2008 and his general approach to the countryside. It is within 
this tension between breached moral economy, uneven temporalities and the remaining 
sediments of older institutional equilibriums that the ongoing wave of agrarian conflicts in the 
Aguán should be understood. And it is within this longer history of the problematic of hegemony 
that the relationship between land and power becomes evident when read along the thread of 
land rent. 
The historian Adolfo Gilly (2007:358) has argued that at the core of the dispute at the 
end of the Mexican Revolution between the “ranchers dressed as generals” – Obregón and his 
allies – and Zapata and the peasant army of the south – which resulted in the creation of famous 
article 27 of the new constitution – was the question about who would enjoy the country’s 
ground rent. For him, 
It was not about resolving the simplistic question of whether there was going to 
be a market or not… It was about deciding whether the land, patrimony of the 
entire nation, was going to be in the market, was going to be the object of private 
commercial transactions and, in consequence, if land rent was going to stop being 
in practice the patrimony of the nation and become the individual private 
property of a few people.  
And it is here that we return to the myth of the rich and impoverished country. Myths, as 
any historical narrative that pretends to operate upon the common sense of a society, are open 
to different interpretations depending on the social position from which they are read. The rich 
but impoverished country myth is no exception. In my time in Honduras I encountered various 
reworkings of the same idea. While there seems to be a national consensus regarding the 
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country’s natural riches and potential for development, there is a conflict about the reasons for 
its poverty. From the perspective of the elites, the problem continues to be the deficient quality 
of the Honduran laboring subject – its lack of ingenuity and industriousness, its laziness and 
tendency towards corruption – and the absence of national capital to tap into those riches. In 
the case of those versions that I heard from peasants and members of various social movements, 
the problem rather, was that those riches were hoarded by limited group of foreigners, such as 
Facussé.  
To phrase it differently and being more formulaic, with the further penetration of 
capitalist relations in the form of the privatization of land, a whole social map of arrangements 
and forms of understanding regarding the position of both subaltern and dominant groups 
began to crumble.  Public land had historically been the patrimony of the nation’s poor; once 
this came into question, the whole idea upon which hegemonic had been built since at least 
Carías, was also questioned, sharpening the edges of the points of contact between classes.  
Strand 2: agrarian reform as labor capture 
…what the Savages exhibit is the continual effort to prevent chiefs from being chiefs, the 
refusal of unification, the endeavor to exorcise the One, the State. It is said that the 
history of peoples who have history is the history of class struggle. It might be said, with 
at least as much truthfulness, that the history of peoples without history is the history of 
their struggle against the State. 
– Pierre Clastres (1989:218), Society Against the State 
 
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg (2010:23) argues that the one characteristic shared by most 
peasantries in the world is the struggle for autonomy. According to him, this struggle 
…aims at and materializes as the creation and development of a self-controlled 
and self-managed resource base, which in turn allows for those forms of co-
production of man and living nature that interact with the market, allow for 
survival and for further prospects and feed back into and strengthen the 
resource base, improve the process of co-production, enlarge autonomy and, 
thus, reduce dependency. 
 For him, this fight for autonomy is a constant and never ending process where 
“…maintaining – that is, actively reconstructing – autonomy becomes a central and universal 
328 
 
feature of the peasantry. Continuity is by no means assured: it has to be repeated created and 
recreated. There is no security whatsoever offered by others, and former successes are no 
guarantee for the future” (p. 36). 
 Further, “[i]t places labour centre stage, linking it with self-controlled and partly self-
shaped resources and with the notion of getting ahead. The specificity of this core becomes clear 
when compared with other modes of crafting ways forward. Getting ahead is understood within 
the peasant condition to be the result of one’s own labour” (p. 35) 
 Autonomy understood in these terms is never a given, it has to be constantly produced 
and struggled over. It is not a story of success either, as peasants usually find themselves in 
situations of subjugation and domination. According to Eric Wolf’s (1966) now classic definition 
of the peasantry, it is exactly in the uneven relations with larger wholes – the state for example – 
that we should read the history of peasants. 
 From this standpoint, the variety of peasantries is dazzling. From the peasants under 
siege described by Kligman and Verdery (2011)111 in communist Romania, to the Guatemalan 
Q’echi’ indigenous peasants analyzed by Grandia (2012),112 what we find is this very ingrained 
notion that being able to control one’s own labor process and enjoy the fruits of this labor is 
central to their being in the world.  
                                                        
111 “Rural Romanian status ideals held that a complete and worthy person must control his labor process 
and its product… Collectivization meant losing possession of one’s land and animals losing the resources 
that attracted other people into one’s networks, losing control over one’s work and harvest and, perhaps, 
most important, losing the ability to provide adequately for one’s family” (Kligman and Verdery 
2011:453). 
112 “The Q’echi’ desire for land stemmed not from some abstract wish for property ownership but, as 
migrants routinely explained to me, ‘to find a place to work.’ As one settler elaborated, ‘Oh yes, I came 
here to work. Anyone comes [here] from somewhere else wants a place to work – to plant his beans, his 
root crops, his banana trees.’ No longer willing to accept the exploitation of life as worker-serfs on coffee 
plantations or sharecroppers on cattle ranches, they emphasized that they wanted to work for themselves” 
(Grandia 2012:65). 
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Particularly important for the point that I would like to make is that we can locate almost 
a continuum in terms of the relation between mobility and the struggle for autonomy by 
different peasantries: from very “rooted” “…country people who did not want to move and 
therefore got into a revolution” (Womack 1968:ix) in southern Mexico; passing through 
migrating slash and burn agricultural practices – such as those described by Grandia (and  by 
me) in Central America – to the nomadic groups of hunters and gatherers described by Pierre 
Clastres (1989) in the Paraguayan jungles.  
However, there is a tendency in the scholarly work dedicated to peasant studies to focus 
on those families and groups whose reaction to dispossession is organization. The result is that 
very few studies (for example, Grandia 2012; Breman 1996) pay attention to the experiences and 
histories of those who decide to migrate rather than stay. As a result, we know much about 
agrarian conflict as it takes place in particular settings, but little about the strategies of flight 
and the impact that they can have in the broader context of the agrarian question (for example, 
denying the capture of labor by capital). 
 More than twenty years ago Liisa Malkki (1992) suggested that there is a strong 
tendency within anthropology to approach the topic of mobility – be it “voluntary” migration or 
“involuntary” displacement – from the perspective of “rootedness.” According to her, a fixed 
relationship between nation-state, culture and society is taken for granted. Thus, “…people are 
often thought of, and think of themselves, as being rooted in place and as deriving their identity 
from that rootedness” (p. 27).  The result: “[o]ur sedentarist assumptions about attachment to 
place lead us to define displacement not as a fact about sociopolitical context, but rather, as an 
inner, pathological condition of the displaced” (p. 33). 
This bias is also applicable to agrarian and peasant studies, where mobility – whether 
migration, displacement or flight – is taken to be a pathology, as something outside the norm 
and that should be corrected. The result is a set of analytical scopes that tend to either avoid the 
anomaly – paying little attention to those who decide to leave –, or to approach it as “problem” 
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to be solved (how many rural development projects are aimed at stopping the outmigration of 
people from their communities?).  
Since Malkki is more interested in the linguistic and representational effects of this bias, 
she does not present a satisfying explanation as to why it happens. Let me offer one directly 
related to the topic at hand. As James Scott (1998; 2009) following Foucault has argued in some 
of his work, one of the central characteristics of statecraft has been making society legible. That 
is, “…to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, 
conscription, and prevention of rebellion” (1998:2).  
This making legible necessarily includes a process of technical simplification by which 
what is normal, and what is not, is defined and enforced. The resulting standpoint – this “seeing 
like a state” or “methodological statism” – is fundamentally sedentary and very much organized 
around the idea of rootedness. As a result, those forms of being in the world that do not fall 
within the matrix of legibility – the vagabond, the nomad, and the “subsistence”-oriented 
household – have to either be “fixed” and brought in line, or rendered invisible and disappeared.   
In terms of the literature on agrarian and peasant studies, the most glaring effect of this 
methodological statism is the bias in favor of organization, as against flight, when analyzing the 
response of the peasantry to dynamics of dispossession.113  
Instead of beginning our inquiry by presupposing that peasants want to remain in one 
single place, I propose that we explore the specific ways in which concrete peasantries navigate 
between remaining rooted or relocating in their struggle for autonomy and the securing of 
subsistence, in the terms given to this notion by Pierre Clastres (1989:195) 
                                                        
113 Think of all the literature that focusses on peasant struggle and organization (Wolf 1969; Paige 1978; 
Guha 1999; Womack 1968; Moore 1966; Edelman 1999), or even the now famous “weapons of the weak” 
(Scott 1985), and how much smaller is the amount of work that focuses on migration in relation to 
agrarian struggle (for example, Arizpe 1980; Aguirre Beltrán 1967; Breman 1996; Edelman 2008). 
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Men work more than their needs require only when forced to… The term, 
subsistence economy, is acceptable in describing the economic organization of 
those societies [where men do not work beyond their necessities], provided it is 
taken to mean not the necessity that derives from a lack… but the contrary: the 
refusal of a useless excess, the determination to make productive activity agree 
with satisfaction of needs.114 
This dynamic and the tensions that come with it, is what I try to apprehend with the 
notion of labor capture. Under capitalism, value is mainly produced by human labor. Ground 
rent, its capture and the political framework – that reified set of political practices that we call 
state – built around it to regulate and police it, would not exist without the capturing of human 
labor. As I began arguing in Chapter 1 – but continued to elaborate in later chapters – labor 
power is never already there; it must be cultivated and assembled. For this to happen the would-
be workers –men and women– must first be separated from their ability to self-provision; this is 
a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition. Subjectively, this new “freed” subject must also come 
to understand herself as a worker. The connection of these material and subjective processes is 
at the core of Marx’s formulation of primitive accumulation which, as I argued in Chapter 1 
following Gidwani (2008a; 2008b), is a process fraught with tensions and anxieties, as there is 
always the possibility that labor might not be there for its exploitation by capital – as George 
Henderson (1998) and Don Mitchell (1996) so eloquently show for the case of immigrant 
workers in California.   
 Yann Moulier-Boutang (2006), in From Slavery to Wage Labor, tracks the normative 
and institutional forms through which the idea of wage labor was constituted as part of a long 
process that predates the rise of capitalism itself. According to Moulier-Boutang, wage labor is 
only one of the various forms of subordinate labor that have been used by capitalism to attend to 
its central and ever present challenge of immobilizing the body of the worker – “bridling” him, 
tying him to the labor relation, preventing his flight, the breach of contract – be it formal or 
informal – and refusing to work for others and becoming legible under the rubric of the state. 
                                                        
114 For a similar argument see Marshall Sahlin’s (1972) Stone Age Economics. 
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One of his central conclusions is that within global capitalism, wage labor has coexisted with 
other forms of exploitation in an often unstable and changing manner, with “unfree” and wage 
labor usually occupying complementary positions in the grand scheme of disciplining subaltern 
classes within a vast field of strategies.  
 I understand as labor capture the forms in which these two processes – primitive 
accumulation and labor bridling – overlap and come together to place certain groups in a 
relation of subordination and labor exploitation in relation to capital. Further, I argue that the 
tension between labor capture – a never ending process that constantly must be reenacted – and 
flight – the never ending attempts by subaltern groups to escape capture – has a distinct 
geographical pattern in which mobility – rather than rootedness – should be seen as the norm 
and not the exception.  
 In chapters 1 and 2 I showed how migration as flight was the constant response by 
Honduran peasant and indigenous subaltern groups to the threat of capture. Further, we saw 
how in the 1960s and 1970s, the expansion of capitalist relations of production and the 
expansion and diversification of the export economy placed severe stress on the traditional 
survival strategies of peasant and indigenous communities in both the southern and western 
sections of the country. Manifested in the form of land encroachment and concentration by the 
elites, this stress was expressed in the increasing necessity of households to look for wage labor 
to complement their domestic production and provisioning. 
This process of monetization was “domesticated” (Carney and Watts 1990), transforming 
the internal dynamics of the household. The traditional lazuro inheritance system – very much 
ingrained in the spatial dynamics of these subaltern groups – gave way to forms of 
fragmentation of the land; more and more, unpaid and paid labor came to be differentiated and 
with it, women’s work was devalued and rendered invisible as domestic and reproductive. 
Access to land became also more monetized, as the only way for impoverished new families to 
access it was through rent. At the same time that households became bridled through wage labor 
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and tenancy agreements, women became bridled to the domestic space, with ever decreasing 
levels of personal autonomy and control over the household’s provisioning. 
It was in this context of generalized dispossession that the men and women that I spoke 
to in the Aguán began the journey east, in search of a piece of land and a better life. However, if 
dispossession was necessarily at the root of their migration, the actual route and pattern of this 
migration was defined by the decision between flight and organization back in their home 
regions. For those who chose organization, the result was their inclusion in the Bajo Aguán 
Project and their induced migration towards the valley’s lowlands. For those who selected flight, 
it translated into a long process of phased migration towards the hills. I will refer briefly to both 
processes.  
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of both increasing land encroachment and of 
mobilization of peasants trying to maintain their access to land. Access to land was, as we saw, 
crucial for Carías’s “peace and order” scheme and for the Honduran passive revolution in 
general. In response to this increasing conflict and as part of an international context framed by 
the U.S. inspired and bankrolled Alliance for Progress, the Honduran government promoted a 
sweeping agrarian reform. As we saw in chapter 2, the objectives of this agrarian reform were 
twofold: on the one hand, diffusing the hotspots of social and political unrest in the countryside. 
On the other, to transform the “traditional” agriculture sector and make the peasantry into 
efficient and market-oriented producers, in order for development in the countryside to flourish 
and impact positively the nation as a whole.   
Based on a process that combined active peasant pressure on the ground with a 
sympathetic and supportive government, the agrarian reform distributed extensive amounts of 
land to peasants organized in market-oriented production cooperatives. At the same time, 
through a set of mechanisms that included particular requirements, training, direct intervention 
and using debt and coercion as leverage, it also became a massive process of peasant disciplining 
and labor capture. Peasant men used to working mostly by themselves and with the freedom of 
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deciding what and how to produce were forced to work collectively and under strict forms of 
discipline and surveillance.  
These peasant cooperatives were born in debt, as they had both to pay back the state for 
the lands and from the beginning were given cheap credits to jumpstart production and invest in 
machinery; in this way they became bridled labor with little autonomy. In the case of the Aguán 
and the BAP, most cooperatives began producing what they knew best: milpa. However, after 
Hurricane Fifí destroyed most of their crops, debt was used to turn them into oil palm 
producers. This change was not only dramatic in subjective terms, it also meant that the value 
that they produced was extracted in the form of rent. In this sense, the 1981 strike to gain 
control over COAPALMA – described in Chapter 3 – should be read as an attempt by the 
peasant cooperatives to gain control over a larger portion of the value that they produced and 
reenact the struggle for autonomy and subsistence that I mentioned before.  
Just as in the case of the 1960s and 1970s cycle of dispossession, the creation of the 
cooperatives and the development of the reform sector in the Aguán was also domesticated. As 
the peasant households became bridled to the cooperatives, their provisioning became ever 
more monetized, as the extensions of land dedicated to oil palms expanded, to the detriment of 
staple crop production. Men became wage laborers for the cooperatives and COAPALMA in all 
but name, at the same time that women lost their tenuous foothold on subsistence and became 
bridled to the domestic sphere; here we can see clearly the complementary manner in which 
paid and unpaid labor operated together to discipline these households, as Eugenia’s testimony 
so eloquently shows in Chapter 3. 
By the time the LMA was approved in the early 1990s, the different points of rent capture 
within and among the cooperatives had created a process of differentiation that eroded the 
reform sector’s unity; with a few successful oil palm cooperatives affiliated with COAPALMA 
surrounded by a sea of poverty that included both oil palm and staple crop producing 
cooperatives. At the national scale, rising businessmen such as Miguel Facussé had managed to 
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amass significant amounts of money in detriment of the state,115 which once the legal floodgates 
were opened, flooded into the region along the cracks left by the internal processes of 
differentiation and fractioning of the reform sector. The result was the concentration and 
privatization of most of the lands distributed during the agrarian reform period in the hands of a 
few businessmen and transnational companies.  
Not enough attention has been paid to the role that the 1960s-70s cycle of dispossession 
and the BAP played in creating the conditions of possibility for the development of today’s 
Honduran palm oil industry. As I argue at the end of Chapter 3, most of the focus has been 
placed on the number of hectares that were transferred, not on the objectified and living labor 
that had been assembled and cultivated upon those same hectares. Roads, levees, the felling of 
the forests, the process of planting, the building of the extracting mills — this is only a part of the 
objectified labor that the new palm men acquired with the lands. Families cultured in the 
rhythms, practices and language of the palm oil industry were “freed” from the cooperatives, but 
remained bridled to the oil palms. As Eugenia somberly mentioned in Chapter 3, the ability –
and the desire, I must add – to produce milpa has been lost by a younger generation that was 
literally born under the shadow of the oil palms.  
This tension between milpa as a form of “escape agriculture” (Scott 2009) and oil palms 
as the enactment of capital and labor capture points to the fruitfulness of reconstructing the 
social history of particular crops for analyzing agrarian transformations. Particularly interesting 
is how by studying the ways in which they are cultivated, promoted and contested, as well as 
identifying the sort of dreams, notions and ideas that are attached to them, we can look at the 
articulation between the material and subjective in particular sites. Phrased differently, by 
                                                        
115 Both Alexander Segovia  and William Robinson (Segovia 2004; 2005; Robinson 2003) characterize the 
1990s and the process of structural adjustment programs, as one of transnationalization in which a new 
economic elite emerged with strong links with financial capital. These are the real “winners” of the 
neoliberal turn. 
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looking at the history of a single crop – understood as enmeshed in several simultaneous space 
times –we are able to analyze some of the ecological, social, cultural, political and economic 
aspects of the history of a particular region (see for example, Grossman 1998; Soluri 2009; 
Rogers 2010).  My analysis of the oil palm just begins to scratch the surface of the potentiality 
that this sort of approach could provide. For example, as I mentioned in chapter 3, at the same 
time that the BAP was being developed in Honduras, similar schemes were also being promoted 
in different parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Comparative work that explores how this 
crop was introduced and how the palm oil industry has grown around it could prove to be a very 
fruitful way of analyzing how capital and agriculture have interacted and mixed in such diverse 
political and economic contexts. 
Also, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1990s cycle of primitive accumulation was deeply 
gendered, as men and women experienced, reasoned and reacted to the process in different 
ways. Due to their position as workers in the fields, men experienced the whole process of 
development and later loss of the cooperatives from the perspective of work, wages and poverty. 
At the same time, women – due to their bridling to the domestic sphere – experienced the 
process from the perspective of the subsistence, wellbeing and autonomy of their households. 
There was nothing natural about this differentiation; it was the clear result in which 
monetization and dispossession positioned each one in regards to the overarching processes. 
When thought about together, these two experiences give us a more rounded perspective of the 
shared experience of dispossession of these households.  
Not all households accepted this fate. Particularly those from the western section of the 
country, who had less experience with wage labor than their southern counterparts and who 
were used to a cooler climate, found the rigors of the Aguán’s lowlands and the cooperatives too 
oppressive and moved up the hills in search of “free” lands. Over time, this process created a 
tension between the lowlands – as a place of discipline and wage labor – and the hills – as a 
space of freedom but poverty. In the hills, they intermixed with the various waves of families 
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that had arrived to the Aguán outside of the framework of the BAP. It is here that we connect 
with the history of those families who instead of organization chose flight as their response to 
the cycle of dispossession back home. Attracted by the supposedly good wages and free land to 
be found on the north coast, many families began a slow journey that eventually led them to the 
Aguán. The rhythms of this journey were punctuated by the production of nature; the decision 
to move from one place to another was usually preceded by a natural event such as Hurricane 
Fifí, the loss of the land’s fertility due to slash and burn agriculture or finding out that the 
supposedly free land ended up not being so free after all when the legal owner would displace 
them. The routes of these migration flows were structured by kinship, as in most cases 
households would relocate to places where members of their extended kin network were living.  
With the exception of works by Angel Castro (1994) and Peter Marchetti (1998), the 
history of these groups – as well as that of the dwellers in the region before the arrival of the 
BAP – has been effaced. In Chapter 5 I argued that this was connected to the fact that their 
trajectory was the result of the flight from capture, and thus, in a sense, they were outside the 
purview of the state. If this is the case – and here I am navigating close to the work of Clastres 
(1989) and Scott (2009) –, then for a long period of time, they were probably the most 
interested party in not being seen and surveyed. At the same time, it does raise the question as 
to why they changed their behavior in the aftermath of Mitch. How was it that a group of 
families, so zealous about their autonomy and distance in regard to labor capture and the state, 
decide one day to come down from the hills, recuperate land and create new communities, 
putting their lives on the line?  
Before the 1990s the tension between capture and flight created a geographical pattern 
based on the understanding that free land existed and was available for the poor somewhere 
else. The BAP and the informal flows of migration towards the Aguán were predicated upon this 
idea. As we saw in Chapter 2, towards the end of the 1980s, the idea of the unlimited free lands 
was coming to a close, as the only way of accessing lands was moving further and further up the 
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mountains; by the 1990s even this alternative disappeared, with the intensified efforts of 
COHDEFOR to enforce forestry protection. After Mitch and under these conditions, the choice 
between flight and organization was presented yet again for many families. In part due to the 
organizing work of the Catholic Church in the hills, in part due to a sense that no other 
alternative was open to them, most of the families that flocked to the Nueva Vida and Guadalupe 
Carney communities were those who, probably for the first time in their lives, chose 
organization over flight. As we can see, there is nothing natural about the shift that is clearly 
informed by a change in the broader context in which the struggle for autonomy and subsistence 
had to be framed and understood.  
This is not to say that flight was not also a viable option. Unlike El Salvador and 
Guatemala, Honduran migration towards the U.S. only took off in the 1990s. This is usually 
explained in connection with the crisis of international coffee prices and the effects of neoliberal 
policies (Reichman 2011; Puerta 2005; Sladkova 2007). I do not know of a single work that 
explores the possible connections between these increased levels of international migration and 
the shift in the national agrarian understanding, from unlimited free lands to a sense of 
enclosure. When comparing notes with Sergio Salazar – a fellow anthropologist who is studying 
the experience of Central American immigrants in their transit through Mexico – the similarities 
between how today’s Honduran migrants make sense of their journey towards the U.S. and the 
testimonies that I collected regarding the reasons for leaving for the Aguán are strikingly 
similar. A longer historical perspective that links internal with international migration and 
processes of dispossession with the production of nature would be an interesting approach to 
shedding light on the current exodus of Hondurans – and Central Americans more broadly – 
towards the U.S.  
Strand 3: the overdetermination of the palm oil monoculture 
Monocultures, we are told, are bad for the environment. They destroy biodiversity and with it 
the nourishment of various species; they attract plant diseases and dry up water sources; they 
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displace the production of staple crops and populations and diminish the social resilience of 
communities (Adger 2000; Altieri 2009; Carrere 2006; Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). Little to no 
attention is given in most of this literature to the ways of being on the world – and the common 
sense that accompanies them – that are also created alongside these plantations. This is the 
reason that I find Vandana Shiva’s (1993:12) formulation Monocultures of the Mind so 
revealing. According to Shiva, the introduction of Western scientific agricultural knowledge and 
practice has rendered invisible other local ecological knowledges and practices that are labeled 
“traditional” or “primitive.” Further,  
…the dominant system also makes alternatives disappear by erasing and 
destroying the reality which they attempt to represent… It is eclipsed along with 
the world to which it relates. Dominant scientific knowledge thus breeds a 
monoculture of the mind by making space for local alternatives disappear, very 
much like monocultures of introduced plant varieties leading to the displacement 
and destruction of local diversity. Dominant knowledge also destroys the very 
conditions for alternatives to exist, very much like the introduction of 
monocultures destroying the very conditions for diverse species to exist. 
Without trying to interpret too much, the idea of connecting agricultural scientific and 
technical knowledge, with commonsense understandings of the world is quite revealing. At the 
end of Chapter 5, I described how the Aguán has become oversaturated by palm oil: how the 
everyday life of most communities in the lowlands of the valley is defined by their relations with 
the plantations; how the regional identity is organized around the palm trees; how this crop is 
seen as the only viable economic and ecological alternative for the particular conditions of the 
Aguán. If the muscle behind this move came in the form of the debt trap and the leverage that 
the INA had on the cooperatives (Chapter 3), it was also the result of the constant preaching by 
agronomists and the press about the ecological conditions of both the region and the oil palm. It 
also relates to the daily observation by the local dwellers, that once the rain levels came up, the 
only things safe were the palm trees.  
This observation is, I think, important. At the beginning of Chapter 3, after I introduced 
the idea of the palm oil assemblage – borrowing from Michael Watt’s (2012b) formulation of the 
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“oil assemblage”– I proposed using Gramsci’s (1971:352) take on how men acquire a particular 
conception of the world. According to him, “[t]he humanity which is reflected in each 
individuality is composed of various elements: 1. the individual; 2. other men; 3. the natural 
world.” It is in these terms – along these three elements – that I understand the process of 
absorption of the oil palm monoculture into the minds of the residents of the Aguán. From this 
perspective, it becomes important to explore not only the ways in which political economy and 
ecology interact – the political ecology maxim –, but also the ways in which these interactions 
are appropriated, internalized and made sense of by local populations. Further, how these 
understandings – seen from the three levels proposed by Gramsci – produce the force field upon 
which both domination and contestation take place (Roseberry 1994). 
However, to leave things here would never do. According to Haroon Akhram-Lodhi and 
Cristóbal Kay (2010a; 2010b), rather than a single agrarian question, we should think about a 
diversity of different agrarian questions, ranging from approaches such as political ecology, 
feminism and historical path dependencies. However, if we boil it down to the basics, the 
agrarian question refers to the ways in which capital penetrates agriculture and attempts – but 
rarely completely succeeds – in turning the fields into factories.  
Seen from this perspective, the agrarian question turns into the exploration of how a 
cash crop such as oil palm operates on the ground, and we need to understand how labor, capital 
and land are assembled to allow for capital accumulation. Or, as George Henderson (1998:x) 
phrases it, “[t]he point would seem, is that capital and nature are webs of constraint and 
confinement that must be carefully recast as fields of opportunity. To be sure, the resulting 
alchemy can be as volatile as it can be profitable.” 
As I discuss in Chapter 3, palm oil is the most used vegetable oil in the world and – due 
to its variable uses – the oil palm is the quintessential flex crop. However, this profitability is 
predicated upon a set of conditions defined by the production process. As I show in that same 
chapter, these conditions give the palm oil industry various particularities (nursing period of 
341 
 
two years before production begins, the need to harvest the fresh fruit, difficulties in 
mechanizing, among others). As a result, the palm oil industry has become at different moments 
and in different ways, the peg on which development dreams have been hung. During the 1970s 
the IFIs and the FAO proposed that it was a viable option for improving both national food 
security conditions and for promoting domestic industrialization. Under this logic, various 
colonization and development projects, such as the BAP in Honduras and FELDA in Malaysia, 
were promoted and bankrolled by the World Bank and the IADB. By the 1990s, when the LMA 
was approved, the industry was well established in the country. However, as we saw in Chapter 
3, due to the fall in the international prices at this time, oil palm cultivation was not necessarily 
a profitable activity for those dedicated solely to the production of the raw material.  It is in part 
due to this situation – among the others that I present in that chapter – that the cooperatives 
could be bought and sold so cheaply. What this suggests is the close linkage between the global 
dynamics of accumulation and the constraints and opportunities on the ground for different 
actors such as Facussé or the peasant organizations.  
If we were to construct a continuum that goes from self-sufficient peasants to fully 
proletarianized rural wage laborers, where would we locate the peasant cooperatives and EACs 
created within the framework of the Honduran agrarian reform? Probably somewhere in 
between, but at the same time outside of the continuum. Let me elaborate. Outside, because as 
George Henderson (1998:77) contends, “…what becomes capital can in fact originate from 
outside the social relations of production of capitalism per se, outside the relations whereby 
capitalists otherwise extract value in labor processes they would control.”  
Following Kalyan Sanyal (2013) I proposed in chapter 3 that we think about the 
Honduran agrarian reform peasant cooperatives as need economies. That is, forms of economic 
enterprises that operate within the M-C-M’ circuit, but where the surplus created (M’), is not 
used for accumulation’s sake (thrown into circulation again to create further profits), but rather, 
used to secure the provisioning of its members, as well as restarting the cycle anew. Thus, the 
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cooperative operates as both employer and employee and, as we saw in chapter 3, is thus 
susceptible to forms of internal exploitation, due to the free rider problem or other forms of rent 
capture. At the same time, just as in Chayanov´s (1966) characterization of the peasant 
household, but on a larger scale, cooperatives are at the same time units of production and 
consumption. Finally, we cannot forget either the forms of subjugation that women suffer within 
the cooperatives, as their domestic labor is not recognized or their access to resources such as 
land and credit is blocked. 
However, these needs economies also operate – as in the cases of the promotion of oil 
palm plantations in South East Asian and Africa – as forms of contract farming. In this sort of 
schemes, “[t]he grower [the cooperatives] lends to the production process his/her labour power 
and the effective property within his/her possession. The contractor [the INA or COAPALMA] 
provides some of the production inputs, participates in production decisions and supervision, 
and holds title to the product” (Watts 1992:91). 
When it operates properly – as seen the case in countries such as Malaysia (Hall, Hirsch, 
and Li 2011; Robertson 1984) – contract farming schemes allow the contractor to have 
significant control over the production process, defining what is to be produced and how. In the 
case of the Aguán, we saw how mainly through debt, the INA managed to force the hand of the 
cooperatives and turn them towards the cultivation of oil palms. Also, how with the creation of 
COAPALMA there was an attempt to both vertically integrate the industry in the region and 
bring under a shorter leash the cooperatives. However, the peasant cooperatives in an attempt at 
retaining a larger portion of the value created, went on strike to gain control over the new 
second level cooperative in 1981. There was nothing anti-systemic or revolutionary about this 
strike; it had nothing to do with rejecting the vertical integration of the industry or fighting to 
produce something different. Quite plainly, the cooperatives went on strike trying to renegotiate 
their position in the market, making sure that the lion’s share of the value produced by the 
industry would remain in the region.  
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It would seem that there is a close relation between vertical integration and a control 
grab. As COAPALMA consolidated itself in the region, the process of differentiation between 
cooperatives accelerated and – as I argued in the case of the San Isidro cooperative – many 
cooperatives were more willing to sell to “foreigners” such as Facussé than to submit to the 
monopsony power that the second level cooperative began to have in the Aguán. This same 
situation repeated itself in the aftermath of the 2009 coup and the negotiations between MUCA 
and Facussé, and the rejection of the former to the latter’s co-investment proposal. In this case I 
would argue that the rejection had little to do with an innate rejection of selling to Facussé or of 
wanting to move away from oil palm monoculture. Rather, what was in play was the capacity to 
sell their production to the highest bidder. The struggle for autonomy and subsistence in this 
context is clearly mediated by the market, the overstructuring of the oil palm monoculture and 
the desire to operate as successful need economies. 
This characterization of the agrarian reform cooperatives as need economies stuck 
between the struggle for autonomy and subsistence, on the one hand, and forms of contract 
farming on the other, calls out for a broader and more in-depth analysis of different forms of 
collective and cooperative labor and their articulation with capital. From important players 
within the U.S.´s corporate agricultural sector (Sheingate 2003; Cook 1995), through the 
phenomenon of “repeasantization (van der Ploeg 2010), all the way to Marx´s letter to Zasulich 
regarding the revolutionary potential of the Russian obschchina (Shanin 1983) and as a 
potential space for anarchist and emancipatory practices (De Peuter and Dyer-Witheford 2010; 
Vieta 2010), cooperatives and similar forms of collective labor animate the imagination of 
scholars. However, little discussion between these different characterizations and the political 
practices that come with them exists.  
One final point regarding the oil palm monoculture has to do with the issue of 
alternatives. According to Shiva, the monocultures of the mind have the effect of destroying the 
possibility of thinking about alternatives to dominant thought. Certain realities become reified 
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and naturalized and the field within which alternatives can be thought of becomes very limited. 
This is very much what happens in the Aguán. Not only does any political project have to take 
into account the palm oil industry – as it overdetermines the region –, but most of the political 
projects that actually exist revolve around palm trees. I already showed in Chapter 5 how all of 
the peasant movements that were created in the region in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch 
have ended up involved in oil palm production as the only viable activity. For example, in the 
last few years, MUCA – in close alliance with the Vía Campesina – has been propounding a 
political discourse around the idea of food sovereignty. When one looks at their practice, 
however, what one finds are various attempts to diversify their production beyond oil palms that 
all fall short of creating an economically viable provisioning alternative for the movement. 
Further, when speaking to both leadership and base, it becomes obvious that there is a clear 
commitment and understanding that only through their articulation to the palm oil industry will 
they be able to pay their debts and improve their living conditions.  
For me, one of the biggest questions that this study leaves open is how might a common 
sense – such as the one that has been created in the Aguán regarding the palm oil monoculture 
– be interrupted or at least destabilized so as to create a space from which different modes of 
thinking can arise? How can alternative narratives be constructed against the backdrop of such a 
dominant material, political and cultural presence?  
Without trying to answer this question, I would like to propose an entry point into this 
problem from Gramsci’s (1971:348) take on “common sense.” According to him, common sense 
is a set of immediate, unconnected facts just taken for granted and non-critical assertions on 
reality and the “way in which things are.” Common sense is conservative and helps preserve the 
status quo, under the idea that things are “naturally” like they are. So common sense is false, in 
so far as it is unable to grasp the concrete relations and forces that create that reality, and 
presents what is the result of political will as natural. In the Aguán case, this means believing 
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that there are no alternatives to oil palms, without realizing that the overdetermination of the 
industry over the region was produced in particular ways by particular actors. 
However, within common sense there are certain elements that, since they are anchored 
to concrete human experience, can be organized to approach reality and go beyond common 
sense; this is what Gramsci refers to as “good sense.”  Good sense is not in itself a critical 
posture, but an entry point from which organic intellectuals can work. We could say that while 
common sense comes mainly from “outside” of the subaltern groups, “good sense” is coming out 
of the concrete experience (from “inside”) the subaltern experience. For the case of the Aguán, 
this good sense would have to come from the peasants’ own concrete experience with the oil 
palm monoculture. This experience has been produced through processes of violence and 
dispossession, in which the fruits of their labor has never been truly their own. Violence and 
dispossession have not only defined their shared experience as a class, but also the ways in 
which they relate to each other – in their gender relations, for example– and to their 
surrounding environment.  
These types of insights are present in the region. Towards the end of my fieldwork in the 
Aguán, I was able to organize a collective mapping workshop with the members of the 
Permanent Human Rights Observatory of the Aguán (OPDH). One of the activities that we did 
was to approach various questions by locating their answers in a large map of the Aguán region. 
Two such questions were: “where have peasants been assassinated?” and “where are the oil palm 
plantations?” When we finished locating the different answers to the questions, we began 
analyzing the resulting map collectively. Alberto, the then coordinator of the OPDH turned to 
me and said, “Most deaths are in those places where there are palm trees.” He paused for a 
second and added, “the palm trees are death.” Everyone else in the room began to nod and 
mumble their approval. “It is interesting” – he began again – “it seems that this is something 
that we all knew, but had never seen before.” 
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Strand 4: Historical narratives, between individual and collective memories 
The raw material of this dissertation has been the individual memories of men and women 
about the process that brought them to the place where they are now. In the majority of cases, 
these were memories of struggle, of suffering, but also of pride and hope. Even in those 
moments in my writing when description fell victim to the violence of abstraction (Sayer 1989), I 
have tried to ground my arguments in what they told me and in what I saw. This was never a 
simple task. The act of remembering is always in present tense and responds more to the ways in 
which the past inhabits the present than to the past itself. As Portelli (2010) argues, the working 
of oral history is found in the connection between “facts” – what happened – and 
“representations” – how the subject positions itself in relation to the events. Further, as 
Trouillot (1995) reminds us, the process of constructing historical narratives – as well as 
remembering – is very much about the production of silences. There is a clear temporality to 
these silences; the same person might narrate the same event in different ways depending of the 
moment, the stage and the audience.  
 Taking these elements into account, the narrative that I have constructed in these pages 
needs to be understood as a partial one and one in which certain voices appear more forcefully 
than others. At the same time, it should also be seen as an effort to tease out the different 
narratives that circulate in the region and to try to understand the forms in which they were 
produced. One of the first things that caught my attention in the Aguán was how there seemed 
to be an “official” subaltern history of the region, one that presented the beginnings of time with 
the arrival of the cooperatives to an “empty” space in the 1970s. In this narrative, the 
cooperatives through their labor, brought down the jungle and planted the palm trees, only to 
fall victims to both internal corruption and the tricks and deceit of the “foreigners,” Miguel 
Facussé, Reinaldo Canales and René Morales. Then, after Mitch, forced by hunger and the need 
to right the wrongs of the past, the people began to organize, creating new organizations and 
recuperating the lands that had been illegally taken away from them. Finally, they were 
347 
 
currently in “resistance” against both the state and the terratenientes, trying to survive and 
leave something for their children. As I spent more time in the region and spoke with people 
from different sectors and groups, it became evident to me that behind this “official” subaltern 
history, were many others that had been rendered invisible. For example, the idea that the 
history of the region begins with the arrival of the cooperatives, negates the fact that the valley 
had been populated many years before. Moreover, the arrival of the cooperatives had been 
experienced by them as a violent process of dispossession. Also, it was clear that the locus of this 
history was the lowlands – in the shadow of state and capital – which came to negate the 
experiences of the families clinging to the surrounding hills. Finally, I have shown in different 
parts, how this official history, and its several variations, presents a very masculine perspective, 
and one in which the experiences of women and their understandings of what happened are 
negated. 
 Besides showing that memories are always divided, this pointed to the importance of 
exploring the relation between individual and collective memories. Individual and shared 
experiences only become collective when they become institutionalized, that is, when they are 
turned into a social and political artifact that circulates in particular ways, responding to specific 
norms and objectives. Phrased differently, collective memories are always aimed at producing a 
specific historical narrative that organizes silences and remembering in particular ways. In 
Chapter 5, for example, I presented the two competing narratives about the early history of the 
Peasant Movement of Rigores (MCR). I showed how there was a certain correlation between the 
general objectives of the organization – creating a legitimate legal claim on the land – and the 
story that the movement was initially started by former members of the Unión Rigores 
cooperative.   
 With these points in mind, it becomes evident that when dealing with memories and the 
historical narratives of subaltern groups, it is particularly important to pay attention to the 
concrete forms in which individual memories become institutionalized and how they then 
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circulate through time and space. It is similarly important to see how behind even these 
“alternative” narratives, strategic silences are also always present. Here again, we find kinship as 
an important conduit. 
 In their analysis of the Maoist movement in Nepal, Gidwany and Paudel (2012:271) came 
to the conclusion that 
…it is impossible to explain the ling history of uprisings in Thabang and the 
success of the Maoist insurgency that followed without close attention to the vital 
ideological function of extended family and kin structures, and to the political 
work of memory these enabled. While such peasant structures have generally 
been viewed with suspicion by the Left, as conservative historical forms that 
impede the development of revolutionary consciousness, in Nepal they served as 
networks of transmission for an emerging, counterhegemonical, common sense. 
 Family and kin networks in Thabang operated as political conduits: first, 
as circuits of intra-generational solidarity lubricated by the social rituals and 
relations of affect that accompany gatherings of extended families; and second, as 
intergenerational mechanisms of interpellation that insured, in one instance after 
another, that several generations of the same family were ideologically aligned: 
son and daughter to father and mother, niece and nephew to uncle and aunt, 
grandchild to grandfather and so on. 
I found a similar situation in the Aguán, where certain families and their extended kin 
groups, operated as nodes of articulation and communication across space – linking different 
communities and movements together – and time, connecting the stories of struggle from one 
generation to the next. This was particularly evident in the case of the OPDHA. In general, the 
representatives of the different movements present in this space are of a younger generation. 
Many of them were born in the region and spent most of their adulthood as wage laborers in the 
private oil palm plantations, housewives or as teachers and construction workers. However, in 
most cases, they are sons, daughters, nieces or grandsons of men and women that have been 
very politically active most of their lives. It was in part due to the stories that they heard at home 
that this younger generation decided to join the different peasant movements in the region. This 
intergenerational transmission was also very much obvious in the great care that they take to 
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raise their kids in the same manner that they were raised; repeating the stories that they heard 
and teaching by example how things are supposed to be done. 
It seems to me that it is in these registers – oral history and kinship – where we can find 
the transmission belts that link the different episodes of subaltern rebelliousness, that appear so 
disjointed, episodic and spontaneous from the perspective of official history and written 
accounts such as those of the media. “The revolt,” Adolfo Gilly tells us, 
is a cut in the homogeneous time of history… It nurtures from the image of the 
oppressed ancestors, not of the vision of the liberated descendants… [T]he 
strength of the revolt without which no revolution is possible, comes from the 
heap of dispossessions, grievances and humiliations accumulated by successive 
generations. (2010:7) 
 “This distinction,” Gilly continues, “between revolution and rebellion… is central for the 
work of the historian. Because a revolution is not only what the books say or what is proposed 
by the programs of its leaders, above all, is what the people that rebel do” (p. 12). 
I set off to the Aguán in search of the rooted peasantry in the midst of a revolutionary 
moment. I found neither. What I did find was a group of peasant households that took to the 
road time and time again in search of a piece of land and some control over their lives, that 
organized themselves politically time and time again in an attempt to carve out some breathing 
room between capital and state in the Aguán. I did not find a revolution, but what I did find was 
a rebellious braid of memories and stories very much worth telling.   
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